TRANSITION IN TIBET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01018A000300070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1962
• Content Type: IR

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CONFIDENTIAL N? 3
Geographic Intelligence Report
TRANSITION IN TIBET
AUTH: ~~HIR~ 0- -1
DAT eY*F" ` EVIEWER:. 008514
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
U DECLASSIF=IED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DOCUMENT NO. -.--~_.... w
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
ONFID'EN T_.. I
e:~ENTIAL
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E.cluded 0can auiomeiic
downg.oding and
dedwditotlen
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CONFIDENTIAL
Geographic Intelligence Report
TRANSITION IN TIBET
CIA/RR GR 62-2
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. Administrative Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
III. Road Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
IV. Air Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
V. Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
VI. Other Economic Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
VII. Legal Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
VIII. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendixes
Appendix A. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix B. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Photographs
Figure 1. The town of Lin-chih in southeastern Tibet . . 7
Figure 2. Part of the road between Kbamba Dzong and
Tingkye Dzong in southern Tibet . . . . . . . 16
Figure 3. Bridge over the Shap Chhu . . . . . . . . . . 17
Figure 4+. A section of the Szechwan-Lhasa road . . . . . 18
Figure 5. Tang-hsiung Airfield near Lhasa . . . . . . . 19
Figure 6. Truckloads of grain at Lhasa . . . . . . . . . 21
Figure 7. The Lhasa Experimental Station . . . . . . . . 23
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Page
Figure 8. A promising section of unused land in
Lin- ch ih . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Figure 9. The clam near the Na-chin hydroelectric
powerplant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Tables
Table 1. Administrative Divisions of Tibet . . . . . . 8
Table 2. Population and Area Statistics of Tibet . . . 10
Maps
Inside back cover
Tibet: Communist Administrative Centers
Tibetan Highlands (351+28)
Tibet: Cultivated Areas (35953)
(35255)
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TRANSITION IN TIBET*
Summary
The Chinese Communist occupation of Tibet has been marked by con-
siderable Tibetan resistance to the imposition of Communist programs.
Although a postponement of further "reforms" was announced in Decmber
1960, changes introduced during the past 3 years have slowly strength-
ened and consolidated the Chinese position in Tibet.
The traditional administrative structure of Tibet was abolished in
early 1960 and was replaced by standard Chinese Communist local govern-
ment units. Although effective local government is possible in predom-
inantly agricultural areas, the sparsely populated nomadic areas of
northern Tibet present unique problems and have to a large extent re-
mained outside the pale of Chinese administration and the instituting
of Communist programs. The actual functioning of local government
units in carrying out higher level policy directives has been hindered
by an insufficient number of trained and reliable Tibetan and Chinese
cadres.
The lack of adequate transportation from China to Tibet historically
has been a major problem in the maintenance of Chinese contraw lti empha-
sis Road construction has been pushed, particularly since 1959,
sis upon an improved network in southern Tibet. In southern and south-
western Tibet, much of the terrain consists of extensive plains in which
little construction is needed to permit the use of motor vehicles. In
the rugged and compartmentalized ridge and gorge terrain of eastern Ti-
bet, however, road construction has been much slower and more costly.
T. spite of improved enroad tirelyrnuponilongfand Chinese
Tibet t depend
supplies.
To lessen their dependence upon food transported from China, Chinese
authorities have stressed the necessity for increased agricultural output
in Tibet. Some increases are likely through the expansion ofrgation,
greater use of fertilizers, and the introduction of other improved
niques. It is possible that improved rations for the Tibetans and self-
sufficiency for the superstructure of Chinese troops, administrators, and
cadres may be achieved during the next few years. The limitations of
The conclusions contained in this report represent the best judg-
ment of this Office as of 1 April 1962.
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unsuitable terrain, high elevations, low temperatures, and insufficient
precipitation, however, make it unlikelrr that enough additional land can
be brought under cultivation to permit significant numbers of Chinese
immigrants to settle in Tibet.
In 1959 and 1960, after the international publicity given Tibet by
the March 1959 revolt and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, con-
sultative bodies to the United Nations made authoritative appraisals
concerning the legal status of Tibet. These appraisals help to clarify
the complexities of international law surrounding the status of Tibet;
and, by concluding that Tibet was an independent state in 1913 when it
was a signatory to the Simla Convention, they also give some support
to the Indian position on the validity of the McMahon Line.
