IMPACT OF THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER WAR ON THE INDIAN ECONOMY

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• Publication Date: November 17, 1962
• Content Type: BRIEF

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Current Support Brief
CIA/RR CB 6 2 7 8
No. Pages 1-1
17 November 1962
IMPACT OF THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER WAR
ON THE INDIAN ECONOMY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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IMPACT OF THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER WAR
ON THE INDIAN ECONOMY
The main impact of the Sino-Indian border war on India's economy
will be reflected in the revision of economic plans and the adjustments
in resource allocation required to meet the new situation that confronts
the Indian leadership. Until very recently, India had developed its
economic plans in an atmosphere that anticipated no major threat to
its borders. The administration had permitted itself to reduce the
share of military expenditure annually in an effort to increase govern-
mental expenditure for investment and popular consumption in spite of
significant excess capacity both in military and in nonmilitary produc-
tion sectors and in spite of the assumption of a fractious attitude toward
its most powerful neighbors.
By mid-November of this year the actions of Indian leaders sug-
gested a revision of their basic assumption concerning the necessity
for domestic military output and a consequent revision of governmental
expenditure patterns toward basic defense and supporting industries.
India also is seeking military assistance to provide the materiel re-
quired immediately to prosecute the border war and to begin the modern-
ization of their defense industry. The immediate need is for foreign as-
sistance to get military production rolling quickly. India's foreign ex-
change shortage is critical, and it will be necessary for liberal credit
terms to be arranged.
The widespread unemployment and undertitilization of Indian labor
resources imply that the manpower for increased military mobilization
and industrial production, including workers with technical training,
could be furnished without a major depressing effect on the level of
current output. Moreover, the increased national awareness associated
with partial mobilization and an identifiable external threat will create
opportunities to break down some of the traditional barriers to labor
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productivity and economic organization and planning that have been the
major deterrents to past Indian economic development.
Similarly, the existence of excess capacity in Indian defense and
capital goods industries indicates that defense production could be ex-
panded somewhat without a diversion of equipment from other uses.
To achieve the level and type of military output now considered essen-
tial by Indian leaders, however, additional investment in these indus-
tries will be necessary. The primary impact of the shifts in investment
on present investment plans probably will fall on the equipment industries
producing for durable consumer goods manufacturers, the chemical equip-
ment industry, and those sectors of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy
that do not contribute directly to the development of military production
and investment. It should be understood that the current ambitious Indian
economic development program is falling behind schedule, and it seems
likely that its optimistic investment plans would have been scaled back
even in the absence of an invasion threat. Nevertheless, because a sub-
stantial amount of investment in defense industries is capable of alternate
uses, much of this investment will not be lost to the economy but in the
future could provide a flow of nonmilitary output.
The Economic Situation
The immediate effect of the Sino-Indian border war on India's eco-
nomic development program undoubtedly will be an emphasis on those
targets of the Third Five Year Plan (April 1961 -- March 1966) that
can make the greatest contribution to the basic economy and basic de-
fense needs.
Aside from the defense industry itself, whose potential is discussed
elsewhere in this paper, priority attention is likely to be given to heavy
industry and transportation. In addition, all possible effort probably
will be made to maintain and possibly to increase investment and pro-
duction in agriculture, partly to ward off inflation.
It is believed that adjustments can be made to gear up the military
end-product industries without seriously impeding Indian economic
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progress. Indeed, it is altogether possible that India may realize a
more efficient utilization of manpower and resources under circum-
stances of external threat. Communist Chinese aggression has created
a greater feeling of national unity and purpose than has existed since
India gained its independence. Even a minor improvement in employ-
*Anent and productivity rates stemming from this new enthusiasm could
have a significant impact on Indian economic rates of growth.
. Furthermore, India has the flexibility and resources to increase
its rate of government expenditure without serious pressure on the
money supply. There is no reason to suspect that moderate deficit
spending in an economy with widespread underemployed resources
would result in unmanageable inflationary pressures, at least in the
short run. In fact, it is probable that the initial impact of such spend-
ing would bring idle resources into production with relatively little ef-
fect on prices -- provided the necessary raw materials can be supplied
under liberal credit terms from foreign sources. A price stabilization
program covering essential goods -- food and clothing -- has been an-
nounced by the Indian Government. In addition, a network of consumer
stores will be set up, more wheat will be released from government
stocks, and efforts will be made to increase cloth production. These
measures, together with the patriotic surge engendered by the crisis,
will hopefully keep hoarding and profiteering to a manageable mini-
mum. In fact, measures arising from the mobilization effort not only
could help to solve the chronic underemployment situation in India and
the underutilization of industrial capacity in some areas but also could
contribute substantially to increasing production.
