NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031400170002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 19, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
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Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Briefs and Comments
OPEC: Current Account Surplus to Soar . . . . 1
ISRAEL: Weisman--Begin Dispute on Autonomy. . . 2
SYRIA-LEBANON: Status of Syrian Forces . . . . 3
CHINA-VIETNAM: Talks Recess . . . . . . . . . 4
FRANCE: Franco-African Conference. . . . . . . 5
JAPAN-USSR: Firyubin Visit . . . . . . . . . . 6
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NATO: AWACS Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Violence Subsides . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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Venezuela to a surplus of $10.2 billion in Kuwait.
are projected to range from a deficit of $4.2 billion in
OPEC: Current Account Surplus to Soar
The large increases in oil prices, coupled with a
decline in Iranian imports, should boost the OPEC current
account surplus to $29 billion this year--nearly 20 times
the 1978 level. The current accounts of all the member
countries probably will improve, easing many of the fi-
nancial burdens of the cartel. We expect only Algeria,
Ecuador, and Venezuela to have current account deficits
in 1979. The individual members' current account balances
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Export earnings of the cartel members should in-
crease to at least $174 billion in 1979, 25 percent above
the 1978 level, primarily reflecting higher oil prices
imposed in the first half of the year. We have assumed
an average 1979 OPEC price of $16 a barrel, including
surcharges. Current market trends, however, suggest
that prices may rise significantly during the remainder
of the year, boosting the average price. Oil export
volume will probably rise less than 1 percent. 25X1
Based on our individual country projections, OPEC's
import bill will increase 5 percent in 1979 to $105 bil-
lion. Although import prices are expected to rise about
8 percent, import volume will mark its first decline since
1973, due almost entirely to an expected 55-percent drop
in Iranian purchases. Import expenditures in most other
OPEC countries are expected to rise moderately. Saudi
import volume will slow as several construction projects
near completion and many new development programs are
stretched out.
The deficit on services and private transfers is
likely to grow by about $3 billion in 1979, to an esti-
mated $36 billion. Increases in freight and insurance
costs for imports and in service expenditures should out-
strip the increase in investment earnings. Grant aid in
1979 probably will increase by about $600 million over
the 1978 figure of $3.4 billion despite Arab OPEC cutbacks
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in aid to Egypt.
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ISRAEL: Weizman-Begin Dispute on Autonomy
Israeli Defense Minister Weizman's request to with-
draw from the government's negotiating team on West Bank -
Gaza autonomy will be considered on Monday at a special
cabinet session convened to give a final review to the
autonomy proposals drawn up by Prime Minister Begin and
his senior colleagues. Weizman's request, made in pro-
test against Begin's rigid negotiating stance, may partly
be a ploy to rally support from cabinet moderates for
more tactically flexible proposals. Should Weizman remain
dissatisfied, he may withdraw from active participation
in the autonomy talks, thereby ng the most moderate
25X1 Israeli voice.
Weizman believes Begin's hardline posture, if main-
tained, will stalemate the negotiations, worsen Egyptian
President Sadat's position in the Arab world, and perhaps
eventually undermine the peace treaty. So far, Weizman
apparently has not asked to withdraw from the 11-member
advisory committee chaired by Begin that supervises the
smaller negotiating team. If Weizman does leave the ne-
gotiating team, he might seek to exercise some influence
behind the scenes by acting in the larger group in con-
cert with relatively like-minded figures such as Foreign
Minister Dayan, Deputy Prime Minister Yadin, and Finance
25X1 Minister Ehrlich.
Yadin and Ehrlich probably will rely on Weizman to
take the lead in challenging the Prime Minister. Dayan,
on the other hand, has been trying in his own way to in-
fluence Begin toward greater flexibility. Dayan report-
edly has gained the Prime Minister's agreement to drop
some proposals from his autonomy plan to avoid locking
the government into rigid positions on matters of details.
(S)
Begin may feel constrained to offer Weizman some
concessions in the interest of coalition harmony and to
avoid a blatantly intransigent image that could be ex-
ploited by the Labor Party. The Prime Minister, however,
is unlikely to change the thrust of his proposals because
of his ideological views, his need to retain the support
of key coalition hardliners, and his desire to test Sadat's
capacity for compromise before offering compromise pro-
25X1 posals of his own.
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SYRIA-LEBANON: Status of Syrian Forces
There are signs the Syrians are altering their
peacekeeping role in Lebanon in such a way that they
could withdraw some forces there over the next several
months if the situation does not deteriorate markedly.
Nonetheless, statements released after talks this week
in Damascus between Lebanese President Sarkis and Syrian
President Assad mention no impending change in the Syr-
ian role. Press reports indicate that Lebanon intends
to ask the Arab League to renew the mandate of the Syr-
ian peacekee pina force after the current one expires in
late July.
Since the end of the last round of fighting with
the Christians last fall, the Syrian military has been
attempting to establish a lower profile in Lebanon.
Soon after the fighting stopped, the Syrians began to
replace their troops along the confrontation lines in
Beirut with units of the Palestinian Liberation Army, a
Syrian-supported group. They have also recently in-
creased their materiel support to some of the other Leb-
anese and Palestinian groups that they would like to see
act as more of a counterweight to the Christians.
drawn their units in Beirut down by 10 to 15 percent.
The Syrians have been in Lebanon for nearly three
years, and there have been increasing indications that
they and their supporters in the Arab League are tiring
of the Lebanese problem. Their efforts to reduce their
role will almost certainly be delayed, however, if the
security situation deteriorates.
