NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031400180002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 21, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Briefs and Comments
Cyprus: Intercommunal Talks to Resume
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Spain: Upheaval at Socialist Party Congress . . 3
USSR - Eastern Europe: Brezhnev, Kosygin
Visits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
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Special Analysis
China: Leadership Maneuvering . . . . . . . . . 6
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CYPRUS: Intercommunal Talks to Resume
Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, meeting under UN
Secretary General WaZdheim's auspices over the weekend,
agreed to resume the Zong-stalled intercommunal talks.
The negotiations will be conducted on the basis of a 10-
point accord that marks a step forward in the drawn-out
effort to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. The
fwo sides have a history of backtracking and reinterpret-
ing agreements to fit their needs, however, and it is b
no means certain this pattern will not be repeated.
The compromise formula, which was largely the work
of Waldheim, calls for the resumption of continuous ne-
gotiations beginning 15 June. Among its most signifi-
cant--and potentially controversial--provisions are that
the talks will be based on guidelines reached by the late
Archbishop Makarios and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash
in 1977 and on relevant UN resolutions, that priority be
given to the resettlement by Greek Cypriots of the city
of Varosha, and that both sides take practical measures
to promote good will and confidence.
Cypriot President Kyprianou and Denktash in the past
have given different interpretations of the agreement
Denktash reached with Makarios. Kyprianou has stressed
the part of the guidelines providing for a unified state
while Denktash has emphasized the provision for separa-
tion of the two communities. The Greek Cypriots had
sought to secure Varosha in advance of negotiations on
other issues, while the Turkish Cypriots have pursued a
similar strategy with respect to the Greek Cypriot eco-
nomic embargo that has prevented their economy from get-
ting off the ground.
The wording of the accord reached Saturday is suf-
ficiently vague to permit both parties to interpret it
as they wish. The vague wording, statements by the two
leaders after their meetings,
ma e it likely that the C rus issue will not be
se ed any time soon.
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SPAIN: Upheaval at Socialist Party Congress
Moderates in Spain's Socialist Party received a
sharp setback at the party congress in Madrid over the
weekend when Secretary General .Felipe Gonzalez unexpect-
edly resigned. According to press reports, Gonzalez'
move yesterday came after his effort to remove the term
"Marxist" from the party definition was defeated by a two
to one margin.
Although Gonzalez in his speech to the congress
stopped short of repeating an earlier suggestion that the
Marxist label be dropped, he made clear his opposition to
the term. Gonzalez wants it removed because he believes
the Marxist label would deter moderate leftists whom the
party must attract to win future elections Radicals
wanted the term retained. 25X1
Gonzalez did not close the door on future services
to the party, saying he would continue as a member but
in some other capacity.
Madrid radio late last night reported that the con-
gress--as its final act--named a "management committee"
to lead the party for the next half-year, within which
time it "should. . . convene an extraordinary congress
to debate the party's political line and elect the
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USSR - EASTERN EUROPE: Brezhnev, Kosygin Visits
The Soviets have announced that President Brezhnev
will visit Hungary and Premier Kos in will travel to
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According to a joint announcement issued Saturday,
Brezhnev will travel to Hungary at the head of a party-
government delegation "at the end of May." Brezhnev has
not visited Hungary since 1972, but Hungarian party chief
Kadar was in Moscow for bilateral talks just over two
25X1 months ago.
