VULNERABILITY OF SWEDISH IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01049A000100080001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 112
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 23, 1950
• Content Type: MEMO

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a SECRET
10 February 1950
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub, ORE
25X1A
ATTENTION IMMO
SUBJECT : The Vulnerability of the Swedish
Iron and Steel Industry to Economic
Warfare.
1. It is requested that this office be supplied
with an estimate of the vulnerability of the Swedish
iron and steel industry to economic warfare.
2. There has been a 17 February 1950 deadline
established for this information.
3. Your cooperation in this matter will be
very much appreciated.
Act
ef, Intelligence Support
Reference: 25X1A
SECRET
25X1A
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DPub 10 April 1950
Digo
111-71-4u1nerability of Swedish iron and steel industry
a
are in
an estivated reserve of two billion tons of high-grade magnetite
metallic content averagini; about 63. per pent and representing
cent of the estimated world u,ply. The deposits are found in three
e oldest .production area is the Bergslagen area of central Sweden
low phosphorous content used chiefly by the domestic iron and steel
mined. 1e most receitly developed mines?and the least important--
$1:el1efte region of Vasterbetten.
St ore region is in Lapland at Kiruna and Gallivare? north of
le, where 80 to 90 per cent og Sweden's iron ore is located with-
ea of 8000 aquare kilometers. The Oallivare depoeite are estimated at
million tons and those at Kiruna at over one billion tOUSs The mines are
open-cut mines although part of a present expansion program includes a
eover to more extensive underground mining. Operations (including
necessary during the long winter nights) are dependent on hydroelectric
Kiruna area has a population of approximately 15,000 persons most
connected with the mining operations.
in the Kiruna area are operated by Luossavarra-Kirenavaara AB
oiled 50 per cent by the Swedish State and 50 per cent by Granges-
. The latter company performs the mining operations. Production
Le regulated by a State controlled vote system and is dependent
n the export market, since onlT a small proportion of this ore is
d demestically. State-owned sing-track electric railreadeearry the
jreater part of the export ore 115 miles to the Norwegian port of Narvik, which
la ice free the year round, and the balance to Lula, which is icebound during
the winter, on the upper part of the Gulf of Bothnia. The port facilities at
ik have been adequately expanded, but exports could be limited by the
fly of the railroad, whose original capacity has been expanded by building
tonal sidings along the line. Operations could be brought to a virtual
till by disruption of the hydro-electric plants at Porjus, Sweden, and
d, Norway. Per Jsupplies the power for the Kiruna mines, the city of
giruna. the K ua-Lul electric railway and half of the Kiruna-Narvik line.
The Station etj? supplies the power for the city of Narvik, its docks,
and the remainder o the railroad from Kiruna.
?Gtal Swedish iron ere production in 1948 was 13,2 87,118 metric tone.;
8,000 were exported during that year and 12,784,000 were exported in 1949.
chief importing countries of Swedish iron ore in 1948 were as followel
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Lump ore (Metric tons)
3,162,136
1,866,4479
1,485,861
(British-A r c zone) 1,316,501
1,228,523
988,677
595,717
4re
choslovakia
Poland
ually no iron ore is imported by Sweden.
and
Reference is made to the Situation Report on Sweden, pares 30 to 34 for
basic information on the iron and steel industry through 1947 and part of 1948
and for general inforoation on objectives of the pm-bier expansion program.
Production of iron and steel increased during 1948 an( 1949. Pig iron pro-
duction in 1948 amounted to 754,300 metric tons, and in 1949 to 801,000 metric
tons. Production of steel ingots and castings reached an all-time peak in
1949 at 4366,400 tone compared with 1,256.900 tons in 1948 and the output
of rolled and forged steel rose from 888,060 metric tons in 1948 to 946,400
tons in 3449. The estimated domestic consumption of finished steel in 1949
was 1,524P00 metric tops. Sweden concentrates on the production of high-
grade steel and therefore must import lower grades of iron and steel and semi-
finished products. Thus in 1948, 100,226 metric tone of pig iron were imported
principally from the Netherlands, the USeUK, Zones of Germany, Finland, and
Austria. Slightly more, than 5,000 tons were imported from each Poland and the
VSSR.
Finished steel imports in 1948 amounted to 616,700 metric tons. The United
States was the largest supplier of steel plate, furnishing roughly 110,000 metric
tons- out of total imports amounting to 208,870 tons. Other principal suppliers
of steel plate were the UK, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Austria supplied approx-
imately 14,000 metric tone, Csechoelevakia 13,000, and Poland 5,000. Imports
of warm rolled iron and steel and products thereof amounted to roughly-252,530
metric tons eupplied principally by Luxembourg, Belgium, end the UK, with ap-
proximately 12,500 tone imported from Czechoslovakia and 11,700 tone from
Poland. Belgium, the UK, and the US were the primary sources of cold rolled
and cold drawn steel amounting to 20,127 metric tons. Belgium, Luxembourg,
the UK, and the US in the order named, were the chief eources for other fin-
ished steel products.
Swedish exports of ironanetfi ly insignificantein com-
eelAt.4?e r eat ere
parison with production and imports, amounting only to 129,800 metric tons in
1948, including 20,000 tons of peg iron and 94,700 metric tons of rolled and
forged steel. Pig iron was exported primarily to Belgium, Switzerland, Prance,
Italy, and Czechoslovakia. Other iron and steel exports were apread out be-
tween such a large number of countries that it is doubtful net any single
Country- except the US received greatly in wweits of 5,000 metric tons. Minor
quantities were exported to Eastern Europe.
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Centralization of the iron and steel industry from hundreds of small iron
works scattered in forest regions began in the 19th century. The Uddeholm
Company commenced this development and today is one of Che largest companies
in Sjeden. All of its industrial plants and lands are located in the province
of 'farmland. It owns nearly 1,200 square miles of land from which most of its
raw materials are obtained. In addition to the production of iron and steel
it also produces wood products such as pulp and timber, and electro-chemical
products. Its metal operations era concentrated in four plants, Aunkfore Iron
Werke, which specializes in cold rolled and stainless steel; the Hogfors plant
which was erected near the olo Uddeholm Ironworks and was designed for the
Bessemer process of steel production; Storfors, which specialises in the manue
facture of pipes and tubing; and Nykroppa.
Besides the UddeholmCompanyvs plants there are only three other steel
plants in VIrmland; Lesjgfars (steel cables), Bjgrneborg (castings and wrought
iron eoode), and Degerfora.
