NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031400040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 4, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Briefs and Comments
Iran: Post-Assassination Tensions . . . . . . . 1
Somalia-USSR: Bid to Improve Relations . . . . 2
Somalia-Kenya: Reconciliation Efforts .
South Africa: Policy Toward Rhodesia
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Brazil: Continuing Labor Problems . . . . . . . 7
USSR-Iran: Economic Aid Talks . . . . . . . . . 8
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Israel: West Bank Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Special Analysis
Rhodesia: A Muzorewa Government . . . . . . . . 10
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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS
IRAN: Post-Assassination Tensions
Iranian Government and religious leaders fear for
their lives following the assassination of Ayatollah
Motahari on Tuesday. The identity of the killers is
still unknown, but if they turn out to be backers of the
Shah many officials will believe the US was involved.
Forghan, the group that claimed responsibility for
the killing of Motahari and of former armed forces Chief
of Staff Qarani late last month, reportedly plans to kill
other senior officials. Its targets include Foreign
Minister Yazdi, Deputy Prime Minister Entezam, Radio-TV
Director Ghotbzadeh, and Islamic economic theorist Bani
Sadr, as well as all members of the Islamic Revolutionary
Council.
The identity of Forghan members remains a secret,
and as long as it remains so many officials will believe
that backers of the Shah, aided or encouraged by the US,
are responsible. If the group is proved to have links
to the Shah, the already strong Iranian suspicions of US
intentions and actions will heighten. The Embassy could
again become a target for violence.
Iranian suspicions and anxieties about a rightwing
counterrevolution have been strengthened by the continu-
ing attacks--reportedly by relatives of executed offi-
cials--on the pro-Khomeini Revolutionary Guards. There
are also rumors that former political and military fig-
ures are plotting coups and were involved in recent dis-
turbances by minority groups.
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SOMALIA-USSR: Bid to Improve Relations
Somalia President Siad has informed selected members
of the diplomatic corps, including the US, Saudi, and
Egyptian Ambassadors, that he is seeking limited improve-
ment in relations with the USSR. He has made it clear,
however, that he does not contemplate a return to the
patron-client relationship of the past. Siad's latest
maneuvers are almost certainly designed to put additional
pressure on Western and conservative Arab states to be
more responsive to his repeated requests for political
25X1 and military support.
Despite the low state of Somali-Soviet relations,
Siad has carefully avoided foreclosing his Soviet option.
In addition to maintaining normal diplomatic relations,
he has used East and West European Communist intermedi-
aries to facilitate a continuing dialogue with Moscow.
Siad has now decided to take this process a step further
by agreeing to a longstanding request for a limited ex-
pansion of the Soviet Embassy staff in Mogadiscio.
Siad, in a conversation with US Ambassador Peterson,
justified this concession by implying that he is under
heavy pressure from colleagues on the Central Committee
to adopt a more conciliatory posture toward Moscow in
light of the West's failure to respond to Somalia's se-
curity needs. He said committee members are increasingly
concerned over Somalia's growing isolation, the serious-
ness of its dispute with traditional Arab benefactors
over the implementation of sanctions against Egypt, and
the Soviet-inspired threat to Somali security posed by
Ethiopian and Somali dissident forces. Despite Siad's
assertions, his suspicions of the Soviets and the deep
anti-Soviet feeling on the part of the Somali military
establishment would probably preclude significantly closer
25X1 ties any time soon.
The Soviets, for their part, will probably expand
their embassy to the new limit set by Siad, but given
their equities in Ethiopia they are unlikely to agree to
any major improvement in relations unless Mogadiscio re-
nounces its irredentist claims in the Ogaden and ends its
support of insurgents there.
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SOMALIA-KENYA: Reconciliation Efforts
//Saudi Arabia has reportedly arranged a meeting be-
tween Kenyan President Moi and Somali President Siad
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late next month in either Jidda or Mogad1se1o to ease
longstanding tensions. The Saudis have worked for more
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//Somalia's irredentist desires toward northeast
Kenya are the weakest of its territorial claims, and Siad
probably believes little would be lost in holding talks
with the Kenyans or even in offering "private assurances."
Siad probably calculates that:
-- The US and other potential Western military
suppliers would favor the move.
