NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031100170002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 21, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
21 February 1979
State Dept. review completed
Toro Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Situation Reports
Chad: Shaky New Cease-Fire . . . . . . . . . . 7
India-China: Vajpayee Curtails China Visit . . 8
Ethiopia-Sudan: Summit Fails . . . . . . . . . 8
Special Analysis
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Israel-Egypt: Domestic Climate and 25X1
Negotiations . . . . . . . . . 9
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It was relatively calm throughout Iran yesterday,
but the government remains concerned about its ability
to establish firm control. Ayatollah Khomeini and Prime
Minister Bazar an are continuin to act against the left-
ist threat.
Khomeini issued on Monday a tough public "final
warning" aimed specifically at communist groups. He
also threatened again to call out his supporters against
leftists if their "anti-revolutionary" activities were
not stopped. The press in Tehran reported yesterday
that Khomeini's paramilitary supporters, the Mujahadin,
had been ordered to help the police and army restore
order.
In a press conference yesterday, Chief of Staff
General Qarani said that, under Khomeini's authority, a
"national guard" would be formed from various reliable
groups in the next two days to maintain internal order.
Qarani noted the continuing disarray in the armed forces
and said some progress is being made in reconstituting
military units. The government wants to avoid serious
clashes with the leftists, particularly as long as it
has no reliable forces to field. F_ I 25X1
Yesterday, Khomeini condemned as opportunist and
not Muslim a leftist march to his headquarters scheduled
for Thursday. He forbade his followers to participate
and said he would not receive the leaders of the demon-
stration. F -1 25X1
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CHAD: Shaky New Cease-Fire
President MaZZoum and Prime Minister and former
rebel leader Habre concluded a cease-fire on Monday
under French and Sudanese auspices. The agreement calls
for both sides and the French to monitor the situation,
but MaZZoum and Habre appear no closer to resolving
their differences and Chadian officials are not optimis-
tic about the agreement. 25X1
The cease-fire, in fact, has been interrupted at
least once by sporadic shooting, and Habre's forces seem
to be reinforcing their position in Ndjamena, contrary
to the provisions of the agreement. Malloum, who last 25X1
week was rumored to be losing out to gendarmerie com-
mander Kamougue and others, has reemerged in the nego-
tiations, but his status is unclear.
French troops continue to hold a perimeter around 25X1
the airport and part of the European quarter in Ndjamena.
The bulk of some 200 US citizens in Chad have hePn PuA('?-
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INDIA-CHINA: Indian Curtails China Visit
Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee cut short his
scheduled week-long visit to China by one day to protest
the Chinese attack on Vietnam. He returned to New Delhi
on Sunday, and yesterday faced a heated debate in the
upper house of Parliament over the wisdom of the govern-
ment's policy of seeking a rapprochement with China.
The US Embassy in New Delhi believes it will be diffi-
cut for Vajpayee to draw favorable attention to any posi-
tive accomplishment of his China visit and that the gov-
ernment's efforts to normalize Sino-India relations have
been dealt a sharp setback.
The meeting between Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu and
Sudanese President Numayri in Sierra Leone last week ap-
parently did little to ease bilateral strains. Mengistu
himself described the talks as "a failure, and useless"
upon his return to Addis Ababa. The Sudanese Chief of
Staff told Ambassador Bergus in Khartoum on Monday that
Mengistu has refused to discuss the insurgency in Eri-
trea, a topic of major interest to the Sudanese. The
Sudanese officer repeated earlier allegations that the
Soviets and the Libyans had pressured Mengistu to scut-
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ISRAEL-EGYPT: Domestic Climate and Negotiations
Domestic pressures in Egypt and Israel on the eve
of the new talks at Camp David will encourage both sides
to maintain tough negotiating positions. A campaign by
Israeli hardliners to force Prime Minister Begin to mod-
ify the autonomy plan for the West Bank and Gaza Strip
that he agreed to Last September has reduced Foreign
Minister Dayan's already Limited room for maneuver.