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I. Introduction
Chinese Communist efforts to bring about a "socialist transfor-
mation" in Tibet have met with frustration repeatedly during the past
several years. In December 1960 the Chinese announced that the social-
ization of Tibet would be postponed for 5 years.* This policy retreat
followed the tacit admission that the introduction of land reform con-
siderable the organization of mutual-aid teams during 1959-60 had met
siderable opposition. The Chinese leadership therefore decided that
conditions in Tibet were not suitable for the furtherance of present
Party policies; instead, emphasis should be placed upon "consolidation"
of the "democratic revolution." The continuance of logistical problems
in supplying the Chinese personnel in Tibet, numbering roughly via long and difficult supply routes also had a dampening effect on the
pursuit of unpopular programs that might spark additional Tibetan
resistance.
Although major Chinese Communist programs now have been shelved, the
imple-
mentation position in Tibet is slowly being strengthened through
mentation of less spectacular measures. The local Tibetan administrative
structure has been replaced by standard Chinese administrative organs,
staffed by Chinese and pro-Chinese Tibetans. Motorable roads continue
to be built, particularly in southern Tibet. The Chinese also continue
to stress the need for increased agricultural production and suggest -
ways of achieving it. Significant gains in this undertaking might per-
linkslocally
the tenuous road requirements
dependentconsiderable
mit thuChinese
uponfood
themsupply
be lesstheir
and thus allow
with Kansu and Szechwan.
After the inauguration of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet
Autonomous Region in 1956, the attempt to curb the power of the monas-
teries and related restrictions helped spark sizable anti-Chinese out-
breaks, particularly in eastern Tibet. Consequently, a 5-year morato-
rium on the introduction of so-called democratic reforms was announced
by Mao Tse-tung in early 1957. In spite of this promise of postponement
of "reform," the outbreak of heavy fighting in March 1959 and the flight
of the Dalai Lama to India led to a renewal of Chinese efforts to prod
the truculent Tibetans into taking the first steps on the "road to so-
cialism." But considerable Tibetan resistance to both land reform and
the organization of mutual-aid teams forced another Chinese "reexam-
ination of Party policies in 1960, and this examination was followed
by the retrenchment announcement of late 1960. In spite of the 1960
moratorium, however, a fundamental change in Tibetan society was ac-
complished during the land-reform program by the confiscation or "buy-
ing out" the large
base from which much sofrtheirnpower wasility,
thus removing
derived.
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The legal status of Tibet came under scrutiny in 1959 when the
General Assembl rof the United Nations debated the "question of Tibet
including the charges that the Chinese Communists had practiced gen-
ocide and violated human rights in Tibet. Under the auspices of the
United Nations, the International Commission of Jurists prepared two
reports on the situation. The Commission included in its findings the
judgment that Tibet was in fact an independent state from 1913 to 1950.
Although the findings have little practical effect on the present sta-
tus of Tibet, tije implication of Tibetan statehood at the time the
Simla Convention was signed in 191+ lends weight to the Indian con-
tention that the McMahon Line is a valid boundary. To this extent the
Commission's findings support the Indian case in the Sino-Indian bor-
der dispute.
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II. Administrative Changes
In January 1960 the Chinese Communists announced that Tibet had
been or anized into 7 special districts (chuan-ch'ii) and 1 munici-
pality (shih) through which the 72 newly created hsien would be ad-
ministered see Table 1 and Map 35255).* This reorganization marked
the end of the traditional administrative system of Tibet, which had
been based on a level of local government called the dzon tsun ),
as well as the end of Chinese efforts to implement policy directives
at the local level through the mechanism of traditional institutions.
Chinese dissatisfaction with the existing situation had become appar-
ent in 1959 when press releases in China noted pointedly that the
administrative units of Tibet were staffed almost entirely by Tibetans.
It was these Tibetan officials, charged the Chinese Communists, to-
gether with the "reactionary clique of the upper strata" -- the cler-
ical and lay nobility -- who were the leading instigators of the re-
bellion. In July 1959 the pro-Chinese Tibetan, Ngapo Ngawang Jigme,
who holds the title of Vice Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for
the Tibet Autonomous Region, called the traditional Tibetan adminis-
trative system "irrational and inconvenient for administrative manage-
ment." jam' Jigme further suggested making a "rational" administrative
redivision based upon topography, communications, economy, defense, and
similar factors. J Administrative changes of this type were made, and
the present administrative structure became effective in January 1960.
