'RECTIFICATION' IN COMMUNIST CHINA (REFERENCE TITLE:(SANITIZED))

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01049A001900060001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 111
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 27, 1959
• Content Type: STUDY

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27 February 1959
OCI No. 0836/59
Copy No. 5
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE'"STAFF STUDY
"RECTIFICATION" IN COMMUNIST NA
(Reference Title:
25X1A
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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OCI No. 0836/59
SINO-SOVIET BLOC AREA
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Reference Title:
25X1A
"Rectification" in Communist China
This study is a working paper, reflecting information
received through December 1958. The paper offers a full ac-
count of Communist China's recent "rectification" campaign:
the introductory phase ofe 1956 and early 1957, in which the
Chinese Communist party set the objectives of improving its
working style and bettering its relations with the masses,
and encouraged outside criticism; the formal launching of
the campaign in May 1957, a month in which the enthusiasm
and scope of criticism gave the party a very disagreeable
surprise; the deflection of the campaign, in the summer of
1957, into a period of "anti-rightist struggle"; the merging
of the struggle and the party's rectification, in autumn
1957, to make a nationwide rectification campaign; and the
identification of the remodelled campaign, early in 1958,
with the "great leap forward." As it turned out, the
rectification campaign was of most interest in showing the
response of party leaders to a crisis, in particular their
determination to maintain a united front. The summary and
conclusions of this paper appear on pages 97 through 108.
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RMCTIF?IATION" IN COMMUNIST CHINA
On I May 1957, the `Pei
i
p
ng people's Daily, organ of the
Chinese Communist party's central comet tee,
tral committee directive that the edit?re published uct
a new ."rectification" campaign. te party would conduct
that the campaign was to be directed againstdnes libureaucrAti and
sectarianism;,, and subjectivism" and would have as its theme
"the resolution of . contradictionsamong the people." This
was the formal .inauguration of a campaign whicl11 with far-
reaching changes in direction and emphasis, was to dominate
the' domestic scene in Communist China throughout the rest of
1957 , and the early ,months of 1958.
Because of the elaborate introduction which preceded it,
the circumstances of its inception, andf_the vicissitudes which
it encountered and which caused it to be radically altered,
the rectification campaign can be
an insight Intothe policy-making profitably studied to gain
y?makiug process in Communist""'Ch,ina.
The Chinese Communists have been engaged in one campaign or
another ever since their assumption of
rectification of 1957 recapitulates theimportant9features
p
of these movements and adds some of its own.
The origins of "Rectification"
The origins of the campaign go. back 20 years to Mao Tse-
"tung's 1937 pamphlet "On Contradictions."
'ruary 1957 which keynoted the rectification acampaignhwas an-
elaboration of the earlier thesis,
ation of the Chinese Communist . party.hadovastly,changedlbeitu-
tween 1937 and. 1957, there were some basic similarities. As
will bo'discussed below, the party was faced in both instances
with a complex set of problems, internal and external, which
required for their solution the somewhat incompatible achieve-
ments of greater discipline among relations with the nonparty masses party
andyoffmembers icials~nd'improved
The Chinese term for a rectification campaign is a con
traction of a phrase meaning "to correct the style:of work,,,
which is derived from a.`speech delivered by Mao Tse-tung at
the Chinese Communist party's headquarters in Yenan in 1942
when the original'rectification campaign began. The Chinese
Communists claim that Mao's invention of the rectification
process was a great contribution to the "Marxist-Leninist
theory of party-building." Mao himself said in-.Moscow
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in November 1957: ,In many years of revolutionary p
we have developed the method of the rectification campaign
ee'in in accordance with the Leninist princplethefinitiativinof
close touch with the masses, recognizing
the masses, and practicing criticism and self-criticism."
Mao inaugurated the 1942 rectification when, onr11 Feb
mFnies
ruary, hedelivered an address at the opening-day
of the party school in yenan. In his speech, he vigorously
ty and
attacked subjectivism to
formalism; in literature
work energetically to correct their ways of thought and acs
tion. A week later, Mao and the party's then propaganda
chief Kai: Feng elaborated on the evils of formalism. After
a series of discussions and the appearance of several edi-
ganda
bras and lannouncedeatformalmrectificationamovement
bureau on 3 April
for the entire party.
A limber of developments prom to Chinese
In 1g37unist par-two
ty leaders to "rectify" the party in 1942. full-
scale after Mao's assumption of leadership of the. party,
scale war with Japan had broken out. This led to the forma-
tion of the United Front between the Kuomintang and the Chi-
jnese Communist party and the establishment of the Communists'
"Anti-Japanese War Bases." This was followed by a
expansion in party membership from about 40,000 in 1937 to
hundreds of thousands by 1942.
The; circumstances in which the party found itself after
1937 demanded a program would
friendhs!ip of the greater part
;Base areas. The party had no assurance of control then-
;War Bases and had to make maximum use of p
direct control instead' of force and dictation. It was evi-
dent that doctrinaire methods
couldanottserveetheselendsess
on the part of party members
The party thus found itself faced with two major prob-
lems inj1942. It had first whoihadgtotbeiedtedptotortho-
vast number of new members,
so sasmembers
elieitdeal
'-doxy. Secondly, it had also to
and
adroitly with the nonparty population policies. The t and.
maintain its active support of party p
cation movement was apartial answer to these problems.
The central committee directive announcing the 1957 rec-
tification campaign had been foreshadowed for many months.
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During the summer of 1956, provincial party congresses were
held as a prelude to the September National Party Congress.
At these provincial meetings, a major topic of discussion
was shortcomings within the party including commandism, bu-
re.ucratism, and subjectivism. Retiring provincial party
committees were often severely criticized for their, failings,
and a general streamlining process was carried out in party
.organizations at the provincial level and below.
The timing of the campaign and the fanfare which pre-
ceded its introduction were influenced by Chinese Communist
interpretation of events in Hungary and, to a lesser extent,
in Poland during 1956. Before and during the Chinese Com-
munist party congress in September 1956 it was evident that
some sort of party reform was envisioned for the not too
distant future. Not until 15 November 1956, however, short-
.:ly after the Eastern European disturbances, was there an in-
dication that a formal reinstitution of a rectification cam-
paign on the 1942 model was contemplated. Mao's linking of
the Hungarian disturbances with failure to: resolve contra-
?dictions among the people also suggests the significance of
this factor in the timing and extent of the rectification
-campaigg.
The time was appropriate for the party reform for other
reasons also. The greatly accelerated socialization and col-
lectivization program which Mao had personally advocated in
1955 had been "basically completed" by the fall of 1956. The'
relative success of this program may have prompted Mao and
other top Chinese Communist leaders to conclude that the need
for coercive measures had passed, and that broader popular..
support for party policies could be sought without critical
danger to the party's position.
The Chinese Communist party in 1957 consisted very large-
1Y .of members who had not been in the party during the periods
of war and civil struggle in which the party had received its
final tempering before taking control of the entire mainland.
These newer members had been subjected to occasional ideologi-
cal reform movements but not to so comprehensive or painstak-
ing a process as a.full-scale rectification, Meetings of party
organizations which preceded the eighth party congress in Sep-
tember 1956 demonstrated concern with the problems of bringing
wayward members into line and eliminating the small minority
that could not be saved. The precedent thus set was to con-
tinue throughout the campaign and eventually affected even
some party members of long standing'.
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Another motive for party reform was the-vast prolifera-
tion of the government bureaucracy in the eight years fol-
lowing the Communist takeover.. Since this bureaucracy was
led and, to a large degree, manned by party members, the par-
ty provided a convenient instrument for the thorough over-
haul of:the bureaucratic mechanism. The error of`bureaucrat-
ism was'; usually mentioned first'in listing the targets of
rectification during the preliminary=and early stages of the
campaign, although active measures were not taken to promote
this phase of the movement until later. These measures will
..be referred to in the discussion of the actual course of the
rectification campaign.
The earPt explicit statement of the themes. which were
developed in Mao's contradiction speeches occurred in the
first Chinese Communist response to Soviet criticism of Stalin.