In the province of DaIarna, Store Kopparberge Bergs1ag replaced 19 of its
old plants with the Domnervets plant which is undergoing extensive expansion and
will have the largest steel ingot capacity in Sweden. Like the Uddeholm Company,
Store Kopparbergs Bergslag engages in many operations in addition to those of
the ironworks, and its metal operations include not only the production of pig
iron and steel but also semi-finished steel products. The Swedish Government
owns the Norrbotten steel plant at Lula which is also expanding its production.
Zh manufactured products such as steel plate, rails, rods, etc,, the
Sandviken Companyeleads the iron and steel industry, but is clooely followed
by Uddeholni, Lesjofore, Donnarvets, and Fagersta.
Nagy of the larger companies in the machine shop industriee own their mines
and ironworks which they have converted or expanded to suit their specialty
production. The Motels. Machinery Company and the Nykgping Machinery Company
have owned ironworks and rolling mills for many years. Other large companies
which followed this example are ASE A (Allm:nna Svenska Blektriska AB) end SKr
(Svenska Kullagerfabriken-e6wedish Ball Bearing Co.). Among the ASIA prop-
erties is the plant at Surahamnar, where a silicon alloy plate for electrical
use is made. SIP hes expanded the steelworks at Bofors to manufacture special
steel for ball bearings. Other large Swedish companies in the machine-shop
field are the le M. Ericsson Telephone Company, AB Separator, At/aseDieael?
and AB Oasaccuoulator.
Imeediately after
its iron and steel indu
commodities. In conjunc
recovery program Sweden
war, Sweden commenced an extensive program to expand
in order to increase its self-sufficiency in those
n will that program and as an essential part of its
alai expanding its engineering industries for the
ultimate purpose of increasing the ratio of exported manufactured products to
raw materials. Mile Western couetriee will be eble to absorb most of the in-
creased exports from the engineering industries, the Swedes consider the USSR
and its satellites as an essential long range market. Such exports to Eastern
Europe are also an important bargaining element for Sweden in obtaining imports
of considerable economic value.
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errou? ta
Sweden is detici.uit in non errous mineral reorcos, many of which are
essential in steel making. Due to & lack of solid fuels domestic snelting of
non-ferrous area, tn some instances is uneconomical, an though the mineral
is domeetically available. The general practice has been to import the metals
often exportin, the ores in exchange, except in times of emergency such aa
*misted during World War II. Both zinc and nickel were produced during the war,
but nne have hoes produced eince 1945. Considerable quantitiea of zinc, lead,
and eopper concentrates are shipped to Belgium for smelting and then returned to
Sweden in the feria of metal. Small deposits of chromite exist in Sweden, but
attempts to utilize this ore were also abandoned in the postwar. period.
Mon-ferrons metallic ores produced in Sweden in 1947 were treated at 19
entration plants. The mines producing these ores, together with quantities,
shown in the following tablet
T' To Concentra-
of Oren Smel.ers tion Plants
ri
ks-
ult
Osterot1and
IMmebergsfaltet
Eaggetorp
'Farmlands
langban
Orsbrol
VaMige zink-
gruvor
Eavetorp8fa1t
Ljusnars gsgruv-
felt
Tsijobergsfalt
Lovasfalt
Gsrpenbergs odal-
felt
Simbergsfalt
Zino
Tungsten
Manganese
Zinc
Lead, zinc, and
copper
Lead, zinc, and
copper
Tungsten
Zino and lead
Pyrite
Zinc
Um, lead, 9n6
pyrites
Lead and zinc
Zinc, lead, and
copper
Zinc, lead, and
copper
2,263
a.
26,901
Ai!
47,304
8,668
46,385
11,173
22,619
9, 544
92,884
11,906
11,738
22,839
47,417
78,209
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TRFIDENNAI
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To To Concentra-
Claes of Ores Smelters tion Plante
(in metric tons)
VINES PRODUCING
Stollbergsfait
Svartbergsfalt
Oransgruvan
Vasterbotten;
felt
Akullagruvfait
Menstraskfalt
Adak-Lindskolds-
fait
Rud1joback3falt
Xristinebergs
felt
Revlidens gruv-
felt
Norrbotten;
taisvallialt
Lead
Lead
Lead, zinc, and
pyrites
Golds, copper
Andalusite
Copper, aad pyritas
Pyrites
Copper
Pyrite.*
Copper, zinc,
and pyrites
Copper and zinc
Lead
01.0.
Oft
18,037
644
WOO
1,06
545
25,748
437
11,318
186,600
744
145,294
3,800
412,234
46,754
144,548
All mines
50,043
1,512,289
In 1948 6weden imported 34,672 metric tons of copper metal, one halt of
which came from Rhodesia. Substantial quantities were also imported from Belgium,
the Belgian Congo, finland, and Canada. Belgium and NOxico were the principal
sources for imports of 13,674 tons of lead. Tin imports amounted to 1,424 tons
and came principally from the Netherlands, Malaya, and the Feat Indies. Norway,
Poland, and Belgium supplied most of the zinc import totalling 19,796 tons.
Canada and the UX were practically the sole sources of aluminum amounting to
13,561 tons. Norway, the UK, and Canada supplied practically the entire import
of nickel amounting to 1,960 tons. Tkentrsix tons of magnesium were imported
from the UK, The UK, Oseehoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were the principal sup-
pliers of antimony imports amounting to 372 tons. Eighty tons of cobalt were
imported from Belgium. The Netherlands, Belgium, US, Norway, and Canada aup-
plied roughly equal amounts of the 87 tons of imported cadmium. 4,041 tons of
copper-alloy were imported, principally from the UK.
Non-ferrous ifletal imports in the form of plates and bands in the amount
of 11,775 metric tons were supp2ied generally by the countries mentioned in the
preceding paragraph and in roughly the mane proportion as the metals furnished
by those countrios.
In addition to non-ferrous metals, 5,545 metric to of ferro-alloy steel
were imported, the two largest imports being 1,595 tons of manganese iron from
the USSR and 1,a67 tons of chromium iron from Norway. Approximately 600 tons
of silicon iron were also imported from Norway, and 300 tons of chromium iron
from the US.
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Imports of non-ferrous metallic ores were considerably reduced in 1948
(especially chromite ore), due principally to import restrictions. Chromite ore
imports amounted to 244695 metric tone. The principal suppliers in the crier of
importanee were Turkey, the USSR, Yugoslavia, India, Rhodesia, end South Africa.