Most of the 72 hsien of Tibet are located in the south and east,
where sedentary agriculture is possible. The population of the agri-
cultural areas is estimated at 900,000, distributed by administrative
division as shown in Table 2.xxx The 300,000 Tibetans who are classi-
fied as nomads are scattered throughout Tibet wherever pastures can be
found, but the majority are located north of the Tsangpo on the high
grasslands of the Chang Thang, or northern plateau. The traditional
independence of the nomads and the obvious difficulties of maintaining
satisfactory control over pastoral people located in a bleak and in-
hospitable physical environment have posed perplexing problems for the
Chinese. The chief shortcoming of democratic reform in Tibet is that,
as the Panchen Lama succinctly stated in December 1960, "a set of work
experiences has not yet been found which will suit the characteristics
of the pastoral areas in which there is a large stretch of land but a
small population and in which the people live widely apart and move
frequently from one place to another." 3/
* Table 1 follows on p. 8; Map 35255 inside back cover.
For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B.
* Table 2 follows on p. 10.
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The creation. of the special districts resulted in the abolition of
the Chamdd LocaJl Area (Ch'ang-tu Ti-ch'ii), a political unit at the pro-
vince level governed by the Chamdo Liberation Committee. The Chamdo
Local Area was established early in the Communist rule of Tibet to gov-
ern the territory extending roughly from the upper Yangtze River west to
the older provincial border between Tibet and Sikang.* Although Chamdo
representativeswere included on the 51-member Preparatory Committee for
the Autonomous Legion of Tibet (organized in 1956) and the inference was
that Chamdo would be a part of the future Tibet Autonomous Region, some
confusion aboutthe status of Chamdo remained even after 1956. It was
shown as a separate unit, not part of Tibet, on Chinese Communist maps
and was listed in administrative tables as a province-level unit. When
Chamdo officially became a part of Tibet through the 1960 reorganization,
however, the ancient political boundaries of Tibet were restored.
Although a (4hinese Communist administrative structure has been forced
upon Tibet (see tFigure 1), the actual functioning of the system that was
set up to achieve effective implementation of Party policies is dependent
upon the staff] of local government organs by trained and dependable
Tibetan and Chinese cadres. Official reports made by the Panchen Lama
in 1960 and 1961 have included statements concerning the necessity of
having "a considerable number of Han cadres and cadres of other broth-
erly nationalities to work in Tibet." Chinese press releases fre-
quently have ref$rred to the incompetency of the cadres in Tibet and the
consequent diffiulty in carrying out Party directives. / Improvement
in cadre qualityiobviously will be a key factor in the furtherance of
Communist objectives in Tibet.
* When the SikanO Province of China was organized in 1928, its western
border was drawn nearly 400 miles west of the upper Yangtze River. At
that time the Yan tze marked the somewhat fluctuating line between terri-
tory controlled from Lhasa and that controlled by Chinese authorities in
Szechwan Provinces Despite any semblance of Chinese administration west
of the Yangtze during the period from 1912 to 1951, the fiction of Chi-
nese control was maintained by maps that showed hsien seats in this area
and a Sino-Tibetan border drawn only 75 miles east of Lhasa. Thus the
creation of the Ch`amdo Local Area, coinciding in territory with this
western portion of, Sikang Province (abolished in 1955), perpetuated the
problems of defining the political borders of Tibet.
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Figure 1. The town of Lin-chih in southeastern Tibet.
Lin-chih is the administrative headquarters of the
Lin-chih special district. The numerous new buildings
constructed by the Chinese Communist occupation forces
and trucks such as those in the left foreground make a
visible imprint on Tibetan communities. Southeastern
Tibet is mostly below 10,000 feet in elevation, lower
than other parts of the country, and receives a consid-
erable amount of rain. Consequently, the slopes here
are covered by shrubs and trees, in sharp contrast to
the barren hills so characteristic of most of Tibet.
