DEFICIENCIES IN PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT DISRUPT RAILROAD TRANSPORT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01003A001400030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 13, 1962
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 200gT (12 f IA-RDP79TO1003A
Current Support Brief
000300011
CIA/RR CB,-7 3 No. Pages 4
13 November 1962
DEFICIENCIES IN PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT DISRUPT
RAILROAD TRANSPORT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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DEFICIENCIES IN PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT DISRUPT
RAILROAD TRANSPORT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Analysis of current Czechoslovak press reports shows that the diffi-
culties that plagued the Czechoslovak railroad system during the latter
weeks of 1961 have carried over to the first half of 1962. It is probable,
therefore, that deficiencies in railroad transport will be a significant
factor in the underfulfillment of economic plans in 1962.
A primary deficiency is an absence of adequate reserves of railroad
rolling stock in Czechoslovakia, so that unforeseen delays in loading and
unloading of rail cars or any variations in demand for cars resulting from
above-plan or below-plan economic production creates bottlenecks through-
out the railroad system. For example, a surplus of freight cars may
exist in a coal producing region where production is below plan while a
critical shortage arises in another region where production is above plan.
Other deficiencies include inadequate maintenance of track and rolling
stock by railroad personnel and factors external to railroad management
such as severe weather conditions during the first quarter of 1962.
Late in 1961 a serious freight car shortage developed, in large part
because of an increase in the turnaround time of freight cars. Turna-
round time increased during the last quarter of 1961 from an average of
3. 99 days in 1960 to 4. 24 days in 1961, an increase of 6 hours. Turna-
round-time increased by 3 additional hours in the first quarter of 1962.
During December 1961, moreover, there was a daily backlog of about
5, 000 freight cars in the yards and terminals waiting to be unloaded
while another 3, 000 cars per day were waiting to be loaded. These
8, 000 cars, all of which were being held overtime, represented more
than 24 percent of the total daily loadings (carloadings averaged about
33, 250 cars daily during the last quarter of 1961), or more than 5 per-
cent of the approximately 140, 000 freight cars in service during this
period. The situation became so serious in December that the govern-
ment ordered the organization of emergency gangs to load and unload
13 November 1962 CIA/RR CB 62-73
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cars around the clock and on Sundays and holidays. In spite of these steps
the backlog of freight cars waiting to be unloaded rose to a daily average
of 5, 500 by 1 January 1962. Freight traffic, in terms of metric tons (mt)
carried, fell below the performance in the first quarter of 1961 by almost
1 million mt and below plan by 4 million mt. By the end of the second
quarter of 1962, the railroads had fallen behind planned goals for freight
traffic by 7 million mt.
It is difficult to determine just where the blame lies for these defi-
ciencies. Press reports indicate that poor planning and management by
users of railroad transport appear to be major contributing factors to
the increase in turnaround time. Shippers and receivers preferred to
pay demurrage charges for freight cars rather than empfpy additional
labor or pay overtime wages to load and unload within the prescribed
time limits. Singled out as the worst violators in delaying freight cars
were the Ministry of Metallurgy and Mines, the Ministry of Construction,
and the Ministry of Chemical Industries, the very ministries which were
complaining that 4 shortage of freight cars was the reason for their
failure to fulfill production plans.
Another cause for disruption in the Czechoslovak railroad system
is the failure of Czechoslovak planning and policy, like that in all the
European 'Satellites, to provide for an adequate reserve of rolling stock.
Moreover, the regime attempts to maintain too delicate a balance be-
tween freight car supply and actual requirements, so that when the utili-
zation plan falters, the entire system is thrown off balance for lack of
reserve capacity. It is unusual, however, for an extreme shortage to
develop during the first half of a year.
Improper planning in traffic management by shippers and receivers
as well as inadequate storage facilities at transshipment points also are
major factors in disruption of the railroad system. A classic example
of this combination of factors occurred in June 1962 in the Danube port
of Komarno. At that time about 67, 000 mt of ore were unloaded from
river barges and stored in Komarno. About 8, 000 Tntwere on barges
waiting to be unloaded, and 40, 000 additional mt were en route by barge.
The regular storage space was exhausted, and ore was being piled along
J.3 November 1962 CIA/RR CB 62-73
S-E -C -R-E -T
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the railroad track, thus making the movement of trains difficult. The
various metallurgical plants throughout the country were unable to accept
increased shipments, so that whole trains loaded with ore were standing
in Komarno and could not be dispatched. At the same time (18 June 1962),
180 cars loaded with coal for transshipment by barge were standing in the
Komarno yards but could not be unloaded, because the barges were loaded
with ore, which, in turn, could not be unloaded because of inadequate
storage facilities. Meanwhile, in the coal mining region of Ostrava, some
mines were forced to restrict production because their storage bins were
full and there were no coal cars available for loading.
Extremely cold weather, resulting in frozen switches, frozen water
lines on locomotives, broken rails, and numerous accidents, contributed
to :ra:ilroad deficiencies during the winter months. Bad weather in con-
junction with a lackadaisical attitude on the part of railroad maintenance
personnel caused a large number of cars -- about 8, 000 per day in May
and June 1962 -- to be undergoing or awaiting repair.
Underfulfillment of rail freight haulage plans in the first half of 1962
means that the entire planned increase for this year in comparison with
1961 -- 14 million mt (119 million mt in all) -- must be carried in the
last half of 1962. This quantity is an increase of more than 13 percent
compared with the same period in 1961. At the rate of freight car utili-
zation that was attained during the first half of 1962 (turnaround time
4. 37 days, average load per car 17.2 mt), about 166, 000 freight cars
will be required in operation to fulfill rail transportation plans this year.
This requirement is about 17 percent above the estimate of 142, 000
freight cars owned by Czechoslovakia that will be available by the end
of the year. Moreover, in spite of the growing shortage of freight cars,
Czechoslovakia has continued to be an exporter of cars in substantial
quantity -- production in 1961 was about 5, 000 freight cars, but it is
estimated that only 3, 700 cars were added to the domestic inventory.
Consequently, unless additional cars are built quickly, purchased, or
rented from abroad or unless there is drastic improvement in the utili-
zation of freight cars, the Czechoslovak railroad system probably will
fail to fulfill the original planned goal for 1962 by several million mt.
13 November 1962 CIA/RR CB 62-73
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Analyst:
Coord:
Sources:
25X1A
Czechoslovakia, State Statistical Office. Statisticke zpravy, no. 2,
1962, p. 76. U.
CIA. CIA/RR EM 62-16, Inland Transport in the European Satel-
lites, 1961, Sep 62. S.
JPRS. 15,140, 6 Sep 62. U.
CIA. FDD Summary no 392, 25 Apr 62. U.
STATSPEC
25X1A
13 November 1962 CIA/RR CB 62-73
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 Analyst:
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Series Nvinber MCIAIRR GBn62-73
L=ate of Document 13 November 1962
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