CURRENT TRENDS IN SOVIET ANTARTIC INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01018A000700010001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1964
• Content Type: STUDY

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SECRET Copy No. .1
GEOGRAPHIC SUPPORT STUDY
CURRENT TRENDS IN SOVIET ANTARCTIC
INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES
CIA/RR GS 61f-22
July 196+
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CURRENT TRENDS IN SOVIET ANTARCTIC
INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES
No basic changes are currently observable in Soviet long-range interests
in Antarctica. Therefore, the Soviets are expected to continue an extensive
program of research to acquire detailed physical environmental knowledge, not
only on the area, but in relation to total world processes in order to foster
more accurate Soviet worldwide forecasting of physical environmental phenomena
for peaceful as well as military requirements. Concurrently, they hope to
gain prestige from their achievements and to establish an image of Communist
superiority and cooperativeness in their international Antarctic relation-
ships.
For the next few years the Soviets are expected to maintain their basic
research in glaciology, geology, terrestrial geophysics (including seismology,
geoelectricity, geodesy), meteorology, upper atmosphere physics (including
geomagnetism, ionospherics), and oceanography. The distinctive Soviet re-
search in geodetic gravimetry is also likely to be given continued emphasis
not only for glaciological study but also as a part of the Soviet study on
the size and shape of the earth. The coverage of oceanographic surveys by
the Soviet Antarctic flagship, the Ob', has been reduced since the Sixth
Expedition (1960-61) because it was necessary to subordinate survey activity
to the primary mission of resupplying three coastal stations along a 2,000
nautical mile supply route. Any increase in survey activity beyond the
present en-route coverage is unlikely unless the number of ships in the
Antarctic operation is increased from two to three. In a move to consolidate
polar operations and studies, the governmental operational and research
activities for Antarctica were transferred about mid-1963 from the Northern
Sea Route Administration, Ministry of the Marine Fleet, to the Chief Direc-
torate of the Hydrometeorological Service (GUGMS), which is attached to the
Council of Ministers. A Directorate of Arctic and Antarctic Studies was
formed under GUGMS to which the Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research
Institute is now attached. Interagency planning and coordination is expected
to continue through the Interagency Commission on the Study of Antarctica of
the Academy of Sciences, which also functions as the Soviet National Com-
mittee for Antarctica. The effects of these changes are not yet observable.
The four permanent stations of the present Soviet network -- Mirnyy,
Vostok, Novolazaryevskaya, and Molodezhnaya -- are likely to form the founda-
tion for continental research for some years to come. Mirnyy, which for the
past nine seasons has been both the main base for continental operations and
the main station for research, is being displaced in these functions by the
shift of the Expedition headquarters to Molodezhnaya. Although the latter is
the newest station, it already has the second largest Soviet research staff.
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Mirnyy will continue as a logistic base to resupply Vostok at the Geomagnetic
Pole and will also conduct some routine observations. In addition to the
four permanent stations, Komsomol'skaya will continue to be reactivated for
traverse and flight support in summer; Sovetskaya and the Pole of Inaccessi-
bility stations also may be reactivated to support traverse operations between
Novolazaryevskaya and one or more of the other permanent stations.
Field operations are now being concentrated on the last major Antarctic
research-gap areas, the interior between 20OW and 60?E. Such operations will
probably be mounted from the newly developing station, Molodezhnaya, and from
Novolazaryevskaya. Within the research-gap area, in March 1964, a traverse
connecting Vostok, the "Pole of Inaccessibility," point 78o00'S-20?00'E, and
Molodezhnaya was completed. Another traverse from Novolazaryevskaya to point
78000'S-20000'E and on to Molodezhnaya probably will be undertaken, possibly
in the 1965-66 season. Such operations are being undertaken to secure concur-
rently scientific and political benefits that result from making new discov-
eries and publishing original observational data on an unknown area. The
Soviets continue to include mineral-resource studies in their geological
surveying and mapping activities, but there is no indication of an attempt
to exploit any of the deposits they may have discovered. Soviet Antarctic
leaders want to increase operational efficiency through the early (November-
December) annual delivery of operational personnel by air and through the
introduction of jet aircraft in intracontinental operations. Alternate
flight routes to Antarctica via South Africa or South America and return
routes via New Zealand and Australia also have been studied.