This took the form of an article in the People's Daily of 5
April. 1956 entitled "On the Historical Experience owe Dic-
tatorship of the Proletariat." The article was-said to be
"based on the discussions of the enlarged meeting of the Po-.,
liticalBureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China." This article stated the thesis that contradictions
could persist even.in a Communist society. "Viewed in this
light," the article said, "the existence of contradictions
between the individual and the collective in a socialist so-
ciety is nothing strange."
InDecember 1956, the People's Daily published an article
called "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship
of the Proletariat," a sequel to its April comment on "de-
Stalinization." The later article again commented on contra-
dictions and introduced the distinction between those "between
the enemy and ourselves" and those "within'the ranks of the
people." It also noted that "finder specific conditions a cer-
tain contradiction among the people may be gradually trans-
formed into an antagonistic contradiction when one side of it
gradually goes over to the enemy." The article made use of
the.formula devised during the 1942 rectification campaign
and elaborated on by Mao in his February contradictions speech;
"Contradictions among the people themselves can and ought to
be resolved, proceeding from the desire for solidarity, through
criticism or struggle, thus achieving a new solidarity under
new conditions."
In'themonths that intervened between these articles,
;two other important statements appeared on the question of
contradictions and how to deal with them. In May 1956 Lu
Ting-i made a speech before a gathering of Chinese scientists,
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writers, and artists in which he revealed the content of the
speech made by Mao three weeks previously which had intro-
duced the "hundred flowers" liberalization policy. ?Lu thus
performed for Mao in that instance a service similar to that
which he rendered later in connection with the new rectifica-?
tion campaign.. 'Lu,declared that contradictions between ma-
terialism and idealism would continue even in a Communist
society. He said, however, that there must be a "strict dis-
tinction between the ideological struggle within the?people
and the. struggle against counterrevolutionaries."
In September 1956, just before the eighth. congress of'
the Chinese Communist.party, an article appeared in the Peo-
plel's Daily which developed the distinctions between anti
nlstlc an c nonantagonistic contradictions in the course of
demonstrating that?antagnonistic contradictions were then in
the process of:elimination in Communist China, With the pub-
lcation of`this article, the?theoretical basis for the theses
presented in Mao's.speeches of February and March 1957 had
been established.
Themes of' "Rectification," Autumn '1956
At.the Chinese Communist party.'s eighth party congress in
September 1956, the first congress held in 11 years, themes
were introduced which were later incorporated into the rectifi-
cation movement. In this brief address that opened the con-
grass, Mao Tse-tung pointed to the errors which were attacked
in the early phases of the subsequent rectification campaign-
Among many of our comrades there are standpoints and
styles of work which are contrary to Marxism-Leninism,
namely, subjectivism in ways of thinking, bureaucracy
in their way of work, and sectarianism in organiza-
tional questions. Such standpoints and such styles
of work alienate us from the masses, cut us off from
reality, and harm unity both within and without the
party.
In his speech to the congress, Mao did not touch on the
"hundred flowers" policy which he had introduced the previous
spring. He did, however, urge that action be taken to im-
.prove relations between party and nonparty people, a major
aim of. rectification-
Although there are over 10,000,000 members in our
party, yet they constitute a very small minority
of the country's population. In the various
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organs of state and in public affairs,a lot of work
L1d.S VV Uc UVUG LI cavaayw.J. V,V y..vyi. ~. ?-r-------
toget the work well done unless we are well versed
in relying on the, masses and cooperating with non-
party people ...(we should also continue to strength-
enlunity among all our nationalities, democratic
classes, democratic parties, and. people's organiza-
tions, and consolidate and expand the people's demo-
cratic united front.) We must take determined ac-
tion to get rid of any unhealthy manifestations in
any part of our work that are detrimental to the
unity between the party and the people.
The principal address to the-eighth congress was deliv-
ered byiLiu Shao-chi. Called a "political report," it ranged
over all facets of party and government activity, summarized
past developments and laid down some guide lines for the fu-
ture. Liu's references to the faults of party members and
the need for rectification were not as concise and specific
as those of Mao and others, but at various points, he intro-
duced ideas which were later integrated into the initial plan
for the rectification campaign of the following spring.
In .a section entitled "The Political Life of the State,"
Liu discussed the struggle against bureaucracy as the first
of the major tasks in improving the government administra-
tion. This bureaucracy, he said, was
characterized by,armchair leadership which does not
understand and which suppresses the opinions of subordi-
nates and the masses, and pays little attention to the
life of the masses. Such bureaucracy, which manifests
itself in being isolated from the masses and from re-
ality, seriously hinders the growth of democracy in
national life, hampers the unfolding of popular initia-
tive, and holds back the advance of the socialist cause.
The struggle against bureaucracy, Liu said, would be a
long one. The first step necessary to correct bureaucratic
vices was the strengthening of Communist party supervision
over state organs and over party members employed in govern-
ment departments. Another measure recommended by Liu was
greatersupervision by the "masses of the people, and by the
low-ranking government workers, over the organs of state."
As a means of exercising this supervision, he said, "criticisms
and exposures from below must be encouraged and supported.
Those who suppress people making criticism or avenge them-
selves on the critics must be duly punished."
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In the one small portion of his speech devoted exclusive-
ly to internal problems of the Chinese Communist party, Liu
said that "one' of the tasks confronting the party leadership
is to study and analyze past mistakes, draw lessons from them
so as to be able-to make fewer mistakes and, as far as possi-
ble, avoid repeating past mistakes, and prevent small mis-
takes from becoming big ones." One source of mistakes is
the influence`of bourgeois ideas which still persists and
must be prevented from impairing the party's political purity.,
The major emphasis of Liu's discussion of the party's
internal problems, however, was on the avoidance and correc-
tion of the "leftist" expression of subjectivism--i.e., doc-
trinairism. He strongly attacked'the"'?'leftist-opportunist
line" of Wang Ming and Po Ku who were the last opponents dis-
placed by Mao Tse-tung in his rise to undisputed leadership
of the Chinese Communist party. "Their mistaken leadership,"
Liu said, "caused serious defeats to the revolutionary strug-
gle, and resulted in the loss of 90 percent of the revolutiona-
ry bases and of the workers' and peasants' Red Army," Liu
-then went on to claim that since Mao's assumption of leader-
ship in 1935, "our party, under' the leadership of the central
committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, has not made any
mistake in its line."
The reason for the avoidance of fundamental errors after
1935, Liu said, was that "instead of meting out severe punish-
ment to comrades who had made mistakes, the party still'as-
signed them to suitable leading posts. With regard to these
comrades, the party patiently waited for and helped them real-
ly to recognize their mistakes ideologically." Liu summed.uip
this method with the familiar slogan, "Take warning from the
past in order to be more careful in the future; treat the ill-
.ness in order to save the patient." He gave much of the cred-
it for improving the party's work to the 1942 rectification
campaign which demonstrated that, "in order to insure the
smooth advance of the party's work and to avoid major mistakes,
the key lies in overcoming subjectivism ideologically." This
emphasis on ideology is characteristic of Liu..
As to Mao's personal role in guiding the party along its
error-free path, Liu had the following to say:
As everyone knows, the reason why the leader of our par-
ty, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, has played the great role of
helmsman in our revolution and enjoys a high prestige
in the whole party and among all the people of the coun-
try is not only that he knows how to integrate the universal
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truth f
M
U
arxism-Leninism with the actual practice of
the Chinese revolution, but also that he firmly be-
lieves in the strength and wisdom of the masses, ini-
tiates and advocates the mass line in party work, and
steadfastly upholds the party's principles of democracy
and collective leadership."
Liu asserted that there were still "serious mistakes of
subjectivism" in the thought and work of many cadres. The
remedy for these errors, he said, was ideological education
rather than the practice of "ruthless struggle and merciless
blows" which had been indulged in by the discredited "leftist
opportunists." "Organizational methods" were not to be rash-
ly resorted to lest they sap the vitality of the party.
In a very brief section of his speech on "Culture and
Education," Liu Shao-chi called for continuation of the "hun-
dred flowers" policy which he credited to the "central com-
mittee of the party."- "On questions of academic and artistic
nature," he said, "the party should not rely on administrative
orders to exercise its leadership; it should promote free dis-
cussionand free emulation to foster the development of science
and art,." He showed his continuing distrust of existing intel-
lectuals, however, by emphasizing recruitment of intellectuals
of "laboring class origin." Liu acknowledged that the serv-
ices of:existing intellectuals must be used, but he warned
that "we must not allow the boureois and petty bourgeois ideas
which they bring with them to corrupt the ranks of the prole-
tariat.' On the contrary, we must hake every effort to help
them become new intellectuals closely linked with the work-
ing people."
