NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031300240001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 28, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of Top Secret
rdG rF'br Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Briefs and Comments
Liberia: Request for US Support. . . . . . . . . 2
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Mauritania: Sahara Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . 5
France: Military Exercise. . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Sweden: Antiship Missile Decision. . . . . . . . 6
West Germany: Schleswig-Holstein Election. . . . 6
Peru: Party Congress Postponed . . . . . . . . . 7
Argentina: Labor Protest . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Special Analysis
Iran: Contending Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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LIBERIA: Request for US Support
//Liberian Foreign Minister Dennis arrived in the US
yesterday to present his government's view of the Easter
gesture
weekend riots in Monrovia and to seek a smboZic I I
of US support for Liberia.//
Liberia will view the US response as':a test of the
"special relationship" between the two countries. The
Liberians want assurances of support and will ask for ad-
ditional financial assistance to enhance internal sta-
bility. Other moderate, pro-Western African countries,
which see Liberia as a US client, will also be watching
the US response.
//The riots have shaken Liberia's conservative rul-
ing elite, damaged the economy, underscored weaknesses in
the security forces, and generated concern about the coun-
try's stability. President Tolbert regards the riots as
part of a Soviet-backed attempt by Liberian leftists to
overthrow the regime, but the evidence indicates that,
while Liberian dissidents organized the initial protests,
the violence that followed was spontaneous.
dent emergency powers for one year enabling him to detain
for 30 days anyone suspected of endangering state security.
Tolbert also may soon reorganize his cabinet and military
hierarchy.//
The security situation in Monrovia remains quiet,
although there are rumors of student demonstrations
planned for this weekend. The curfew has' been removed
and the contingent of Guinean troops, which the regime
requested during the riots and held in reserve,may be
sent home next week unless new trouble develops.
The legislature has given the Presi-
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MAURITANIA: Sahara Policy
//High-level diplomatic contacts under way between
Mauritania and the others involved in the Western Sahara
conflict--Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and the Polisario
Front--suggest that the new Mauritanian leader, Prime
Minister Ahmed Bouceif, is seeking an acceptable way to
extricate Mauritania from the dispute. We cannot, how-
ever, confirm press reports from Libya and Algeria that
Mauritania is preparing unconditionally to cede its por-
tion of Western Sahara to the Polisario. The Mauritanian
regime, which has denied the press reports, apparently
hopes to achieve disengagement through negotiations within
the context of UN-sanctioned self-determination. Bouceif
will attempt to preserve good relations with Morocco, but
at the same time pursue efforts to restore diplomatic
ties with Algeria and expand the dialogue with the
Polisario.//
FRANCE: Military Exercise
French armed forces are conducting major, joint-
service maneuvers in a demonstration of French concern
that NATO is not paying sufficient attention to the pos-
sibility of a threat from the south. Described as the
largest French military exercise since World War II, some
17,000 men, 200 airplanes, and 19 ships are participating.
Paratroopers and naval commandos from the French overseas
intervention force are posing as aggressors in a conven-
tional assault on the west coast of France. An exercise
involving at least two armored divisions, to be conducted
this fall in the eastern part of France, will most likely
evaluate French capabilities against an overland Warsaw
Pact attack through the central region.
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SWEDEN: Antiship Missile Decision
//To support its defense industry and maintain em-
ployment, Sweden has decided to arm its 12'Spica-class
patrol boats with domestically produced antiship missiles
in lieu of the US-built Harpoon. The decision upset both
naval and air force officials in Sweden who have been
seeking to strengthen defenses against a sbaborne amphib-
ious assault; the Swedish SAAB-Bofors missile is not
likely to satisfy this requirement. The decision to pro-
cure a Swedish missile offsets in part the government's
recent cancellation of development work on two Swedish
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WEST GERMANY: Schleswig-Holstein Election
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Chancellor Schmidt's coalition parties are likely to
unseat the conservative government by a narrow margin in
the Schleswig-Holstein state election tomorrow, thus end-
ing 29 years of Christian Democratic rule.' The state
government's endorsement of nuclear power has become a
political liability since the Three Mile Island incident
and has been used effectively by the Social Democrats,
despite the obvious conflict with the Bonn'' coalition's
pronuclear stance. The Social Democrats are concerned
that the environmentalists will be able to'pick up enough
votes from the issue to get into the state assembly, thus
limiting the gains made by the Social Democrats and their
partners, the Free Democrats. A victory in Schleswig-
Holstein would marginally improve the coalition's posi-
tion in the upper house in Bonn, which must pass on all
key legislation.
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PERU: Party Congress Postponed
Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, chief of the American
Popular Revolutionary Alliance, Peru's largest. political
party, is reported to have suffered a setback yesterday
in his struggle against cancer, forcing an indefinite
postponement of the APRA party congress scheduled for
5 to 7 May. At that time, Haya was expected to receive
his party's presidential nomination for the election to
be held before the restoration of civilian rule planned
for 1980. The 84-year-old Haya has been conducting party
business from his home since returning on 12 April from
the US where he received medical treatment. Haya's re-
lapse underscores the precariousness of the military re-
gime's reliance on its alliance with Haya as the corner-
stone of the democratization process and will probably
set in motion a vigorous reexamination of political op-
tions by the military and the party.