The USeR was the principal source of manganese ore,. supplying 12,093 metric tons
out of a total of 15,404 tons impertede leolfrae ore amounting to 2,204 was ime
ported from- 17 countries, but China) Australia and Burma were the principal
sources. Molybdenum ore imports amounted to 419 metric tons and came prae-
oipally from the US- and the Philippines*
Except for chroeite ore., imports of non-ferrous metallic ores inc ;-d
slightly durtng 1949e Especielly eotewortey are increased ehipments of eene
gentee ore from the USSR. Another development ha been the decision of the
Swedich eoeernment to subeidise aluminun netal production in view of that
motel's growing importance in 'Sweden's nngineering industries. The estimated
1949 domertic requirerente for aleminum were 14,000 metric team and the expan-
sion program is designed to increeee the output of Sweden's lone producer,
Svenska Aluwinunkoreaniet, from 4,000 to 8,000 metric tons. The latter company
is LON 50 per cent Swedish owned, and the remainder is owned by Aluminut Limited
of Montreal. Aluminum oxide (the raw material for aluminum production) can be
produced from donestic andalusite, as was dere during the war, but this is
nornally too expensive. Preeentlye aluminum oxide is produced from bauelte
imported principally from Yugoslavia and Greece. Hovever, aluminum oxide can
now be imported directly from Canada more cheaply than it an be produced
domestically from either imported or doeeetic ores.
?us; Requireeente
Sweden is completely dependent on imports for its eolid and liquid fuel re-
quirements, but has developed extensive hydro-electric capacity. Requirements
of the Swedish iron industry for solid fuels other than metallurgical coke (and
domestically produced charcoal) are not eignificant. Fuel requirements of the
steel industry also are low since steel is produced largely in electric furnaces
utilising hydro-electric power. estimated requirements of metallurgical coke for
the iron industry in 3.949 amounted to roughly ,8?0,000 metric tone, although the
expansion program now in progress may increase this. requirement. The program
also provided for some conversion from the use of domestic charcoal to metal-
lurgical coke.
In the iimiediate postwar period Sweden's iron industry was considerably
dependent on Polish coal and coke import* but this has been reduced as other
sources have becoee available. Total coke imports in 1948 amounted to
1,615,873 eetric tons, although it is not knoen how much cf this was metal-
lurgical coke. 639,000 metric one came from the US-UK Zones of Germany and
the greater eart? of the remainder, in nearly equal amounts, came from the UK,
Poland, and the Netherlands. In addition to coke, Sweden imported,81e0120
metric tons of gas and coke coal, half of which cams from the US and the re-
mainder from the UK and Poland. Sweden has a coking capacity in excess of
500,000 tons per year,
In the postwar period there haa been extensive conversion to the use of
liquid fuels for power and heating. It is estimated at the present time that
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approximately 3 zillion ons of solid fuels (including metallurgical coke) would
satisfy the requirements of all Swedish industries. To solid fuel imports in
194S amounted to 7,2311000 metric tons, approximately one-half of which come
from Poland. 3.949 imports from Poland have been reduced and increased quantities
have been received from the UN, the US-UN Zones of Gerrsany and from the US.
V)
OIRDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pubs, ORE
ATTENTION
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
27 February 1950
25X1A
Russian Emigre Groups in China
25X1A
1. It is requested that this office be furnished
information concerning the identity and politics of
the Russian emigre groups in China together with
identification of the leaders.
2. This memorandum confirms conversation between
25X1A on 24 February 1950.
25X1A
Actin e , Intei.Llge
CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET
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letot Tho claosiUcation of this memorandum must be raised to eoniorm
cinsaiticat:Wn of the draft it covers-
-:'4INORANDOM FOR cum', PUBLICATIONS DIVISION
filBJEOT: Transmission of Draft Report
21iOLOSUREs IP-72 "Russian Emigres in China"
t)ate 27 March 1950
le,......apadiummivnemAelareviv
___a.s914p
1, Enclosure is forwarded herewith for review and, if requirt
foe formal coordination with the departmental intelligence organi-
zations,
2,, This dral't report has been coordinated informally 1'th the
ovganizations checked below:
VAMAII PIA:
Dia D/M0
D/In EJ DAA
p/Tr j D/VE
D/
E_.
OtE La Other
DIFE D/O
.1.1011111.0?.
gute41.041
State (OW
Army MARS&
Navy (ON1)
Air (AID)
Other
WifilistaffroyMellitatlf.DF.IIMLIM
3,, Naps and/or Graphics to be inclFded in this report and
arrangements completed for their production by the Hap Division or
the Presentation Staff are ae foiltw
None
comqgtel
The specific questions covered in the attached report
were aveloped in consultation with OFC 9 March 1950.25x1A
25X1A
FE
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?
MO:a Wel*
Mere are believed to be upwards of 88.000 Russian
akiang. and China Proper, of *home perhaps 80.000 are in possession of
si-genuine Soviet eitisenship. obtained for the most part after Jaary 194
(a) There are probably 86.000 or more Nussianeedgres in nohuntaj this
figure doe. not include Soviet officials* 4oviet forces in the Port ?rthar
naval baie area. or Soviet advisors and technicians attached to the railesys
and to other Northeast enterprises. The largest colony of Russian emigres
in Manehuria is in the eity of Marbin, where the Russian oonosunity,whieh
is almost solidly *riot, is estimated at 80.000. another 8*000 or more
Russians, almost all of *hula are Soviet citizens, reside in Radon. Rairen,
Changchun. Taitsiher, Kirin and other cities, It is doubtful that there are
more than 1.000 'White Russians--persons of Aussian descent not claiming
Soviet citisenship-,-in all of Manchuria, it it further doubtful that any
Russian Swi4rants' Assoeiations (REa) are funstioning in Manchuria or that
any Mate' Russian individual oanatill be regarded as an motive 'leader f
emigrant activities. ThereAlre Soviet Consulates-Uneral In Rambla and
Dairen. and probably in Mukden, as well as smaller offices in other Manchurian
*Wes; the Bussian communities in the area are certainly under the close
and probably under the tight control. of 4iet officials.
in Maas la.
'80U* This report is based largely on the knowle. of a single analyst
Wit responsibilities an an ON: officer in the field during the period
1948 .? 1048 included special cognisance of Russian activities in
It is not believed that the departmental records. which were fairly oomp ete
and smourate as of early 1948* have been kept up to date. It is believed
that the most likely source of precise current data would be 080 whish
Pr.atial"4 has a aaatiduiad lanVE`tVlitligft-Mi MAWbilstt
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appears to be effectively sealed off fres the it, and, while
ontaot with surviving /White Russians could perhaps be made. it it most
improbable that such persons would be able to engage in any significant
anti-Nleviet activity in Manahuria.
