TRANSMISSION OF DRAFT REPORT, ORR PROJECT #15 40.112 TITLE COMMENTS ON COMMUNIST CHINA'S CURRENT FOREIGN TRADE POSITION ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01049A001000040002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 14, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

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 j4o
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ea~tC39:3 La) USSR
_q, The Wes ,, 141nrlA
Cor irr axe 1, t China, achieved. ran. ex,)ort surplus in 1950 of approximately 650 minion"
The favorable balance was the result of an export surplus with the Soviet Bloc
he est
-
m But in 1951 Communist China o s mushrooming
need for imports to run a War wiped out this modest surplus,, Total imports ii
1951 wera probably 64M million more than China's exports for a net adverse
balance: W+f.5 million or a cumulative balance of $365 million since 19500 Of
this balance for 1950?51, 63 percent or 4230 million was on Western account,
To cover the import surplus with the West, available foreign exchange re-
serves from earlier years were probably augmented by 175 million through over-
seat remit ttanees and by, exchange raised from private holdings and by opium, and
gold sallies n Overseas remittances in 1952 and 1953 were probably sufficient to
: -nce the import surplus with the West o
The 1950-51 import surplus of $150 million with the Soviet Union, largely the
rer t O,' military purchase:s, was probably covered by the annual loan extensions
It has not yet been determined how this affects the balance of payments,,
o 0 million and a special supplementary loan in 1951,, Since 1951 China may
have had a slight export surplus with the Soviet Union?
It has been estimated that the planes and parts provided China by the Soviet
Un yogn wou .lid be valued at over $500 million (in US prices) for both 1951 and 199520 25X1
St,
i; ?;csts that the pD-Lnes are loaned with China paying for destroyed aircraft o It
Is a so possible that the planes (and other war material) were sold for a token
pa::/`rent o The above trade figures cannot include aircraft valued at $500 million,
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st, China has Possibly maintained a favorable trade balance-with the
aateI :i ; ; s since trade relations were re-established in 1950.
I -cnczai, it appears that China is pushing exports but holding imports in
i .e c,b a rallable foreign schangea Thus, the Chineso Coauxnists are operating
on a very .rFarrmv margin of reserves,
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2. What are Communist Chin B s broad iM ort Egauirements for its no andustriali-
`Fhe September 1953 agreement on Soviet aid during the Chinese 5year in-
dustrial L:,ation plan indicates that much of the Soviet aid will go toward in-
creasi .. the production of industrial raw materials steel, nonferrous metals,
coal, electric power, oil. - and the production of machinery and transportation
equipment
transportation and communications network facilitates the
deve:.optn ant of the internal econo. yy as well as moves export goods to the border,
In. the p:.Bt imports of such equipment and supplies have been given a high priority.
No doubt. supplies still have a high priority though requirements are much less
be,ause of the rapid reconstruction and growth of the network. Equipuent will
probably continue to be imported under the plan-though a domestic manufacturing
iniustry is a possibility?
8hor';a,e of electrical generating capacity is believed to be one of the key
problems affecting Chinas present industrial potential, for power is basic to
the entire ec:onomy@ Coi mtnnist China has recognized the seriousness of this
problem imported whole power plants. One of- the three Sino-Soviet agreements
concluded early in 1953 provided for Soviet aid to China for the expansion of
power s%E.t "aeons, both existing and under construction,
once t eansporta-tion, communications, and power is provided, then the Indus
tr:X?a p: ?c during industrial. raw materials and capital goods are free to develop
more rar~id: y, (It is not 1 caly that any of these sectors of the economy has
boon given an over-riding priority so that one will be d veloped completely be-
: yore the other, for these sectors are interdependent o) However, China must expect
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to iiupo::t during this 5 -year period a large part of her capital goods and some
of the :?aw materials,
In eneral,, it may be expected that imports of industrial is in the be-
9Elt er l Ca-"
ginning of this period will continue to be basic ue goods requiring
a~ f7Kat:iv~.t~. at-+R~+~ !l et-Glt mot. ~A Ga ~_
i:'?? ZF?.~C7 y~ 1 d~ !-~J~`t+ r ?Tr j_ ?_'.`~__ G~^
~~
.
j -f
a~3J
Perhaps under the later years of the plan a comp x chin andiproduc
V-1-1 be required for Chinos industrialization.
