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December 15, 2016
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May 6, 2004
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February 15, 1979
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25X1 Orove}ifipr Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100 National Intelligence Daily (Cable) State Dept. review completed Top Secret 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO311001 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO3110 - National Intelligence Daily (Cable) Contents Situation Reports D 25X1 25X1 25X1 Alert Memorandum China-Vietnam-USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Briefs and Comments Afghanistan: Death of Ambassador Dubs . . . . . 7 Vietnam: Oil Exploration Renewed . . . . . . . 8 Portugal: Budget Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Uganda: Domestic Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Chile: Foreign Investment . . . . . . . . . 10 Jamaica: Government Violence . . . . . . . 11 Special Analysis Iran: An Assessment of the Left . . . . . . . . 12 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0311 0130002-0 25X1 The security situation in Iran is deteriorating rapidly. Iranian press reports indicate that there have been clashes in Tehran, Tabriz and Qazvin between forces Zo aZ to the Bazar an government and various opponents. //The attack on the US Embassy yesterday was the work of a radical leftist terrorist group, the Chariks, ac- cording to fragmentary reports. They have denied respon- sibility but the sophistication of the operation suggests they were involved. Prime Minister Bazargan told the British Ambassador that the attack was clearly aimed at undermining the authority of his government, but he did not identify the attackers.//F I 25X1 I Ireported considerable fighting in the capital yesterday; at one point, Tehran radio briefly reported that it was under attack and appealed to Ayatollah Khomeini's forces to defend it. In Tabriz, the government radio station reported fighting between 25X1 Khomeini supporters and former employees of the security forces and other alleged monarchists. In addition to coping with the breakdown in secu- rity, the Bazargan government will test its ability to restart the economy on Saturday, when both Khomeini and Bazargan have called on workers to return to their jobs and end their "strikes, resistance, and deprivations." In the critical oil sector, however, the new govern- ment is likely to have great difficulty resuming produc- tion for export because of the resistance of entrenched radical leftists. Some workers--particularly in the public sector--have grown accustomed to receiving pay- checks without doing any work. Others will be forced out of their jobs because of curtailed operations or be forced out of business entirely following months of fuel shortages, bank closures, and non-delivery of essential imported goods. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031100130002-0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 25X1 Approve 25X1 CHINA-VIETNAM-USSR 25X1 nese could attack at any time. Moreover, with the re- turn of Vice Premier (and Chief of Staff) Deng Xiaoping to China, some political restraints deriving from his presence in the US and Japan have now been removed. i-nue to e zeve that from a military viewpoint the Chi- There remain political, economic, and military argu- ments against an attack. The Chinese must consider US and Japanese advice to exercise restraint, possible So- viet reaction, the demonstrated ability of the Pol Pot forces to bleed Vietnam in Kampuchea without direct Chi- nese intervention, as well as the impact of major fight- ing on Beijing's cherished modernization campaign. More- over, Chinese forces have not engaged in extended combat since 1953 and may not be fully efficient. In the past week, a number of Chinese officials have adduced some of these factors as reasons for China not to strike against Vietnam, and some of these officials appeared to be speaking on foreign ministry guidance. Neverthe- less, Deng Xiaoping himself has repeatedly stated in public and in private that Vietnam must be "taught a lesson," and this theme was echoed in a Chinese response to a US demarche in Beijing on 10 February, which cau- tioned against Chinese military action. 25X1 25X1 25X1 proved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03110q 25X1 125X1 I On balance we believe there is about a 60 percent chance that the Chinese will in fact attack in res onse to real or contrived provoca- tion. The size of the buildup on the border suggests if the Chinese attack it would be on a scope larger than we had originally thought likely--a brief and shallow incursion. The Chinese have a wide range of options open to them, beginning with a limited cross border at- tack designed to inflict heavy casualties on Vietnamese border defense forces. One likely option would be to rout the border forces and drive far enough into Vietnam to threaten but not actually attack Hanoi, with a view to withdrawal after several weeks. We cannot exclude an attack on the capital itself, but we think this unlikely for both political and military reasons (the Chinese probably could not achieve air superiority in the vicin- ity of Hanoi). Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031100130002-0 25X1 25X1 I Ap~roved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 We continue to believe that the eventual Soviet choice in reacting to any Chinese attack on Vietnam will be contingent on the extent and severity of the Chinese action and its political effects. In response to rela- tively small-scale and shallow Chinese attacks, the So- viets are likely to restrict their active response to Vietnam proper, consulting under the Treaty, making con- spicuous deliveries of military assistance, and probably issuing strong warnings. Against Chinese attacks in the middle range--which went so far as to begin to threaten Hanoi--the Soviets would increase their aid in Vietnam but might in addition mount military demonstrations on the Sino-Soviet border, seize islands in the border rivers, or even make quick small raids across the fron- tier, all of which they could do without reinforcements. 25X1 A severe dilemma would confront them in the event of a massive, direct Chinese attack on Hanoi, the least likely Chinese option. Against such a contingency, the above Soviet measures would not relieve the postulated threat to Vietnam and would be perceived by world opin- ion as a Soviet failure of nerve. Even in these extreme circumstances, the Soviets would wish to avoid large- scale cross-border ground operations to any substantial depth that would risk enmeshing the USSR in protracting fighting inside China and might instead consider air 25X1 attacks. In any event, the Soviets continue to be careful not to commit themselves in advance to any particular course of action. An authoritative Pravda article of 10 February on the Chinese buildup was notable for its failure to mention the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty or to allude to the possibility of a Soviet response if the 25X1 Chinese attacked Vietnam. 25X1 6 roved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO311d0130002-0 I 25X1 AFGHANISTAN: Death of Ambassador Dubs The killing of Ambassador Dubs yesterday appears to have been incidental to a continuing conflict in Afghan- istan between the Soviet-backed regime and its conserva- tive Muslim opponents. 25X1 So far, we have no information linking the four ter- rorists--now all presumably dead--with a larger dissident organization, and we cannot identify the persons the ter- rorists demanded be freed in exchange for the Ambassa- dor's life. The Muslim Brotherhood claimed responsibil- ity for several assassinations and acts of sabotage last year. At least two Pakistani-based dissident groups are said to support continuing unrest by Muslim tribesmen in several parts of the country. 25X1 The Afghan Government describes the kidnappers as "anarchists" and asserts that the individuals whose re- lease was sought were not under detention. These indivi- duals may, however, have been among the approximately 150 Muslim leaders who were rounded up earlier this month. The government's refusal to prolong negotiations with the terrorists and its decision to ignore US pleas to avoid precipitate action may have been intended as a warning to the many opponents of the regime. The police chief, the Deputy Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin all refused to talk with Embassy person- nel throughout the episode. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO3110 - 25X1 25X1 App VIETNAM: Oil Exploration Renewed Offshore oil exploration in Vietnam has resumed after a four-year hiatus. Exploration conducted by US firms in Zate 1974 indicated commercially exploitable oil, but drilling halted with the coZZapse of South Viet- nam in April 1975. Vietnam hopes oil revenues will boost the country's dismal post-1975 economic performance and give Hanoi some foreign policy flexibility. A group of Canadian companies will probably complete its first well. in the South China Sea, 200 miles south of Ho Chi Minh City, in three weeks. West German and Italian firms are likely to begin drilling soon. Hanoi would like US firms to participate, but US law prohibits it. Some industry sources believe potential oil reserves could eventually lead to a production capacity of 500,000 to 1 million barrels per day. Available data do not as yet support this high a level. Even small amounts of ex- portable oil could have an impact on Vietnam's economy within several years. If large amounts are discovered, Vietnam over the longer run would be able to finance a major share of its economic development and reduce its 25X1 dependence on the USSR. 25X1 25X1 oved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031100130002-0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031100I130002-0 