The Soviet use of satellites (Sputniks I, II, and III, Vostoks III and
IV, and Electron II) in Antarctic research has been limited so far to simple
visual and photographic observations and radio monitoring. Soviet sources
indicate that radio monitoring has been used in radio wave propagation studies
and that 20 star positions of Sputnik III have been determined. There have
been no recent indications of plans to undertake sophisticated tracking.
Possibly the next development in the Soviet tracking of satellites may come
if and when the Soviets launch high-inclination satellites. The Scientific
Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) of the International Council of
Scientific Unions at its meeting in Cape Town in 1963 called to the attention
of the Committee for Space Research (COSPAR) the value of high-inclination
satellites for new Antarctic data on eight topics of study, and the Inter-
national Association of Geodesy in August 1963 recommended satellite observa-
tions in Antarctica. Such formal affirmative assertions may aid Soviet
Antarctic specialists in justifying an increased use of satellites in Antarc-
tic research. Earlier this year a US program was announced for a worldwide
satellite triangulation system using a passive satellite and a photographic
technique to formulate precisely positioned triangles on the earth's surface.
Thirty-six stations were selected initially, based on the best geometry and
on the distribution of landmasses. Of these stations, three are located in
Antarctica: Peter I Island, Dumont d'Urville Station, and Molodezhnaya. The
US program may well invite Soviet participation since it would be a logical
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extension of Soviet geodetic research in Antarctica, would be consistent with
the Soviet policy of cooperation in Antarctica, would give added scientific
prestige to Soviet activities, and would offer the USSR a safe back-door en-
try into international geodetic satellite research without risking the dis-
closure of Soviet domestic geodetic data or positions.
Soviet whaling operations now include four flotillas: the Slava, the
Sovetskaya Ukraina, the Ivan Dolgorukiy, and the Sovetskaya Rossiya. Despite
the general concern over depleting whale stocks, the Soviets have stated that
they do not intend to reduce their present 20 percent quota set by the Inter-
national Whaling Commission. Since the 1947-48 season the Antarctic flotillas
have included one whaler for research, and in the 1960's the number was in-
creased to four. The Soviets claim that research operations now accompany
whaling in all three ocean sectors: the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans.
Research on whaling includes oceanography, hydrobiology, biology of whales,
and the technology of the whaling industry. The feasibility of adapting
whaling ships to fishing operations has been studied. The whalers also are
used for propaganda purposes when they stop at various ports -- including
such remote points as Tristan da Cunha -- and natives are invited aboard and
shown Soviet films. Thus, there is little doubt that Soviet Antarctic whaling
operations are likely to continue into the indefinite future.
The two-volume Atlas Antarktiki, in preparation since 1961, is now sched-
uled for publication in 1965. More than 21 research institutes participated
in the production of this 500-map atlas, which has been designed to be com-
prehensive in content and to utilize exhaustively both Soviet and non-Soviet
sources in order to offer the "most complete presentation of the natural
characteristics and the history of exploration of the south polar region
from a position of the leadership of Soviet science, and to help make the
atlas understandable and meaningful for the wide mass of our readers." One
of the sections of the atlas will tend to show a superiority of Soviet re-
search in Antarctica through the use of Soviet and non-Soviet maps at large
scale. Since Soviet maps cover more area of Antarctica at scales 1:200,000
and larger and with more detailed symbolization than those of other countries
whose map coverage is at smaller scales, the areas of Soviet activity will.
appear to have been studied with much greater accuracy. The atlas will be an
impressive cartographic production and will be disseminated and shown widely
as an effective showpiece of Soviet Antarctic achievements.
The Soviets can be expected to continue to observe the major provisions
of the Antarctic Treaty, to support all activities that will insure freedom
of access to all of Antarctica, and to support all programs that will stimu-
late the collection of observational data and assure access to such data.
Although no intentions to alter the Treaty are currently indicated, the
Soviets can be expected to oppose any proposals that would tend to curb
freedom of research or require burdensome reporting of, or accountability
on, Antarctic activities. The Soviets are opposed to the establishment of
a Secretariat or any arrangements that would start a trend in that direction.
