NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031400140002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 16, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
On file USDA release instructions apply.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
OPY
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
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Briefs and Comments
USSR: Grain Imports from US. . . . . . . . . . . 1
USSR - Eastern Europe: Crop Conditions . . . . . 2
Afghanistan: Growing Opposition. . . . . . . . . 3
Ghana: Military Intervention . . . . . . . . . . 4
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Yugoslavia: Presidium Reshuffle. . . . . . . . . 5
East Germany: Restrictions on Journalists. . . . 6
Special Analysis
Mexico: Impact of Agricultural Developments. . . 8
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USSR: Grain Imports from US
//Soviet grain imports from the US will reach close
to 15 million tons in the 1979 contract year ending in
September, according to the US agricultural attache to
Moscow. This is the maximum amount allowed for 1979
under the bilateral five-year Long-Term Grain Agreement
that expires in 1981. This amount, plus 2.5 million tons 25X1
of grain expected from non-US suppliers, will cost the So-
viets some $2.5 billion, $700 million more than
average outlays in the past two contract years.
The Soviet intention to purchase this much US grain
this year is somewhat surprising. The record grain har-
vest last year and imports of 21 million tons should
have left the Soviets in a comfortable position. Moscow's
attempt to regain momentum in livestock output by greatly
accelerating the use of feedgrains may account at least
in part for the surge in domestic use. The Soviets may
also be hedging against the possibility of a poor 1979
harvest or of paying higher prices for grain later in the
year. Moscow can postpone a portion of its purchases to
the 1980 contract year should crop conditions prove fav-
orable.
Up to a few weeks ago, Moscow showed little interest
in taking the maximum allowed under the agreement. Large
purchases of US corn last week, however, brought total
known grain purchases for the year so far to roughly 10 25X1
million tons--2.5 million tons of wheat and 7.4 million
tons of corn. Even if the Soviets buy 15 million tons of
US grain by 30 September, US logistic constraints may re-
strict deliveries within this period.
Recent upward pressure on grain prices is expected
to continue--in part propelled by the Soviet purchases.
Possible increased Soviet activity in the wheat market
will also add additional strength to wheat prices, which
are already substantially above last year's and have been
steadily rising since early April. F I
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USSR - EASTERN EUROPE: Crop Conditions
Reduced Soviet winter grain area and delayed spring
seeding make it unlikely that the Soviets will repeat
last year's record grain harvest--237 million tons--or
meet this year's planned 227 million tons. Favorable
weather in the next few months, however, could allow
total grain production to exceed the 200-million-ton
average of recent years. In Eastern Europe, grain pro-
duction could reach the recent avera e o 92 million
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The sharply reduced Soviet winter grain harvest ex-
pected this year results from problems during seeding
last fall and slightly more than normal damage to the
crops over the winter and this spring. We estimate that
the Soviets will harvest only 26 to 28 million hectares
of grain--compared to 32 million hectares last year.
Favorable soil moisture levels and good weather this
month and next could nevertheless ensure good yields.
Winter grain output, which normally accounts for about
one-third of the Soviets' total grain production, could
still approximate the recent yearly average level of
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In Eastern Europe, grain prospects are mostly fa-
vorable, and at least average yields are expected.
Winterkill was probably below average, with only Hungary
reporting any sizable losses--about 10 percent. Spring
planting was mostly successful, despite delays caused by
heavy rainfall. Poland, hardest hit by flooding, re-
ported delays of up to three weeks. Soil moisture in
Eastern Europe is slightly above normal.
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AFGHANISTAN: Growing Opposition
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//Violent opposition to the Leftist regime continues
to grow. periodic interdiction of the
roads from Kabul to the important. cities of Mazar-i-Sharif
in the north and Qandahar in the south, and the rebels
may soon be able to interdict the route from Kabul to
Peshawar in Pakistan--the Last relatively secure main
outlet from the capital. The tribal uprising in Hangar- 25X1
har Province is spreading closer to the Kabul-Peshawar
road east of JaZaZabadj -1
the military had seri-
ous command and control pro ems last week when it sup-
pressed a revolt by villagers on the outskirts of Kabul;
42 Afghan Army personnel were reportedly killed in the
action. High casualties, disaffection among and purges
of the military, and the lack of replacement troops will
continue to hamper efforts to deal with the insurgents.
