(Sanitized) CIA/RR CB 63-40 (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01003A001600110001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 29, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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Current Support Brief
THE CPSU LETTER OF 30 MARCH
TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS:
A REAFFIRMATION OF SOVIET STRATEGY
IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
CIA/RR CB 63-40
29 April 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
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THE CPSU LETTER OF 30 MARCH
TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS:
A REAFFIRMATION OF SOVIET STRATEGY
IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) took another step
toward bilateral discussions with the Chinese by proposing in its letter
of 30 March to Peiping that high-level talks begin in Moscow about
15 May. The USSR took the occasion to reaffirm its basic positions on
doctrinal issues, particularly with reference to its strategy in under-
developed countries. Because such questions undoubtedly will be a
major issue in any forthcoming meeting and because Moscow shows
little inclination to modify its basic approach to the "national liberation"
movement, it may be useful to review briefly the Soviet position as ex-
pressed in the letter of 30 March.
1. Some Underlying Assumptions
The underlying strategic concept which motivates current Soviet
policies in underdeveloped areas has its doctrinal roots deep in a Com-
munist perspective that envisages the growth of the world revolution as
essentially a centripetal historical process in which a growing federa-
tion of industrialized Soviet republics draws "liberated" colonies into
their orbit largely by force of "economic attraction. " Tactically,
Soviet theoreticians visualize the transformation of underdeveloped
countries to socialism as encompassing a two-stage process: in the
first stage, socialist countries support bourgeois national liberation
movements in which indigenous Communists play a subordinate role;
in the second stage, socialist countries actively encourage a progressive
polarization of class forces within the country in which a proletarian,
peasant-based Communist alliance would assume dominant control and
further the "social" (Communist) revolution.
Predicated on the assumption that with Western morale and will to
resist vitiated by this growing "encirclement" of Soviet-dominated nations,
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current Communist doctrine concludes that "the remaining bourgeois
complexes will in all probability surrender with all their organizations
intact." Whether, in fact, this nonviolent -- and on the whole opti-
mistic -- solution would be realized depends primarily on capitalism's
own efforts to avert its impending collapse. It was previously conceded,
however, that the West would seek to resist this transformation through
resort to force and hence the "series of frightful collisions" that both
Lenin and Stalin envisaged for the period of transition to world Com-
munism:
The working class and its vanguard, the Marxist-
Leninist parties, are striving to carry out socialist
revolution by peaceful means, without civil war. Imple-
mentation of this possibility would correspond to the
interests of the working class and of all people, the
nationwide interests of the country. Besides this, the
choice of the road to the development of revolution does
not depend only on the working class. If the exploiting
classes resort to violence toward the people, the working
class will be obliged to use nonpeaceful means to gain
power.*
What is significant in more contemporary Soviet attitudes toward
East-West relations in general, and the national liberation movement in
particular, is the present Soviet leadership's assessment of the existing
"correlation" (that is, balance) of world forces -- an appraisal that takes
account of the nuclear stalemate and the growing economic power of the
socialist countries and that effectively denies to the West its traditional
alternative of reliance on military force to resolve the East-West strug-
gle:
All quotations are from the text of the CPSU letter of 30 March.
2 -
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The antipopular and predatory nature of imperialism
has not altered, but with the establishment of the world
socialist system, with the growth of its economic and
military might, the possibilities of imperialism's in-
fluencing the course of the historic process are being
markedly curtailed ... . Fear of the answering blow and
the terror of retribution restrain them from unleashing
world war. The socialist comity has become so strong
that imperialism can no longer thrust its conditions and
dictate its will on the peoples as before.
Hence the terms of Khrushchev's coexistence may be "imposed" on the
West, thus providing a growing possibility for the USSR to select both
the forms of struggle and the field of battle.