(b) there *re perhaps 20.000 Ibassians in inkian, .zcludin Soviet
officials andgetsuine Soviet eitisens frogs the USSR. As of spring 1947#
it is emtimated that more than 15.000 Russian emigres in Sinkiang were in
possession, of Soviet passports in addition to none thousands of non-
Russian natives to whom the USSR had offered citizenship. Of the possibly
15-17.000 Soviet ultimo of Russian descent in Sinkiang in 1947. aocut
10.000 are believed to have been concentrated in Laing (111), and the
remainder distributed between the cities of Tihua. Xashgar, Tga.ohleng.
Cheng7Ada 1Mrkand and had. Of the possibly 3-5.000 Russian emigres in
Sinkiang who regarded thaaselves as 'mite' Russians in 1947. several
hundrod persons made their way out of the previa**, in 1947.40. and most of
these mho remained have probably boson. Soviet citizens. As is believed to
be the moo in Manchuria, it is doubtful that in Sinkiang there are mere
than 1.000 remaining 'White/ Ruseians, or that any of their associations and
leaders are still active. The Soviet consular eetablishments in Tihua.
Xashgar, Ila-ch'eng Cheng-hue and lain; (Ili) are presumed to have, as in
Manchuria. effective control over Russian communities throughout the pro-
viso,. Because Sinkiang appears to be even more tightly sailed off from the
Wait than is Menehuria. there is even less prospect of significant anti-Soviet
etivity by 'White/ Russians in the province.
(o) There are possibly 10.000 Russians in China Proper. exoludin the
Soviet advisors and technicians recently reported to be streaming into Cour
*mist China, and excluding Sovi.t diplomatio personnel. ?he largest RUSsiSit
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eenmm ity In China Proper Is In Shanghai. with perhaps 15,000 Russians remain.
lag. nest of when are Soviet *Wiens of the type offered citisenahip after
lannary 1949. The neat lergest is in Tientsin, where possibly 3,000 Russians
still reside, followed by Peiping and Uinta* with perhaps 700 each, with
another SOO or so spread among the cities of lalgan. Lam:Aloe. Sankow, Nanking,
Canton and other points. Out of this figure (an approximation) of 10,000.
it does not 'mem likely that more than 2,000 are still 'White' Russian*:
with the possible exception of the UFA in Shanghai, it Is believed that no
meigreassouiations are still functioning, and that few or no 'White, Russian
leaders aro still direating emigrant affairs. Although China Proper is not
yet sealed off from the West. It appears reasonable to judge that the remaining
Mattel Russian* in China Proper are adjusting themselves to the prospect (or
the imainono.) or Soviet control, with the possible exception of the activity
at %mite Russian agents of Chinese and Western intelligence agenoies (a
Imree of irritation to the Soviets), no significant *mount of anti-soviet
astivitles in China has been reported in the past two years.
iloyalty, of loviet CItiseme
It le not believed that any detention has immured on th. part of soviet
officials in China or of the very tow non-offleial genuine Soviet citisens in
China. In the period 1945-44 when relations between OS and USSR diplomatic
personnel in China were offic lly amiable, and oontactwas frequent, certain
Soviet officials (usually in the lower grades) were believed to be tensible
potential defectors, however, none of these persons actually attempted to
and every one of the:mete was so suspected had been sent back to the
U5R by the end of 1947. In 1948. one Soviet Army enlisted man defeated in
North Zorea and sought sanctuary In Chinas it is believed that this man was
turned over to the Soviet authorities by the Chinese Nationalists, in the
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154102T
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Interest of avoiding incidents. The loyalty of the quasi-Soviet citizen* in
China--those who had obtained *Wean ship after janOary 1946* whose passports
were not valid for entry into the USSR* and who werequite distinct in Soviet
eyes from genuine Soviet +citizens coming from the 08.16--was and is highly
enspeet The Soviet officials who dealt with emigre- affairs in China were
well aware that the majority of applioante for Soviet citizenship in 1946 were
less interested in Soviet citizenship jm. se than in ridding theme elves of
their statelesn and vulnerable status. Soviet officials apparently felt that
they-would be suooessful in (a) organising and indoctrinating these of its
new sitizenewhose services would be valuable in China* and (b) repatriating
to the, USSR those whose services were desired in the USSR or whose presence
vas not desired in China. The Soviet estimate of the situation efts approxi-
mately correct; i.e.* a fairly high proportion of the new citizens becanw
Sealy presentable representatives of the USSR and were useful to the soviet
intelligence servions while several thousands of persons In the second oats
gory (desirable: in the USSR or undesirable in China) were repatriated from
1946 to. 1946. However* metal hundred of these lersats' oitisens* in eities
held by the Chinese Nationalists* repudiated their Soviet citizenship in 1941?..
44* r.torning their passports to Soviet consular offices and publishing notions
of their return to stateless statue. (The USSR continued to view then as
Soviet ) In addition* it 8041111 likely that many at the hundreds of
'ersatz.' Soviet citizens *bo e*tgrat.4 to now0Commanist countries* apparently
with Soviet sppyovl* subsequently repudiated their woviet citizenship. More-
Soviet officials in china seemed to believe* and most Western observers
that the majority of sersetzt Soviet citizens in China 'furs not
p*litioully reliable* and that, even though they faithfully followed the
In public* they would be inclined to 'defect' to the West whenever
FeefFreitifiteeileOttetWlihrerrArRi3fthilitel**AdOWTOVOMPOBI-Pedr
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*soaps fro* Soviet authority. A great ashy of these "ersats' citizens *lin-
lambed friendly relations with Western representatives. and voluntarily supplied
information on Soviet affairs in China. A few 'ersatz' oltizens were aotually
in the 'Deploy of Western intelligence services. It Is believed that the identity
of most of these 'ersatz* eitisens, who supplied information on either a volun-
tary or paid basis is known to Soviet counter-intelligenoe. and that appropriate
astion has been or will betaken. In any event. Soviet citizens In China era.
expected to become increasingly cautious in their relat ens with Westerners.
Russians
at hand precise information on the numbers of 'Shit,' ibzs.isna
cuation program of the International Refugee Organisation or
en the =fibers at Whites' remaining in China after the completion of that program.
Mewever. it is roughly estimated that, of the 7.4.000 '1hite' Russians believed
Ube in China in au 94S. perhaps as many es 5.000 succeeded In leaving
China in the next several menthe5 primarily through: the good offices of IRO. At.
the *lose of the IRO program in spring 2940 after the Comma/et occupation or
Shanghai. these may have been 14.000 "Whites' remaining in Shanghai up to
000 in Tientsin, up to SOO in Uinta*. up to 900 in Nigage and perhaps a
few hundred more in other eities. However. It eau probable that most of those
',hien': have sine, applied for Soviet eitisenshipz it is estimated that less
than 2000 Russian: emigres In China newreord themselves as 'White Russians.
end their number is expected steadily to decline. Inasmuch as the Chinese Communist
authorities preaussably will **operate with Soviet effieials in putting pressure
en the remaining 'Whites' to accept Soviet eitizenship and 4oviet authority.
