NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031300170001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 20, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
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Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Briefs and Comments
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Iran: Oil Policy and Price Effects. . . . . . . 2
Nigeria:
Presidential Disqualifications . .. . . 3
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Saudi Arabia: Conscription Announced .
West Germany - East Germany: Restrictions on
Journalists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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Special Analysis
Palestinians: Operations in Israel and the
Occupied Territories . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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IRAN: Oil Policy and Price Effects
Despite Tran's claims that its oil production has
risen sharply, buyers probably will not be able to pur-
chase as much as they had negotiated for, in most cases
25 percent less. These cutbacks apparently are the re-
sult of government interference in contract negotiations
that had already been conducted by the National Iranian
Oil Company. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have
reduced their production causing oil prices to go still
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According to one Iranian oil company official, con-
tracts were initially negotiated on the presumption that
production would be about 4 million barrels per day,
but the government recently ordered revised export plans
to conform with an output of 3 million barrels per day.
Other reports, including a recent statement by the Chair-
man of the National Oil Company, indicate that production
will level off at 3.5 million barrels per day. The
Iranians probably have not settled on long-term production
rates. Estimated government spending plans would require
sustained oil production of more than 4.5 million barrels
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//The government claims that oil output reached
4.7 million barrels per day last week but that this rate
is only temporary to fill a backlog of orders. Even if
the Iranian figure is correct, the surge will provide
only limited relief to upward pressures on oil prices.
Production adjustments by other producers are still push-
ing u surcharges on Persian Gulf oil.
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Iranian Government and religious leaders will not
hesitate to intervene in other oil decisions. While many
experienced officials of the National Iranian Oil Company
have been retained, they are apparently unable to make
even operational decisions without approval from workers'
committees dominated by pro-Khomeini forces.
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NIGERIA: Presidential Disqualifications
Nigeria's military government will announce today
its decision to disqualify two of the country's five
presidential candidates from the election scheduled for
11 August I 25X1
eas that support the disqualified candidates 25X1
r
Wide- 25X1
spread, prolonged unrest wou force the postponement of
Nigeria's five national and state elections this summer 25X1
and perhaps the cancellation of plans to return Nigeria
to civilian rule next October.//
The affected candidates--Nnamdi Azikiwe of the major
southern Ibo-based Nigerian People's Party and Amino Kano
of the minor northern Muslim-based People's Redemption
Party--will be disqualified for irregularities in past
income tax returns, a violation of federal election laws.
Neither is a presidential front-runner, but Azikiwe's
group is the third-ranking party. There has been specu-
lation for weeks among Nigerians that the two aspirants
might be disqualified. It is not clear why the regime,
which appears determined to have its civil rule plan
succeed and has carefully stage-managed it thus far, is
willing at this late date to run the risk of sparking
considerable political violence.
Disturbances are most likely in the northern state
of Kano, where the violence-prone People's Redemption
Party has its main strength. Trouble also is possible
in Nigeria's middle belt--a buffer zone between the north
and south--where the Nigerian People's Party has a large
following. The Ibo--defeated in Nigeria's civil war--may
be less inclined to demonstrate openly. Even if wide-
spread violence is avoided, the disqualifications are
likely to spur major political realignments that will
affect the outcome of elections. F7 I
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SAUDI ARABIA: Conscription Announced
Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan has announced
that Saudi Arabia will implement compulsory military
service, probably this summer. Faced with acute man-
power shortages in the military, the Saudi Government
has been debating this step since early 1977, but has
been reluctant to institute conscription because of its
presumed unpopularity.
The Saudi armed forces have an authorized strength
of 89,000, but their actual strength is about 59,000.
Lack of personnel has delayed modernization of the mili-
tary and severely hampered its operations. Enlistments
have dwindled for over two years because many Saudis
are pursuing more lucrative opportunities in the booming
civilian economy. Young Saudis also apparently find
the austere military lifestyle distasteful.