Indian statistical reporting indicates the existence of substantial
underutilization of production capacity. The extent of this failure to
utilize fully existing capital is greatest in the basic industries that
supply materials for the military establishment and among the capital
equipment suppliers for the consumer goods industries. Even in the
consumer goods industries, where it has been alleged that shortages
are greatest, there is an element of excess capacity. Inspection of
capacity-utilization statistics over several years indicates a chronic
tendency to understate capacity and thus a tendency to overstate utili-
zation of capacity.
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Recent additions to installed capacity in several key areas have
led to less than commensurate increases in output for these areas.
For example, additions that doubled the installed capacity in the iron
and steel industry led to an increase in iron and steel output of about
20 percent. Not only are imports of necessary raw materials and
parts limited by India's tight foreign exchange position, but also there
is a lack of followup in the planning, execution, and operational main-
tenance of existing plants. For the development-oriented Indians (and
this is true in many developing countries) it is easier to generate enthu-
siasm for creation of new projects than it is to meet the challenge of
fully utilizing established plants.
Table 1
Percentage Change in Installed Capacity and Output
for Selected Indian Industries
1960/61 - 1961/62 _a../
Installed Capacity
Production
Pig iron
+97
+17
Finished steel
+107
+21
Stationary diesel engines
+15
-3
Automobiles
+1
-4
Jute manufacturing
Nil
-6
Cement
+8
+7
a. Indian fiscal year, April-March.
A recent study of import statistics indicates substantial unused do-
mestic capacity in production of certain goods that were being purchased
abroad and paid for with scarce foreign exchange. Prominent items in
this category are steel pipes and tubes, steel files, copper tubing, wire
rope, and lead sheet.
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There appear to be exceptional opportunities for a considerable in-
crease in production in key areas of the Indian economy, such as the
basic iron and steel industry, with no increase in capital investment.
(Existence of excess capacity in the munitions industry is dealt with
else"trhere in this paper.)
25X6
The flow of external assistance for India's Third Five Year Plan
is expected to continue. There are no firm indications that India seri- 25X6
25X6 ouslr intends to seek substantial diversion of economic credits for mili-
tary end use,
The US has made it clear that previously extended economic aid
will remain earmarked for development purposes. The government of
India is basically assured of external support for the development pro-
gram through the second year of the Third Five Year Plan, ending in
April 1963. In all likelihood the government will make every possible
effort to fulfill its role in those projects for which foreign aid is avail-
able.
Although the pace and scope of India's defense effort cannot be
foreseen very precisely at the moment, it is believed that it could be
carried out without a major negative impact on Indian economic de-
velopment and even perhaps with positive effects in some sectors.
TroubLe spots do exist, however, in the economy. Activity during the
first 2 years of the present Five Year Plan indicates that India would
have been unable to fulfill its Plan goals under recent administration
of its economic affairs even in the absence of the present conflict
with Communist China. In fact, the main weakness in the Indian
economy probably lies in a lack of managerial skills. Nevertheless,
although the organization and conduct of economic affairs leaves much
to be desired, the Indian economy is not considered to be in serious
trouble.
Indications that India's Third Five Year Plan would not reach tar-
geted objectives this year (1962/63) include the following trouble spots:
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Exports
As of October 1962 it appears quite certain that exports in
1962/63 will fall short of the target, $1,512 million. On the basis
of statistics for the first quarter (April-June 1962) it is estimated
that the value of exports in this fiscal year will range between $1, 386
million and $1,407 million, approximately the same as in the previous
year ($1, 390). Underlying the forecast are lower returns from major
and traditional export items -- lower prices for jute and tea in partic-
ular -- and no over-all improvement in other export lines in spite of
promotion activity.
Agriculture
Preliminary estimates for 1962./63 indicate that agricultural
production generally will be higher than in the previous year. Progress
in the agricultural sector has been slow, however, and even if produc-
tion of foodgrains and pulses (the most important categories in the agri-
cultural sector) reaches the 81 million metric tons forecast, this amount
would represent only the achievement of targets established for 1960/61.