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Their lack of enthusiasm for exercising the inspection provision of the
Treaty is currently explainable by their satisfaction with the annual ex-
change of scientists, who incidentally perform a type of inspection. The
Soviets are not likely to be enthusiastic about promoting inspection, but
they probably would oppose any moves to restrict or eliminate that right
from the Treaty. They are likely to exploit or support proposals that
would liberalize the present Treaty restrictions and might afford broader
accessioning and participation in the Antarctic Consultative Meetings. The
Soviets can be expected to continue to encourage Bloc participation. in their
Antarctic operations. Up to now, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
to a limited extent, Poland have participated. It is not likely that Poland
will reactivate its station in Antarctica, and it is doubtful whether any of
the other Bloc countries will mount stations of their own, despite Czechoslo-
vak references to a "Czechoslovak scientific expedition." Exchanges of
scientists with non-Bloc countries, such as the one with the United Kingdom,
for the 1963-64 season, may be broadened. Similar exchanges could even in-
clude Chile and Argentina -- especially if Soviet Antarctic ships use either
Montevideo or Buenos Aires as a resupply port of call. The Soviets may also
broaden non-Bloc scientific cooperation along the lines of the two joint
projects already undertaken with the French: (1) the recent joint glaciolo-
gical traverse and (2) conjugate point magnetic research between the Soviet
Arctic and Kerguelen Island.
Although the Soviets appear to be completely satisfied with the Antarc-
tic Treaty and with their participation in SCAR, they were the first to dis-
rupt the harmonious relations among the Treaty signatories. In protest
against the racial policies of the Republic of South Africa, the Soviets
boycotted both the Seventh Meeting of SCAR and the Symposium on Antarctic
Geology which were held at Cape Town in 1963. This action was followed by
the abandonment of Cape Town as a resupply port for Soviet ships en route to
and from the Antarctic. Even earlier, in 1962, two Soviet military commenta-
tors who were intent on deriding the value of the US ballistic missile
early warning system pointed out that Soviet rockets can now be launched
southward over Antarctica. Such propaganda uses the Treaty prohibition
against military installations in an artful maneuver against the US mili-
tary power image.
Although no further unfriendly actions can now be foressen, there is no
doubt that the Soviets are pursuing a policy of political competition in en-
hancing the Soviet image. Not only are the usual claims made for the unique-
ness and superiority of Soviet achievements, but two new lines of political
action have emerged. First, the Soviets have extended their program of
historical research and publication into a determined effort to prove their
claim of prior discovery of Antarctica by the Russians Bellingshausen and
Lazaryev, despite the general decline in publications on the historical
sovereignty theme by other Treaty signatories. Second, they persist in
labeling US activities as militarily motivated and dominated. In 1963,
two authoritative Soviet Antarctic specialists repeated the 1956 unofficial
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remarks of US Admiral Dufek on the value of US Antarctic operations to
the US Navy. One of them -- a Soviet exchange scientist who wintered at
a US station -- lists the Department of Defense, specifically including
each of the three military services, as the leading agency in US Antarctic
operations. He ranks the National Science Foundation as fifth in importance,
the National Academy sixth, and CIA seventh. In his 1963 book the Director
of the Soviet Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute, A. F.
Treshnikov, rehashes old accusations of imperialism against pre-IGY Antarc-
tic activities of the United States. He also ascribes the assignment of
research during the IGY to the US Navy by US political and military
leaders to two motives: (1) the desire to train military personnel in
polar warfare and (2) the desire to explore and map Antarctica because of
the importance of exploration and mapping in settling the political status
of the continent. He states categorically that operational support for IGY
operations of the United States was a cover for military objectives. He
also states that US scientists actually fell into complete dependence on
the military command, which viewed scientific interests as last in priority.
Late in 1963 a USSR broadcast from Moscow for the domestic audience severely
derided Cardinal Spellman's Christmas visit to Antarctica, as if the visit
of a chaplain arranged by the US Navy were an impingement on the spirit of
the Antarctic Treaty. Although these discordant and prejudicial views do not
indicate a change in basic Soviet political policy on the Antarctic, they do
represent a deliberate Soviet effort to paint the United States in a milita-
ristic image.
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