BOMBING OF THE RAILROAD TRANSIT ROUTE THROUGH NORTH VIETNAM HAS LITTLE EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01003A002400250001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

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INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
BOMBING OF THE RAILROAD TRANSIT ROUTE
'~'HR~UG~-f 1VURTH- VIETI~TAM HAS LITTLE EFFECT
ON ,THE ECQNOMY OF CO1vIMUNIST CHINA
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
-Office of Research ,and Repoxts
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Excluded from' ovlomatic
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BOMBING OF THE RAILROAD TRANSIT ROUTE
THROUGH NORTH VIETNAM .HAS LITTLE EFFECT
ON THE ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA~~
Summary
The economy of Communist China, including that of the southwestern
province of Yunnan, will experience no appreciable adverse effects as a
consequence of the bombing of the railroad transit route through.T1'orth
Vietnam. The Chinese have sufficient trucks and_road capacity tp move
any essential traffic by interior routes to and from Yunnan Province,.
although transportation costs will be greater. Loss of transit rai7~
service, however, may hindex the economic development of yunnaGn
for the next year or two until construction is completed on a direct rail
connection between the province and the main Chinese rail system.
After that time, there will be practically no need for the transit route-
through North Vietnam.
'~~ The estimates and conclusions in this brief represent. the best judg-
ment of this Office as of 1 December 1965.
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1. The Economy of Yunnan Province
Yunnan, one of -the most isolated provinces. of Communist China,
has basically aself-sufficient agricultural economy. The province is
dependent in only. a few important respects on, and. contributes co~mpara-
tively little to, the rest of China. Much of the construction effort to
extend the Chinese railroad network in recent years, however, ha,s been
aimed. at improving transportation between this area and the rest of take
country in order to develop .the economy- of Yunnan and. to facilitate mili-
tary and political control of the area.
a. Relationship of Yunnan to the Economy of China
The major contribution of Yunnan.ta the economy of China con-
sists of the production.of a few important metals. .that have been maned
in the province for many years, the- most important of which are tin
and. copper. At least 10,.000. to 12, 000. metric tons (mt) of tin per
year -- about 75 percent of China's- total estimated output in recent
years. -- are mined and refined in the area of Ko-chiu, located south
of K?un_ming (see .the map). Chinese requirements fa.r tin are sm;x.11
and.most of this production is exported.. Chinese exports of tin .have
amounted to only $10 million to $12 million annually in the past few
years,. however, and they account for only a small fraction. of Chinaa's
total foreign trade earnings. About 20, 000 mt of copper per year -.
roughly 25 percent of China's output ---are mined in Yunnan. IV.Iosi:-
of this copper is used within China. In addition, Yunnan produces
small amounts of lead, tungsten, and nickel, but in quantities. too
small to make more than a slight contribution to the economy of
China.
- The only manufacturing industry in Yunnan of importance t~
the Chinese economy is the recently expanded machine tool plant in
K'un-ming. Small quantities of jig borers, milling machines, and
lathes are shipped from this plant to the rest of China. -The plant is
believed to be nearly self-sufficient because pig iron, steel castings,
and rolled steel are produced in both K'un-ming-and An-ning.
The most important commodity transported into Yunnan,.is
petroleum, a large part of which is used for military purposes, In
addition, such items as rails, structural steel, construction equip-
ment, transformers, generators, spare parts, light industrial products,
fertilizer, consumer goods, ;and medicines have been moved into the
province by the transit route.
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b. Trans ort Connections with 'Yunnan
The only direct connection between Yunnan`s sparse transport
network and the main Chinese transport system is by road.' The most
direct road connection is a windin drs ustem of Chinna at An sh n in han-i
railroad line with the main rallroa Y
Kweichow Province. Two additions ~ on d nks I{"unoming with Nan ning
are also of Importance. one connec
on the main railroad system in dws nsg em at Ancpiennin Sze hwanlProvince.