I 25X1 PORTUGAL: Budget Vote Prime Minister Mota Pinto's budget may squeak by in Parliament today, but the political parties have been angered by his insensitive tactics; pressures to oust him will continue to grow. 25X1 Since taking office last December as a prime minister independent of any political party, Mota Pinto has upset the parties by his determination to move forcefully on unpopular economic issues and by his abrasive style. The budget controversy seems more a reflection of the par- 25X1 ties' political disenchantment than of their objections to the Prime Minister's economic policies. Only the Center Democrats seem committed to vote for the budget, which means that Mota Pinto must win support at least from the Social Democrats to achieve the nec- essary simple majority. 25X1 //The Social Democrats are torn between the hardline opposition of their party leader, Sa Carneiro, and mod- erates, who are sympathetic to the Prime Minister. Even if Mota Pinto survives the budget vote, his reprieve may be short-lived. As lower real wages, higher taxes, and reduced government services take their toll among lower income groups, both the Socialists and Social Democrats will see greater political advantage in oppos- 25X1 ing him. The temptation to replace Mota Pinto with a more innocuous government until after the re ular elec- tion in 1980 may become difficult to resist. 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031100130002-0 25X1 Appr~ President Amin evidently is coming under increased domestic pressure as Tanzania moves its forces farther into Uganda. 25X1 icers or u anese origin--the' nucleus of Amin's power base in the army--told Amin re- cently they want to quit and go home. This and other reports of disaffection in the Uqandan Army may have been triggered by a meeting of military personnel in Kampala late last week. Amin evidently has smoothed over his immediate problems with the officers, but they may become less cooperative if conditions continue to worsen. Uganda's renewed appeal this week to the UN for a Security Council discussion of the border situation reflects Amin's efforts to end the conflict without fur- ther loss of face. Despite Ugandan charges of partisan- ship by the US and the UK, the Ugandan Foreign Minister assured the diplomatic corps in Kampala that US and British citizens in Uganda are safe. CHILE: Foreign Investment Chile's economy is becoming increasingly attractive to foreign investors. A US firm recently organized a consortium of local and international companies to con- struct a $130 million ethylene plant in southern Chile-- the largest foreign investment in Chile since the Pino- chet government took power in 1973. It nearly equals the $150 million in direct investments recorded last year. Bank financing for the project has been committed, and construction could start within 90 days. The US firm is also eyeing investments in Chile's rapidly ex- 25X1 panding forestry sector. F7 I 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 I 25X1 //Prime Minister Manley's government may be provoking violence to justify further strongarm measures against the increasingly effective opposition part . An eyewit- ness alleged that the Jamaican police last week killed a reformed" opposi- tion thug who helped negotiate and enforce a year-long truce among armed political gangs in Kingston's slums. Manley's security minister has reportedly taken credit for the murder and has boasted that there will be more political killings. The respected Jamaican Council on Human Rights has cast doubt on the official version of the murder and has called for an independent investiga- tion of 18 other police killings in the past two months.// 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 25X1 App SPECIAL ANALYSIS 25X1 IRAN: An Assessment of the Left 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 firmly entrenched throughout the oilfields. Oreports that radical left-wing groups have The attack on the US Embassy in Tehran yesterday dramatically illustrated the growing power of the left in Iran. There is no one organization of the left and its leadership is largely anonymous. The leftists have long drawn much of their support from students and are usually highly dedicated. In some cases, they operate in well-organized clandestine groups. The left has been very active in recruitina war in the oilfields. Founded in 1971 as an outgrowth of earlier Marxist guerrilla organizations, the Chariks have long engaged in attacks on Iranian police stations and aar-iai- +., ,-.o,.