2. Neutralism and the National Bourgeoisie
Whereas Stalin refused to recognize in principle or in fact the ex-
istence of a "third force, " an "uncommitted country, " or a "neutral"
in the East-West conflict, Khrushchev not only accepts the fact that
between the two poles of imperialism and ants-jrnperialism there is a
"neutralist zone" but stoutly endorses the policy of nonalignment as a
practical and advantageous one for the uncommitted nations. Signifi-
cantly the current Soviet interpretation of neutralism is markedly dif-
ferent in emphasis from that commonly accepted by the West or, indeed,
by Stalin. The idea of a "third force" playing an essentially passive and
peripheral role in world affairs is thoroughly rejected by the present
Soviet leadership. A policy of neutralism is in no way synonymous with
a renunciation of active participation in world politics or, more impor-
tantly, in the struggle against imperialism. On the contrary, neutralism
and nonalignment not only offer an opportunity for independent political
development but create favorable conditions for economic development
and large-scale material support from the Bloc:
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The Communist Party of the Soviet Union regards fra-
ternal alliance with the peoples who have cast away the
colonial yoke and the peoples in semi-colonies as one of
the cornerstones of its international policy. Our Party
regards it as its international duty to help the peoples
advancing along the path of gaining and strengthening
national independence, all peoples striving for the com-
plete destruction of the colonial system. The Soviet
Union has been and is supporting ... all-round moral,
economic, military, and political support to the na-
tional liberation movement.
Moreover, the nonalignment policies of many newly emergent nations
are regarded by the USSR as a peculiar form of split in the world capi-
talist system -- a denial to imperialism of its hitherto trusted rear or
reserve. The extension of Bloc economic ties with newly emergent na-
tions is designed effectively to preempt traditional Western economic
domination and to deny to capitalism unrestricted access to the markets
and sources of cheap labor and strategic raw materials on which a sub-
stantial part of its strength is presumed to rest:
The peoples struggling for their on national libera-
tion and those who have already won political independ-
ence have ceased or are ceasing to serve as a reserve of
imperialism ... . Now, when political independence has
been gained, the struggle of the young sovereign states
against imperialism and for final national regeneration
and economic independence is coming to the fore. The un-
derdeveloped countries' achievement of complete independ-
ence would mean a new, serious weakening of imperialism,
since in that case the entire system of the present plun-
dering and unequal international distribution of labor
would unavoidably be destroyed. The basis of economic
exploitation of the world's rural areas by capitalist
monopolies would be undermined. The development of the
independent national economy of the underdeveloped coun-
tries, using as a basis the effective aid of the socialist
system, will deal a new, heavy blow to imperialism.
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Reminiscent of the Communist tactics toward national liberation
movements before Chiang Kai-shek's "betrayal" in 1927 and again dur-
ing the "popular front" movements in the mid-thirties, Khrushchev has
reinvested bourgeois -nationalist leaders with an "historically useful
role' in the struggle for national liberation, thus establishing the basis
for "lengthy cooperation" between them and the countries of socialism.
For what seems of major significance in current Soviet attitudes toward
non-Communist governments of underdeveloped countries is not the
ideological commitments and ultimate ambitions of one or another of
the contemporary national bourgeois leaders but the more immediate
goals toward which they strive and the "objective" consequences (such
as N.sser's anti-Western bent) of their actions. Regardless of whether
they "themselves realize the full meaning of the revolution in which they
have taken part, their avowed policies of "nonalignment, " when reflected
in a coincidence of attitudes with the Bloc on many international issues,
enable them to play, in the eyes of Soviet strategic planners, an essen-
tial role in the anti-imperialist struggle and make them unwitting allies
in the development of the world socialist revolution.
Thus differences in outlook and social systems need not impede the
development of friendly state-to-state relations with such governments,
and even overt anti-Communism may be tolerated, within the context of
Khrushchev's more "creative" approach to the national liberation move-
ment:
In the struggle to gain and consolidate independence,
the all-round cohesion of all the forces of the nation
which are ready to struggle against imperialism is essen-
tial. The right wing of the national bourgeoisie, striv-
ing to consolidate its dominating position after the
achievement of independence, can establish reactionary
political regimes and persecute communists and other dem-
ocrats for some time. Such regimes are not, however,
longlasting, if for no other reason than that they hinder
progress and ... achievement of economic independence ... .