-- Any improvement in Somali-Kenyan relations would
lead to a corresponding reduction in Kenya's
military ties to Ethiopia, which are largely
a reaction to Mogadiscio's claims.
-- The Saudis may be more under-standing of his
reluctance to break with Egypt , another impor-
tant source of aid.//
//Moi has also been under pressure to meet with Siad
but Kenyan distrust of the Somali President has blocked
previous efforts to arrange a meeting. The Kenyans now
may be motivated in part by concern over Tanzanian in-
volvement in Uganda and the present unsettled conditions
on their borders.//
//The meeting, if it occurs, is not likely to lead
to any improvement in relations. Moi's distrust of So-
mali motivations and his close alliance with Ethiopia,
reaffirmed in January, make it unlikely he will accept
Somali assurances of territorial respect if they are not
made public. Siad has refused to take such a step for
fear of its internal repercussions.//
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SOUTH AFRICA: Policy Toward Rhodesia
Foreign Minister Botha told a press conference early
this week that South Africa's decision whether to recog-
nize the Rhodesian Government that emerges from the re-
cent elections will depend on its viability and effec-
tiveness--not on whether it can end the war. South
Africa's basic aim, in fact, is to encourage the estab-
lishment of a stable, majority-ruled government in Rho-
desia with which it can cooperate. The South African
military, which appears to be gaining a stronger voice
in Prime Minister Botha's government, may press for posi-
tive South A ican support of the regime in Salisbury.
A friendly government in Rhodesia is essential to
South Africa's overall design for an eventual regional
economic and military alliance in the region. South
Africa's renewed interest in such a scheme reflects its
increasing isolation from and defiance of the outside
world in the wake of growing internal discontent over
the recent government scandal and international Pressures
for independence for Namibia.
South Africa will doubtless step up essential mili-
tary and economic support that it has long provided to
Rhodesia. Having come this far, South Africa is willing
to gamble that the new government in Salisbury will de-
velop into a stable regime with which the South Africans
can work over the long term. Moreover, if the Rhodesian
regime were to gain international acceptance, it could,
in South Africa's view, be used as a model for a similar
solution to the problem of Namibian independence.
Should the new government not take hold, South
Africa has extensive contingency plans to evacuate whites
from Rhodesia, but the South Africans do not appear to
have any other plans for direct military intervention.
This situation could eventually change, particularly be-
cause the military is willing to go to greater lengths
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BRAZIL: Continuing Labor Problems
The regime's takeover Wednesday of the striking 25X1
teachers' union in Brasilia is a measured but clear warn-
ing to other strikers in several cities that there are
limits to the government's tolerance.
This is the second time since his inauguration in
mid-March that President Figueiredo has ordered such a
move. Earlier, he ousted the leaders of three influen-
tial metalworkers' unions in Sao Paulo after talks over
wages and other issues broke down. Although a federally
mandated cooling-off period is now in effect for this
labor problem, the metalworkers might yet return to the
picket lines. In the meantime, however, their leaders
have been allowed to exercise de facto control of the
three unions.
Sporadic strikes began a year ago, but the pace has
picked up recently in response to the rising cost of
living and the advent of greater official tolerance of
dissent. Thus far, the government has clearly preferred
a conciliatory approach and has allowed a great many of
the strikes to be settled on terms favorable to the
workers. Officials are concerned, however, that the
situation could get out of hand and pose a severe threat
to the regime's anti-inflation drive and even to its
overall authority.
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TASS reports that Semyon Skachkov, the chief of the
Soviet foreign aid program, will arrive in Tehran today
for talks on economic aid. Skachkov"s visit to Iran, the
first by a Soviet official since the culmination of the
revolution in February, indicates the Soviet desire to
resolve some of the economic problems that have developed
since the fall of the Shah. The Soviets are concerned
about disruptions of natural gas deliveries to the USSR
and about joint aid projects such as the Soviet-built
steel mill at Isfahan.
Israeli authorities yesterday closed indefinitely
the Palestinian Bir Zayt University near Ram Allah on
the West Bank, following two days of clashes there be-
tween Palestinian students and Israelis from a nearby
Jewish settlement. The unrest apparently originated
Wednesday when ultranationalist Gush Emunim members fired
at Arab students protesting Israeli settlement activity.