-- In the early 1970s, the Chariks cooperated with the Islamic terrorist group known as the People's Strugglers or Mujahiddin, which is cl y tied to Ayatollah Khomeini. The Chariks espouse a vague philosophy they call Islamic Marxism. They use a good deal of Marxist termi- nology but also stress their commitment to traditional Islamic religious principles. We have no information that the pro-Soviet Communist Tudeh Party is in contact with the Chariks but we do not rule ou some clandestine 25X1 communications. The Chariks have received training in the past from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and 25X1 25X1 25X1= 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0311001130002-0 1 25X1 from South Yemen. The current extent of foreign support for the Chariks is unknown. 25X1 Late last year, the Chariks stepped up their attacks on police stations and SAVAK posts in widely separated parts of Iran. The terrorists were clearly prepared to 25X1 capitalize on the confusion last weekend and they parti- cipated in several attacks on security positions, obtain- ing large amounts of arms in the process. The Tudeh has markedly increased its activities in recent weeks. It staged its first demonstration on the streets of Tehran in many years on 21 January drawing 25X1 about 5,000 people. Communists probably have cells on nearly all university campuses and they now compete openly with other groups for support. Tudeh organizers have not appeared openly on any of the "workers' councils" that now exercise control in such key areas of the economy as the Central Bank. Unidenti- 25X1 fied leftists who may be party members, however, seem to provide leadership for some of the councils. Policy statements from the Tudeh Party leaders in exile in East Germany suggest that a decision was taken several weeks ago that the party should become more ag- gressive in sponsoring activities independent of Khomeini's Islamic movement. The party has continued to stress cooperation in a "united front" but a statement issued in mid-January warned that the Islamic movement should not seek to dominate other groups. Starting on 13 January, the Tudeh specifically called for the people to begin an armed struggle. 25X1 The recent increase in Tudeh activities coincides with a change in party leadership. Iraj Eskandari, who had been first secretary since 1971, was replaced on 4 January by Nur-ed-Din Kianuri, formerly second secre- 25X1 tary. Kianuri, who at 63 is one of the youngest Tudeh leaders, is said to be the foremost Tudeh theoretician. He is virtually unknown outside party circles. The USSR has always been the Tudeh's principal patron. Given this close connection it can be assumed 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100 - 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031100130002-0 that Tudeh policies have at least tacit Soviet backing, but reporting on actual Soviet involvement is not ex- 25X1 tensive.r -1 At the far left of the political spectrum is the Revolutionary Oraanization of the Tudeh Party, a Maoist offshoot that broke away from the official party in the late 1960s. This group--and possibly other Maoist organ- izations--is active among students in Europe and probably also in Iran. It views the official party as too con- servative and does not eschew the use of revolutionary 25X1 violence. Other leftist groups are sprouting up rapidly: 25X1 -- A new Marxist party called the Communist Party of Iran claiming 2,000 members was announced to the press on 6 February. -- Press reports yesterday mentioned the existence of a leftist terrorist rouo calling itself the "Red Dawn." The collapse of SAVAK and other internal security forces in Iran has allowed the left to make considerable progress in organizing itself. The confusion of recent days and the widespread distribution of arms in the capital has enormously benefited various leftist forces, 25X1 especially the Chariks. The rapidly weakening cohesion of the Iranian mili- tary is also benefiting the left. The desertion rate continues to grow in the military and the command struc- ture has been upset by the recent purges Khomeini has or- 25X1 dered. Khomeini's own followers are disorganized and have clearly been unable to restore order to the capital. In some provincial capitals there appears to be a state of 25X1 near anarchy, 25X1 25X1 14 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031100130002-0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO311001P0002-0 1 25X1 At this stage the Chariks appear to pose the prin- cipal obstacle to restoring order. We anticipate further provocations by the Chariks aimed at weakening the Bazargan government; they can be expected to resist any attempt to disarm them. If the government delays forcing a confrontation with the Chariks, they are likely to grow stronger and their successful resistance to govern- ment authority would embolden other terrorist groups. The ultimate goal of the Chariks appears to be a leftist government. A Charik spokesman said yesterday the Chariks are "ready to fight against any regime that is not sufficiently progressive." 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100 - Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0 25X1 Top Secret A.1.... /fAA A /A7/AD 1 111117 f1TAAf17G A A7A AAAA 7AAA/1 Top Secret Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31100130002-0