ARGENTINA: Labor Protest 25X1
A 24-hour strike called by Argentine trade union
leaders yesterday to protest government economic and labor
policies was only partially successful. Two principal
rail commuter lines serving Buenos Aires were shut down,
the port was paralyzed, and more than half the factories
in the city's industrial belt were affected, although
little effect was felt outside the capital. Bus and sub-
way services were normal, and banks and stores were open.
Despite the strike's limited nature--probably owing to
the threat of reprisals--union sources say that the strike
threat not only prompted the government earlier this week
to grant a May wage increase 15 percent larger than ex-
pected, but also forced it to reconsider bitterly opposed
changes in labor and social welfare legislation. The ar-
rival of prominent international labor figures in Argen-
tina on Thursday to request the release of imprisoned
union leaders should put further pressure on the overn-
ment and encourage beleaguered union organizers.
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IRAN: Contending Forces
The inability of prime Minister Bazargan's govern-
ment to deal effectively with the numerous problems that
have plagued the country since Ayatollah ,Khomeini's tri-
umph nearly ten weeks ago has resulted in a significant
increase in the ZeveZ of dissatisfaction with the progress
of the revolution. There is still wide popular support
for the ideal of an Islamic republic, but groups ranging
from the radical left to the reactionary right are seek-
ing to capitalize on the growing discontent and are in-
tensifying preparations for an eventual challenge to
Khomeini. We Zack sufficient information) to predict with
confidence how the situation may unfold. The government
may continue to muddle along for some time, but the situa-
tion remains volatile and a relatively minor incident
could spark substantial violence between !Khomeini' sup
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The government's problems are becoming increasingly
serious:
The administrative performance of the govern-
ment is deteriorating as revolutionary com-
mittees nominally loyal to Khomeini disrupt
operations.
The nation's police powers are undermined,
particularly in Tehran, as neighborhood
revolutionary committees in charge of
local security continue their arbitrary
acts.
-- Unemployment now affects some 3 million to
4 million people--about 30 to 46 percent
of the labor force.
-- Growing commodity shortages and price
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Factions within the Islamic movement that were once
unwilling publicly to question Khomeini's leadership have
begun to voice some criticism of his performance. Major
clerical figures, Ayatollahs Taleghani and Shariat-
Madari, have become steadily more disenchanted with
Khomeini's failure to crack down on unruly members of the
committees. Both leaders are wary that opponents of the
Islamic movement might exploit their differences with
Khomeini, however, and have avoided an open fight with
him. They know, moreover, that Khomeini still has massive
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The Mujahadin, the Islamic militia organization, is
now split into numerous factions. One group openly par- 25X1
ticipated in the recent marches on behalf of Ayatollah
Taleghani while another condemned them. A quasi-Marxist
faction is also active.
Several politicians are attempting to organize
Western-style political parties to compete in promised
elections. National Front leader Karim Sanjabi, who re-
cently resigned as foreign minister, is seeking to re-
suscitate his political group and hopes to run for the
presidency. The National Front and other secularist par-
ties will probably attract some support from the middle
class, but these groups have always lacked grassroots
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organization and support. They are now in limbo because
the provisional government has postponed indefinitely the
election to establish an Islamic regime.
Iran's various dissident ethnic minority groups are
incapable of--and uninterested in--taking over the central
government, but they are seriously challenging Tehran's
authority in the provinces. The Kurds have established
virtual autonomy in their areas. None of these groups as
yet are overtly secessionist; but those that press, often
violently, their demands for extensive autonomy help to 25X1
perpetuate the country's instability, divert the overn-
ment's energies, and highlight its weaknesses.,
The most significant political force on the left is
the Marxist People's Fedayeen. It is based primarily
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The pro-Soviet Tudeh Party has been trying for
months to infiltrate government and workers' organiza-
tions but still appears weak when compared to the armed
Mujahadin and the Fedayeen. Although still technically
illegal, the party opened offices in thelcapital last
month, and party leader Nur-ed-Din Kianuri returned to
Iran this month after many years of exile. He has been
careful to set limited public goals for his party and is
pushing for a united leftist front.
The government's efforts to enhance public security
have been further complicated by attacks on revolutionary
militiamen by gangs of youthful relatives of executed
supporters of the Shah. Reports reaching the US Embassy
indicate that on some recent nights such groups have
killed as many as 30 militiamen in retribution for the
Al
among university students but is gaining some support
from unemployed workers and the middle class. The group
seems content for now to keep pressure on the government
in order to force concessions. It is preparing, however,
for an eventual armed showdown, and members in Tehran are
receiving training on a variety of weapons, including
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Other terrorist organizations seem to be developing.
One such group claims credit for the assassination early
this week of former armed forces Staff Chief General
The assassination of Qarani and the apparent attempt
against Bazargan the following day suggest that extremists
hope to upset the fragile balance among the contending
factions. These incidents will almost certainly prompt
the religious hardliners to intensif their efforts to
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Bazargan's efforts to establish control are hampered
by the lack of reliable security and military forces.
Continuing disturbances among the minority groups and
mounting pressure from unemployed workers in the cities
have prompted the government to make a start at revitaliz-
ing the police and military. It has made little progress,
and the danger of a collapse into anarchic fighting among
the various armed groups remains high.
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The indefinite postponement of an election for a
constituent assembly is symptomatic of the strains
between the religious conservatives and the more moderate
leaders in the Islamic movement. E- I 25X1
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