K'un-ming with the main. rallr-oa Y
Extension of the railroad system from terminals in Kweichow
and Szechwan Provinces to Yunnan P a Hsulanhweband 'Chan-P may beby
Peiping, and the line from An-shun
completed in 1966 or 196'x? Pending the completion of a railroad line
within Communist China, all rail tr of thetD g D ng -YHano~ h Lao Ca
through North Vietnam, primarily o
railroad network which connects Yunnan with Kwangsi.. In addition,
some transit traffic has moved ohCalg ~eh~~ ~u~i?an a This entire transit
over the Haiphong -Hanoi - La
route is meter gauge, the interchange point with the main standard-gauge
system. being at Ping-hsiang in Kwangsi Province,
Z. Effects of the Bombin of the Rail Transit Route
a, Loss of Through Rail Service
In July 1965, US aircraft began bombing railroad bridges along
certain sections of the Hanoi - Laoo and from Yunnan. t This t of fminating
all, ar almost all, transit traffic t
averaged. almost 1, Z00 mt per day during 1963 anal by 1964 had increased
to perhaps 1, 30f1 mt per day. Petroleum transported by tank car from.
Kwangsi to Yunnan probably 3 0 tmt e s day Pn both 19b3 and 1964
freight, accounting for about 5 p
During the four months that through traffic has not moved on
the line, there has been no evidence that the disruption of transit traffic
through North Vietnam has r hi laeasia wholes Analysissof aerial pho~my
of Yunnan or of Communist C
tography, however, indicates that the North Vietnamese have attempted
>F Although a recent report claims that a railroad 1 the f re ort htas n t
P
through An-pien to K'un wing has been complete
been confirmed
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to restore through rail service on the Hanoi -Lao Ca railroad line. No
similar attempt has been made to restore through rail service to the
heavily bombed southern part of North Vietnam. Restoration of t~r'affic
on the Hanoi -Lao Cai line is important to North Vietnam becausE:, in
addition to the transit traffic, the line normally carries considerable
domestic traffic, including North Vietnamese products for export. The
most important of these export products is apatite from the mines near
Lao Cai.
Alternative Means of Transportation
The three main road networks from Kweichow, Szechwan, and
Kwangsi Provinces to Yunnan have sufficient capacity to move the normal
flow of commodities to and from Yunnan. The Chinese can thus resort
to combined rail and truck transportation within China as a short-run
.alternative to rail service through North Vietnam. The Chinese also
have the alternative of continuing to move supplies through-North 'Vietnam
by using a combination of rail., truck, and inland water transportation.
to circumvent bombed sections of the railroad line. This method prob-
ably would be used only if road transportation within China became in-
adequate, because it would involve both the use of scarce transpoY?t
equipment in North Vietnam and t:he risk of destruction by aerial attack.
About 500 to 600 trucks per day are sufficient to carry petroleum9~~ to
Yunnan by a combined rail-truck route within China. These trucks can
transport all normal exports from Yunnan -- including tin and copper ~~
on their return trip. It is estimated that China has about 230, 000 trucks
in its civilian and military inventories, and such a reallocation of trucks
can be made with little disruption to the economy. In early 1964, some
petroleum products for the Koun-ming area were being moved on the
road from Kweichow, the shortest route into Yunnan, by both tank i:ru.c.ks
and trucks carrying drums. Even so, the transportation cost over the
shortest truck route within China is at least 20 percent greater than
over the former all-rail or sea-rai.l transit route through North Vietnam.
Construction of railroad lines leading to Yunnan will not be
greatly hindered by the cutting off of shipments of rails that normc~.lly
moved through North Vietnam. The mast difficult and time-consuming
work in building these railroads is the construction of tunnels, bridges,
and roadbeds. Once these facilities are completed, rails can be laid
without difficulty from the present rail terminals in Kweichow and
Szechwan. The small amount of consumer goods, light industrial
>,~ Three tons per truck, transported in drums.
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products, and medicines required by the province can be handled easily
by truck transgortation.
Further development of industry and agriculture in Yunnan in
the near future may be hindered by the disruption of rail service through
North Vietnam because larger tonnages are needed for this purpose.
Once Yunnan is connected directly by rail with the rest of China, however,
there will be little need for the indirect rail service through North Vietnam,
although occasional export shipments of Yunnan's tin may be routed through
the port of Haiphong. 'The all-China railroad route will be shorter for
goods produced and cansumed domestically than is the transit route through
North Vietnam.
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 5-2774 12-fi~~ GIA
I-pin
An-pien
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Mienjyang
002/ ~ 25 : CIA-`~
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Nguyen
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00 ~AO 24~2~~~1 7NORT~~H VIETNAM:
Railroad (Meter gauge)
Railroad (Standard gauge)
Railroad (Standard gauge mnder construction)
Selected road 25
1
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