PROPOSED JOINT SOVIET BLOC - CUBAN SHIPPING SERVICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01003A001500260004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 11, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

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Current Support Brief
PROPOSED JOINT SOVIET BLOC - CUBAN SHIPPING SERVICES
CIA/RR CB 63-26
11 March 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File*
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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PROPOSED JOINT SOVIET BLOC CUBAN SHIPPING SERVICES
At the end of November 1962, representatives of the shipping organi-
zations of Cuba, the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary attended a conference in Rostock, East Germany, at the sugges-
tion of CEMA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). The conference
announced that a joint shipping service embracing Cuba, Poland, East
Germany, and Czechoslovakia is to be established between Cuba and Com-
munist Baltic ports.* The shipping service is to employ 12 ships totaling
110, 000 deadweight tons (DWT), and a total of four sailings are to take
place each way each month. The service was to begin on 1 January
1962. 2/ The prime reason for the conference appears to lie in an attempt
to provide regular and reliable service, rather than to increase the exist-
ing level of service.
In December 1962, another conference on shipping was held in
Moscow by the USSR and Cuba. No mention was made of the number of
Soviet ships to be employed, but the USSR assured Cuba that shipping
between the Soviet Bloc and Cuba would be guaranteed in the event that
a scarcity of Western ships resulted from US shipping restrictions. 3/
1. Scope of Activities
. Reports from the recent Rostock and Moscow conferences on ship-
ping vary slightly, but the decisions reached indicate that the joint Euro-
pean Satellite - Cuban service announced by the Rostock conference in
November will concentrate principally on Communist Baltic ports and
Although Bulgaria was neither in attendance at the CEMA conference
nor included in the joint shipping service, the September issue of a
periodical published by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Transportation
and Communications stated that Bulgaria intended to open a new regu-
lar line to Cuba. 1 / Two Bulgarian dry cargo ships and. two Bulgarian
tankers called at Cuba in 1962 on an irregular basis.
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that Soviet ships will provide service between Cuba and the Mediter-
ranean, North Africa, and the Black Sea. Soviet ships also will pro-
vide service covering Antwerp, Hamburg, Rotterdam, and London as
the need arises. Examination of the pattern of calls by Satellite and
Cuban ships in 1962 shows that Cuban ships did load at Western Atlantic
ports after calling at Baltic ports but that Satellite ships loaded only at
Baltic ports. Beginning in December 1962, Soviet ships have called
with greater frequency at Western Atlantic ports both inbound and out-
bound en route to and from Baltic ports. 4/
Unless the Satellite-Cuban shipping service is to include tramp
ships in addition to those already serving the Cuban run, the agreement
is merely formalizing and presumably coordinating the services in
existence during most of 1962. All but two of the Satellite and Cuban
dry cargo freighters on the run in January 1963, including those en
route to the Baltic and those in Europe scheduled to sail for Cuba, were
on the Cuban run before the disruption in November and December caused
by the US quarantine. There were 15 of these ships totaling 120, 000 DWT
compared with 12 ships totaling 110, 000 DWT proposed for the joint ship-
ping service. In addition to the 15 ships on the Cuban run before the
quarantine, two others, one East German ship in Cuba (possibly a tramp)
and a Cuban ship in Casablanca, raised the number involved in the Cuban
trade in January to 17 ships totaling 131, 000 DWT, well above the pro-
posed joint service fleet. Cuba also used nine other ships totaling
43, 000 DWT to make between one and three trips each to Europe and
North Africa in 1962. 5/ Although cargo information is not complete on
all trips, the available information indicates that all of the foregoing
ships were running reasonably full each.-.way. 6/
2. Implications
Inasmuch as the Satellite-Cuban agreement offers no improvement
in the scale of existing services, other conclusions or speculations as
to the reason for the agreement are in order. The policy of organizing
a joint line is in accord with other such moves formerly made by CEMA
countries, separately or in concert, in underdeveloped areas. The
Rostock conference is, however, the first known instance of a non-CEMA
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country actually participating in a Bloc shipping conference under
means of cem nt gMA
auspices. The implication of the conference as
xaHmplowe stheet "line" by the United be
political and economic relations is obvious-
p it ma follow the book-
operated is not known. Y by setting up common
Africa line (Polish and East German) each in Europe and in Cuba, staffed by s e f bear toe tablist a al
ing centers organization. The countries involved may go
specific shipping line under a name and a direction of its own h(like ike the r
e
which will solicit cargo and p
United West Africa d to it. On the other hand, the joint line may develop schedules
in lines for the purpose of
for the ships allotted to t.
into only a loose 1and agree anlg onl freight gates and fees.
coordinating schedules
Even coordination of schedules, however, if the schedules are
adhered to, will be an improvement on past performance of ships on
Cuban route. During 1962, arrivals in and sailings from Cuban
the
ports were -even of Polish ships whose schedules
very irregular -
were published in advance -- principally because of delays and a lack
we of ports. If 12 ships can be operated in truly
ready cargo in Cuban linerlike fashion, the efficiency of service to and from Cuba can be
greatly improved.
In b view of the fact that, from January 196 to
on the Coth t excess of 1Z ships run, he Satel-
lites and Cuba have had fa s in
be expected to be employed over and
additional tramp p "liner" operation. Poland and East
above the 12 ships assigned to the oG
ghters
a ermany, in particular, can afford to~e fleeta20 oceangoing fsre
vice to Cuba. In 1962, Poland added to 00 DWT.
of a type that could be used in the Cuban run. These totaled 1712, 3 0 0 000 DWT
augme trot er lines --
East Germany added 16 similar oceangoing
are 1 lannedgt hte
for its fleet. Most of these 36 ships p and East Africa
South America, US, India, and tramp,
for example, the West Africa,
routes -- but the capacity is there to expand service, particularly to Cuba. In 1963 it is likely that Cuba will take delive
these is nowP lishute
yards of three 10, 000-DWT freighters, and
a. 7/ All three most probably will gooon tre ns -Atlantic route,
erv
to Cuba. _ s
the probably into the 000DWTVCuban freighters presently in use on the
3, 000 -DWT to 6,
Trans -Atlantic run. - 3 -
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Analyst: 25X1A
Sources-
1. Air, 7000th Support Wing (USAFE) DOCOG. 1524870,
7 Nov 62. U.
2. FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 3 Dec 62,
p. EE Z. U.
3. FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 17 Dec 62,
p. BB 36. U.
4. Lloyds Shipping Index, daily, 1962-63. U.
5. Polish Ocean Lines Sailing Schedule, Dec 62. U.
6. Navy and State. Various intelligence reports, 1962. S.
7? FBIS, Economic Item 63, L318, Warsaw, 13 Jan 63.
OFF USE.
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