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3. To what extent is there state control over fare trade and how would
PEeq Yr. Chinese trading rul,es affect trade with the West?
A xifoxm but rigid system of foreign trade control was adopted after the
outbreak. of the Korean war,, Under this system private trade is still recognized,
but, the requirement that exports and imports not only must be licensed but must
also be approved by the appropriate government authority assures complete govern
mental ccntrol, However, state-operated companies are now carrying on about 90
percent of the total foreign trade, All trade with the Soviet Bloc and state-
spc}nsored deals with non-Communist countries are handled by the state companies,
Private ttra.ders are "encouraged" to handle minor commodities,, which they trade
mainly with and through Hong Kong and Macao,
The Ioreign trade control .system screens trade (1) to eliminate or reduce
imports c f luxuries and the exiport of "strategic" materials 6 (2) to utilize trade
as an adjunct to government policy, and (3) to produce under the barter-link
y?tem favorable ten of trading and special advantages vis-a-vis the West, The
barter-41-ink system, based on the principle of importing before exporting, is an
effort tc link vital or strategic imports with less important exports, However,
control is flexible and changeable, Control provisions are often waived in govern-
merit spur sorsd deals in favor of political and , Barter in this
q
reamer scrno-61raes requires the it ,exporter (this holds true for the Chinese,, too)
to be an importer as vwell, and vice versa; an awkward predicament for then
trader,
Foreign exchange is controlled with a view to finance needed imports, All
foreign Exchange must be surrendered to the Bank of China or its appointed banks.
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Control of the exchange rate seems to be part -.-.~
i&.l,y directed by this view .. so
that porters (before 1952) often suffered by constant revision of the rates.
The exchange rate since mid-1951 has remained constant except for an upward re-
vision o; 6 December 19520
Comma:jst China had generally shown indifference to trade with non-Communist
countria?ae until the Moscow Economic Conference, The demand at this conference
for cxpeFadod trade with the West may possibly have reflected'Communist Chimes
cociaern over the embargo and Chimes desire to use the trade agreements set
forth there as wedges to split those countries carrying out the UN embargo,
Rowevers this renewed effort to regain trade with non-Communist countries was
characterized by trade directly with the Chinese Communist Government rather
than trade through private channels. This may also have been an attempt to by-
pass the established entreport traders in Hong Kong to get to the manufacturer,
and so t:'iten control over trade with the West as well as squeeze out the middle-
mazes co;tso
As its as December 1953 Communist China was fixing more stringent terms for
Western concerns wishing to trade, The Chinese require foreign exporters to
quote thci lowest possible prices and to expect no payment until 15 days after the
arrival c f cargoes in a China port, Foreign concerns have been advised that the
CN.C is the sole agency with which they can do business, with a few exceptions,
Deals tht,,t call for barter of foreign goods for Chinese prodzcts are favored.,
The emphasis, at present, is apparently to tighten controls over trade so as
Ul. to
improve Communist China's position vis-a-vis the West;
6 bee se if the
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embargo is lifted,, Communist China expects keen competition among the Western
exporter ?s for trade with China.
s. ~-~ TA.id. ? . ~.,_?w ?, ~.,o s o 'rhe rules and procedures the Ef
general policy behind them t tradeOAtheA.r et0 The main reason for
the small nose of Si owest trade is, of course, the fact that .Communist China has
apparen1,-.1y deliberately reoriented trade toward and concluded binding agreements
wi4h the Soviet Bloc. How much of this reorientation was due to normal develop-
Much to , and how mue to the embargo is not known.
Re noval of the embargo would not necessarily reverse t ta_prmoo s significantly,
TM West;. would have to offer more attractive terms o
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DRAFT
To what extent would Communist China's balance of a manta sition affect
,iar~aort preference, i.e. the selection of Bloc countriea or Western
natl.=ins as the sources ofs
Co=}mist China's import preference is only partly determined by economic
factors. Thus, the reorientation of China's trade from the West to the Bloc was
probably induced in part by the political fact that the two areas were Communist
and basie,aj.i,y hostile to the We:,t.