Another important speech made to the eighth congress was
that ofparty Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping., who reported
on revision' of the party constitution. Teng began his report
by pointing out the differences between the situation of the
party in 1956 and that which obtained at the time of the pre-
vious congress in 1945. Since 1949, he said, the party had
found that "to assume the position of the party in power is
also to'subject our comrades to the danger of easily acquir-
ing the habit of bureaucratism." This in turn would result
in "errors of subjectivism," i.e., doctrinarism and empiri-
cism. Moreover, Teng said, "there are also those who like
to consider themselves as leaders and to stand above the
masses giving orders instead of consulting with the masses
on all matters"--an attitude of "narrow sectarianism." Thus,
Teng said, "confronted with this situation, the party must
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constantly attend to the struggle against subjectivism, bu-
reaucratism, and sectarianism." He went on to say that the
Communist party was "in need of supervision over our party
organs and members by the masses of people and personages
outside of the party."
Teng offered an explanation of the party's "mass line"
as contained in the new constitution. This line must be
re-emphasized, he said, because "it is the fundamental ques-
tion in the organizational work of our party, the funda-
mental question in the general principles of the party con-
stitution." The mass line "demands that party leadership be
courteous and cautious." Teng condemned pride, arrogance, a
domineering spirit, conceit, and failure to consult the masses
which characterized the attitude of some cadres. He again
gave special emphasis to the dangers of bureaucratism and the
need'for a struggle against a growing tendency toward this
evil.
Teng Hsiao-ping next commented that the party constitu-
tion could not automatically solve all problems; he suggested
a number of practical measures for carrying out the mass line.
Among such measures, Teng advocated that there be "'sufficient
freedom and support. to enable the basic-level party and gov-
ernment organizations to criticize expeditiously and freely
mistakes and shortcomings in the work of upper level organiza-
tions." He gave considerably greater attention to a point
which Liu had touched on only briefly. "In implementing the
mass line and launching the struggle against bureaucratism,
it is of great significance to cooperate closely with non-
party personnel and utilize extensively nonparty personnel
in the struggle." The significance of the relationship be-
tween party and nonparty people, Teng said,
lies in the fact that these democratic people outside
of the party can play a supervisory role which our par-
ty is not easily capable of doing by relying solely on
party members, that they can discover in our work cer-
tain errors and shortcomings which we have been unable
to discover ourselves, and that they can be of some
help to our party..
The most liberal of Teng's remarks appeared in his de-
fense of the new provisions of the draft party constitution
regarding the rights of party members to discuss freely "the
theory and practice of party policy" and to criticize any
party organization or personnel--provisions similar to those
in the CPSU statutes. Going well beyond the Soviet position
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eng asserted that party members,.while bound to honor majori-
ty decisions of party organizations, could properly reserve
their private opinions and present them totheir own organiza-
tion or even to higher organizations. In most cases, Teng
said, dissenters would ultimately recognize the correctness
of the majority position and so join the majority willingly.
"If, on the other hand, the truth is shown to rest with the
minority, the reservation of their right to sustain their
views will enable the party to discover the truth more easi-
ly.
A fourth major speech at the.eighth party congress was
delivered by Chou En-lai who discussed the central committee's
proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan. He had less to say,
about the aims and methods of the forthcoming rectification
campaign than had Mao, Liu and Teng. His closing exhortation,
however, seems to have anticipated the campaign and its later
association with a new economic "upsurge":
Comrades, the day is not far ahead when the First Five-
Year Plan will be fulfilled successfully and the Second
Five-Year Plan will begin.... If only we are careful,
modest, and patient and rectify subjectivism and.,bureau-
cratism in our work we will be able to go forward'in
the-s-truggle for building our country. into a great, so-
cialist industrialized, and strong country.
The resolution on Liu Shao-chi's political report passed
by the congress outlined the party's basic policies for the
coming years. It contained most of the elements which were
combined to form the rectification movement when the campaign
was introduced the following spring.. On liberalization, the
resolution said that the "guiding principles of 'letting
flowers of all seasons bloom and diverse schools of thought
contend' must be maintained so as to insure that sciences.and
arts flourish." On the matter of criticism and "supervision"
from below, the resolution had the following to say:
It!is essential to make further efforts to invigorate
the democratic life of the country, oppose bureaucracy,
strengthen supervision by the people's congresses over
thej government and criticism and supervision by the
masses of people and government departments of lower
levels, and make appropriate adjustment between the
administrative powers and functions of the central
and; local authorities.
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Finally, theresolution cites for correction the same
errors which the rectification campaign was originally de-
signed to correct:
The fundamental shortcoming in the present work is
that many party cadres have not yet shaken off sub-
jectivism in thought and work. It is necessary to
develop the party's mass line, carry out the princi-
pal of collective. leadership and inner party democra-
cy, and overcome. bureaucracy and sectarianism.
During the months that followed the eighth party con-
gress, there was some discussion of liberalization policies
in the People's Daily and party theoretical journals: The
major theoretical journal argued in January 1957 that there
is "not enough independent thinking and free discussion" in
current theoretical studies. The article attacked blind
belief in "authorities" and advocated the extension to the
party schools of "letting diverse schools contend." This
extension of liberalization was never fully endorsed by the
party leadership, however, and the "hundred flowers" policy
remained substantially restricted to the arts and sciences
until,it fell victim to "antirightist" attacks during the
following summer.
The formal decision to institute a new rectification
campaign was announced to the second plenary session of the
new central committee on 15 November 1956. Mao Tse-tung
called on all government workers and economic personnel "to
struggle, through rectification-of work style, against ten-
dencies toward. subjectivism, sectarianism, and bureaucratismo
In this connection, a party ideological journal in January
1957 defined "rectification, of work style":
It is a method by which the Chinese Communist party
educates cadres with Marxism-Leninism to overcome
all nonproletarian thought. It comes from the rich
experience gained through the summing up, by the par-
ty center and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, of the ideologi-
cal work done in the past.
The journal described three phases of the method: (1)
study of documents to enable cadres to distinguish'right
from wrong; (2) criticism and self-criticism to determine
the state of mind and work of each person; and (3) correc-
tion of errors in accordance with the principles of (a)
"warning a person in advance so he may do well in the fu-
ture," and (b) "curing the disease to save the patient."
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Cadres were cautioned against false accusations, rudeness,
hastiness, and giving too much attention to fixing. responsi-
bility rather than correcting errors.
Peiping's later claim that the rectification campaign
was based on the proceedings of the eighth party congress ap-
pears to be justified. The principal elements of the cam-
paign were introduced on that occasion. The "antileftist"
character of the campaign, strongly emphasized during its
early phases, was given a great deal of attention.by Liu Shao-
chi, while Teng Hsiao-ping spoke at length on the similar
theme of the need for criticism from outside. the party. It
was the failure of the latter feature that brought about the
radical revision of the campaign during the summer of 1957
and the institution of an "antirightist "campaign to recti-
fy the rectification.; All major speakers at the congress
touched on the need for correction of the errors of "s,ubjec-
tivi-sm,'sectarianism,:and bureaucracy"--although the order
of listing varied--which became the principal targets'of the
rectification movement.
Prior to February 1957, the discussion of the need for
rectification and its principles and goals was confined to
Communist party channels. The eighth congress, the second
plenary session of the central committee elected at that con-
gress, the People's Daily and other party publications all
served to disseminate the views of party leaders to the rank-
and-file membership. The task of extending this dissemination
beyond the party was undertaken by Mao Tse-tung in his famous
speech on. "contradictions," which attempted to promote one of
'the major aims of rectification: improvement of relations be-
tween party members on the one hand and the puppet parties and
the masses on the other.