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Administrative Divisions of Tibet a/
Special District Municipality Administrative Seat
Ya-sha (unlocated) Cha-ta
Possibly Gar Dzong, which Chung-pa
previously has been ac- Jih-t'u
cepted as military head- Kai-tse
quarters for western Ko-chi
Tibet. Ka-erh
P'u-lan
Ch'ang-tu
(Chamdo )
Ch'ang-tu
Chang-tu
Ch'a-ya
Chiang-ta
Kung-chiao
Lei-wu-ch'i
Lo-lung
Ning- ching
Pa- su
Pien-pa
Sang-ang-ch'u
Ting-ch'ing
Tso-kung
Chiang-tzu Gyangtse Chiang-tzu
(Gyangtse) Jen-pu
Lang-k'a-tzu
Pai-lang
Ta-lung
Ya-tung
Jih-k'o-tse Zhikatse Ang-jen
(Zhikatse) Chi-lung
Hsieh-t'ung-men
Jih-k'o-tse
La-tzu
Nan-mu-lin
Nieh-la-mu
Sa-chia
Sa-ko
Ting-chieh
Ting-jih
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Administrative Divisions of Tibet J
(Continued)
Special District Municipality Administrative Seat
Lin-chip Lin-chih
Shan-nan
(Loka)
Nagchhu Dzong (Hei-ho)
Tsethang
Lhasa Shih Lhasa
Chia-li
Hsueh-pa
Kung-pu-chiang-ta
Lin-chih
Mi-lin
Mo-t'o
Po-mi
An-to
Hei-ho
Nieh- jung
Pa-ch'ing
Pan-ko
Pi-ju
Shen-cha
So-hsien
Ta-mu-sa-chia
Cha-nang
Che-ku
Chia-ch'a
Ch'iung-chieh
Kung-ka
La-chia-li
Lang-hsien
Lo-cha
Lung-tzu
Nai-tung
Sang-jib
Ts'o-na
Ch'u-shui
Lin- chou
Mo-chu-kung-k'a
Ni-mu
P'ang-to
Tang-hsiung
Ta-tzu
Tui-lung-te-ch'ing
a. J. For a comparison of the present administrative structure with the
earlier organization, see 7/.
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III. Road Construction
Road construction in Tibet was greatly accelerated after the March
1959 revolt, particularly the building of new roads to the Nepal, Bhutan,
and northeastern India frontiers. Roads now connect most of the im-
portant Tibetan towns in the Himalayan border region, and an east-west
road (actually parts of several roads) now parallels the entire southern
border of Tibet (see Map 351l28).* Most of these roads were hastily built
to support Chinese military operations against areas of dissidence, many
of which were located between the Tsangpo and the Himalayas. After the
more immediate military requirements of 1959 had been satisfied, the
further extension of the road network enabled the Chinese to maintain
tighter control of the southern border regions of Tibet. Through the
construction of a road net along the southern border, the southward
movement of Tibetan refugees can be regulated, possible overland smug-
gling of military supplies into Tibet can be checked more easily, and
Chinese military capabilities against India, Nepal, and Bhutan are
enhanced.
One of the more significant of the roads built during the past 3
years is the 600-mile road linking Zhikatse with Barkha, a point on the
Sinkiang-Tibet road in western Tibet. The completion of this road link,
which has been rumored as under construction for many years, should now
permit the movement of supplies from the major Chinese bases at Lhasa
and Zhikatse to western Tibet. Up to now, western Tibet has been depend-
ent upon goods brought from Sinkiang over a road that is probably closed
to traffic during much of the winter and early spring.
Another recently constructed road of considerable importance con-
nects Zhikatse with Tingri Dzong, a strategic Chinese base near the
Nepalese border. From this road a number of feeder routes probably have
been built or are under construction to such points as Tingkye Dzong,
Sar, Nyalam Dzong, Jongkha Dzong, and other places near the border. The
importance of the Tingri Dzong route was increased by the signing, on
15 October 1961, of an agreement between Nepal and Communist China for
the construction of a road link between the two countries.
The relatively open valleys and level plateaus that are character-
istic of much of southern Tibet permit roads to be "constructed" with
minimal effort and in little time. Most of the roads built since 1959
probably have been "simple highways"** with natural earth surfaces (see
* Inside back cover.
** Roads in Communist China are classified in six basic types according
to construction specifications, type of surface, and traffic capacity.
