CROP PRODUCTION IN COMMUNIST CHINA IN 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01003A001000030003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 31, 1961
• Content Type: BRIEF

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CONFIDENTIAL
CIA/RR CB--61-3
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CURRENT SUPPORT BRIEF
29
Copy No.
31 January 1961 25X1
CROP PRODUCTION IN COMMUNIST CHINA IN 1960
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OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This report represents the immediate views of the
originating intelligence components of the Office
of Research and Reports. Comments are solicited.
This document contains information affecting the national defense of
the United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18
USC, Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which
in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CROP PRODUCTION IN COMMUNIST CHINA IN 1960
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The Assistant Chief of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of
Communist China, Fang Fang, is reported to have said in a speech
25X1 that severe
in, had a ec ed the crops on one-half of China's
cultivated fields. He further stated that the'total harvest (presumably
grain) in 1960 would be about 200 million tons. 1/
Fang's estimate of the total grain crop is the only known quantita-
tive estimate of the 1960 crop made by a Chinese Communist official.*
A Reuters correspondent in Peiping reported on 15 November 1960 that
the American reporter Edgar Snow was told by Chou En-lai that natural
disasters in 1960 were China's worst in the 20th century and that the
1960 grain crop, while topping 1957, would be lower than 1958 and
1959. 2/ The Chinese claims for grain production are 185 million tons
in 1957, 250 million tons in 1958, and 270 million tons in 1959.** Ac-
cording to Chou's statement, there is a 65 million ton spread within
which the official 1960 grain estimate can be set; however, Chou's
reference to the 1957 output would have been gratuitous were not the
1960 claim to be drastically below that in 1959. Support for a figure
even lower than Fang's forecast appeared in the 4 January 1961 edition
of the official Polish government newspaper Trybuna Ludu, where in a
discussion of natural disasters in China it was stated that "as a re-
sult, crops dropped to the 1957 level." 3/ The goal for 1960 was 297
25X1 million ton
ORR-bstimates 1958 and 1959 grain crops to have been around 212
and 190 million tons respectively. It is not clear whether the har-
vests of the "leap forward" years of 1958 and 1959 were deliberately
exaggerated by the central authorities. Overenthusiastic cadres, in an.
attempt to outdo one another in overfulfilling production quotas, ex-
aggerated actual accomplishments; at the same time, state statistical
organizations were encouraged to publish agricultural data which were
politically favorable to the Party line, at the expense of statistical
objectivity. It was probably the chaotic effects of such reporting on
economic planning that caused the government in August 1959 to change
the 1958 grain claim from its original 375 million tons to 250 million
tons. The output planned for 1959 was at that time reduced from 525
million tons to 275 million tons. 4/ The regime has probably found it
difficult to reconcile its claims -'or production in 1958 and 1959 with
the food shortages reported throughout the country during 1959 and
1960. Were the official claims for 1958 and 1959 actually achieved,
there would have been no shortage of grain.
During most of the 1960 growing season, the Chinese claimed that
various natural calamities were adversely affecting agricultural pros-
pects. In July 1960, a People's Daily editorial commented on the
drought and stated that a great vItory would be scored on the agri-
cultural front even if the amount of grain harvested during the summer
The text of the communique on the 9th plenary session of the Party
Central Committee held 14-18 January 1961 did not contain any agricul-
tural production figures although a report on the 1960 plan fulfill-
ment report was presented at the session.
** All these figures include potatoes on the basis of 4 tons of potatoes
equal to 1 ton of grain,
31 January 1961 CIA/R& CB-61-3
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were "equal to, higher, or slightly lower than that of 1959." 5/ In
August 1960 the area affected by calamities was said to total -40 mil-
lion hectares, 6/ while by October 1960 it had reportedly increased to
60 million hectares because of "the most serious natural calamities since
the founding of the People's Republic." 7/ Beginning in late December
1960, Chinese press releases stated thatithe calamities were the worst
in 100 years. 8/ These inter-year comparisons of area affected by
calamities are not very useful, because the criteria used to describe
"calamity" are not clearly defined and can be changed by the regime to
suit their immediate purposes.
Although 1960 was unquestionably a year of severe natural disasters
in many:,areas of mainland China, the Chinese reports appear to exagger-
ate the severity. Weather information and soil moisture estimates from
US government sources indicate that much of China was affected by drought
in 1960, especially the major wheat growing areas in North China. Rain-
fall in other areas, however, was about the same as last year. It is
unlikely that drought did much more damage in 1960 than in 1959, which
the Chinese now admit was also a poor crop year, although they claimed
a record grain harvest of 270 million tons. It is believed therefore
that the regime is deliberately exaggerating the damage from poor weather
in 1960 in order to prepare the way for a return to more realistic agri-
cultural statistics, absolve itself and its policies from any blame for
the situation which h developed, and justify the harshness of its ra-
tioning program. c0RR stimates that total grain output in 1960 was again
U_ 4. 11^^ -3''19! ___
The seriousness of such a deficit in agricultural production, however
--a harvest below that in 1958 and probably about the same as in 1959 with k`
some 30,000,000 more mouths to feed this year than in 1958--is reflected
25X1 in the increasing number of reports of serious food
latter part of 1960
25X1 the food short.a cue and probably not yet at its most severe.
for the first time since 1949 something ap-
proaching famine threatens parts of the country. 9/ Other reports from
the mainland speak of famine conditions, an increase in nutritional dis-
25X1 eases, and reductions in grain rations. There is said to be a high in-
cidence of beri-beri (a condition of painful neuritis caused by a lack
of vitamin B1) among university students in Peiping and Tientsin,, and a
campaign to reduce physical activity has been initiated. 10/ Another re-
port reveals that the grain ration in Peiping was reduced on 1 November
1960. A ration of 32.5 catties, for example, was reduced to 28 catties a
month, with the average reduction estimated at 20 percent. The reduction
effected in Peiping on 1 November is said to have started in other parts
of China in August. 11/ The harshness of the regime's rationing system
has led to increasing disgruntlement among the population, and open de-
monstrations against the regime in some instances.
To alleviate this worsening food situation, Peiping has recently pur-
chased sizeable quantities of grain from Australia, Canada and Burma.
Negotiations now underway will bring total grain import commitments for
1961 to almost 2,500,000 tons, which will cost China close to US$ 200,000,000
in foreign exchange. An expenditure of this size, which will necessitate
a readjustment in China's pattern of foreign trade--more specifically a
cutback in other imports-and probably further drains on an already pre-
carious foreign exchange position--attests both to the seriousness of the
present food situation and to the very real concern it is causing the re-
gime. At the same time, however, China is continuing:to export grain.
Known commitments for 1961 to Albania, Ceylon and Cuba total almost
500,000 tons, and exports to the rest of the Bloc, while not known, may
approach or even exceed this amount.
31 January 1961 CIA/RR CB-61-3
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There seems little doubt that food reserves on the mainland are
extremely tight, and the situation may become critical before the first
harvest in the summer of 1961. The regime has served notice that rations
will be meager this winter and, in addition to the strictest controls
on consumption, has taken steps to lessen the work load of the peasants
during this period. It is believed that these controls on consumption
which will stretch available supplies as far as they can conceivably go,
the easing of the work load during the winter, and imports of grain to
augment domestic availabilities will suffice to carry the population
through the winter.
31 January 1961 CIA/RR CB-61?3
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