Mao's Speech on "Contradictions"
February 1957
On27 February 1957, Mao Tse-tung delivered before a
SupremeiState Conference an address which was to provide a
major canon of the rectification campaign. A. Supreme State
Conference is an ad hoc body of variable membership which
may be convened aEtEorder of the'chairman of the Chinese
Peoples Republic and which has served in the past as a forum
for major pronouncements by Mao. In this instance, the mem-
bership of the conference included the entire Chinese Peoples
Political Consultative Conference, principal organ of the
"united front".in..Communist China, and other "democratic per-
sonages" not associated with any party. The address was-en-
titled "on the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the
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PeopIe" The speech remained unpublished until 18 June 1957
when a much.>modified "text" appeared at a crucial moment in
the development of the rectification campaign. In the inter-
vening 'monthsi, however, there lwas much ,published comment on
this speech and on another on'the same subject delivered on
12 March, and there were also several private accounts of
these speeches, so that the main lines of Mao's position be-
came fairly c'lear,, (The alterations evident in the June
official version will be noted in the discussion of the
period in which they were made.)
Mao reaffirmed the concept of "contradictions" which had
been stated in the collective pronouncements on intrabloc re-
lations in April and December 1956. He declared that there
are important "contradictions"--conflicts of many kinds, in-
cluding Conflicts of interest--even in a socialist society.
He specified that there are contradictions within each class--
workers,.peasants, intelligentsia and national bourgeoisie--
and between those classes. Of more importance, he said (and
repeated, in the June official version) that there are con-
flicts between the interests of the state (collective inter-
ests) and the interests of the person (individual in
.and between "the leadership and the led." He added that prob-
lems arise also from the "bureaucratic practices" of state
functionaries.
Mao maintained that all of the above-cited "contradic-
tions" are contradictions "among the people," and are there-
fore to be regarded as "nonantagonistic.11 They differ in
kind from contradictions between "the people" (the four
classes named above) and their enemies--this latter type of
contradictions being "antagonistic" or fundamental. This be-
ing so, Mao said, the regime is justified in using different
types of measures to'handle the different types of contradic-
tions.
For the purpose of resolving nonantagonistic contradic-
tions among the people, Mao prescribed the formula worked out
during the 1942 rectification campaign. This formula called
for the resolution of contradictions by proceeding from a "de-
sire for unity" through a period of "criticism or struggle"
to achieve a "new unity" on a firmer basis. Mao cited the
value of this method in 1942 in bringing the "doctrinaries"
into line with the Mao-oriented mass ::6f party members.
Mao emphasized that his approach to nonantagonistic con-
tradictions was once of reliance in "persuasion and education,"
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not coercion. He reportedly criticized Stalin for having re-
lied excessively on coercion for handling his problems, al-
though he is said to have reaffirmed the position,of the April
1956 statement on de-Stalinization that Stalin's merits were
on balance more impressive than his faults. He is said also
to have: noted that the liquidation of counterrevolutionaries
in China had been just about completed.
25X1A
Mao's soft line of this period was particularly apparent
in that part of his speech in which he reaffirmed his "hun-
dred flowers" policy. The reaffirmation was unquestionably
very much stronger in the actual speech than in the official
and amended text published in June. Mao is reported to have
said that his policy was absolutely necessary, that he had
insisted on it despite opposition in the party,'and that
his critics were mistaken, (Actually, they proved to be
correct. The significance of this aspect of the speech is
discussed in Chinese Communist policy toward the
intellectuals.
er chronological sequence.
Although Mao's references to mutual supervision were ob-
scured-by the changes made in the speech before publication,
a quotation in the People's Daily of 12 May 1957 provides
some light. A Chinesproa 1?y ,heard Mao ;.deliver b.s. cppkeech
quoted Mao as saying that "90 percent of the party membership
do not understand the 'long-term coexistence, mutual supervi-
sion' policy." In the light of many public statements which
appeared in party publications throughout the preliminary and
early stages of the rectification campaign, it is evident that
Mao referred to the fear of many cadres that criticism from
outside the party would expose their shortcomings and add to
their problems. An editorial from the Shanghai Liberation
Daily, reproduced by the People's Daily in a column ascent
the policy to the same severe restrictions as were imposed on
other liberalization measures in the June text. The nature
of these restrictions will be taken up in more detail in prop-
In; addition to the "hundred flowers" policy, Mao also
dealt with that of "long-term coexistence and mutual super-
vision"'among the Chinese Communist party and the puppet par-
ties. This latter policy was potentially and, as later events
were to'show, actually, a more dangerous one since it referred
specifically to political matters rather than to the arts and
sciences as had the "hundred flowers." In the published ver-
sion of:his speech, Mao gave very little attention to mutual
supervision, and only with the apparent motive of subjecting
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on. noted above, said that some party members,
confronted with the , prospeetr of general discussion, felt
"afraid,: aggrieved, troubled, rushed." Such an attitude,
,the editorial said, was wrong and should be replaced by an
"? appreciation". of the advantages of general discussion outside
party circles. Criticism from "our friends outside the par-
should be welcomed, the editorial asserted, since the
multifarious problems of estabjishing socialism could not
.be solved by Communist party members alone. This line, which had
been conspicuous in the speeches of Liu Shao-chi and Teng
Hsiao-ping at the party's September congress, remained in
effect.until criticism struck too close to home during the
early weeks of rectification and stringent countermeasures
were taken.-
.-In arguing the need for resolution of contradictions-
'among the people, Mao was reportedly careful to point out
the relevance of the Hungarian example. He is said to have
argued, in approximately the language of the June official
text, that where "foreign and domestic counterrevolutionary
elements are at work, the reactionaries i.n.a socialist .country,
in league with the imperialists, take advantage of contradic-
tions among the people to foment disunity and dissension and
.fan. the flames of disorder in an attempt to achieve their con-
spiratorial aims,. This lesson of the Hungarian events deserves
our attention."
Although Mao's speeches of early 1957 did not contain any
basic doctrinal points that had not
they still had unique importance. Fiprevious y rst, Mao'sbstatementsuondp
the existence of contradictions between the leadership and the
A ...led and means of resolving them were much more forthright than
earlier ones had been. Second, and more importantly, Mao's
speeches were a call to action; they were not mere theoretical
disquisitions. Mao reportedly made this clear at the conclu-
sion of the section on the two different types of contradic-
i-tions in his' February speech. In the language of-the official
text:
It is imperative that at this-juncture we raise the ques-
tionof distinguishing contradictions among the people
from contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, as
well as the question of the proper handling of contra-
dictiops among the people, so as to rally the people of
all nationalities in our country to wage a new battle
the battle against nature--to develop our economy and
culture, enable all our people to
go
tion period in a fairly smooth way, through this trans~.-
secure, and build up a new state.. make our new system
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?s
It is apparent from the foregoing that.
February 1957 recapitulated and elaborated aboutjthepnints
brought up at the September party congress
for rectification and the_mto be asgreat deal farther
In addition, the speech apparently than had:-the statements, made at the congress. in advocating
'!'liberal";policies in the arts and sciences and " utul sup-
ervision" among the Communist. party. and the puppet
cratic" parties. Mao's advocacy of.greateanliberalizato n
appears in part to have been motivated by
lence in Hungary and Poland,, and was clearly based on a mis-
calculation of the degree of abplitti topthe.Chi ese C~non-
m
coerciver4 unist party means. and the-party's y to
Mao's statements anticipated to some extent. the application of rectification to an economic speed-up and
;even to the "technological and cultural revolution" intro-
duced at;the second session of the eighth party congress in
.May 1958:
The:rectification campaign was thus firmly identified
;with MaoTse-tung. Mao was reported as issuing the first
call for' such a campaign invember .195 , andlhis subse- the
quent speeches on contradictions
movement. This is not surprising since the earllierecampaign,
on which: the current m?vtbewas forerandnserved in part as
.been launched by Mao 15 years
the final stage in the'consolidation of his leadership of
.the party. Insofar as the 1957 rectification campaign was
conceived as a continuation of,tthhinaibera was ation" policy
then being pursued in Communis an impetus
of a movement which had been given greatly i ed
!by Mao's May 1956 speech which introduced the "hundred flowers"
policy.
In,spite of Mao's close association with reccttificaat onn,
his personal advocacy of the campaign came only
dal of adoasedd k thed resumptionathatfsimilarndisturbances.