The lowest class, Type VI-B, is a "simple highway," designed as a single-
lane, low-capacity road with a natural earth (footnote continued on p. 16]
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Figure 2). 1 An October 1959 Chinese Communist press report stated
that after the suppression of the rebellion, simple highways were built
to connect most of the hsien in southern Tibet. 18 The speed of con-
struction can be explained by the relatively open terrain and the likeli-
hood that existing caravan tracks were used as road alignments. Most
roads are estimated to be motorable during all but a few weeks of the
year. Although precipitation generally is light in southern Tibet, oc-
casional heavy rains and resultant flooding during summer may disrupt
traffic, particularly on simple highways where smaller streams may not
be bridged. In some of the protected plains and lower valleys near the
Nepalese border, winter snowfall has been known to halt transport for
several days at a time. Depending upon the importance of the route and
the availability of alternate means of transport, many of these original
simple highways probably will be improved through the realignment of
difficult sections, widening, bridging, and the addition of aggregate
to road surfaces (see Figure 3).
Figure 2. Part of the road between Khamba Dzong and
Tingkye Dzong in southern Tibet. Open, flat valleys
such as the one shown here are characteristic of much
of Tibet, permitting roads to be built with little in
the way of actual construction. This would be char-
acterized as a "simple highway."
surface. The building of such a simple road in Tibet, as suggested by
its construction specifications and surface characteristics, may involve
nothing more than the use of stones to outline a roadbed across flat
barren or grassy plains.
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Figure 3. Bridge over the Shap Chhu. Although
relatively small streams can be forded, improve-
ment of a road usually includes the construction
of bridges such as this one on a road in southern
Tibet between Sakya Gompa and Zhikatse.
Although Chinese Communist transportation capabilities have improved
markedly in southern Tibet, poor communications remain a problem in many
areas of eastern Tibet (see Figure 1). Here deeply incised rivers and
streams have dissected the plateau into an intricate mosaic of deep
canyons, sharp ridges, and precipices. Thus the northwest-southeast
alignment of these terrain features greatly hinders east-west commu-
nications. The main Szechwan-Lhasa road, particularly the section between
Ch'ang-tu and Lin-chih, has been plagued since its completion in late 195+
by maintenance problems because of ice and snow on the higher stretches
during winter and frequent landslides in areas of lower elevation where
rainfall is comparatively heavy. To bypass this section of the route
and to improve over-all Chinese Communist control, new roads have been
under construction for several years, notably a southern route via
Batang, Ning-ching, Pang-ta, and Sung-tsung, and a northern road,
apparently uncompleted, from Chang-tu to Ting-ch'ing to Nagchhu Dzong.
Where political and economic conditions warrant and the terrain permits
their construction, branch roads lead from the major routes into side
valleys. Data are insufficient, however, to plot the location of all
these roads on the accompanying map.
T-I-A-L
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Figure 4. A section of the Szechwan-Lhasa road. The terrain of
eastern Tibet is extremely rugged and mountainous. Rocky, north-
south aligned ridges must be crossed by roads from Szechwan to
Lhasa and southern Tibet. Construction is very difficult, costly,
and time consuming.
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IV. Air Transport
An air link between Tibet and China has existed since 1956, when
the airfield near Tang-hsiung, some 60 miles due north of Lhasa, was
completed (see Figure 5). The Tang-hsiung field is built on a plain
at an elevation of 1+,000 feet and has the distinction of being the
highest airfield in the world. Numerous reports during the past sev-
eral years have mentioned other airfields under construction in Tibet,
but -- with the possible exception of a field located near Nagchhu
Dzong, some 150 miles north of Lhasa -- none is believed to be oper-
ational.
Figure 5. Tang-hsiung Airfield near Lhasa. The Tibetans in the
foreground are welcoming the first plane that landed on the new
field, in June 1956. The airfield is 1+,000 feet above sea level;
the peaks of the Nyenchhen Thangiha in the background rise several
thousand feet higher.
The extensive and generally hard-surfaced plains that are common to
many areas of Tibet facilitate the construction of airfields. Possibly
some sites could be utilized as landing grounds with little more than a
ground check to remove stones and other minor obstacles. Much of the
reported construction activity related to airfields, therefore, may be
in the nature of preliminary work designed to provide emergency landing
fields in areas of possible future air operations.