The target of the Third Five Year Plan for food.graiiwarid.ptIses'is..tlighTly
more than 100 million metric tons by 1966. In order to meet this target,
annual production in 1962 should be about 88 million metric tons.
Unfavorable weather and inadequate supplies of chemical ferti-
lizer have contributed to the disappointing increase in agricultural pro-
duction. A rapidly increasing population has made the per capita result
of this output even more unsatisfactory.
Inasmuch as agricultural income constitutes about half of India's
national income, a relatively constant or only slowly growing agricultural
output will seriously depress the average improvement in national income.
If this estimate of agricultural production proves to be correct, the in-
crease in national income in 1962/63 may be no more than 2 to 3 percent.
This follows an increase for 1961/62 of slightly more than 2 percent in
national income as against a rise of 7 percent in the preceding year. The
Third Five Year Plan requires an annual increase in national income of
about 5 percent.
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Industrial Production
In spite of the decline in the annual rate of increase in industrial
production in 1961 (the first since 1957), industrial production remains
the strongest influence for economic growth in India today. In large
measure the declize in the growth of industrial output is a product of a
serious lag in transport capacity and in the operation of the existing
productive capacity. Failure to meet output targets in electric power,
in part caused by the inability to haul coal when mined as well as by
lagging output at the mines, resulted in power failures in several large
cities that led in turn to reduced output in many major industrial centers.
Thus acute power shortages occurred at some industrial centers, while
at the same time a number of large electric stations were operating at
only 50 to 75 percent of capacity.
Planned rates of expansion in transport and power probably are
less than needed for 1962, but a directive to accord special priorities
in foreign exchange and construction to these sectors may raise the
level of actual (as opposed to planned) investment sufficiently to permit
substantial operational improvement. Even with increased attention,
these sectors would constitute a limitation on the expansion of military
output unless some substantial redirection of new capacity were under-
taken.
Output of steel, coal, cement, and fertilizer were all short of
plan during 1961, while effective demand for many of these commodities
exceeded production targets for 1961. Output of steel for 1962 shows
every promise of meeting planned levels, but transport and power short-
ages are likely to perpetuate the shortfalls in 1961 in the other indus-
tries.
The general industrial production index for the first half of
1962 was 7 to 8 percent above the same period of the previous year in
spite of a poor showing in cotton textiles, which constitute almost one-
half of the index weights. Output of jute and chemicals, as well as
steel, has increased sharply. Output of coal for the first half of 1962
has improved markedly, although it remains substantially under Plan
goals. In short, industrial production for 1962 will be much like that
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for 1961. The Sino-Indian Border War as such will exercise little im-
pact on industrial production for the calendar year of 1962.
Table 2
Index of Industrial Production
1951 =
Annual Increase
100 (Percent)
1957
136.4
1958
139.0
1.9
1959
149.5
7.6
1960
167.3
11.9
1961 al
180.5
7.9
a. Provisional.
Foreign Exchange Position
India's present foreign exchange reserves are $196.6 million,
down about $100 million during the past year. At the same time that
reserves have been dwindling, foreign exchange requirements for main-
tenance of imports under the Third Five Year Plan have been revised
upwards. (A recent estimate by the American Embassy indicates that
a billion dollars additional in foreign aid would be necessary to meet
plan goals.) Because of India's weakening foreign exchange position,
procurement of complex military equipment from abroad and technical
assistance for the manufacture in India of advanced military hardware
will have to be acquired on generous payment terms.
India's Defense Mobilization Potential
The expansion of India's munitions industry during World War II
left the country with substantial excess capacity, part of which has
since been devoted to peacetime production of metal goods for non-
military uses. Although self-sufficiency in military production has
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been a long-term goal of the Indian Government and although capacity
exists outside defense industries that would have made its achieve-
ment feasible, this objective has been subordinated to nonmilitary
economic development programs. Thus India has deferred the de-
velopment of capability for domestic production of modern aircraft
and ground equipment, depending on foreign sources for such weapons
and equipment. The UK has been the principal source of ground equip-
ment, while aircraft have been purchased from the UK, France, the
US, and the USSR. Previous Soviet offers to sell MIG-2,1's and aid in
the establishment in India of MIG manufacturing facilities are still con-
sidered firm by the Indian Government.