Euurope had r rais p roach to the campaign is
might also occur in China. This app
tances in which Mao or other major
i
ns
similar to previous
party leaders became identified with a cetain policy linees-
only after it had opportunitygto assess the
ser figures an
response.
Lu Ting-i Introduces "Rectification," March 1957
During thefortnight between Mao's two speecheson con-
tradictions, the People's Daily published an important article
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Lu Ting.i, directorof the Chinese Communist
Banda department: This artieleostensibly written party'tos propa-
com-
memorate the 15th anniversary of the 1942 rectificatiin-
pagn, was in fact the formal introduction of the new ocnam co
paign. The" outlines of the coming rectification :Mere drawn
clearly f or the first time by Lu, who drew on ideas expressed
by every top leader of the'Chinese Communist
partydurng'and
afterth e eighth party congress of September 1956.,,
Lu Ting-i is said to be especially close to Mao Tse_tung,
a relationship dating from the earlier rectification movement
when he reportedly was able to render useful services to Mao
in his successful attempts to consolidate his control over
the`partye As Lu's position indicates, he has been used often
to explain Chinese Communist policies and to elaborate on and
justify ' significant changes in line.
Lu's introduction to the new rectification began. with a
review of the original campaign which had been inaugurated
by the delivery of two reports by Mao at the party's Yenan'
headquarters on 2. February 1942. The titles of these reports,
as given by Lu, were "Rectify the Party's Style of work and
"7pposin,Party Formalism." The 15 years since this campaign
proved, according to Lu, the great significance of the reeti-
$$ication movement.
In'discus- sing, events leadi
ng up to the 1942 campaign, Lu
aid ' particular emphasis on the defeat of the "Wang Ming deft-
st opportunist line
n
Lu, like Liu Shao-rchi in September
6represented
h
"
t
e
Wang line" as a doctrinaire error which
respon"'sible for heavy losses among the revolutionary bases
and``the Red Army during the four years it was in effect. Lu's
article reiterated Liu's assertion that, in the more than 20
years since defeat of the Wang Ming line'
the Chinese Conamu?
nist p ,rty' had` not committed any mistakes in its national
line.
In the decade between 1935 and the party's seventh con-
gress in 1945, according to Lu's article, the party, under
the guidance of its central committee led by Mao, had car-
ried out a thorough study of previous mistaken lines and
had clarified the thought of its cadres. The 1942 rectifi-
cation was an important part of this ideological education,
Lu said, and was largely attributable to Mao himself: "Com-
rade Mao Tse-tung devised the rectification campaign--a form
of movement suited to inner party struggle. It is a great
contribution to the Marxist-Leninist teaching on building
the party."'
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Lu maintained that in the development of the par
rent and correct line, as represented by Mao Tse-tung, the
Ming line was especially important:
struggle against the Wang'
`Among the inner-party struggles which we ,have experienced," was the
he said, "'the struggle for the defehoododoatistsmwore the
t
gm
most difficult .''. This was because
clothing of Marxism-Leninism and took advantage of other
nien's blind belief in Marxism-Leninism m and the p, mem''Y
of political maturity. To expose
quired long and painstaking ideological education.
The article ..,speaks of "dogmatism" as them incipal ex
pression of "subjectivism," one of,the
of the new rectification campaign. A long section is devoted
to justifying the identification ofdogmatism aa s the most im-
portant '',subjectivism error, and to pointing.
of subjectivism.
After a long and intricate discussion the
ificati:ony Lu turned to certain basic asic reflecting Mao's
o
the Chinese Communist party -
assessment, Lu presented a sanguine picture of the situation
in which the party then found itself: "Our country is
a socialist country, classes have been basically id_
counterrevolutionary power has been basically wiped out, the tellectual elements have u~dehaveebeen?organizede~olUnder these
people of the entire country gentle, painstak-
ci~rcumstances, he concluded, only long-range,
of persuasion need be used to resolve. existing con
[tradictions. The party's current policies--"Let a hundred flow-
ers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend," and "long-
;term coexistence, mutual supervision are the correct poli--
cies to be applied.
Noting that the revolution had. been essentially
Lu saw the party's problems as those involved
The Party had successfully led
on
.
revolution to constructi
the revolution, he said, but revolution is not an end but a
meal
We'learned how to guide the revolution but, down to
the present, our experience is inadequate with re-
spect to China's' socialist construction., We have not
yet become thoroughly conversant with its laws of de-
velopmentand are still blind to a certain degree.
Our current fundamental task in 'ideological work is
to; achieve a better and quicker grasp of the, laws of.,.
development of our country's socialist construction
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 "The great majority of our party members exert themselves
positively and their work is:effective,"" Lu said, "Still,
this is not to say that all who have entered the party organi-
zationally have entered it ideologically." Some of these mem-
bers are bound to .retain subjective methods of thinking to
some degree; In speaking of new members he said:
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in order to be able to guide the work of socialist
construction in such a .way as to make..few mistakes
of any kind and no major mistakes. Thus we can, in
a short time, successfully construct a great social-
ist nation and attain the productive level of the
advanced countries. This is,*; extremely serious
task-'and our party. must struggle zealously to achieve
it.
SECRET
None of our; new methbers has gone through an ideologi-
cal remolding such as the 1942 rectification movement.
In general they cannot be deeply aware of what sub,jec-
tivism.is. Among them a number still retain the unre-
formed thinking of the old society, and have not changed
their original:petty bourgeois standpoint to,a proletarian
standpoint.
The magintude of this problem. is indicated by the fact that
the party's membership in 1942 was "several hundred thousand,
according to a statement by Mao Tse-tung, while by 1957 it had
surpassed 12,000,000. Thus by the time of the new rectifica-
tion campain only a minute fraction of the party membership
had undergone the rectification process. "Such a situation,"
Lu Ting-i said, "demands that we arrange a new rectification
movement throughout the entire party with the aim.of setting
right the cadres' style of thinking and style of work,"
In conclusion'Lu said:
If the coming new rectification campaign is carried out
successfully, it will greatly increase the ability of
our party to lead socialist construction and will play
a great role in promoting the great enterprise of build-
ing a socialist China. The purpose of our commemorating
at this moment the rectification campaign in Yenan 15
years ago is to make this point clear.
It will beseen that.Lu Ting-i's article reiterated the
vigorous attack on "leftist" doctrinairism within the party
which Liu Shao-chi had emphasized in September. Lu also fol-
lowed Liu in praising the leadership of Mao Tse-tung in over-
coming incorrect "leftist" methods and in guiding the 1942
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rectification campaign., Like Teng Hsiao-ping, Lu noted 0600he
problems'posed by the fact that the party's membership had
grown enormously since the previous rectification movement.
tie also pointed out, ashad Teng, that becoming the party in
power carried with it the danger of falling into bureaucratic
ways. In devoting such attention to the connection between
rectification and: the economic and cultural progress of the
country, Lu's article repeated points that had already been..
made by Chou En-lai in September 1956 and by Mao in February
1957., The article extolled the importance of Mao's 1937 writ-
ings "On Practice" and "On Contradictions" and quoted from.
them at length, although it did not refer specifically to Mao's
February ;speech.
Although the tex tof Mao's reports on contradictions was
not published immediately, there were numerous "discussions"
of the topic among the leadership,of the non-Communist puppet
arties and local Communist party organizations. The People's
Daily allo.devoted considerable attention to the subjeZt.
On 13 April 1957, a People's Daily editorial dealt with
,the question of contradic. gns between the people and their
leaders,the boldest of Mao's innovations. "At present," ac=
cording to the editorial, the "contradictions between the
.masses of our country and the leaders result mainly from.bu--
reaucratic leadership ih..`:work." Many leaders were accused-of
having acquired a habit by.which "as soon as they gain power,
they enforce orders and..depend-solely on the enforcement of
orders to take the place of ideological and political work
among the masses. Such a tendency to commandism is a manifes-
tation of a bureaucratic style of work.."
Ten; days later another People's. Dail editorial called on
all Communist party organizations o eaal-correctly with in-
ternal contradictions among the people. The paper said that
it was the "urgent task of all Communist party organizations,
(particularly high-level organizations and their responsible
members, conscientiously to study and carry out Chairman Mao's
directive on correctly treating the internal contradictions
within the ranks of the people." One of the aims of this
study was to consolidate the "friendly relations between the
Communist party and the people."