However, China's import preference is also limited by the available foreign
exchange which in turn is largely limited by her ability to exporto Both China
and the :31o- are agricu3-tonal, and this limits China's ability to &Vort to the
Bloc . `i le Bloc cannot absorb all of China' n agricultural Ambpkesv for the Bloc
produces manly of these products, too. In other cases, as for example, tungoil
and bri ;lea, Chinese products have always found their main market in the West
and cannot be used in guanti$,y in the Bloc,
e thu
n
------
g
s ea ned from exports to the West generally must be ex-
pended cu imports from the Went. In recent years the Soviet Union has apparently
accepted only gold,. US dollars (which, of course, are relatively scarce) and some
starlir> At the present times however the USSR appears ~ to need sterling and
this may give China some additional flexibility as long as this sterling shortage
exists .1 the USSR. The accounts with the Bloc and with the West have apparently
bean kep s paratelly in balance largely because of the Soviet exchange restric-
tions an l the barter
principle upon which trade is usually based,
r,2 %
"f 3;'ac between China and Japan were to develop, Chinese exports of coal,
iron ore, a-id other raw materials might considerably improve the flexibility of
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the Chinese position. This appears to be the nearest major market in the West
in which the Chinese might find a major expansion of their exports possible.
Ess43ntially then, the direction of trade is determined by the share Communist
China o:?fern to the West. However, the overseas Chinese remittances - approxi-
mately 350 million - enables the Chinese Communists to purchase more from the
West tI n they export. Another source of foreign exchange Western capital - is
dafinit(3ly anathema. As long as individual Western accounts are not too far out
r tat AA-AV-
of balance it is possible for China to balance them by Ww purehaseAof Western
It Is not likely that China oas-.r wants to convert Western currencies into
" 44 6 %A X .
1
et.cw,~- GZ? :~ .
currencies on the free Hong Kong market W Fug''
rablea*. It is more likely that at least in 1950 China had wanted toy ruble
to purchase Western capital equipment. However, the Soviet loans restrict China
to purchases of Soviet goods. The numerous barter trade agreements with the Bloc
also ei :?ects trade inward toward the Bloc. It is significant to note that the
Soviet loan can be repaid in dollars (and gold and Chinese products). If the
e,nbargo were :Lifted, it is possible that the Soviet Union might insist on repay
mint in dollars This, of course, would encourage China to export to the United
States or dollar areasu
Thu3, the political decision to trade with like-Communist countries, coupled
with b>nter trade and Soviet exchange restrictions, has and probably will to a
large e:;;;ent determine the trade pattern,
-
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5.
To v1tat extent can the Bloc offset Western controls on certain broad
cat roriss , of ti r n ox s?
Under present Western controls and the Soviet Bloc system of priorities the
Soviet Bloc has been able to meet nearly all of Communist China's minimum require-
ments for the "strategic" commodities. A small and apparently insignificant por-
tion of these shipments are purchases from the West for transshipment via the Bloc
to Communist China. In some instances the Bloc is in short supply, particularly
in bearings, electrical and electronic equipment, locomotives and some chemicals.
Either the Bloc sacrifices to supply Chins, as for example in the case of loco-
motives, :)r China attempts to circumvent Western controls, as for example in the
case of b3arjngs.
In all cases (except rubber), the Bloc from its own sources could supply
China with at least raininum requirements, provided China were given one of the
higpiest p~9iorit,ies. Thus, five percent of Soviet production of electrical and
ele;;troziiv equipment would satisfy Chinese needs, even though invaherOP-suppIr in
the Soviet; Union,. Though. h:ana's requirements are not fully known,, Ohim4ww-
little or no market for the more complex and intricate machinery and equipment,
trat:asport>,tion equipment, and highly refined specialty chemicals, which require
special M?ocesses, or trained personnel, or special, or extensive maintenance.
China has not adopted the diesel locomotive because of the maintenance problamo
It -ja in this more advanced 3roduct that the Bloc would have difficulty in supply-
iingAChina, but thin, may not be ready for this type for several years yet, in
which tiro the Bloc may be in a better supply position.