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a ? a
VW"
oL Make Russians
White' Ruisians in 4;hina made and presumably still w4k, their livings in
the sui.e le itinate and illegitimate Dishions as their 'ersatz' Soviet fellows.
As a rule, bo r1 the more prosperous members of any given KUSSillal community
in China tended to bee- 3oviet ?Wiens after January 1946, It was the Ler
preeeien ot most nestern observers that the rank..and-rile of 'Whits' RUNALAUO
in China, i d stinot from the relatively fee wealthy 'Whites'. ware- obliged to
devote the greater part of their energies to the struggle to mks a LY1 for
themselves and their families. Reny of them devoted a eensiderable part of
their free time to community enterprises, most of whioh, in tumn, were oonoerned
with oaring for ill and Indigent members of the Mite oommenisty. Alth the
possible exception of the Russian Amigrants' Association of 4bangbal. led by
Col. G Bologov, acne of the REA's, atter 1948 had sufficient resoureed LD
personnel or hinds to conduct a significant anti wrist efferti and wren in
Shanghai the 'White newspaper was foroed to suspend publioation
through leek of support. In Shanghai, and occasionally in other *Sties.
local REA would periodically stage 'Mhite' Suseian publio sr/Aeolis*, in
White' leaders wquld speak of the aolidarity of the 'White' community, their
lty to the Orthodox Uhuroh, their determination to struggle with the
eta Ito the let'. and so on. Saab activity, vim not of greet inportanse.
szsept perhaps to keep up the morale of Mate' communities. It is known that
offloials in China were not greatly disturbed by ouch aotivity on the
part of the Mates and appeared oontent to take note of the 'White leaders
fer litter retaliation.
S. Clendestine Mittel% 'White'
A number or 'White' RURSJAMA were suepeoted of be-ng, sad ao
were in the .npZor of the USSR, reportin? to oviot intelligenoe on the aoti-
f other intelligence sorrioos, various ne and Chinese Wises and
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duals, and on other 'bite' Suasion personalities, A small number of
ibly rrhito Bussiens--bit aotually 4oviet?were perhaps included,
oned by the USW in the thousands of 'White Russians evacuated by IRO.
f the alleged liohltee' in the employ of US offioes.as guards. drivers.
laborers, engineers, etc.,- were probably Soviet ?Miens in fact. Bseept
for their intelligence functions, the olandestine activities of White'
Pussians on half of the USER did not appear to be widespread; at leadt In
China foper, there was no confirmed reports of murder, abinotion alit sabotage
undertaken by ' White Ruselans to further the interests or the UESR So far
as Western observers ?could judge. the USSR did not rely heavily on clandestine
aetivi I s by rhite' Russians.
?
R no.a China
!14s offj, has received no inforuation on this subject for the past year.
The 'white' ussian leaders of the 1948-48 period presumably were aware that
they would for at soviet hands under a pro-soviet Chinese Communist adi*in-
titration, and
therefore wade every sZfort to depart Chine prior to Comuunist
socupation of the cities in shich their 'nhite' oommunitiee were 'pouted. In
any event it is very doubtful that any of the 'White' Russian leaders of the
past. all of whom are well known to the USSR. are still operatind as alders'.
7.
Between 'i!hitet Russian,aroupa
f 1948, it is known that "White' Russian groups in China had for many
years maintained oontact with each other and with similar groups in the US in
Central and 4outh snorts*. in Commonwealth nations, and in various countries at
Western urope and itsia. However, fra?mentery information from Russians
outside Chine. received In the past year, indicates that they are eneountering
ffioulties in oomunlosting hy mail with their acquaintances in China; cable
service, they have reported, hLs been somewhat more reliable, but does not
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ed For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T21049A0001000800011-13
ussion of confidential matters. It seems probable that the Chinese
Communist authorities, with Soviet assistance, will institute a system or cur.
veillanoe 844 censorship of the mail sent and received by 'White' Russians in
t trait whatever actual contact there may be between ?Whits* Russian
groups in China and abroad, it is known that 'White' Russian groups and indivi
duals in China have frequently claimed to maintain contests with other groups
all over the world (ineluding points in the USSR itself) which., upon investi-
gation. proved to be tenuous or non-existent, the leading 'Rhite' Russian
liaieekhddy in 1gns, for mapy years, was the bretetvo Roes4py Pravdi (brother
Ruewian truth), headed for a time by amoral P. 4. Durlin. who is
believed to be in Taipei now. Investigation of the 8140 in 1047. assisted by
Gen. Burlin himself, established that the organizetionwas no longer in actual
operation, and that its alleged a000mplishmants (at that time) were fabricated
by twilit** RU40IAU oonfidenoe?men in Ltanghai who hoped to enlist Western
finanoial support for the activities, of a defunct body.
a.
Of
f 'White' Russians
has not yet
nformation to date, in regard to Chinese Communist treatment
ans. indicates that severe disorinination against the latter
practiced, although several sources report that preferential
treatment is asoorded Soviet ?Mims, Sommer, offeotive 000rdination of
Soviet amd Chinese Communist policy is to be ...vested and will probably result
ins the 'nosing down of emigrant organisations throughout China' the transfer
or their property to 'eviet ***trials pressure upon the 'hit.' &WSW'S to
'widest ?Soviet citizenship (except, perhaps, a few persons who are too old or
too unwell to be of importance to the USSR), and the repatrittlaWto the USSR
of those emigres who have been found objectionable to the USSR. Although
large numbers of 'White Ruselans were permitted to leave Shanghai tor various
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at eountries after the Communist 000upotion of shanghai. it is not
the majority of those remining will be allowed to leave.
Mepoi ti on or Russinns
the USI is believed to have forcibly repatriated 6-6.000 White' Russians.
from Manchuria in 1946-46. The only known public and voluntary repatriation
program %loured in 1947, nvolving perhaps 1,000 Soviet citizens in Sinkiang
and possiAy up to 6,000 in China Proper. Another general repatriation was
plenaed for 1J46, wut, es a result of discouraging lot (or no letters)
tram pervious repatriates mos indefinitely postiJoned. Another repatriation.
both of 'ersatz' Soviet citizens and of mate' dussianz who refuss to acoept
snob citizenship. is excepted within the next year, although the majority of
the 60,000 'ersatz' Soviet oitizens in China will proba11y Ns permitted to
remain.