Egyptian domestic opinion continues to support President
Sadat's policy, but cynicism about Israeli motives has
deepened and the Zack of progress on a treaty and eco-
nomic problems are eroding the optimism that was preva-
lent Last fall. F_ I
Be in is still the ultimate arbiter of Israeli cab-
g
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inet debates, but right now he feels he has little choice
but to conciliate and placate important opponents of his
autonomy plan in his own Likud bloc and in the National
Religious Party, his indispensable coalition ally. The 25X1
Prime Minister so far has succeeded in parrying the
hardliners' most extreme demands by approving new settle-
ments on the West Bank and in Gaza and by agreeing to
future cabinet discussions of autonomy.
The hardliners sense that the loss of momentum in
peace talks increases Begin's susceptibility to their
pressure. They probably think a prolonged stalemate--
especially in the current atmosphere of growing Israeli
concern over threats to regional stability posed by
events in Iran--will encourage the public and Begin's
coalition to become further disillusioned with autonomy.
Agriculture Minister Arik Sharon, a vocal figure on
the right wing of Likud, along with Education Minister
Zeyulun Hammer and others in the National Religious
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continued control over the West Bank and Gaza.
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Party's hawkish youth faction, are the most prominent
hardline spokesmen. They fear implementation of Begin's
autonomy plan in its present form could lead ultimately
to Israeli military withdrawal from the West Bank and
Gaza, curtailment of Israeli settlement activity, and
eventual establishment of a Palestinian state.
The hardliners are skeptical of Begin's willingness
to stand firm against US pressure for further concessions
linking an Israeli-Egyptian treaty to future negotiations
on autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza. Several argue
that the US has abandoned its role as a mediator in
favor of full partnership with Egypt and that Israel,
as a result, must take action of its own to assure its
25X1 the US Embassy in Tel Aviv describe the
-information recently leaked from a government report on
Israeli options under autonomy as the most restricts
ve
of several alternatives outlined in the paper.
25X1 the leak appeared designed to embarrass the
governmen and further stymie negotiations. The leaked
recommendations--which parallel those advocated by Sharon
and his allies--propose a dominant Israeli military and
security presence on the West Bank and in Gaza, control
by Israel of water sources and nearly 20 percent of the
land on the West Bank, and freedo for Israelis to settle
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In a public address last week, the Israeli Foreign
Minister referred to the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion as a factor to be taken into consideration in se-
curing a treaty with Egypt and eventually in reaching a
comprehensive peace. Dayan subsequently sought to qual-
ify his remarks in the face of strident criticism from
the coalition and the opposition Labor Party.
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//It is unclear at this point why Dayan chose pub-
licly to depart from the past refusal of Israeli leaders
to take account of the PLO's relevancy to the negotiation
process. Some observers speculate that Dayan was trying
to counterbalance the negative impact on the peace talks
and on his own limited negotiating authority caused by
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the leaks from the government's study on autonomy. Dayan,
by intimating his personal flexibility and willingness to
take a major political risk, may also be attempting to
place himself in a better tactical position for Camp
David in the hope of deflecting some of the anticipated
US pressure for concessions.
President Sadat does not yet appear to be under
serious domestic pressure to speed treaty negotiations
with Israel, although Egyptian public disillusionment
is likely to increase the longer the stalemate continues.
The great majority of Egyptians greeted the Camp David
accords with considerable enthusiasm. When the pace of
negotiations slowed near the end of last year, Egyptians
became even more supportive of Sadat's policy. They
viewed his insistence on a comprehensive peace agreement
as refuting Arab charges that Egypt was willing to con-
clude a separate and dishonorable peace. Egyptians also
were deeply gratified over US support for Cairo's nego-
tiating stance, and believed that peace was close at
hand despite the delays. 25X1
The hopes of the Egyptian public for an eventual
breakthrough probably have been sustained by the US
Government's continuing close involvement in the peace
process. The possibility of another round of summit
talks after the ministerial level discussions will reas-
sure many Egyptians of the US determination to help
forge a viable peace agreement. 25X1
Egyptian extremists of the left and right have had
difficulty in seriously criticizing Sadat's negotiating
stand, and this is likely to continue as long as Sadat
does not appear to be capitulating to Israeli demands.
Nonetheless, Islamic fundamentalists, particularly those
among Egypt's restive student population, remain a poten-
tial source of serious opposition to Sadat's policies.
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