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The following is an anaisis/by broad categories of strategic goods as drawn
tip for the China Prohibited Cargo List) :
a. I ryas and Munition: The Soviet Union has certainly net China's minimum
c errands for war material.
b. Electrical and Electronic,,,AC, mast: Communist China's requirements are
sual.l, yet Communist China has had to import some Western goods, for the
-viet supply situation is short.
c. iLekinery~ grad indu8tri4 uipnent: In the basic and, less complex
m ichinerr and equipment., the Bloc can meet China o s minimal needs. The
s:Lgnificant exception is bearings which have a higher priority in the
Suvt.ot Union.
d. Metals (iron and steel and mi.soeflaneous metals and alloys) : The Soviet
Union has not been able to meet Chinas s requirements of rolled steel
products o
e. Oil: The Bloc can supply China .
r: The Bloc does not produce rubber, but can supply some synthetic
~A. Chemicals: In general the Soviet Union can supply those chemicals con-
o'
strategic by the West. However., the Soviet Union probably does
n&; rsz:,3et Chinese demands for phenol and ammonium nitrate. Chile saltpetre
(?)
sni ce
llulose are not considered strategic by the West but both can be
A
us, ,~d ~ n the manufacture of explosives. The Bloc cannot supply either.
Iron ort and Marine ~a3 zent : In railroad equipment the Bloc is some.
what short. However, the Bloc sacrifices its own consumption to supply
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DRAFT
6. Con un st China's foreign trade: 1950-l953
The :Following table represents the latest estimates of Communist China's
foreign trade for 1950 through 1953. These estimates are closely interrelated,
based largely on trade relationships or equations derived from Communist dis-
closures., and on recorded trade estimates of Sino-Nest imports and exports.
TAM 1
Communist Chinas Foreign Trade W
1950-1953
(millions of US dollars)
USSR SATEMTTES W LO ALA
:1950 103 7 110 415 525
1951 615 145 760 530 1290
:1952 173 730
557 245 101,0 37755 1385
1953 Plan
EK?ORTS
:1950 153 22 175 400 575
1951 415 145 560 315 875
:1952 213 780 270 1050
:1953 Plan 775J 285 1464 325 1385
A/
Revisions have been added.
These, estimates have been chocked independently. Though based on incomplete
data, total recorded exports for 1953 amounted to 0334 million and total re-
corded and unrecorded imports for, 953 amounted to $*,million.
2/ Anaysis of available data onAshipments will not support this estimate and
suggests a magnitude of $;630 million `(see text).
The '1C--Rl--82 estimates have been revised in the light of other information
no, available?
A brcakdonnn of the Soviet Bloc trade in 1951 as between the Soviet Union and
tho Satellites was made possible by the publication of the claim that total trade
with the Soviet Union in 1951 was to be four times the 1950 level, or on the basis
of esti=ted 1950 trade, approximately xl,030 million.ASatellite trade is thus
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$x:90 million or the residual of Soviet Bloc trade less Soviet Union trade. If it
i.a assur{isd that the trade with the Satellites was in balance, or 4145 million
each tray, then. Communist China's imports from and exports to the Soviet Union in
1951 would amount to 15 million and 2l5 million, respectively. But this esti-.
?'',e of 4223-5 million appears to be love. In 1950, exports to' the Soviet Union
sh,-)wed a rising trends exports In the second half were at least double exports
in the :rst half. As Communist China was making a great effort to restore trade
at least to prewar levels and simultaneously was shifting its trade toward the
Bloc, it would be reasonable to expect a further increase in exports in 1951.
Thus, thlo decline of $85 million in exports to the West in 1951 over 1950 may
haire bear offset by a corresponding increase in exports to the Bloc. In fact,
the Chia :se Communists admitted a rising trend in trade when clam a doubling
in the 15151 trade turnover over that of 1950. Yet exports in the second half of
l9!'0, at an amiual rate, probably were equal to 1951 exports, thus showing no
i . 1951. As it is reasonable to expect the rising trend in 1950 to conm-
tirine into 1951,0 the estimate of exports to the Soviet Union in 1951 was revised
upt. and by 120 million to 41,15 million. As total Sino-Soviet trade was fixed at
L,030!.'.11i on,Ai'aports from the Soviet Union waaue reduced by 4200 million to $615
million. As compared to the previous ~ 600 million deficit, this $200 million defi-
cit on the trade account appears to be more in line with the estimated loan exten-
lions in 1951 of $158.5 m -1l.ion.
