NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031200270001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 31, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
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Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Situation Report
Egypt: Oil Production Prospects. . . . . . .
4
North Yemen - South Yemen: Unity Plan.
EC: No Common Energy Policy. . . . . . . . .
Iran: Defense Minister Resigns . . . . . . .
9
Zaire: Departure of Inter-African Force. . .
10
Spain: Suarez Investiture. . . . . . . . . .
Special Analysis
South Africa: The African National
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Congress . . . . . . . . . .
11
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EGYPT: Oil Production Prospects
Increasing Egyptian oil production--partially as a
result of the pending return of territory occupied by
Israel--wiZZ strengthen Egyptian economic development in
coming years. Oil production and refining will generate
additional real economic growth, although the impact on
employment will be small. Expanding production will also
accommodate rising domestic petroleum consumption, fa-
cilitating growth throughout the economy. Finally, bur-
oil exports will strengthen the balance of pay-
25X1 ments.
While lacking the reserves to rank with the major
members of the organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries, Egypt nevertheless has become the largest oil pro-
ducer after Mexico among developing countries that are
not members of OPEC. Egyptian oil production could reach
1.1 million barrels per day by 1984 compared with the
current production level of slightly more than -500,000
barrels per day. Return of the territory from Israel
will give Egypt oil from the Israeli-discovered Alma
field, allow the completion of development work on fields
that straddle Israeli-controlled Gulf of Suez waters, and
permit exploratory drilling in promising offshore Gulf of
25X1 Suez and onshore Sinai concessions that nder
25X1 Israeli jurisdiction. F7
Projected increases in oil production and refining
activity will directly add around 1 percentage point an-
nually to real Egyptian economic growth through the mid-
1980s. The most important effect of increased oil pro-
duction will be the easing of balance-of-payments strains.
With peace, Egyptian net foreign oil earnings of about
$700 million last year could approach $2.4 billion in
1984--at 1979 oil prices. The increase in oil export
revenues in the next several years will help reduce
Cairo's need for foreign assistance. The value of the
25X1 additional oil exports made possible by peace--$600 mil-
lion in current prices by 1984--about equals last year's
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NORTH YEMEN - SOUTH YEMEN: Unity Plan
The Presidents of North and South Yemen agreed yes-
terday to a plan for the establishment of a unified
state--the Latest in a 10-year series of merger efforts.
As Long as the present regimes in Sana and Aden are in
power, however, it will prove difficult to implement the
plan. Each side would Like to see a unified Yemen, but
one created in its own image.
The new unity plan calls for a constitution to be
drafted within four months, followed by a referendum and
the election of a single legislature. The time frame
for completion of unification is not clearly set.
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The Marxist South Yemeni Government has-been the
driving force behind the new unity effort, which, like
most past efforts, has followed serious but inconclusive
border clashes between the ideologically dissimilar re-
gimes. The clashes, finally halted in mid-March by Arab
League mediation, underscored the relative weakness of
the Sana regime. North Yemeni President Salih's willing- 25X1
ness to go along on unity this time may be intended to
gain time to buttress his shaky internal position and
rebuild his army, which was mauled in the fighting.
The outcome of the current unity scheme is more dif-
ficult to guage than past efforts because of governmental
changes that took place in Sana following the recent
fighting. Some hardline foes of Aden, including Foreign
Minister Asnaj, were ousted and replaced by ministers
whose views are unknown to us. The weakness of the con-
servative Salih's government increases the uncertainty. 25X6
Saudi Arabia, North Yemen's close ally, has not re-
acted to the announcement, but probably is troubled by
the development. Riyadh's policy always has been to keep
the two Yemens separate, fearing that a unified state
would be a threat to Saudi interests.
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EC: No Common Energy Policy
//EC energy ministers this week conceded the Commu-
nity's inability to forge a common energy policy. In-
stead, they unanimously adopted a French proposal to
base Community "policy" on the sum of member-state poli-
cies. The Community role will thus be exclusively ad-
visory, emphasizing common ground and recommending im-
provements.//
//The Council also left to member states the spe-
cific measures for reducing oil consumption to the level
set by the recent European summit. Although adoption of
the French proposal disappointed some ministers, Energy
Minister Benn of the UK--the only EC country with sub-
stantial oil reserves--hailed the minimalist approach.//
//The decision not to pursue a common energy
policy--a Community goal for years--indicates that the
member states believe they cannot now go much beyond
what they are doing nationally. Their opportunities for
substantial energy conservation, supply diversification,
and alternative sources are few in the near term.//
//The Council's positive actions were restricted to
monitoring efforts, further reports, and demonstration
projects. The ministers postponed consideration of the
recent price increases by the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries until a special meeting on 24 April.
That session will also consider possibilities for an EC
dialogue with OPEC on oil subjects other than price
which might include other countries as well.