Heavily armed youths are becoming a standard supplement
throughout the country to police and military forces.
The government continues to charge Pakistan and
"hostile international forces" with backing the insur-
gents and contributing to the deteriorating domestic se-
curity situation. President Taraki last week warned
again that further "interference" from Pakistan would
force Afghanistan to retaliate, presumably by stepping
up support for separatist movements inside Pakistan.
Prime Minister Amin echoed the charge and added that
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ons. Amin hinted that any further threat could result
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in increased military assistance from Afghanistan's
"friends"--an obvious reference to the Soviets.
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GHANA: Military Insurrection
//Forces loyal to the government of General Akuffo
early yesterday quickly crushed an insurrection by a
disgruntled junior Air Force officer and a handful of
followers. Accra is calm, and we do not believe this
incident will impede Ghana's scheduled transition civilian rule in July.//
//The short-lived uprising apparently was an effort
by an obscure flight lieutenant to redress personal
grievances over his treatment by the Air Force rather
than an attempt to overthrow the government or to pre-
vent a return to civilian government. According to
radio Ghana, all the insurrectionists are in custody
and are undergoing interrogation. The rebels took con-
trol of the military air station in Accra for about six
hours and besieged a nearby Army barracks before surren-
dering. Reportedly one soldier was killed and a few
others wounded.//
//Civilian presidential and parliamentary elections
will probably be held as scheduled on 18 June. The
insurrection, however, is likely to underscore to in-
coming civilian leaders the need to keep the military
establishment placated. There already is public pressure
for the next government to bring a former head of state,
General Acheampong, to trial for corruption and misman-
agement. A military coup could ensue if the process of
ferreting out Acheampong's misdeeds leads to indiscrim-
inate attacks on military leaders.//
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YUGOSLAVIA: Presidium Reshuffle
President Tito has reshuffled duties within the
powerful party Presidium on the eve of his trip to the
Soviet Union in such a way as to suggest that the poZit-
icaZ fortunes of Stane DoZanc are on the rise.
The party secretary originally had power to oversee
both party policy and administrative machinery. The de-
cision to go to a collective leadership last October
and the simultaneous creation of a new policy coordinator
post, Presidium chairman, left Dolanc with mundane duties.
A plenum yesterday downgraded the Presidium secre-
tary post to a two-year rotational position and gave it
to Dusan Dragosavac, a Serb from Croatia.
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EAST GERMANY: Restrictions on Journalists
Determined to restrict its dissidents' access to
Western media, East Germany has begun to enforce new
restrictions on foreign news correspondents. According
to Reuter, the government has ordered a West German
correspondent out of the country after his unapproved
interview with dissident Stefan Heym, which was broad-
cast in West Germany and received in the East. The
recent regulations require prior official approval for
all interviews of East Germans by foreign journalists.
Some Western newsmen, in attempting to comply with the
regulations, have sought--and been refused--permission
to interview Robert Havemann, a well-known critic of the
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
MEXICO: Impact of Agricultural Developments
Many observers of the Mexican economy and society
have outdated concepts of the role of agriculture in
Mexico. Mexico in fact is no longer primarily an agri-
cultural country; it is an urban, industrial nation--
similar in a number of respects to the US in the 1920s
and 1930s. Agriculture is destined to become steadily
less important to the Mexican economy, but the farm sec-
tor is essentially in good health. Developments in Mexi-
can agriculture will affect three areas of primary in-
terest to the US--ille aZ mi r tion, trade, and political
stability.
As the Mexican economy has become more modernized,
agriculture has become increasingly dualistic. On the
one side, a growing number of farmers and their hired
hands, especially in the north, are obtaining near-urban
standards of living from capital- and land-intensive
farms and ranches. On the other side, the majority of
Mexican peasants on collectively owned plots, called
ejidos, and on small private holdings are falling stead-
ily behind their compatriots both on ercial farms and
in the cities.
Coupled with the explosive growth in population,
this has produced a steady flow of poor peasants to the
cities and to more prosperous farming areas. The only
peasants able to maintain near-urban living standards on
small holdings in central Mexico are those who make pe-
riodic work trips to the US. The rural-urban flow will
continue until some kind of equilibrium is established
between opportunities and living conditions in urban
slums and those in rural small holdings. Given the pop-
ulation problem, such an equilibrium is unlikel before
the 1990s at the soonest.