Revision of these figures, however
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moans tha'J total 1951 exports and imports must also be adjusted, but the 1951 export
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fi,,;ure 1s based on a Chinese Communist claim made i.n October 1951 that total ex-
i,K
ports for 1951 were 60 percent greater than the 1936 exports of China o It is not
clear 'what this statement represents and so samwiw discarded. It is now possible
to recalculate total exports by adding exports to the Bloc to exports to the Westo
Sin larly, total imports can be recalculated,
The 195n estimates of trade with the Bloc represent modifications of those
appearing in EICRIa-S20 In that report Chiness trade with the Blcc was based on
the assumption that China ,had an import surplus of $150 million :?:s its total
foreign trade in 1952. The above estimates are based on Li Ning. 4s assertion
that Cozmmzn3.st China's trade in 1952 was in balance.
An estimate of Communist China's 1953 trade plans is based on t4?,Go assumption S
that he trade balances , 1 e-th same as in 1952 and on the following communist
claims: 1) the volume of total trade in 1953 is to be 32 percent higher than in
1952, (2) trade with the Soviet Bloc is to be increased by 37 percent ir,, 1953 over
1952, and (3) trade with six Eastern European Satellites in 1953 would be 37.4 per-
:eras, over 1952 levels
On the .s = : ai s planned exports would amount to $775 million. Assuming an aver-
110-//6 7
age price of t O per tone this would be the value of approximately O million
tons of f eight, but there is no evidence. to support shipments of this magnitude,
It is likely that Chinese export shipments to the Soviet Union may be approximately
20 percent less than the estimated planned, or about $630 million. Moreover,, it
is possible that the planned value of
exports includes some services of reflected
in the giwntity of shipments from China to the USSR,
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Tho VUEsster`di Trade Controls have forced a shit in the orientation of
Cra ;t 010m is trade from the a World to the USSR and the Soviet Blots
3iereas . in 1950 about 3/4 of Co rnmist China's trade was with the Free
Wor3dd, at the present tine 3/4 of its trade is with the Soviet Bloc. it
it; perhaps significant that this adjustment. could be made in a rolativelyy
shoat period of time and that the total value of trade is higher than In
1950. It is doubtful, however, -whether the. Bloc nations have been able to
absorb exp s from Cor? rrist China of such products as tmg oil and hog
bvisi;3soE fc which the US had been the principal a ket. -Thus : the inhib:Lti
e l'fect Cf ?estern trrad controls on the Coate st: Chim ecos r and. war
pe nt:yai; has been uncertain,
St G.=,
.FC Zti: 1' iI011T
TiOsbc :-n trade controls have acted largely as thqA~m orienta-
tJ on of 3oomu st Chjra is trade from the Free World to the USSR and the
1-'u ror
a!t ~ ca113tes. Nhereas in 19,0 about 3/It of Coast Chian is trade
r+ith V'10 FMe TIMM., at the present time 3/4 of its trade is with the
Sc i et s 1 c`c It is perhaps significant that this- adjustment could be nado
a '-elat5.re1Gr short period of tip and that the total valuo of trade is higher
nor than, in 1930. It is douabtfu3 ,, ho?evor, whether the Soviet Bloc has been
able to absorb those Chi sea products such as tong oil and hog bristles for
i ilah tkac, J3 had been the p -Imipa1 ria cet before the imposition of the a goo
Th has a,~. ntl hurt Ch , but the over-a3_1 effect of Western trade caar?
tr ale on the Co mist China o ononr and war potential. has been uncertain.
MAP-, 6P,6 f4,t_
3.5 -
d eaOdUO~i2?R
9T1000 000 0002-4
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Soviet Union ports to Communist China a 95 ,-195j
205,000
9 5 , , 0
1 euU!