The high elevations and severe climate of Tibet affect air operations
as well as the construction of airfields. Frequent gales, low temper-
atures, and changeable weather hamper air operations. In the rarified
air of the Tibetan Plateau, extraordinarily long runways are essential.
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V. Agriculture
A major problem for the Chinese Communists in maintaining control
of Tibet is the necessity of transporting foodstuffs from China to
supply the large numbers of Chinese troops, cadres, and technicians
(see Figure 6). Because major increases in the amount of food trans-
ported into Tibet are not likely to occur until (or if) the Hsi-ning--
Lhasa railroad is constructed, emphasis probably will continue to be on
measures designed to increase local production.
Figure 6. Truckloads of grain at Lhasa. The need to
import food supplies into Tibet via long and costly
truck hauls to feed the large numbers of occupying Chi-
nese is one of the major problems of Communist control
of Tibet.
Estimates of the total amount of land cultivated suggest a figure
between 450,000 and 500,000 acres -- far less than 1 percent of Tibet's
total area. (See Map 35953* for approximate distribution of agricultural
land.) In general, most of the flat land in river valleys below 1+,000
feet in elevation is cultivated. The principal crops are barley, wheat,
buckwheat, and root vegetables. In a few places where elevations drop
below 10,000 feet -- such as the Chumbi Valley and parts of Lin-chih in
southeastern Tibet -- a greater variety of foodstuffs, including rice
and fruit, can be grown. As indicated on Map 35953, not all river val-
leys below 1+,000 feet can be cultivated. Portions of the Tsangpo Val-
ley between Zhikatse and Tsethang, for example, are covered with great
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sand dunes; some of the valleys of southeastern Tibet are still in
forests; and the deep canyons characteristic of rivers and streams of
eastern Tibet restrict cultivation to isolated valley flats and scatter-
ed fields on the upper slopes. As a consequence of the paucity of
cultivated land and the limitations on output imposed by the severe
Tibetan climate, agricultural production has been barely adequate for
the local populace. Traditionally the Tibetans have carried on a lim-
ited border trade by exchanging wool and salt for foodstuffs from
India and Nepal.
Feeding the Chinese stationed in Tibet aggravates an already diffi-
cult problem of procuring an adequate food supply. Chinese efforts to
increase and stimulate agricultural production have been centered at
their Lhasa Experimental Station, located in the fertile and protected
Kyi Chhu Valley (see Figure 7). Common garden vegetables in wide variety
have been grown successfully, and experimental test plots have been
planted with different varieties of barley and wheat. By 1959 the Chi-
nese Communists claimed to have achieved self-sufficiency in supplying
vegetables to their personnel in Tibet. 17! A 1960 report claimed that
some 50 percent of their meat requirements also were met through their
own efforts. 20 The validity of these statements, however, is doubtful,
in spite of the probability that many permanent Chinese installations
include vegetable gardens and that Chinese personnel engage in animal
husbandry to some extent. In Lhasa in January 1962, a conference on
production by government organizations gave a less optimistic picture of
the present and a qualified view of future production by stating that if
ideological, planning, and policy problems are settled "all Tibet govern-
ment organizations may well be self-supporting in food crops, edible
oils, meat, vegetables, and cattle fodder in years to come." 21
The possibility that agricultural production could be dramatically
raised by reclaiming large tracts of land has been suggested occasion-
ally (see Figure 8). According to Anna Louise Strong, a pro-Communist
author who visited Tibet in 1959, Chinese officials professed to have no
statistics available on the amount of land reclaimable. 22 In her talks
with numerous officials in Lhasa, however, the consensus was that culti-
vated land could be increased by 50 percent and possibly doubled. 23
Considerable labor would be needed to drain swamps, build irrigation
ditches, and carry out other measures that are required to open up addi-
tional land. There have been various claims that the area under culti-
vation has been increased, but the major Chinese effort continues to be
toward increasing yields from land now in crops. 24+ Because of the
relatively primitive state of Tibetan agriculture, higher yields could
be achieved through increased fertilization -- although, in view of the
transport problems, local supplies of animal manure will probably have
to be used instead of chemical fertilizers. Manures, however, may be in
short supply in some agricultural areas that are deficient in fuelwood,
because dried dung is commonly used for fuel. The use of improved seeds,
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Figure 7. The Lhasa Experimental Station. Solidification of
Chinese Communist control in Tibet is closely related to at-
tempts to make the Chinese community self-sufficient in grain
and vegetables. Plots of vegetables and grains at Lhasa have
been undergoing trial during the past several years to find
those varieties best suited to the harsh Tibetan environment.
