Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 20, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 1, 1965
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T01003A002200050001-1.pdf523.21 KB
Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : M 2RtRIetb1003A002200050001-1 IN' 1 El LIGENCE BRIEF JA/RR G13 65--5 January 1965 Copy No. 1.AG IN SOVIET EFFORTS TO CONSCRIPT PLANTS ^'y 'ROF)UC E c;H1,:MiC;AL. E'QUL1'MEN'I` .( I'()RATF, OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Research and Reports 30P I 4 x:Uinq dttd ~ sa i #, afw Ins ficotinn _.. _f Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP19101003A002200050001'-1 Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02200050001-1 This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02200050001-1 Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200050001-1 S-E-C-R-E-T LAG IN SOVIET EFFORTS TO CONSCRIPT PLANTS TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT A year has now elapsed since the Soviet leadership announced a major new effort to boost output of the chemical industry. An important supporting role for this well-publicized program was to have been assigned to certain machine building plants identified in December 1963 for partial conversion from their customary production to that of chem- ical. machinery and equipment. Thus far it appears that this activity is faltering badly. The chemical, program as outlined by Khrushchev in December 1963 at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party called for massive investment through 1970 as shown in the following tab- ulation- Billion Rubles** Total investment in the program (including some investment in other sectors) 42 Direct investment in the chemical industry 25 Equipment required for the program 16 Equipment indus try required for the chemical 10 It was evident to Soviet planners that the machinery required for the program could not be met fully from a rapid expansion of the existing chemical machine building industry and from imports. At that time, Khrushcheve s Chairman of the State Committee for Chemical and Oil Machine Building, Leonid Kostandov, rose to tell the plenum that nine additional machine building plants would be called on to backstop the Rubles nominally may be converted to dollars at the official rate of exchange of 0. 90 ruble to US $1. This does not indicate, however, the relative burden of the chemical program on the Soviet economy or the true costs of the program in dollars. Ruble figures are intended to in- dicate only that the requirements for chemical equipment through 1.970 are very large relative to present production. It is not intended to suggest in any way the level of support for the program that might be required from the nonchemical machine building sector. S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200050001-1 Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200050001-1 S-E-C-R-E-.T effort. Kostandov's list included two shipyards, two railroad equip- ment plants, and several other plants producing various kinds of heavy industrial machinery. In the weeks immediately following the plenum, 11 other nonchemical equipment plants were identified in the Soviet press for conversion. 1/ 1. Background 25X1 C A review of Soviet open-source information for 1964 clearly suggests that the conversion program is not going according to plan. Only in the case of the Zhdanov Shipyard in Leningrad and a machine building plant in Kishinev has anything come to light. The Zhdanov works is now producing heat exchangers and condensers for chemical. combines, and the Kishinev works is produc- ing "many types of machinery and equipment for the chemical industry. These references, however, are not firm indications of conversion, because both of these installations already were suppliers of limited amounts of chemical equipment before December 1963. Although Soviet political leaders traditionally are overly optimistic in assigning new technological programs and generally expect more than can be accomplished, they apparently missed the mark by a considerable degree with the conversion program. There were hints almost from the start that major difficulties were arising. As early as February of 1964, Khrushchev soundly castigated Soviet planners for failing to take the necessary steps to promote the chemical industry because of "parochial allegiance to this or that branch of production. " 2/ Some of the bureaucratic foot-dragging can be explained by sheer inertia in the Soviet planning system and by a strong desire on the part of indus- trial managers to retain the type of production activity with which they are most familiar rather than undergo a disruptive -- and bonus dimin- ishing -- conversion to an unfamiliar product line, however well advised it might be for the economy as a whole. 