This is why, despite active support by the imperialists,
these regimes will be swept away by the struggle of the
popular masses.
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Within this Communist perspective, Soviet Bloc economic assist-
ance to prospective national democracies is viewed as helping to build
up an economic system that ultimately will become the legacy of a Com-
munist regime. Khrushchev may well insist that his policy is one of aid
to peoples rather than to governments: Nassers may come and go, he
once remarked, but the Aswan Dam as a symbol of Communist aid would
stand forever.
3. "National Democracy"
In what appeared to be a tactical effort to forestall "doctrinarians
and Leftists, " who seek to "jump over certain historical stages, " a
vaguely worded and ill-defined concept of the "national democratic
state" was inserted at Soviet suggestion in the Declaration of the Moscow
Conference of 81 Communist Parties in December 1960. Designed, ap-
parently, to formalize the transitional stage of development in countries
where "capitalism has lived out its day, but the conditions for socialism
have not yet matured, " the "national democratic" government is to con-
sist of a ruling coalition embracing elements of the working class, the
peasantry, the democratic intelligentsia, and the anti-imperialist strata
of the national bourgeoisie. "National democracy" does not pose as its
immediate goal the liquidation of all exploiting classes or the construc-
tion of Soviet-style socialism but rather the completion of the "bourgeois-
democratic, national-liberation, anti-imperialist, and feudal revolution. "
The calculated vagueness with which the 81-Party Declaration dealt
with the concept of national democracy, and Peiping's subsequent silence
on the thesis suggests that Moscow's more gradualist formula for the
period of transition between national liberation and socialist revolution
in underdeveloped countries has not met with Chinese acceptance.
The Soviet letter of 30 March refrains from employing the term
"national democracy" in deference to apparent Chinese sensitivities on
the subject but reaffirms its belief in the formulation as a particularly
relevant definition of the sort of environment in a non-Communist state
that will lead it into a Communist course of development:
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The emancipated peoples are coming face to face with
the problem of consolidating political independence, liq-
uidating economic and cultural backwardness, and destroy-
ing all forms of dependence on imperialism. The vital
tasks of national regeneration in the countries which have
cast off the colonial yoke are successfully realized only
on the condition of a resolute struggle being waged against
imperialism and the remnants of feudalism, through unifica-
tion into a single national front of all patriotic forces
of the nation: the working class, the peasantry, the na-
tional bourgeoisie, and the democratic intelligentsia.
To date, no "national democratic" states have as yet been recog-
nized as such, although Soviet spokesmen have consistently pointed to
Indonesia, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali as examples of "prospective na-
tional democracies. " Cuba, originally hailed by Bloc spokesmen as a
"national democracy, " apparently has been unwilling to accept the
formula, perhaps in anticipation of a higher state of historical de-
velopment than the "national democratic state" formula implies. Sig-
nificantly the recently announced Soviet slogans for May Day 1963 ac-
knowledge Cuba as in the process of "building socialism. "
4. Prospects
The tenor of the Soviet note seems to provide for little or no com-
promise in the Soviet position. While ostensibly welcoming "an exchange
of opinions" at the projected meeting, it nevertheless asserts, "The en-
tire course of world development in recent years has fully confirmed the
correctness of the line of the Communist movement, " and adds, "We are
deeply convinced that there are no grounds for a reexamination of this
line. "
Furthermore, that the Kremlin continues to be reluctant to sanction
any immediate overt moves for power by Communist Parties in underde-
veloped countries is made patently clear in its warning that "precise
analysis of the concrete situation and correct assessment of the correla-
tion of forces are among the most important conditions of the revolution":
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One must not hold back the impulse of revolutionary
masses in the struggle for the victory of socialist revo-
lution when objective and subjective conditions have be-
come ripe for this; this would be like death. But revo-
lution must not be pushed artificially if conditions are
not ripe. A premature rising, the experience of the class
revolutionary struggle shows, is doomed to failure.
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