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Approved Folakelease 2000/04/17S:'413FT74];01049A0001011030601-8
Thc wr-A
.6m:ft
''T..0Pr4P,DaV,
FC! PBA? PriglATE01,6 DTVISTON
JUNTECT: T.0.42x:rtmleo of ft Report
IMLOSURE! IP. _7_13 !!.S.gyl._atr.!!alinas.e., Yreatyl.t _ _
1, 17 April 1950
c:z.E.,1 ;ri -
fopww-ded her.nyith for revlew 44?11(1:. If
foraInt comdIrw.tiort v;he cizItovr'140 Intollifre,r,co
1,;azionr,
2, ban tnen coordlAatd inforrhalTIdUA the
organizat..,tots checked below:
L,411.,-7Ilet C11"
vitt.). 1 DiR0 ,i
)/In . __A 04LA r-... i
D/Tr 1. i D/WE
WEE IX : DiMa ,
r;,,I.FE I-1 LVEG 1
r,vq1E 1 1 Othet r
OutTd
State ('Th)
kk.aly (10,41.(13U131)
Navy (ON1)
Air (AID)
Other . _
)- flaps tcad/or Graphlos 'in be included ',in th:!..a repor arld
az'rangenertts tcmp1oted for tam:...r reoduztioP. th ip Division or
the PreIeotaticm Staff are as
None
rdwImerit-;-
Conclusions contained in the attached report are largely based
on speculation, since field collection efforts covering the subjects
treated have been unavailiht..
25X1A
D/F
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Approved For Release 2000/Ste0111A-RDP79T01049A00CM0680001-8
fkipl. April 1950
Arrow CfllNSX ZA3O1 FORCE TO USSR
Recent unsubs
to mention the employment of a Chinese labor
force in USSR. Numbera oited have gel rally run in the magnitude of the bun
dred thousands and larger, The eono/usion of ORB, on the basis of the data
cited in the following sections, is that there has been no significant migra-
tion of Chinese workers to the USSR. It is believed that* for reasons of
t*
political expediency, the Chinese Communists cannot ',spans large-scale mi-
gration to the USSR at this time. Large-scale migration, should it take place
in the future id be readily evident to intelligence collection agencies.
Forced reoruitment on a large-seale could hardly be concealed, and voluntary
recruitment would require public ap sale for workers through the usual prop.
da media.
1. Information from China
a. Reports t laiter intelligence dispato from ommunia't Ch
nor report' in the Chinese Cosemmi t preen, nor radio broadcasts from Commun-
ist China have made mention of Chinese laborers being sent to the USSR. In an
assessment of the possibility that large numbers ot Chinese have been sent to
murk in the USSR, the absence of Chinese reports on the subject is of some
significance, for the ream that voluntary recruitment of Chinese on any sub-
stantial seals mould require propagandistic appeals in the press and on the
radio. The possibility exists that resort is being made to forced. recruitment.
It woold be difficult, however, so long as families relatives, and friends of
impressed laborers remain behind, to keep the fact of forced recruitment on any
large scale hidden in most parts of China.
In ManehUriar however, the Communists may have suff6444 in secretly effecting
some forced recruitment of labor. With US intelligence gathering aetivities
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SECRET
verely reatriated, it ia quite 7ossible that such foroed reoruitment could
occur undetected by the US.
b. Speculationt The following aonsiderations give iome veak suvort to
epeeu tion that foreed recruitment of Chinese laborers may be proceeding on a
limited saa
(1) The Com- ni ta have publio y encourafed the evacuation of
1a numbers of urbn reeidents from Shanghai and other cities. Although,
tor the moet part,the Communists have preferred to rely on propaanda to
enoourage volun migrsp from the cities the Ch1iose preis does indicate
that some force haa been used to move "loafers" and other surplus elements of
the population to rural areas. Some of these prson coi ha-e been diverted
from their ostensible destinations and shipped to the USSR as forced labor.
However there is no factual support for this line of speculation.
(2) It ii impossible to aocount for hundreds of thouand? of former
idlers who defected to or were taken prieoner by the Communists.
Therefore, may be apeeulated that some of these ex-Nationalist sqldiers.
1-1
?su.o
tally those taken in Manohuria, may have been made available be the
as a labor force. This is believed unlikely4 however, since it has rot
the
subjeet of any reports from the field, either in Communiat orNatio41ist Chinas
rurthermore it has not been mentioned even in Nation list prop ganda-which has
ooutinui1y attempted to exploit plausible line to demonstrte USSR-Chinese
mmunist collusion.
2. Intelligence from areas outside China
a. RePPrt**
(1) C. X.. Sulzberger, correspondent for New York Timetwritin
from Paris, rep,irted that the Soviet* have requested that 500,000 Chinese iRborers
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be made ai
Manehuria
spondents
Evalue
i able to the
d 'Atett 300,000 were airetidy en route from
York Times ansary 1950), Other Amerioan press ?erre..
repeated the report, in some oases citing even lar er numbers.
The press dispatohes are based on information fromunreveaied
Until corroborated in some measure by other ohannele of intelligence,
these dispatches oan be received only with the usual measure of reserve twoordod
.wsoaper reports,
(2)
sighed a secret
In the autumn of 1
ist China and the U55B reportedly
referred to as the Moscow Pact". This purported
remnant, the souroe of whioh we the Tokyo correspondent of the Chinese Nationalist
Central Neal Service, provided that*
In the event hostilities should break out in Europe involving the
the Chinese Com-unlat will dispatch one million laborers to aisi
nap effort,
Evaluation, There is no confirmation of the reportthat a "Mosoow Pant"
was in fact signed by China and the USSR. In any event, it is to be observed
that the purported Peet deals with a oom7itment to furnish labor in the event
of hostilities involving the UM. NO mention A.:7 de of a commitment to furnish
laborers under present circumstances,
(3) A000rding to a report in March 1950 rrom the U5 Ymbassy
Warsaw, the British embassy has received information th!lt preparations were
being made to receive large numbers of Chinese laborers, In this onection,
the Ostdeutsohen Zeitung of Bonn, a weekly publication circulating amont East
Conan refugees, reported on 17 November 1949 that some Chinese workers had
arrived. In Poland to -work in the coal mines of Upper Silesia and that additional
number* were espected in the near future,
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aide
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uatiens These reports taken at their face value do not iiidioate
,?
that many Chinese workers havesrrived in ?elands' yet, and are rather vague
g rding the extent of possible future Chinese imr-igrations. They leek further
aonf1rmation4, and therefore can be evaluated no higher than "possibly true%
b. Speoulationt The USSR as a whole has an adequate supply of un-
skilled lebor. Ina reale within the SR which lack an adequate local supply
of such labor, Chinese labor might feasibly be utilised or nrojeets requiring a
low degree of sH.1i. The neat of transport, mainteNtanee, and the additional
incentives whioh mould be required to induoe free Chinese labor to migrate to
those regions would, however, be an muoh as, or perhaps even more than would
be required to reoruit free Soviet labor, relative to the productivity of each
group. Soviet slave labor would be less cohtly and more reedily mobilized
than either of the two groups mentioned above, or Chinese slave labor.