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IRAN: Defense Minister Resigns
The resignation of Defense Minister Ahmad Madani
yesterday, following the resignation of Chief of Staff
Qarani earlier this week, is a further indication of the
confusion in the Iranian military. Madani's replacement,
70-year-old Taqi Riahi, served as Army Chief of Staff
under Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953 and has longstand-
ing ties with the National Front. Madani will continue
to serve as commander of the Navy. The military is ap-
parently having serious problems in restoring order in
Gonbad-e Qabus where Turkomen tribesmen have been fight-
ing government forces since Monday. The town is under
martial law, and Tehran has sent reinforcements to bol-
ster local progovernment militiamen. Tehran also appears
concerned about the Baluchi tribes in southeastern Iran
and the Azarbayjanis in the northwest. Khomeini dis-
patched emissaries yesterday to Zahedan and Ardabil to
meet with local leaders of the two dissident tribes.
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ZAIRE: Departure of the Inter-African Force
Moroccan King Hassan and Zairian President Mobutu
have decided that the Inter-African Force that has been
in Zaire's Shaba Region since the invasion by ex-Katangan
rebels last spring will withdraw at the end of June, ac-
cording to the Moroccan commander of the force. Although
there have been many rumors regarding the departure of
the Inter-African Force, this is the first time that the
commander has offered any concrete information on with-
drawal. The withdrawal could lead to an exodus from
Shaba of expatriates who help run Zaire's vital mining
complexes. The expatriates regard the Inter-African
presence as necessary for security from rebel attacks
and for protection from the Zairian Army.
Prime Minister Suarez won his vote of investiture
yesterday with seven votes more than the absolute major-
ity required for the first ballot. As anticipated, the
rightist Democratic Coalition, the Andalusian Socialist
Party, and a few independents joined Suarez' Union of the
Democratic Center in supporting him, while the main So-
cialist Party, the Communists, and a few loners were op-
posed. The only surprise was Suarez' decision--regarded
as highhanded by the left--to insist on the investiture
vote before permitting a full debate on his program. Al-
though doubtless aware that he might be setting a prece-
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nents from scoring points with the voters.
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SOUTH AFRICA: The African National Congress
The African National Congress--South Africa's prin-
cipal black insurgent group--has increased its military
capabilities in the past two years but it still Lacks
effective Leadership, organization, and trained manpower
to play a significant role in destabilizing South Africa
in the near future. The group is receiving military aid
from the USSR, Cuba, and East Germany, and recruits are
training at bases in several neighboring black African
countries, as well as in Libya and Cuba.
//Recruitment by the ANC was spurred by the Soweto
riots in 1976, after which the group was able to enlist
large numbers of dedicated and embittered young blacks
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//The organization's nominal leader, Nelson Mandela,
remains the symbol of the liberation movement for many
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since 1964. Acting President Oliver Tambo is not a.dy-
namic leader and has been unable to build a well-organized
force or to increase ANC operations significantly.
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ANC leaders believe that terrorism, civil disorder,
strikes, and propaganda are the only practical means now
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available to break down authority within South Africa.
They have avoided direct military confrontation with
South African security forces because of the difficulty
of smuggling large quantities of arms across the border
and because of the efficiency of the South African mili-
tary. ANC leaders are aware that urban terrorism could
lead to a backlash against them because the black commu-
nity, which would be hurt most by terrorist acts, largely
opposes violence.
//The organization claims credit for about half the
terrorist attacks inside South Africa since 1975. Al-
though the frequency of such attacks has increased no-
ticeably in recent months, the security forces have dealt
effectively with them. ANC leaders encourage pressure
for political change from within the country rather than
from outside because they realize that the frontline
countries fear South African military and economic re-
taliation and other African States are reluctant to su -
port large-scale ANC operations.//
The organization has long been strongly oriented
toward the USSR and became even more so after Soviet
President Podgornyy promised Tambo increased military
training and weapons in 1977. The USSR, as well as East
Germany and Cuba, have been receiving ANC recruits se-
lected for political training. Most of those chosen for
military training are sent to Angola where Cuban advisers
conduct the training.
The banned South African Communist Party has consid-
erable influence in the ANC and many of the members of
the ANC's Revolutionary Council, the executive body in
charge of organization activities inside South Africa,
are members of the party.
The ANC maintains training bases in Mozambique, Zam-
bia, and Tanzania. Swaziland has become important as a
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recruitment area and a route into and out of South Africa
for ANC personnel. Some guerrillas also undoubtedly
transit Botswana periodically en route to South Africa
without official sanction from the Botswanan Government.
The ANC's objective is the destruction of white rule
in South Africa, but most ANC leaders recognize that ma-
jority rule will not come soon. They hope their efforts
will gradually lead to the breaking down of South African
Government authority and encourage growing numbers of
blacks to support their cause. In support of this strat-
th
e
egy we expect terrorist activities to increase over
r
i
ve area.
long term and take place over a more extens
Significant destabilization of South Africa would
require widespread terrorism, black civil disorder, and
strikes, possible with much more sophisticated direction
and internal organization than the ANC now possesses.
The ANC could become increasingly irrelevant if militant
young blacks gain confidence and experience by carrying
out further outbursts like the 1976 events in Soweto
their own or under the leadership of ad hoc groups.
The South African Government may find itself faced
with intensified problems should an independent Namibia
and a black-ruled Rhodesia provide additional ANC infil-
tration routes, but it will be some years, if ever, be-
fore the ANC will be able to field enough manpower to
threaten seriously the efficient South African security
services. Black South Africans are not now leaving the
country in large enough numbers to enable the ANC to in-
filtrate significant numbers of trained terrorists back
into South Africa.
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