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Over the last few months, the Syrians have allowed
Lebanese Army troop to take amar czinyeral sensitive o-
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uin doing so, the Syrians have
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The first round of the Sino-Vietnamese peace talks
ended yesterday with the Chinese delegation's departure
from Hanoi and its call for negotiations to continue in
rseijing. The Chinese did not announce a date for the
25X1 .econd round. No progress has been made in the talks,
which began on 18 April, although the first group of
prisoners of war is scheduled to be exchanged on Monday.
Hanoi and Beijing blame each other for failure to
move the talks off dead center. The Vietnamese stuck to
their original proposal to withdraw forces from the im-
mediate border area and establish a demilitarized zone.
The Chinese, however, demanded that the Vietnamese dis-
cuss a number of broader issues, including Hanoi's asso-
ciation with the USSR, its occupation of Kampuchea, and
its alleged mistreatment of Vietnamese of Chinese ances-
try. Both sides appear to want the talks to continue
25X1 even though neither sees any prospect for an early solu-
25X1 tion to their disagreements.
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French President Giscard and several African chiefs
of state will begin their annual two-day summit on Monday
in Rwanda. The conference--which includes former colonies
of Belgium, the UK, and Portugal as well as France--illus-
trates France's efforts to expand its influence in Africa
by playing down ideology and emphasizing less controver-
sial issues such as economic aid. Security matters may
also be discussed despite formal objections at last
month's preparatory conference by some African represent-
atives that military matters should be reserved for all-
African forums, such as the Organization of African Unity.
Giscard is expected to outline his aid plan for
Africa that calls for close coordination among proposed
donors--France, the US, West Germany, the UK, Canada, and
Belgium--on common projects that would be selected for
their regional impact. The intended donors have not yet
subscribed to the plan, probably because of their mis-
givings over the vague nature of the proposal and suspi-
cions that Paris will garner a disproportionate amount of
credit for the effort. 25X1
African reaction to Giscard's proposal is expected
to be mixed. Moderate, pro-French countries, which as-
sume their aid level will increase, will almost certainly
favor the plan. English-speaking, Portuguese-speaking,
and more radical countries that generally receive little
or no French aid may fear that aid allotments from the
other donors will be reduced. African states that have
developed bilateral aid programs also may fear losing
them because donor funds presumably would be reallocated
for regional projects.
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JAPAN-USSR: Firyubin Visit
Japanese Foreign Ministry officials believe that So-
viet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin's visit to Tokyo on
14 and 15 May signaled Moscow's desire to improve bilat-
.:ral relations. The Japanese did not anticipate, or make,
any headway on outstanding political issues. They were
:ncouraged, however, by Soviet interest in continuing
regular vice-ministerial consultations and satisfied with
Moscow's apparent desire to play down differences over
25X1 Japan's relations with China.
The principal point of contention was the Soviet
military presence in Southeast Asia. Over the past sev-
eral months, Japanese commentary on Indochina has focused
increasingly on concern over the Soviet activity in Viet-
nam. Although the Japanese voiced this concern to
Firyubin, he turned it aside and said that Moscow was only
fulfillinq its treaty obligati
25X1 threatening no third country.
The Soviets confined themselves to restating their
longstanding positions on the northern territories dispute
and the terms for a bilateral peace treaty, but Tokyo was
encouraged by Firyubin's relatively tactful approach that
avoided belaboring the differences between the two coun-
tries. Foreign Ministry officials also said Firyubin em-
phasized that there was no likelihood of a shift in Soviet
policy toward the Koreas. He said Moscow would continue
to support Pyongyang's policies and avoid opening official
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//The dispute over the location of the headquarters
of NATO's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
has been settled, but issues dealing with cost-sharing
arrangements and West European dissatisfaction with the
level of US Purchases of West European weapons remain
unresolved.//
//The Belgians announced at this week's meeting of
NATO defense ministers that they will agree to locate the
AWACS headquarters in the Dutch city of Brunssum. The
Belgians had held out for months for a Brussels site and
had annoyed the rest of the allies by refusing to par-
ticipate in the AWACS pro ram until the dispute was set-
tled.//
//Belgium, dissatisfied with its projected AWACS
bill, still has not agreed to take part and may now press
even harder to get its projected share of program costs
reduced. Portugal has already accomplished this by plead-
ing poverty, and Turkey hopes to do the same. Virtually
all members of the Alliance are concerned that AWACS
costs will rise now that Iran has canceled its purchase
of seven Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft.//
//West Germany has additional reservations. It has
been one of the countries most dissatisfied with amounts
of US purchases of West European weapons systems under
the "two-way street" in Alliance arms sales. Bonn agreed
to take part in AWACS with the understanding that the US
would buy the Franco-German "Roland" surface-to-air mis-
sile and a West German gun for the XN-1 tank. Doubts
that the US will go ahead with the missile purchase and
worries over delays in the XM-l program may cause West
Germany's AWACS contribution to be debated in the Bundes-
tag this summer.//
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Kathmandu and the rest of the country have been
relatively quiet during the past week, following the
violent clashes between striking students and security
forces earlier this month. The few demonstrations that
have occurred in recent days have been orderly and po-
lice restraint has contributed to the decrease in vio-
lence. Government and university officials appear opti-
mistic that their policy of conciliation will eventually
end the confrontation, but it is unclear whether the
students will return to classes when campuses reopen
next week. Future stability is likely to depend heavily
on the content of a report to be prepared by a royal com-
mission now investigating the recent disturbances and on
the implementation of its recommendations.
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