Details of the new system have not been announced,
but last fall the Saudis were discussing the conscription
of all male citizens at age 18 for two years. Although
fewer than 100,000 persons reach this age each year, this
number would exceed the military's numerical needs. The
Saudis' record in implementing other military programs,
however, suggests that conscription probably will prove
only a partial remedy to their forces' more serious
qualitative problems.
Senior Saudi officials have privately argued that
national service will help to instill patriotism, dis-
cipline, and purpose in the country's pampered youth.
The Saudis appear to recognize that the system must be
applied to royal family members and commoners alike if
it is to avoid provokin a popular outcry and becomi
a political issue.
Conscription will aggravate the already serious
shortage of labor in the civilian economy and government,
and could lead to the employment of more foreign workers.
Some 2 million foreigners are now employed in Saudi
Arabia, in comparison with 5 million Saudis, and the
regime is already concerned about the security threat
it perceives they pose.
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WEST GERMANY - EAST GERMANY: Restrictions on Journalists
The West German Government clearly wants to limit
domestic political fallout from the severe restrictions
on journalists recently imposed by the East Germans, but
is still uncertain how best to handle the pointed af-
front to its policy of an all-German reconciliation. Bonn
believes the restrictions are not meant to derail de-
tente or permanently damage inner-German relations.
Rather, it sees the new rules in large part the result 25X1
of internal East German developments. East Germany's
action, however, is particularly embarrassing to Chancel-
lor Schmidt's Social Democrats, who face a key tes
the Schleswig-Holstein state election in 10 days.
The East Germans ostensibly reined in the journal-
ists because of what they believe to be pejorative re-
porting on recent changes in currency procedures. West
German reporters, since their admission to East Berlin
in 1973, have been an irritant to the East German leader-
ship because of their often unflattering, but accurate
coverage of events in East Germany. Such reporting in
West German media is available to much of the East German
population. East Berlin may also have intended the move
as a signal that the East German leadership is firmly in
charge despite recent West German press speculation about
German "reunification."
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Schmidt and his Social Democrats are in a quandary
about how to respond without further risk to their
cherished Ostpolitik. The government has ruled out the
Christian parties' suggestion of economic retaliation,
saying that its leverage is limited and that the burden
would be borne by the East German population. Egon Bahr,
Social Democratic architect of OstpoZitik, suggested that
two East German correspondents in Bonn be expelled, but
this would invite retaliation and world o on would
see the expulsions as equally arbitrary. 25X1
In its frustration, Bonn has appealed to EC and NATO
countries to protest the action as a violation of the
Helsinki accords. The West German Government has also
announced that it is consulting with the allies responsi-
ble for Germany as a whole, namely France, the UK, and
the US.
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PALESTINIANS: Operations in Israel and the
Occupied Territories
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Palestine Liberation Organization leaders have made
no secret of their plans to step up their activities in-
side Israel and the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip
in response to the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace
agreement. PLO Central Committee member SaZeh KhaZaf
told Fatah cadres on 14 April that PLO leaders were de-
termined to "escalate the military struggle." Other PLO
officials have made similar statements and have warned 25X1
that the Palestinians are intent on demonstratin that
the PLO cannot be ignored in the peace process.
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all operations. Last year, according to the US Consulate
in Jerusalem, there were 134 terrorist incidents on the
West Bank alone, 73 of them in Jerusalem, which is a
major tar et. Fifty-four people were killed and over 315
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These statistics suggest that the Palestinians have a
fairly significant and well-educated manpower pool to
recruit from
Fedayeen Objectives
Besides keeping the Palestinian issue alive in the
Arab world and in international opinion, terrorism in
the areas controlled by the Israelis:
-- Maintains Palestinian and fedayeen morale
by demonstrating that the PLO can strike
at Israel.
-- Keeps up the pressure on Arab govern-
ments to support the Palestine struggle.
-- Intimidates Palestinians in the occupied
territories who might be willing to
cooperate with Israel.
Palestinian leaders are undoubtedly aware that their
operations inside Israel and the occupied territories have
little impact on Israel's military strength and, in fact,
often lead to severe Israel retaliation. Nonetheless,
they clearly believe the operations are useful for the
Palestinian movement.
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