The; same editorial reported that Mao's reports had "at-
tracted the greatest attention of all Communist party members
.and the people. The widespread discussion of this question by
all the .different social strata of. the various localities'has
'brought 'a striking change in the political life.of our country.
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In spite of this claim of; wide popularization, texts of the
reports were not yetpublished for general circulation.
During this same period, Peng Chen, an important polit-
bu.ro,member and second ranking member of. the party's secre-
tariat-,-'discussed Mao's speeches before a party meeting..` He
was quoted-by Peiping radio as having said that the "period
of class war within the country had, by and large, ended, and
it was now all-important to recognize any difference that may
arise , within;., the big family of China's people. are family dif-
ferences which can .be...settled only by democratic means, that
is, by discussion and persuasion proceeding from a desire for
unity." According to the radio report, he stressed the im-
portance.of "encouraging the free expression of opinion, crit-
icizizig as-weak-hearted and incompetent' those who feared such
freedom of expression."
It seems probable that not all party leaders were taking
a line identical with Peng Chen's--a line which reflected the
unprecedentedly "liberal" tone of Mao's various remarks of
early 1957. Liu Shao-chi at the party congress in September
1956 had emphasized the need to avoid "doctrinairism," but
Liu had been careful as always to state the other side of the
picture--the dangerous-influence of bourgeois ideas, and the
unreliability of unreconstructed intellectuals. It was this
darker side which had been missing from Mao's statements in
early 1957. In this connection, Liu made a report to govern-
ment:.cadres in Canton sometime prior to mid-April which was
never published. The:speech was presumably concerned with"
some.aspect of Mao's policy on "contradictions," and may well
have . had a lessliberal tone than Mao at that time thought de-
sirable.. Teng Hsiao-ping, who like Liu had apparently been
in agreement with Mao's approach as of September 1956, like
Liu-was not associated publicly with the more liberal tone of
early 1957. Another politburo member, Kang Sheng, spoke at
the. same meeting as did Peng Chen; Kang's speech, like Liu's
earlier, remained unpublished.
"Rectification" Formally Launched, May Day 1957
It was in this atmosphere of vigorous propagandization
of Mao's "contradictions" thesis that the Chinese Communist
party's central committee approved, on 27 April 1957, the di-
rective that formally launched the new rectification campaign
throughout the country. on May Day, After citing the "great
victory" of.the 1942 campaign, the directive linked the forth-
coming rectification campaign to the need to "lead the trans-
formation of the whole society and the construction of a new
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society." "In order to strive to fulfill the. target of build-
ing a great socialist state," the directive said, "our. party
and the working class must at the same time remold themselves."
The, directive then explained the- necessity for further
rectification in terms of the principal errors which had al-
ready been frequently pointed out as requiring correction::
In the past few years there has been in the party a
new growth of bureaucracy, sectarianism, andsubjectiv
ism'which departs from the masses and reality. There-
fore, the central committee considers it necessary, on
the; basis of the policy of "proceeding from the desire
.for unity and, through criticism and self-criticism,
achieving new unity on a new basis," to launch within
the; party once again an extensive, throughgoing recti-
fication against bureaucracy, sectarianism, and sub-
jectivism, and to raise the Marxist ideological level
of the whole party and improve the working style so
as to conform with the needs of socialist transforma-
tion and construction.
Referring to the new circumstances in which the-party
found itself, the directive said that "ma ny"+comrades -,do not
understand or understand inadequately this new situation and
task of the party." Because the party is now in a ruling po-
sition and has "won-the support of the masses of the people,"
many par.ty.members..had become. prone to using purely adminis-
trative measures in dealing with problems, according to the.
directive... Another group of party members were described as
"wavering, elements" who were "liable to be contaminated with
remnants,;of the Kuomintang style of work from the old society,
to think of themselves as privileged,: and even resort to at-
'tacks or oppression when dealing with the masses." All of
these erroneous methods of action and thought were to be identi-
!fied, criticized, and rooted out in the course of the forthcom-
ing rectification campaign.
The directive specified that the campaign .would': be "guided
ideologically" by Mao's two reports on contradictions. These
reports,:according to the directive, had been "relayed to broad
sections; of the cadres and intellectuals and will be relayed to
.all party members and the people." The directive said that
these reports had already stimulated vigorous discussion both
:within and without the party. Party committees at all levels
were ordered to organize study of these reports and to examine
other relevant documents in accordance with the basic ideology.
.of the reports.
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.Regarding the techniques to be apple in conducting the
new campaign,` the directive said that "this campaign should
be a movement of,ideological education carried out seriously,
yet as gently as-a breeze or a mild rain." The criticism and
self -criticism practiced during the campaign should be car-
ried "to the proper extent," and meetings ehould be limited
to small:-discussion meetings or group meetings The direc-
tive specifically forbade "large. meetings of criticism or
'struggle.'.." Instead,."comradely heart-to-heart talks in
-the form of conversations, namely exchange of views between
individuals," were to be used.
The methods prescribed for closing the gap between party
-members and the masses were not limited'to discussion and edu-
-cation. The directive also provided that:
In order to strengthen the contact between the party
and the broad mass of working prople and to change
thoroughly the situation where many of those in lead-
ing positions are separated from the masses, it is neces-
-sary, while the rectification campaign is being conducted,
for the whole party to advocate and encourage that the
leading personnel who hold key positions at all levels in
the party., the government, and the military service, and
who are fit for physical labor, should devote part of their
time to engaging in physical labor with the workers and
peasants. This measure should gradually be made into a
permanent system.
Such activity would to a large extent eliminate bureaucracy,
sectarianism, subjectivism, and "lordly airs," according to the
directive.
First secretaries of party committees were charged with per-
sonal responsiblity for organizing the campaign and furnishing
"firm leadership." Two weeks were allowed for submission of
concrete working plans to the central committee by party organi-
zations.
The directive gave brief attention to nonparty participa-
tion in the campaign:
Nonparty people who wish to participate in the rectifica-
tion campaign should be welcomed. But this should be
done on an entirely voluntary basis, and no coercion is
allowed. They should be permitted to withdraw freely at
any time.
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The central committee directive recapitulated, more con-
cisely than Lu Ting-i's introductory article a few weeks earlier,
the major characteristics of the new campaign as envisaged by
Chinese'Communist leaders. It gave as a primary'motive for
the campaign the improvement of party leadership during the
coming period of "socialist construction." It cited the suc-
cess ofthe 1942 campaign and specified the "unity-cf?iticism-
unity" formula as the basic policy of the new movement. The
directive vigorously attacked "leftist" mistakes and declared
that Mao's "Contradictions" speeches would provide ideological
guidance for the campaign. Party cadres were directed to study
means of carrying out both the "hundred flowers" and "mutual
supervision" policies, and the noncoercive nature of the move-
ment was emphasized in the slogan devised for the new campaign:
"As gently as a breeze or a mild rain." Finally, it was explicit-
ly stated in the directive that the new rectification was to be
.a party movement better to enable party members to lead the rest
of society; nonparty people were to take part~-only voluntarily.
Inonly two respects did the central committee directive
add to previous authoritative statements. As would be expected,
the directive provided specific instructions on implementation
of the new campaign. In addition, the directive ordered lead-
ers to perform physical labor to the extent that their duties
and capabilities permitted. This measure gathered momentum
throughout the campaign until the exploits of leaders at all
levels who went out among the people to labor occupied a pvomi-
nent place in the domestic news in Communist China.
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Explanations, May `1957
Publication of the Chinese Communist party's central com-
mittee directive on rectification on 1 ,May 1957 initiated an
intensive press campaign to explain and promote the new move-
ment On the following day, the party's newspaper linked the
May Day celebrations with rectification and devoted a part
of its front page to-an editorial entitled "Why Rectify?"
This editorial referred the origin of the movement to the
preceding party congress: "The party center directive on
the rectification campaign is in reality a continuation of
the resolutions of the eighth party congress."
The editorial summarized and extended earlier state-
meits on the current situation and the need for rectifica-
tion. The principal contradictions remaining in the country,
`according to the editorial, were not those between enemies.