915.,ooo
d,o009Ga0
ti,! q> 0 t~'3 Total at-33
Goods and A,g c? tural Totem. Tote. Pntt]. f .land 0verl rd
?isce11aneo Products AU.. Carriers 0verlar4 Sea water (millions
LIT)
518,,o( 27,000 1,r,636 ooo 1386,000 200f,000 50~000 48.0
663DOOO 35., 0 29493.000 1,8189000 2 o00A 759000 6L9
i7~9 o 3asUCO 2,1 1,000 3.93119Ui;0 20U,900 W0,oo0 591
765
Th d x 5.,. . . P 25X1
of fi s of a nt and a., n ition ahi DIL ants were originated by or coordir .t .c I IPe ~ etni estir tes are those oi'II(wp.) , 25X1
t
l
o o
a
Ooirn a ad against p tro1.ezm and war rnat r o)-, with 1,20 agricultural and 19/20 i*anufactur?ed goods. Aesu d average values Tim", t,L00
m tri
t
I
f
o
ou
or mnu
act res and miscellaneous and 150erti t frltld
p merconor agicuura goos"
iut," vajaitf of trade repreGents contracted value of goods and services received by Ching, from the USSR as scheduled for each of the years involved.
Total v a l u e of freight move ier to represent. an eat nate of the v a 1 ' u e of goods which actually moved in each of t h e years. Differences may, be
~~ ./RM ~~ ~a ~~b al.- lam ar:u iue-LIi;d o.t aLC,ounU; . The most, important. iacc,ora. however., probably is the item of ar iatuente and ar tione
? 53 r~.. t?F- Q5 u ,1 e p ov"i? ed for tho Far Bat t eatie on igk , balls on w~ oil v 1, i o aro w,s*b' ir'3bieo A value of 31,000' per iiett'jc ton he's
teen asaig ied to ? 'taese eatiiuatess, which is very low by US standards. There is the further possibility that a portion of the military goose may have
oven is IJ utedq or given for a token or defer ;d payment,. Aireraft have haev t' tted ent .re.ly beeai=.se of their i ir;ht wory.ght +r tha o~aQ hand and
.,
at airs aft d
ive
o Chi
..
d
lt.b
`4,8 e
z6C1 =WL"%q J --L value
3 ~__ ??,, ?
i r, .y+ ~? a yy .
at then
aiFJd sin es YS Le v 1. o}. t e dur Uhe ye`'e, 7. $'"..l C. Yf L 9!
sad
Sep %a er
( 11ions (mi lions
ofk of a
of Iua eo a a~ Total Va1i
Al QaF: sac, of Trade
(millie of (millions o
)) 497 63,5
67o 557
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w5r'p. s:'O'a?.GdL
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. ~ i .Yati.k c hp r n ?ae~^ ~ A ..
f)i 73 t"Y....~~L~., YehlSwf!
aal~L~~'Ew~'.~+?w, v~~mi~.~~v.b?~i: y,~~Ca1aB'~+3"~,~l,
' w ..at a, ~c RAY: t
Overland S viand water
d7 to 0
46
64,, oc o
b'N bklkk./ IW bNL*4, yY j
o v a' L- GYM"01 I
uvertand Sea n ~aatez- Over ~as3
s
and - CL : .~ vsvar?u:w tv Pr(Siutzai Gy,
z~z eae3 m.a v xccaa n?" ?"^n~?y - / '1t+. afl-CI wl' m
.. M 1YdA :biJ McMi - F/6a' k{ ... 9.. .? ?w b - - ..,,.. - 1 ?hi
d
y a~~ u rare oil u$Tiv:wtaucisciai uasxuea ,~sWirs: akua ue~ w, ;.ass wr vur i+k wx aIeW7
euA's
~" rt.V N1n? aivb 'Yiwia
."i:S::M
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP79TO1049AO01000040002-4
 Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP79TO1049AO01000040002-4
Too i
I . T atei'
100fr;O X
Total
All f-'arrie,
uverlmd Val
523
Sea value
(,?.o
37
yid. pater Value Total Value
a 1io:.a f mil.L .ona
Pt1.15-
567
63 W
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP79TO1049AO01000040002-4