TASS announced on Friday that Kosygin would visit
Czechoslovakia "in the coming days." A Czechoslovak
diplomat has said that Brezhnev will confer with Czecho-
slovak leaders during a stop at Bratislava en route to
the mid-June summit talks with President Carter in
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A ranking Soviet diplomat in Budapest had told the
US Embassy there in late March that Brezhnev would visit
Hungary this spring. It is likely that plans for the
trip to Budapest late this month were finalized at the
Brezhnev-Kadar talks in March--before agreement on dates
for the US-Soviet summit. Brezhnev's apparent plans for
a stop in Bratislava imply that he will travel to Vienna
by train. F I
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CHINA: Leadership Maneuvering
//Party Vice Chairman and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's
escalating criticism of high-level political opponents
appears to be a counterattack against those who forced
him to make a self-criticism and to back down on key
policy issues at the Central Committee work conference
last month. Denq's counterattack will further exacer-
bate Leadership tensions, which invariably are magnified
at lower levels, and will thereby contribute to China's
already serious problems of economic mismanagement
bureaucratic malaise, and popular disaffection.//
Deng's attack came in a "Contributing Commentator"
article published on 11 May in the Guangming Daily,
People's Daily, and Liberation Army Daily, an exposure
that lends it considerable authority. The article is a
sharp-edged uncompromising statement, a virtual declara-
tion of ideological war against Deng's opposition. It
accuses the opposition of "supporting Lin Biao and the
25X1 Gang of Four, opposing true Marxism - Leninism - Mao
Zedong thought," fostering "cliquism and sectarianism,"
and "Preserving and creating factors for instability."
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//Some of the conflict may be resolved at the Na-
tional People's Congress, which is likely to be held in
late May or June. Such a meeting is usually preceded by
a Central Committee plenum, where party leadership changes
are often announced. At this point, however, it is by
no means clear that Deng will be any more successful than
at previous meetings in bringing together a leadershi
group entirely responsive to his will.//
//This opposition, usually referred to as the "what-
ever faction"--from its advocacy of dogmatic obedience
to "whatever" former Party Chairman Mao Zedong said--
reportedly is led by Party Vice Chairman Wang Dongxing,
and includes several other Politburo members. Their
opposition to-Deng's policies is primarily ideological,
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but they apparently have used other policy problems--
including economic readjustment, the war with Vietnam,
and the development of Sino-US relations--to press their
attack on Deng's leadership. Other political leaders,
who do not necessarily share the ideological orientation
of the "whatever faction," have joined with its members
on specific issues, and their combined influence appar-
to ~a^u -;:-7 from some of his more
n
d D
f
e
g
orce
ently has
controversial policies.
The "Contributing Commentator" article, however,
suggests that Deng's patience is wearing thin. The
charges in the article are the most serious yet against
those who cling to Maoist orthodoxy, and could be con-
strued as laying the groundwork for an eventual purge of
Deng's opponents. Deng probably is aware, however, that
a purge might be very difficult to carry out as well as
highly disruptive to economic and political plans now
being considered. His more likely strategy is to keep
the pressure on members of his opposition, to discredit
them in the eyes of their supporters, and to ensure that
new leadership arrangements do not give them significant
authority.
//Even the removal of the leftist opposition would
not necessarily bring about an end to Deng's problems
or a more stable leadership. Age and infirmity are
beginning to erode the Politburo's ability to perform
effectively. The poor health of two other party vice
chairmen, Ye Jianying and Chen Yun, influential in
military and economic affairs, apparently precludes them
from devoting full attention to their jobs. One active
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member of the Politburo died in February, and at least
five others are believed to have serious health prob-
The fact that Deng is not the absolute leader of a
cohesive faction further complicates the resolution of
political difficulties. Other Politburo members con-
sider themselves to be equal to Deng in prestige and
experience, and while they support him on some issues,
they differ sharply with him on others. Moreover, some
highly influential former members of the Politburo,
recently rehabilitated but not yet restored to their
previous rank, are pressing for complete exoneration
and return to power. Deng appears to be in the uncom-
fortable position of trying to hold these individuals
back, while at the same time trying to get younger
officials to agree to their return.
//The Defense Intelligence Agency does not agree that
there is significant opposition within the Politburo to
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping or that "serious policy dis-
agreements have developed on a number- of issues." On
the contrary, Deng enjoys the firm support of an over-
whelming percentage of the Politburo membership and the
small minority who may oppose him on ideological grounds
were politically neutralized at last year's party plenum.
Recent adjustments in economic policies may have been
debated, but there is no evidence that Deng suffered
a political setback for the apparent errors in economic
planning. The referenced "Commentator" item of 11 May,
is the type of political rhetoric that is commonly dissem-
inated prior to the convening of major leadership
meetings, and does not necessarily ortend a purge within
25X1 the Politburo.//
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