They were those among people who faced the demands of build-
=inglbf an advanced industrial country and the reality of a
backward agricultural country; the need for rapid economic
and cultural development, and a situation in which the exist-
ingeconomy and culture could not fulfill the people's needs.
This situation, the editorial said, was unique in the
history of the party and the nation, and the party faced cir-
cumstances and tasks that were completely new: "Since con-
tradictions- between the enemy and ourselves will not again
become the principal contradictions in the nation, the party's
task in domestic problems is to unite the entire people to
develop production." The goal of the new rectification cam-
paign was said to be that the party should "learn correctly
to resolve contradictions among the people in order to ful-
fill the glorious task of developing socialist construction
and building a socialist nation."
The editorial sought in earlier statements and writings
of Mao for justification of the methods to be used in the
forthcoming rectification. Mao was quoted as using a proverb
during the'anti-Japanese war: "Toward ourselves, peaceful;
toward the enemy, fierce." His 1949 work "On the People's
Democratic Dictatorship" was quoted to the effect that in
the process of reforming "ourselves" in the direction of so-
cialism and communism, the methods that should be Used are
"democratic, persuasive methods, not coercive methods."
This editorial closed with a declaration that the point
of view expressed was identical with that of Mao's February
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speech on contradictions. To put this point of view to work,
it said, was of great historical significance.
During the early days of May, daily headlines. exhorted
party members to rectify themselves and provided examples to
be followed. These examples were drawn from party organiza-
tions within the central government organs and various pro-
vincial party organizations in which rectification was'ap-
parently undertaken with great alacrity. "Leading cadres"
were urged to take the initiative in reforming themselves
and entering into the rectification process.
On 8 May 1957, a meeting took place which set in train
a reaction that brought an abrupt shift in the rectification
campaign. This was a symposium convoked by the Chinese Com-
munistparty's United Front Department for "responsible'men
of the democratic parties and nonparty democratic personages."
The central question for this discussion, according to the
People's Daily report, was: "What ideological and operational
pro ems o tie democratic parties and nonparty democratic
personages wish our party to solve in the process of rectifi-
cation?," only were nonparty people invited to criticize
the Communist party and the government, but they were pro-
vided with an opportunity to respond immediately to the invi-
tation.
Li; Wei-Than, director of the party's United Front Depart-
ment, stated that his purpose in calling the symposium to-
gether was "to ask everybody to help us carry out 'rectifica-
tion, to help us correct our shortcomings and mistakes." Li
said, that this was the first time in the history of the Chi-
nese Communist party that the united front method had been
used to carry on a rectification movement. "Because of this,"
he said', "it is hoped that everyone will express many criti-
cal opinions."
Among those who responded to this liberal invitation
were Minister of Communications Chang Po-chun and Minister of
Food Chang Nai-chi.. Both of these ministers were later re-
moved from their posts in the "democratic" puppet parties of
which they were officials and, after many months, from their
government posts. Both voiced a number of complaints which
centered around the futility of non-Communists attempting to
exercise real influence in national affairs. Although the
Communist party spoke often of "mutual supervision" among
the Communist and "democratic" parties, they said, there was
actually no means by which this supervision could be exer-
cised.
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P concerning the Communist part and
,ernment had been expressed prior to this s y
ov-
to the "hundred flowers" YmPosium in response
tote a huad ear. liberalization which had been insti-
ined aioeasalier These had been scattered and relative-s voked a violent reactionyfromdtheeChine and had not
The symposium of 8 pro"
Communist party.
May 1957 se
boweverp marked
of a flood of unprecedentedly
severe criticismhb beginning
men in government posts as well as others. y nonpars
were not only spoken in meetings, but were widely published
Perhaps coincidentally
tion to criticize was issud,oanothersame
meetingtwas held iinlpni-
ping at which a Communist leader hinted at the turn which rec-
tification-was to take a month later.
ag Chen
member and second-ranking member of the P Pe, secretariat
arty's addressed a mof the Peiping Politburo
ad means of meeting eti carrying the rectification municipal party committee
He advised his audience that the first requirement of etheccam-
paign was to study carefully the two reports of Mao Tse-tung
the central committee directive on rectification, and relevlPeople?s Daily editorials. an
must be explained) accord-
cally n to` the newspaper report,Hthatptheirectification move
Put into effect beginning from the to
p matt
process must begin with an examination of thethought as, the
work style of leading cadres. and
could be In this way, Pengsaid, examples
provided and experience accumulated which could be used
in gradually extending the movement to lower levels. At e
stage, opinions .should be sought from those on the same oralow-
er levels and from "friends outside the party.,
Peng then turned to the "gentle wind and mild rain"
pect of the directive on rectification.
as-
He two He said that there
groups who disagreed with this:
that a situation of "no wind and those who thought
those who thought that +v a no rain would develop and
a manner of speaking but gthatewhindtheac mlairnin,, was only
there would be "fierce wind and heavy rain. Both ht thunder way
of view were unsatisfactory, Peng said. The first view wasibe-
Y the fact that there was already much wind
the rectification campaign got underway, and ign
After
there be 'fierce -wind and heavy rain?" other asked, might
the party use harsh methods? I I otwords, would
n hi
cautioned his audience that then intent of gthesdirective'o
ectification was that the question
r ~ng
n
ee, campaign should be earnest yet gen-
He added that "in the course of the campaign a i
wind might arise,? and advised the cadres to act in 1 the a
cordance
with the demands of the directive....,, "strict ac-
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Chen's statement
The ambiguities of peng
that cadres should not be afraid to use "a little "" coercion
: to fulfill
on the subjects of rectification, if necessary
and as long as
the intent of the rectification directive,
the ""spiri't" of the gentle method ,was observed. about This con-
eech made by Peng er-
what with month
taasts some the speech
the people.
earlier in which he advacateai hferencesfamong the c
suasive methods in settling of sterner methods, however, was
his more recent advocacy
solely to party members and not to
still intended to aPP y regime.
nonparty critics of the Criticism surprises Mao, May 1957
rty during this
The severe criticism dirxeWeag g~tafh a detaile d evidence
doubt
period would fill volumes.. h little
was presented in the he pro ce~llwhsif?edd 1Theefollowing were
that the complaints were w expressed at the. symposiums
. some of those most frequently
and in the press:
arty has replaced the government.
1) The Communist p
2) There is no legal code to guide the people and thus
the Communist party is free to act arbitrarily.
decides policy without even a pre-
3) The communist party decides al "leaders."
tense of .consulting nonparty p
rest
vidual communist party members have built a g
or ""gulf" between themselves and the common people and
"" 4) Indi
wall st non-Communists in matters of pay and pro-
discriminate again
motion. er and
5) Non-Communist ~~~~tlsubordinatesles but no pow
are controlled by Comm
6) The '"mass organizations" are tools of the ruling party.
ty
Igo Communist regime has ever permitted, 'let along enco
es by the
aged such a flood of outspoken non-Communist criticism as that personages which fol-
lowed the summons issued to non
time,
united ;Front Department of the Chinese Communist party. control measures had,evidently been prompted-the effective party until to this t
the Chinese. people and the world.
the question arise
x?tcaas-to ingswhat
posure',of its?sho arty.autharit.ies. had no idea that
stored up so great a reservoirbf
Part of the answ
the .darn. of repression
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ill will. It will be of interest to examine some of the oth-
er reasons for the: momentary opening of the floodgates.
: The close relationship between.the opening of the rectifi-
cation campaign and the: Chinese Communist party's invitation
for` criticism: from non-Communist quarters indicates that."out-
side" criticism was initially regarded as an integral and im-
portant part of the rectification process.
Since a major goal of the rectification movement was to
improve relations between Communist party members and the
public, Communist authorities apparently believed that cadres
should be exposed to a certain amount of criticism from those
.whose good will they were intended to seek. It appears like-
ly,,therefore, that the statement by the director of the Chi-
nese Communist party's United Front Department that the.pur-
pose of. criticism was to assist the Communists to carry out
rectification and correct their shortcomings and mistakes con-
tained a certain element of sincerity. That this tactic was
not unanimously approved within the party was indicated by
a comment in the Shanghai Liberation Daily that lower cadres
were "terrified of the criticism o? the masses."