2. Specific Problems Some of the concern., however, undoubtedly was based on the fact that some of the plants identified for conversion were manifestly un- suited to produce chemical equipment. One such plant is the Novo- krama.torsk Metallurgical Equipment Combine in the Ukraine. This industrial giant, which is geared to making mammoth castings and forgings for the steel-processing industry, can produce and has produced S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200050001-1 Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA RDP79T01003A002200050001-1 S-E-C-R-E-T equipment for the chemical industry, but for it to be required to do so on a large scale would have amounted to a wholesale revamping of the present production structure of the combine and the mothballing of many large machine tools. The president of a US metallurgical equipment factory somewhat similar to the Novokr.amatorsk combine stated that such a conversion program would virtually put his company out of business. Furthermore, this same official. said that were he the Soviet industrial manager concerned, he would have no difficulty in pre- senting a, convincing case against such a conversion. There has been nothing in the Soviet press to suggest that the leadership has now set aside the conversion program or that sufficient chemical equipment is being produced by the specialized plants to obviate the need for such conversion. In fact, there apparently are some strong proponents of expanding the program, An article in the JIu.l.y 1964 issue of Voprosy ekonomiki, the major Soviet economic jour- nal, strongly urged that 30 to 35 machine building plants be converted to production of chemical equipment -- not just the 9 originally iden- tified by Kostandov -- because the present chemical: equipment industry cannot be expanded rapidly enough through 1970 to fulfill requirements. 3i Based on an announced planned increase of 55 percent during 1964-65, an annual increase of 25 percent in production of chemical machinery was needed to meet plans in 1964. The actual increase for 1.964 prob- ably will be less than 20 percent. S-E.-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02200050001-1 Approved For Release 2001/04/17: CIA-RDP79T01003A002200050001-1 S-E-C-R-E- Sources: 1. CIA. CIA/RR CB 64-8, Soviet Conscription of Plants to Pro- duce Chemical Equipment, Jan 64. S. 2. Pravda, 14 Feb 64. U. 3. Voprosy ekonomiki, no 7, Jul 64. U. Analysts' 25X1A S,-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02200050001-1 Approved For Release 2001/0SECRE-RDP79T01003A002200050001-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02200050001-1 Analysts: Approved For Release 2001/04/17: CIA 300"1"26868560014'I 5205) OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS St/P/RR - Control Section 25X1A 25X1A Control Sheet CBOU? 1 ET Excluded from automatic dowunradfnd and dvinslticatfon Series Number CIA/RR CS 65-5 Classification Date of Document Janu rv-1965 rq Number of Copies 280 21 Jan 65 Approved For Release 2001/04/17: CIA-RDp7Q1003AO__ o405AA.ni_1. ---?. Recipient St/P OCR SA/RR CGS/HR/Ops, 1G81, H r Approved For Release 2001/04/17 :~ 79T01003A002200050001-1 CREW--- Copy No. I O/DDI, Room 7E32, Hdqtrs. 2-3 NIC 4 - 12 OCI Internal 13 - 15 ONE 25X1 A 16 - 21 St/CS/R 22 O/DDI - 23 - 31 NSA 32 NSAL 33 - 280 ORR Distribution, St/A/Document Support Section, Room GH0915, Hdqtrs. 25X1A (Distributed by OCR) Distribution of Current Support Brief No. to to Conscript sepal to Produce ?rnte GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declanlilcattan Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200050001-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200050001-1 St/A/DS Distribution of Current Support Brief No. 65-5, lag in Soviet Efforts to Conscript Plants to Produce Chemical Equipment -- January 1965 (SECRET) Copy No. Recipient 33 AD/RR 34 DAD / RR 35 Ch/E 36 St/PR 37 - 42 D/A (1 each branch) 43 - 48 D/MS (1 each branch) 49 - 54 D/R (1 each branch) 55 MRA 56 - 60 D/P (1 each branch) 61 - 66 D /F (1 each branch) 67 St/PS 68 - 76 D/1 (1 each branch) 77 - 78 D/GG 79 - 80 D/GC 81 D/GX/X 25X1A 82 - 87 RID/AN, Unit 4, Room 1B4004, Hq. 88 St/P/A 89 St/FM 90 & 230 Analyst/Branch 91 GR/CR 92 BR/CR 93 FIB /SR/CR, Room 1G27, Hq. 94 Library/CR 95 IPI/CR. 