Authors often state four pessimistic themes--essen-
tially myths--in writing on the rural sector of Mexico.
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The first, and most pervasive, is that Mexican agricul-
ture is in crisis. In truth, total agricultural exports
generally have exceeded agricultural imports by a wide
margin throughout the 1970s. The daily food intake of
the average Mexican is well above the Latin American
average. Although agricultural output did not keep pace
with population growth during most of the 1970s, agricul-
tural output has been recovering since President Lopez
Portillo took office in late 1976 and now a ears to be
growing above the population growth rate.
A second myth holds that Mexican agricultural policy
is usually inappropriate and often irrational. Actually,
Mexican agricultural policy has been highly successful in
achieving its goals--the maintenance of peace in the
countryside and preservation of a farm sector able to
supply the country's needs without diverting substantial
resources and talent from other sectors. Agricultural
policy also serves to maintain the viability of Mexico's
unique political system.
According to the third myth, Mexico lacks the land
and water resources to expand production. Given the
proper investments, however, extensive new areas could
be opened and existing farm areas could be much better
utilized. Tropical areas in the south are especially
promising. These areas offer more favorable conditions
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for year-round cropping than northern areas. Neither the
government nor private businessmen are likely to make
the investments required, however, unless they are sure
their products will bring prices high enoughto make
their investment economically rational. 25X1
The fourth myth centers on the notion that the Mex-
ican rural sector is a social and political powderkeg.
In rapidly urbanizing Mexico, the landless peasant is
becoming steadily less convinced that land ownership is
the key to getting ahead. An even more important factor
defusing rural tensions is the opportunity for the most
ambitious workers to migrate on either a temporary or
permanent basis. F7 I
Another, more optimistic, myth suggests that--with
the proper mix of government policies and a little luck--
a revitalized agricultural sector could go a long way
toward solving Mexico's social and demographic problems.
--continued
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of income equilibrium with urban areas is reached.
A mild form of this myth is implicit in the prescriptions
of many international organizations and Mexican planners.
Although many of these programs are valuable, there is
no way that they can fulfill the high expectations held
out for them. Even if the government gives high priority
to agricultural development, the growth of employment in
agriculture will not be great enough appreciably to af-
fect rural-urban migration or national unemployment rates.
Peasants will continue to flee the land until some sort
Mexican agricultural develo ment touches important
areas of interest to the US.
Illegal Mi ration: Under any probable scenario for
Mexican agricultural development, the pool of potential
rural migrants to the US will remain at least as large
as it is today, though the relative importance of rural
area-s as a source of illegal migration will probably de-
cline. Government programs that concentrate on the poor-
est rural people would probably exacerbate the situation
by dislodging additional people from their traditional
ways as well as by providing increasing numbers with the
funds needed to make the trip north.
Agricultural Trade Balances: The potential for Mex-
ican agricultural trade is hg ly sensitive to access to
the US market as well as the growth rates of population
and nonagricultural output. Under the most likely sce-
narios, the surplus of agricultural production over do-
mestic consumption will range between zero and 10 percent
by the end of the century. This assumes that agricul-
tural growth rates approaching the historic rate of 3.9
percent can be achieved if Mexico undertakes substantial
investments in the agricultural sector. Any sizable cut
in US demand could make this growth rate impossible to
achieve even though some diversification of Mexican ag-
ricultural export markets can be expected in the future.
Despite Mexico's drive for self-sufficiency in basic
foods, production shifts to higher value food items will
likely prolong Mexico's dependence on US grains and oil-
Political Stabilit : Given the steady decline in
the po itical, demographic, and economic importance of
rural Mexico, the danger of serious political trouble in
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--continued
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the countryside is waning. Rural migrants in urban slums
are not likely to become a destabilizing factor unless
the system comes under severe challenge from middle-class
groups. The declining political importance of the easily
co-opted peasant organizations, however, could leave the
government without one of its major sources of support.
The effect would be to give greater power to groups in
labor, the middle class, and big business, which are
harder to control.
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