3. Conolusion
It is riot probable that the reoru tment of Chinese laborers for work
in the SSR if it is proceeding at all, is going on only on a very small scale.
The po)ittosi tmpracticability, from the Chine e Communist point of view, of
sendtn large number of Chinese to the US-li iv indioated by :he fact Vat any
agreements on the subject have born secret rather than announced. The Chinese
Communist do not at this time, consider it politioallY expedient to expouse
a program of sendtng Chinese laborers to the USSR. Without such public espous
no large-soal* volztary worker mIrr tion from China is pasz1b1*. Tat-
vev has ea urea, voluntary or forced, must be quite small in soale-.-
enough,. in fact, to have escaped the natio* of obeervers in China, both
eve and foreign. The number, if there has been any worker emirratien at
11 ?n be no more than ahre thoeland rather# than the hundred thousands or
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SECRET
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Although there has been no evidence of sirnifiesn ricer mirr
date frora China to the USSR. China may be oonritted to euply a labor force of
vowel hundred thou4ind in the event of hostilities involving the OBSR. Such
contribution be similar to the assistance rendered by Chita to its
durine World Aar 1. when China implied close to 200.000 laborer* for
service in Frame?.
The possibility also exists that China may c cam tted to suolly some
laborer* to the 'O3 E. in the next few years even thonrh the ussn is not nvolved
in hostilities. Rowever, in view of the fact that the 78SR in general has an adequate
supply of unskilled labor, it i. not likely that such a labor force would be
larre-4 If and when a recruitment program on a substantial eoale shoud be
Inetitnted, the propagand*. appeals needed to assure its. success will preclude
any effective efforts to keep it a seer .
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8RCRET
II,?OVIET USE- OF cti: 'ESE w'Aitlit WATE1i FORTS
The USSR, in aadition to securing, at least through 1962,
its special privilegea in the warm water ports of Dairen and Port
Arthur according to the puOlished terms of the recently signed
treaty, may also be accorded in secret articles the right of
free access to other Wainese warm water ports. Unconfirmed re-
ports, largely from Lthinese ?bati,nalist sources, indicate current
USSR naval activity in Chinese waters and press and other specu-
lation on the secret clauses of the tr-aty has concluded that this
activity is likely to be extended.
1. Ipforma-don concerning boviet kaval Activit in Chinese
'a ters
On the whole, reports of soviet naval activity, ex-
ceptin that in the Port Arthur Naval case Area, are of doubtful
accuracy and stem for the most part from prejudiced Nationalist
aources. It is believed that a small portion of the Soviet Far
Sastern Fleet wintered at ort Arthur. however, rekorts that
Soviet eubmarines or other vessels either are based in other
Chinese ports, or Ulaat. they are actively supporting the operations
of the Chinese Uommunists are lacking in confirmation and tnere-
fore considered doubtful.
a.) In January Admiral Kwei of the talineoe ationalist
navy told the 113 ARA in Taipei that he was "certain" risin,stao was
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SECRT
being used as an operational oase for 6oviet submarines and
other !hips of unknown numbs (Navd telegram Taipei 131830).
Comment: Althouzb SoA.et submarines and other vessels
may nave visited Tsibgtaoa it is doubtful that they are based
in that port. The crews of U3 cummeroial vessels which have
visited Isirt4tae subseq,Aent to tne date of this report have not
oeserved rlearned of any 6oviet activity thee.
b.) A Nationalist source reports sezret boviet sub-
mIrine opeka.ti,ns in connecticn with the forthcoming campaign
against Hainana (ONI 0E-32242f/cake 6 Jan.), According to this
source these submarines are 12 in number and are based, not on
at 1,airen and Port Arthur, out alao at Tsingtao and Mawei (near
Foochow).
giammAuit This report lacks confirmation, and also is
OU ted of ueing no more than hationalist propaganda.
0.) Acording to a report ootained via the Italian
consul in ietin, i)coviet Vice-Admiral iiilotoski is to eatablish
headquarters at C)nefoo or lsingtaos and have responsibility for
the coastal defe4se Qi enahtung and hopei provinees (State Tele.-
gram Tientsin 82, 23 Jan.).
t.
eommpt4t: This report iatotall4 1ackin in confirma-
on and ie believed false. It waa aocompanied by a numoer of
Other higlaid doubtful r,4aors. Alec, the same source in June-
Ju. 1949,, provided a mass of false information on similar sub-
jects.
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The chinese fiationalist tr iforce A-2 reported in
that 18,,000 fishermen have beon removed from the bhan hai
area for trainiik, in the operat.t.t.n of captured vessels under the
boviets in 5.singtao (State eiezi aipet unnumbered, 27 eb.).
Qommlept: This report mao have some basis in fact,. since
it is consistent with a nunawIr of other r ports concerr,ing Soviet
advisory and technical assistance to the bhiness Qomraunists in
various fields ahd localities. However, nfirmatiun is avail
.-
able regarding this particular report, whion gives no information
regarding possible USLR base facilities or special privileges.
It is evaluatod. as possibly true, witu the qualification that the
numbers of (.hineee are believed to be greatly exa.g6erated.
e.) Admiral Kwei in March, informed the US ANA, in
TaLei, th.a6 the boviets .fere helping' the Chinese communists in
the rehabilit4t.4.c,n of ex-US au.ph,tbiLus trucks arc tanks at Little
liar or, Tsingtao.
forciment: Although there is no confirmtion, this in
evaluated possioly true, for reasons ind.cated in paragraph
above.
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2.
* * *
n V.?
7 : CIA-RDR7,9T01049A000100080001-8
C 4 0 ! 0/3. * 4
a.igtLIZTX22,16, 28 Jen . (Paris dateline): Correspondent Sask.
berger, quoting unidentified informantr, etatee that the Soviets were demanding
in pro-treaty negotintions, full Soviet control over 7 Chinet,, ports: Chin..
huangtao, Li Purchen (Li was One of the thine:,e negotiators, the port might be
Melchor, Shanheikuan NuIutao, etc.): Chetoo? Taing"no, Dairen, and
Port Arthur. Sulzberger added that the Chinese had made counteredomands and
that, as far as his information rent, no conclusion had been reached.