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 - 103 104 - 106 107 108 109- 110 III 112 Chief, OCR/FDD CD/0O OCI/SA/R, Room 5G19, Hq. DD1/CGS, Room 7F35, Hq. DDI/CGS/HR, Room 1G81, Hq. OSI OB1 DD /,SF T/SAINT 25X1A C)TR,/fS /IP,. Room 532, Broyhill Bld . , 1000 Glebe (1 9 OTR/SIC) NPIC/CSD/REF, Room 15518, Commandant National War College, Leslie McNair, Attn: Classified Records Section, Rm. 26, Nat'l War College Bldg., Washington, D. C.. 1.13 114 Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, Room 4D825, Pentagon 115 1.53 Defense Intelligence Agency, DIAAQ-3, ABldg., Arlington Hall Station 154 157 USIA, Warren Phelps, IRR/D, Room 812, Walker Johnson Bi.uildin. , 1734 New York Avenue, N. W. 158 169 State, IN Communications Center, Room 7818, State Dept. Bldg. 170 171 Dr. Neilson Debevoise, NSC, Room 365, Executive Office Bldg. 172 173 Frank M.Charrette, Agency for International Development, Chief, 174 - AZZ9 231 - 280 Statistics and Reports Division, Room A-204, State Annex #10 St/P/C/RR, Room 4F41, Hq. Records Center Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA- 1T aeleda yfffl dosaagrading and dpc asificatlan Approved For Release 2 k-RDP79TO1003A002200050001-1 26 January 1965 State, Counieations Center, Room 7818, State Dept. Bldg. Suggested distribution for Embassies in Berlin, Moscow, Bonn, Geneva, and London 25X1A v04 RA DI FOR: Chief, Dissemination Control Branch, DID/CR FR(14 : Chief', Publications Staff, 0 1 5r Secret, be forwarded: as follows: . It is requested that the attmc e c p Soviet Efforts to Conscript Plants to Produce Chemical E-LIRIPMER-1.1 January Transmittal of Material RR CB 65`5 ; in h A o -1 es of / Copies #197 - jeol of cB 65-5 Ar! CD D The dissen-m_ation requested by this memorandum has been completeth BY: l7RIe. / I Approved For Release 2001/04 SECRET 17"nU ;l,,'40R*T01003AO02200050001-1 and nGp,.ty Approved For Release 2001/04/17. 1A-rR-DP79T01003A002200050001-1 Project No. 34. 5205 Report Series CIA/RR CB 65-5 Title La in Soviet Efforts to Conscript Plants to Produce Chemical Equipment --- January 1965 (SECRET) Responsible Analyst and Branch RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION TO STATE POSTS ~B lin, Germany Bucharest, Romania Budapest, Hungary .Moscow, USSR Prague, Czechoslovakia Sofia, Bulgaria Warsaw, Poland Europe Belgrade, Yugoslavia Bern, Switzerland n, Germany Brussels, Belgium Copenhagen, Denmark Frankfurt, Germany Geneva, Switzerland Helsinki, Finland The Hague, Netherlands Lisbon, Portugal -London, England Luxembourg, Luxembourg Madrid, Spain Oslo, Norway Paxis, France Rome, Italy Stockholm, Sweden Vienna, Austria Pacific Bangkok, Thailand Djakarta., Indonesia Hong Kong Rangoon, Burma Kuala Lumpur, Malaya Saigon, Vietnam Seoul, Korea Singapore, British Malaya Taipei, Formosa Tokyo, Japan Vientiane, Laos Phnom Penh, Cambodia Colombo, Ceylon Near East & South Asia Ankara, Turkey Athens, Greece Cairo, Egypt Damascus, Syria Kabul, Afghanistan Karachi, Pakistan New Delhi, India Nicosia, Cyprus Tehran, Iran Baghdad, Iraq Tel Aviv, Israel Beirut, Lebanon Amman, Jordon Jidda, Saudi Arabia Wellington, New Zealand Ottawa, Canada Manila, Philippine s Canberra, Australia Melbour3x op rove olrl-2elease 200 MS/M 25X1A Mexico Guatemala Panama Brazillia, Brazil Buenos Aires, Argentina Bogota, Colombia Santiago, Chile La Paz, Bolivia Montevideo, Uruguay Caracas, Venezuela Africa Yaounde, Cameroun Leopoldville, Congo Addis Ababa, Ethopia Accra, Ghana Abidjan, Ivory Coast Nairobi, Kenya Monrovia, Liberia Tripoli, Libya Rabat, Morocco Lagos, Nigeria Mogadiscio, Somal Khartoum, Sudan Tunis, Tunisia Pretoria, South Africa. Algiers, Algeria Cotonou, Dahomey Dakar, Senegal Bamako, Mali A-,RD da re P19TO141OdD A002200050001 -1 ra"ing aa SECRET A it d -1 X~ -14144 p A" n Fnr RECORD OF REVIEW OF ORR PUBLICATIONS FOR SECURITY SANITIZA 10 ROVAL jJBJECT 25X1 C 25X1 C S 50001-1 (9.36-43) FORM n c p Excluded from automatic 1 2- 64 L :JO downgrading and declassification