Indian military units have been underequipped in both quantityLand
quality by recent Western standards, as the government has sought to
temporize on defense expenditures until greater progress could be
achieved in India's basic economy. Although Indian defense spending
in fiscal year 1962 was at a record high,. it represented a declining
share of total government expenditures -- a decline that has persisted
throughout the past 10 years. Although India.n defense expenditures
have maintained a relatively constant relation to national income, vary-
ing around 2 percent of the latter, this is a small share even for a na-
tion at an early stage of development. Burma, for example, spends
more than 7 percent of the national income on defense.
The decline in the importance of defense spending has been, in
large partt a reflection of the increasing priority afforded the economic
developmdat program with its large government investment program.
Government investment is currently 3 to 4 times greater than defense
spending, while total investment (including private' investment) is more
than 5-1/2 times greater.
As a result of these expenditure policies, India's government-owned
defense plants are presently handicapped by outmoded and poorly main-
tained equipment and machinery and by some shortage of skilled technical
and managerial personnel. Production has generally concentrated on
World War II type infantry and light artillery weapons and ammunition,
which have proved inferior in recent engagements to those used by the
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Table 3
Indian Defense Expenditures
1952-62
Fiscal
Year 2/
Total
(Million US $)
As a Percent
of Total Government
Exmnditures
As a Percent
of
National Income
1952
389
35.5
1.8
1953
412
32.9
1.9
1954
410
24.7
2.0
1955
399
22.6
1.9
1956
445
19.0
1.9
1957
587
17.5
2.5
1958
586
17.4
2.2
1959
561
14.7
2.1
1960
590
14.4
2.0
1961
688
13.9
N. A.
1962 121
781
12.8
N.A.
a. Starting 1 April.
b. This figure will be boosted. by about $200 million as a
result of a supplemental appropriation in November 1962.
Chinese. Although production can be substantially increased with ex-
isting plant, a major retooling and machinery replacement program will
be required if India is to equip its ground forces with more modern weapons
from domestic sources. The process of retooling could be phased together
with. a program of transferring and training skilled workers and technicians
now in other industries or presently underemployed in defense industries.
The necessary programs will require foreign machinery and technical as-
sistance as well as certain manufacturing rights. The Indian Government
has requested such machinery from the US. Given this assistance and the
determination to carry out such a program, India could again supply a
modern army of considerable size as it did in World. War II, when the bulk
of ordnance supplies for the Indian forces of about 2.5 million, .as.well..as
substantial amounts of munitions for British forces, were supplied from
Indian. factories. *
* An of these factories remained in. India at the time of partition.
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The Indian aircraft industry, in spite of the fairly modern and ex-
tensive facilities of Hindustan Aircraft, Ltd., at Bangalore, is not in a
position to supply India's needs for combat and transport aircraft. De-
velopment of the HF-24 supersonic jet fighter beyond the prototype stage
has been slowed by problems of procurement of a suitable engine. The
diversity of aircraft now in the Indian Air Force inventory, which will
be further complicated if MIG-21's are added, creates formidable prob-
lems of maintenance and spares. Although the use of the plant at Banga-
lore and the maintenance facilities at Kanpur for repair and maintenance
work on presently held or newly acquired foreign aircraft would seem the
course of wisdom during the present crisis, it is probable that continued
efforts will be made to produce the HF-24 and to undertake production of
the MIG-21 if the Soviets remain willing.
s
As long as the Sino-Indian Border War is confined to border areas
where only relatively small forces can be supported on either side, it
is believed that the Indian logistic problem, while posing military dif-
ficulties, will not cause great impact on the Indian economy. Further-
more, if the Chinese choose to extend the war south of the Himalayas,
Indian logistic problems rapidly diminish while those of the Chinese in-
crease sharply. While the roads now extant will permit movement of
limited supplies to combat areas, many Indian troops in forward areas
can be supplied only by portages or airdrops. Fortunately, there are
a number of forward airfields available for both operations and logis-
tic support.
Th ,a Indians have at least 200,000 trucks in military and civilian
use, approximately the same number as Communist China. The dis-
tances over which supplies must be trucked to the combat areas is,
however, much shorter for the Indians than for the Chinese because
of the availability of railroad transport in adjacent rear areas. The
requirement for trucks and gasoline to maintain the Indian supply lines
is accordingly much less and impinges far less on the total availability
of these items to the military and the civilian economy. Existing
Indian refinery capacity. -- assuming sufficient imports of crude oil --
is considered to be sufficient to provide fuel for truck and air trans-
port and for air operations.
/7 November 1962
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