Figure 8. A promising section of unused land in Lin-chih.
Some attempts have been made by the Communists to reclaim
land or to open up new areas for agricultural production.
It would appear that here Chinese cadres are explaining the
use of a plow to the local Tibetans.
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extension of irrigation works and better maintenance of them, and other
agricultural techniques may also increase output significantly.
Discussions of land reclamation are often tied in with the assertion
that Tibet could be populated by millions of Han Chinese immigrants.
Although it is likely that substantial increases in agricultural output
can be realized during the next few years, it is unlikely that this in-
crease will be so great or new land so extensive that Han Chinese would
be permitted to settle in any more than token numbers. Probably the
increases in production will provide little more than improved rations
for the Tibetans and self-sufficiency for the superstructure of Chinese
troops, administrators, and cadres.
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VI. Other Economic Developments
Aside from improving agricultural practices, few attempts have been
made to develop the economy of Tibet. A major exception has been the
mining of borax at several places near Pan-ko Hsien in northern Tibet.
In 1959, some 10,000 tons of borax were exported to the Soviet Union;
with the inclusion of exports to other Bloc nations, this figure prob-
ably had doubled by 1961. / Other development has been of local sig-
nificance only, consisting of the construction of a small hydroelectric
station near Lhasa (see Figure 9), the opening of coal mines near Lhasa
and in northern Tibet, and the establishment of motor-vehicle shops,
farm-tool manufacturing plants, and leather-tanning and similar handi-
craft industries in Lhasa and other urban centers. 26 Agriculture
remains the first priority, and Chinese Communist officials have stated
that industrial development of Tibet is de endent upon its first be-
coming agriculturally self-sufficient.
Figure 9. The dam near the Na-chin hydroelectric powerplant,
built in 1960. This earthen dam east of Lhasa channels water
from the Kyi Chhu to the powerplant, which presumably supplies
Lhasa and its environs with electric power.
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VII. Legal Status
Before the March 1959 revolt the world was little concerned about
or interested in the legal status of Tibet. This indifference resulted
primarily from (1) the physical isolation of Tibet and its almost non-
existent external contacts, and (2) the continued claims of past and
present Chinese governments that Tibet was an integral part of China.*
The latter point was reinforced by the undeniable fact that Tibet was a
dependency of China for nearly two centuries prior to 1912. The flight
of the Dalai Lama to India in March 1959 and the confirmation of large-
scale fighting between Chinese and Tibetans sparked considerable inter-
est in Tibet and its relationship with China, including debate in the
United Nations over the reported Chinese violation of human rights and
the practice of genocide against the Tibetans.
The activity of the United Nations in Tibetan affairs included the
investigation by the International Commission of Jurists, an organiza-
tion with consultative status to the United Nations Economic and Social
Council. Both reports prepared by the Jurists -- a preliminary one by
the Commission in July 1959 and a more detailed study by the Legal In-
quiry Committee that was specially convened under the aegis of the Com-
mission in 1960 -- concluded that Tibet was at the very least a de facto
independent state at the time of the 1950 Chinese invasion. 29/ The
jurists were satisfied that from 1913 to 1950 Tibet had demonstrated
the conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international
law: a distinct people inhabiting a definite territory and having a gov-
ernment that conducted its domestic affairs free from outside control and
also conducted its own foreign relations. Although its foreign relations
were few, the evidence showed that the Tibetan government exclusively
conducted its own affairs after 1913. Also, countries with whom Tibet
had foreign relations treated Tibet as an independent state. The find-
ings of the Commission are largely of academic interest as far as any
practical change in Tibet's present status is concerned, inasmuch as
Tibet is and apparently will continue for the foreseeable future to be
a de facto territory of Communist China.
A more tangible result of the jurist's deliberations is additional
backing for the Indian position regarding the legality of the McMahon
* The Government of the Republic of China, as well as the Communist
regime on the mainland, maintains that Tibet is an integral part of
China. After the March 1959 revolt, President Chiang restated the po-
sition of the Chinese Nationalist Government that "when the mainland is
recovered," it would "assist the Tibetan people to realize their own
aspirations in accordance with the principles of self-determination." 28
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Line. If, as the jurists contend, Tibet was an independent state in
1913, then it was in a position at the Simla Conference of 1913-14* to
negotiate and sign the Simla Convention. of 1914 that included a map on
which the McMahon Line was delineated.
