STATUS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID TO BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01003A001700230001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 26, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

SECR -oved For Release 2000/05/12: CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01700230001-7
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Current Support Brief
STATUS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID TO BURMA
CIA/RR CB 63-78
26 September 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01700230001-7
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01700230001-7
 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001700230001-7
STATUS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID TO BURMA
On 9 January 1961 the Peoples Republic of China extended a line of
credit for $84 million* to the government of the Union of Burma. The
agreement signed at that time specified that projects were to be imple-
mented under the credit between 1 October 1961 and 30 September 1967. 1/
Until quite recently, Chinese Communist economic assistance to Burma
had been limited to planning for the utilization of between one-third and
one-half of the $84 million. Since the beginning of 1963 the Chinese Com-
munists have undertaken a number of feasibility studies and technical
assistance projects under the 1961 line of credit. 2/ This recent activity,
coupled with the completion of all planned surveys for construction under
the credit, has led some observers to believe that construction of the
various Chinese Communist projects may begin in the near future. 3/
There has been ample evidence that the Burmese press and govern-
ment anticipate deliveries of substantive aid under the $84 million credit.
Although it is difficult to dispute the capacity of Burma to absorb such
aid, there are many indications that the Chinese Communists are less
than eager to proceed with construction. If the construction projects
under the credit are to be implemented in theLnear future, the next
year should witness a significant increase in the number of Chinese
Communist economic technicians in Burma, the preparation of some
of the construction sites, and the beginning of a program of commodity
imports to generate counterpart funds. Thus far, there are no firm
indications that drawings against the credit during the coming Burmese
fiscal year)"44 will total more than the estimated $2 million drawn to date.
It is unlikely, therefore, that activity under the $84 million credit will
prove to be of political benefit to the Chinese Communists in the fore-
seeable future. The Chinese will find it increasingly difficult to prolong
negotiations and continue to achieve propaganda successes beneficial to
the maintenance of their favored political position.
z Dollar values in this publication are given in terms of current US
dollars.
I,"* The fiscal year in Burma runs from 1 October to 30 September.
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 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001700230001-7
1. Magnitude of Chinese Communist Economic Assistance
In late December 1961 the Chinese Communists reportedly asked
the Burmese not to insist on using mor~ than $42 million of the 1961
line of credit until after 1963. 4/ Becaise the projects planned at the
end of 1961 included a 265-mile highway, in Wa State and a diesel-engine
and water-pump plant that subsequentlyhave been canceled, 5/ it is
probable that the $42 million :represent d total obligations at that time.
These cancellations bring the amount olligated down to an estimated
$25 million. Thus the Burmese can. clallim to have planned the disposi-
tion of one-third to one-half of the $84 illion credit that was extended
to their government almost 3 years ago
There has been so little productive (,activity under the Chinese credit
that estimates of total drawings are difficult to make. The only tangible
benefit that the Burmese have :received under the credit was the delivery
in April 1963 of 3, 500 apple, peach, an( I pear seedlings. 6/ Other draw-
ings against the credit have been limited to surveys for those construction
projects thus far planned, recent technical assistance activities of Chinese
Communist experts in Burma, and a number of feasibility studies presently
underway. 7/ It has been estimated. that only $2 million had been drawn
against the Chinese Communist credit by 30 June 1963. 8/ Thus, with the
Chinese Communist $84: million credit iapidly approaching the third anni-
versary of its extension and the halfway mark in the planned period of
implementation, less than 3 percent. of the total value has been delivered
to Burma.
2, Projects Planned Under the Chines Communist Credit*
By mid-1961 the Burmese had undertaken the planning of projects at
the state and national levels, and the government had created a board
that was to concern itself solely with implementation of the credit. 9/
In early October 1961 the government o Burma submitted to the Chinese
some 49 different project proposals, 9 of which the Chinese agreed to
review seriously. 10/ A Burmese delegation to China in December of
-~ For locations of Chinese aid projects'i in Burma, see the map, follow-
ing p. 2.
S-E-C-R-E-T
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