Comment: Although this report has not been confirmed it is considered
possible that the Soviets did make such dernands. Thee have been no reliable
reports, however, that the ghinese made any concersions of such a farbreadhing
nature.
b, Nashington Daily News, 6 Mar. (Parts dateline): A SeriPPw-
Howard correspondent, on the basis of informs ion from a owelloinformed
satl-
lite diplomat", reported that the Treaty had a secret annex, establishing a joint
eltueso-Chineze Pacific A4mira1t," to have full control of all 3ino-Soviet naval
operations in the Pacific According to this story, the Admiralty, was to have
its headquarters in iladivostock, and would exercise jurisdiction over all
Chinese ports.
Comment: In the absence of confirming information from more reliable
sources, this report can be ace pted only with great reserve.
3. SWAMI=
The published terms of the SinceSoviet treaty insure the continuation
Of the USSE special rights in Pert Arthur and Dairen, at least through 1952.
It is considered likely that secret agreements to that treaty extend Soviet
privileges to ports in China proper. There is a lack of reliable reports on
present Soviet activity in warm water ports of China Proper, and only apecu
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ARSaiViiifoofalUVRAKCjie 1=1=112="1-8
It Is believed Maly that the USSRlass been given assurances that it
will be accorded free access to Chinese ports for its Pacific Fleet, end the
ri? to use certain labors facilities. It is believed further that the USSR
sa re special naval rights at Tsirztao, supplementing its assured posi-
tion in Arthur The latter conclunion derives some support from the
trequeit references to Tsingtao in the reports cited above, but perhaps more
support from Tlussian historic interest in Tsingtao as well as its excellent
naval anchorage and facilities. However, it is doubtful that the USSR will
attempt to establish naval bases a= other Chinese ports. So long as China
is under a CommuniA regime, the USSI1 presumably will have free access to
Chinese ports th or pftlifyut special rights. in time of war such ports
in friendly hands could offer safe-havens to Soviet vessels If they were
way identified as W3ki naval bases, they would be subject to attack. In
time of peace, the esta lialtent and development of Soviet naval bases would
certainly stisulate Chinese antagonism toward the USSR and woad be diffi..
cult to defend propagandasisee
17-
C:)
CU
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eCs\ks
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1A
Project; OFFICE OF REPCRTS AND ESTIMATES
To: lications Division, Projects Planning
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Subject: PrAes?iNL stmmkgve-,S.
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Approved far Release 200
VallgRUT01049A000100080001-8
q
1 March 1950
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub, ORE
25X1A
ATTENTION
SUBJECT Request for Information
1. It is requested this office be furnished the
following information:
a. Have the refugees from the various Iron
Curtain countries maintained any kind of a distinct
existence or are they indistinguishably merged in
the larger Jewish community?
b. How many Jewish refugees are there in
Israel from each of the following countries: Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Ruman14
c. How many Jews are there at present remaining
In each of the above countries?
d. What Jewish groups in England, France, and
West Germany are engaged in charitable or similar
activities in Israel? Are any of these grows
thought to be Communist penetrated!
2. It is requested this information be furnished
by 7 March or as soon thereafter as practicable.
Reference:
25X1A
Act i ef, Intelligence Support
25X1A
01'
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COt'
25X1 A
March 1950
Haat/Africa Division
- 74
,Ne ceeaea;.-ALA caalave_
e..Q taao, ej
\AA
A. The rtfugeeI from the various Iron Curtain countries a taining
a distinct existence in Israel, and are not merged in the larger Jewieh
commueity. However, physical factory, not free choice, have (riven the
jobless immigrants to cluster together in the vacated Arab towns of Mae,
Jaffa and Lydda for an existence apart from the established life in Israel.
1. Of the 360,000 immigrants who have out
Proaimatelr 74,000 have come from Poland, 23,
13,000 from Hungary and 30,000 from Rumania. *
Israel since May 150 1946,
ram Czechoslovakia,
C. The mer of Jews remaining in each of the following countries is
estimated at 0000 in Poland, 15,000 in Czechoslovakia, 130,000 in Hungary
and 350,000 in Rumania. *
ape
ation to Israel.
0, We have. intornation on two alleged communist front organizations
as late as April 1949.
only ralgh estimates, based on incomplete and often
. Most of the intormation is from Jewish sources,
inflate or deflate figures for political expediency.
government statistics rarely indicate, for instance,
listed as a Rumanian Jew is of Rumanian origin or whether
embarted for Israel from a Rumaaian port. To the
thews figures refer to country of origin rather than
Taking into consideration available data on the number
, in these countries plus the emigration policy of the
we have compounded that, we consider to be the most
order to present an approximate picture of Satellite
de la De An organisation not
est w c opera ng clandestibeli. Its
headquarters at 110 Cours Vieutaud, Marseille, and it is directed by
Heil David Cohen. The offices are freeway visited by former members- of
the Stern gang and the organization is definitely pro-communist. Its
principal work is aiding the Jewish commupists.
2. ur 3.a Resistance t lt id (UJRE) A Prench-a.
Jewish as- tional headrnrters in Paris. The Marseille
ApItritAdiPetzigreni R6:TIK-46-127 9 TO1 dreA0 0 tri 0 0 0 80?071114-ru-
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COIN":7:"71,'
dent is Leonce Cremieuxi 3 Place de la_ &Erse,
e aecretaryl-Genera is Pierre Cohen, 32 noulevard
This association follome the Cow:mist Party line
cabers belcmg to the Stern Cang. Under the protection
the so-cdlled religious society, 'Marcel Hamisrain4
which have not the= r3..."ntered with the local authorities,.
. This Utter organization ie directed by e].
zed FronChman who mas born in Poland,
be
are t 66
nalaborg, a na
organizationa operating in Frans, about ailich me have
t tion are t The Fi?Mon branch of the
and the Youth taiyab4 which has
emish orgauizettions ort
n )4th whieh
dee have not been cnnnist penetrated:
2. zrachi Pdeaiqn of C*t 3iti artd Ireland
3.
4.
5
in
Deve
id.
Jr a4ttinaI infoiUon on tbe above z'uup p3.0 a
of organisations operating in England see
p4b1ished b7 the Zionist Organization o
the organisations listed above and in the book
sinear on any list of communist front groups in
tthre
have chocked
available.
h tee
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h groupo operating in I'Vestern,
urope Division and there is -no
25X1 A
Te
OtM IA-RDP79T01049A000100080001-8
list
Vol.
All
do not
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Approved Fpr Release
Project:
41,
0 04 IA-RD 79,741049A(MpRO
CPIVRAL INTELLIGENGE AGENCY
UNICE OF REPORTS An ESTIMATES
Date: (s, kw( Sb
To: nestle= Division Projects Plardaing
Fr. VEc
Subject: GMISY6QA eAccIstNkt 6