* The Simla. Conference of 1913-14, attended by representatives of Great
Britain, China, and Tibet, was called in an attempt to settle the status
of Tibet. A primary objective of the Conference was to partition Tibet
into an Inner Tibet, where Chinese sovereignty would be recognized, and
an Outer Tibet that would be autonomous., In the course of determining
this Sino-Tibetan border, a boundary between India and Tibet east of
Bhutan was defined and drawn on a map. This boundary became known as the
McMahon Line. Although the Chinese representative refused to sign the
final agreement, the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries concluded the
Simla, Convention on 3 July 1914 using the map on which the McMahon Line
had been drawn.
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VIII. Conclusions
The difficulties encountered by the Chinese Communists in their
attempts to control Tibet and the Tibetan people are similar to those
faced by earlier Chinese regimes. Perennial obstacles to Chinese dom-
ination in Tibet include the great distances separating centers of
Tibetan authority from Chinese bases as well as the high cost of main-
taining communications between them; the size of Tibet, in which large
areas are sparsely populated by mobile nomadic groups who traditionally
have resisted any form of external control; and the widespread antip-
athy between Tibetans and Chinese, which is sharpened by their contrast-
ing ways of life.
The construction of motorable roads seemingly should have eased con-
siderably the problems of transportation between Tibet and China, but
adequate supplies of indigenous food and other necessities are lacking
and the large numbers of Chinese in Tibet are still largely dependent
upon supplies brought long distances over difficult roads. The trans-
portation situation is not likely to improve in the near future because
air-supply capabilities are limited and the proposed railroad from
Tsinghai to Lhasa is a questionable project with a completion date many
years in the future.
Basic Sino-Tibetan animosities remain, and the Chinese leadership
has admitted that among the "masses" an understanding of socialism is
imperfect -- which, in effect, means that the Chinese have experienced
determined Tibetan opposition. The lack of trained cadres, either
trusted Tibetans or reliable Chinese, who could implement Party pol-
icies at the local level continues to be a problem.
In spite of the opposition of the Tibetans and the other vexing
problems with which the Chinese Communists have been confronted, the
record of 10 years of Communist occupation has been one of halting but
continuing alteration of the social, political, and economic structure
of Tibet. The apparent breaking up of the vast power of the monas-
teries by confiscation of most of their large land holdings through
programs of land reform and the resultant general depopulation of the
monasteries are perhaps the most far-reaching and significant of the
Communist "reforms." The Chinese Communists have reiterated that, in
spite of the present moratorium on new programs, the political need for
eventual reform persists. They seem determined to proceed toward their
goal of transforming Tibet into a pliant and socialized territory under
complete Communist domination.
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GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
Although considerable information from Chinese Communist sources
on the political-administrative measures introduced in Tibet over the
past several years has been published, reliable data on theme implemen-
tation and effectiveness of these measures are fragmentary lack
areal coverage. In particular, information is lacking on the type and
degree of Chinese control over the nomadic groups in northern Tibet.
Complete statistical coverage of the population breakdown by adminis-
trative unit also is lacking. Maps depicting the administrative bound-
aries at the special-district level are not available. No reliable
data are available on the amount of cultivated land and land that could
be cultivated nor on the areal distribution of cultivated and cultivable
land. Little information is available on the numerous branch and feeder
roads that have been built from the major transport routes.
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SOURCE REFERENCES
25X1A
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information
Doc. - Documentary
1
- Confirmed by other
A
- Completely reliable
2
- Probably true
B
- Usually reliable
3
- Possibly true
C
- Fairly reliable
4
- Doubtful
D
- Not usually reliable
5
- Probably false
E
F
- Not reliable
- Cannot be judged
6
- Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff offi-
cer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
0
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25X1A
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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 International boundary, demarcated
max- International boundary, delimited only
International boundary, indefinite
International on
recent
-,-.- Internal administrative boundary
Internal administrative Capital
Railroad
Road
Major caravan mute or bail
Pas
Spot height (in feet)
Seale IR,000mm
50 _IDD 150
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
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