Bir Zayt students have a long history of political activ-
ism and have been in the forefront of Palestinian pro-
tests against the Israeli occupation. The university
was closed twice previously following clashes between
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Despite Bishop Muzorewa's impressive victory in the
election last month--his party won 67 percent of the
popular vote--his hold on the new government to be in-
stalled about a month from now is likely to be tenuous.
The Bishop's immediate task is to set up a government
that must include his political opponents, white and
black, according to the constitution that governed the
elections. The fragile balance that will exist between
Muzorewa and the whites will restrict the new govern-
ment's already limited ability to reduce or end the fight-
ing, reverse Rhodesia's four-year economic decline, and
secure international recognition.
25X1 //Muzorewa must accept whatever candidates the other
parties propose for cabinet positions, although he will
decide how to allocate the portfolios.
He recognizes that several important posts--most likely
internal affairs, finance, and justice--must be given to
whites if he is to retain their confidence in the new
25X1 government.//
//Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole's recent threats not
to participate in the new government because of alleged
voting irregularities probably should not be taken seri-
ously. His party will have 12 of the 100 seats in the
House and two cabinet positions, although these will
probably be minor appointments. Nevertheless, his posi-
tion is sufficient to make him an attractive coalition
partner for the whites in any parliamentary test of
25X1 strength with the Bishop. Moreover, Sithole controls
an estimated 2,000 armed auxiliaries, and so Muzorewa
cannot afford to treat him cavalierly.
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Ndebele Chief Ndiweni has promised to cooperate with
the new government, but he and Chief Chirau--who failed
to gain any parliamentary seats--have indicated that they
would continue to push for an all-parties conference as
the only real solution to the Rhodesian problem. Chirau 25X1
has observed that the new government may not be "accept-
able" to the outside world--probably a ploy to get an
important post in the new government.
//Leaders of the white Rhodesian Front party and
Muzorewa's party met several times before the election
to discuss the future distribution of power between their
parties. Officials of both parties agree that the Rhode-
sian Front must continue to play a prominent role in or-
der to retain white confidence, prevent an economic col-
lapse, and maintain the loyalty and efficiency of the
security forces. The whites may not be pleased with the
cabinet posts Muzorewa plans to offer them but, whatever 25X1
the composition of the government, they will continue to
control the bureaucracy and thus determine the day-to-day
governing of the country.//
//Officials of Muzorewa's party also recently met
with the heads of Rhodesia's five largest economic asso-
ciations to work out future economic policy. White busi-
ness leaders expect that once in power Muzorewa will be
under strong pressure to appoint more blacks to respon-
sible positions, and they have already suggested a number
of personnel changes in the committees that oversee the
Reserve Bank, Air Rhodesia, and the Electricity Supply
Commission. //
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//Muzorewa recognizes that the long-term viability
of a black-led government will depend on its success in
winning the support of blacks in the countryside. He
hopes to accomplish this by improving their living condi-
tions and offering new incentives to black farmers.
Muzorewa also plans to institute a limited land reform
program. He will discourage nationalization for its own
25X1 sake or the splitting up of white-owned farms into small,
uneconomical plots to avoid provoking a white exodus that
would lead to economic collapse.//
Muzorewa hopes to strengthen his government's con-
trol over the countryside by expanding the size and role
of the auxiliary force now at his command. The auxilia-
ries--some 8,000 men including many ex-guerrillas who
--continued
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have defected to the transitional government--were used
to provide security in rural black areas during the elec-
tion, and the Bishop apparently wants to use them more
in a political role. The whites, however, want to inte-
grate them into the security forces I I
and their status
could become a point of contention.
Muzorewa's strong showing in the election signifi-
cantly lessens the chances that he will seek an accommo-
dation with the guerrilla leaders. Although the Bishop
maintains that guerrilla leaders Nkomo and Mugabe are
welcome in Salisbury, his government will continue--and
possibly escalate--raids on guerrilla targets in neigh-
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//Muzorewa has offered a general amnesty to the
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from the Zimbabwe African National Union because most
ZANU guerrillas belong to his ethnic group.
Muzorewa pro b::
ably will wait until his government is firmly esta-
blished--which could take several months--before consid-
ering making any new approaches to ZANU. Personal and
tribal differences between Muzorewa and Zimbabwe African
People's Union leader Nkomo and white antagonism toward
Nkomo rule out any prospects for a deal with ZAPU for the
25X1 time being.// F_ I
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