The response to the new liberalization move was far more
rapid and widespread than had been the case after Lu Ting-i's
announcement of the "hundred flowers" policy. As suggested
above, this response was due in part to the provision of forums
at which replies might be expressed immediately. The fact that
the invitation was linked with the widely publicized rectifica-
tion campaign may also have lent a greater air of sincerity and
thereby invoked a freer response. An additional factor may
have been that the invitation was addressed not only to academ-
ic intellectuals but to "political" figures who might be more
inclined to express their views publicly in the hope of influ-
encing the course of affairs.
The Chinese Communist party may also have been motivated
.by a ,desire to foster a greater sense of participation in the
government. on the part of an articulate portion of the popula-
tion. By thus creating an illusion of free discussion, party
authorities may have hoped to relieve the party of a part of
the burden of responsibility for unpopular government measures.
This tactic had been pursued in theory since the founding of
the Chinese People's Republic in 1949 but never in matters of
fundamental importance.
The fact that the invitation was Issued indicates a.seri-
ous overestimation by the Communist leadership of the. extent o
which non-Communist intellectuals and political figures had
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been converted to the-Communistpoint of view. It appears
that the. long silence from non-Communist quarters was inter-
,preted as acquiescence rather than as the discretion which,
until then, non-Communists had felt . to -be the.:better part of
valor. Since Mao Tse-tung.was presented.as the foremost ad-
vocate of a policy of relaxation of restrictions .on freedom
of expression, he must-also be considered foremost among
those who failed to assess correctly the true attitudes of
non-Communist intellectuals and puppet party leaders.
Mao was quick to perceive this error. On 25 May 1957,
he spoke before a national congress of the New Democratic
Youth League (now.the Young Communist League) in the presence
of the entire top echelon of the Chinese Communist leadership.
Mao made a statement that recurred frequently during the fol-.
lowing weeks and became the keynote of the Chinese.. Communist
.party's counterattack on its newly discovered opposition:
"Any word or action that is at variance with socialism is
.completely wrong." Thus, less than three weeks after it was
issued,'the invitation: to free speech was rescinded.
The CCP''s Counterattack, June 1957
During the next few days,. the counterattack gained mo-
mentum. Peiping radio announced on 3 June that the follow-.
ing day Ta Kung Pao, a newspaper next in authority to the
icommunienparty's eople's Daily,, would carry an editorial
entitled "Criticisms for Unity." The broadcast observed:
The editorial points out that it is not true that all
criticism will lead to a new.level of unity. Only
criticism which is factual and. just will serve this
purpose. It is only when criticism is true and sin
cere and when friendly relations exist between those
who are criticizing and those who are being criticized
that it is possible to establish comradely unity.
This marked the beginning of an attempt to stem the flow
.of criticism at the same time giving the impression that one's
freedom in this regard was not cut off. On the day following
the Ta Kung Pao editorial, the.People's Daily reprinted an
edit orislrrom a Nanking paper w c urge continued int.en.-
si.ve development of the rectification movement. Those who.
had been lax in their criticism, the editorial said,. should.
increase their efforts in the "blooming" and "contending" of
opinions over various questions. As for the future, "this
should become the practice of today, as it should.also be
the practice for tomorrow, for both the rectification move-
ment and the principle of 'let flowers of many kinds bloom
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and diverse schools of thought contend' are long-term .matters . "
Throughout the remainder of the rectification campaign the
terminology of the brief period of "liberalization" continued
to be used, but the meaning of the words was greatly changed.
A`considerable part of the initial counterattack on crit-
icswas carried out by non-Communists. As an entering wedge,
Lu yu-wens assistant to the secretary general of the State
Council and,member of the central committee of the Revolution-
ary Committee of the Kuomintang, made public a letter he had
mously in regard to a speech he had delivered
received anony
on'how to assist the Communist party"in itsgrectificationt.
movement. The letter accused Lu behavior. Luis speech
devil,," and warned him to change his
probably had been intended as an opening gun in the counter-'
attack critics of the regime. The letter it provoked
brought the People's Daily into the fray.
on 8 June 1957, the People's Daily had this to say about.
the letter:
struggles. This letter e
large-scale class struggle in our country has subsided,
it is by no means completely finished. This is par-
ticularly true on the ideological front.
r of Luis speech provided a con-
a
trying to'use the reef ca
Communist party as a means to carry out severe class
t lls us that although the
ident a major event in the politi-
i
nc
We consider this
cal life of our country at this moment, because this
letter constitutes a warning to the great masses of
the people. It shows that there are persons who are
iti tion movement of the Chinese
y
The people s Daily summ
venient ter or nonp ra ty puppets of the regime who wished to
the vandwagon:
The people should not confuse
ILI
pitalisttemptctocy
c
a
nor
with socialist democracy,
weaken or eliminate the leadership of the Chinese
Communist party.
2. Well-prepared documents should be readied for dis-
cussion at State Council meetins so that the mistake
made by capitalist countries of turning their parlia-
ments into forums for endless disputes without achiev-
ing results can be avoided. This practice is not de-
signed to turn the meetings into a matter of mere for,
mality, nor to prevent the discussion of the subjects
contained therein.
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3. The speaker found no gulf
o r barrier between him and
CCP members If
there arelfde
. gus an barrirs between
other persons and CCP members, joint efforts would be
made to eliminate them.
CCP members; are entitled to the right to,.defend them-
selves against criticism. This act sh
l
ou
not be in
-
.discriminately taken as an act of vengeance,
Simultaneously with the publication of the People's Daily
editorial-.the Chinese Communist party put into a etc anc tz
well-worn propaganda technique in its-efforts to stifle the em-
barrassing flow of critical opinion. In Peiping a symposium of
trade.union cadres and workers was held in which to air opinions
on-the case.of-the threatening letter. According to Peiping
radio" 'they were unanimously opposed to all kinds of false
statements departing from socialism, and condemned. the low trick
of threatening people by anonymous letters."" It was also re-
ported;that workers and staff members of many factories in
Tientsin met to express their indignation. These meetings
.quickly developed into general attacks on critics of Communist
.leadership. Their limited scope suggests that they were con-
vened hastily in anticipation of the forthcoming intense cam-
paign to suppress opposition to-the regime.
,on 9.June 1957, the People's Daily developed the thesis
that. while criticism was per ec y correct, countercriticism
was also: correct. The editorial then distinguished between
,proper and improper criticism:
As for criticism which is not well-intentioned and which
aims at undermining the socialist undertakings, the peo-
ple's democratic dictatorship, and the. unity between the
party and the people, since it is not compatible with
the interests of either the people or the party's recti-
fication movement,! it is, to be sure, all the more neces-
sary to wage correct countercriticism against this criti-
cism of a destructive nature.
Since there are now these two different schools of criti-
cism, those who are responsible for the people's under-
takingscannot afford indiscriminately to regard all
criticism
h
as
elpful ad bfiit
nenecal_o the people. They
cannot but offer their own opinions in answer to that
criticism which,is.wrong and of a destructive.nature. If
no countercriticism is offered against wrong opinions'in
debate, not only will it be impossible to uphold the truth,
but also the socialist undertakings will inevitably suf-
fer damage.
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: The next day, the People's Daily added further direction
to the Communist 'party's co~xnerak . "During the past two
days," the editorial said, "many workers in Peiping, Shanghai,
Tientsin, Mukden, Anshan, and other areas have successively
held symposiums during which they indignantly denounced the
reactionary, antisocialist views of the extremely small num-
ber of rightists," 'Assuming further the role of spokesman
for the working class, the editorial asserted that "the work-
ing class realizes that at a time when there are those who
are conducting activities opposed to the socialist system
and to the leadership of the Communist party, the most im-
portant thing:`is to unite as one and defeat these attacks."
Another appeared in the People's Daily two days later
entitled "On the Socialist Founaa ion,ale of the Whole
Country Unite!" This began on a somewhat defensive note.
In the words of Peiping radio, "the editorial emphatically
points out that to follow the socialist path without the lead-
ership of the working class and the Communist party is unim-
aginable." The editorial then recalled the various attempts
of certain rightist elements to take advantage of the rectifi-
cation movement to oppose socialism and undermine socialist
undertakings. These rightist elements, the editorial said,
were a small remnant which evidently hoped that its opinions
would receive support from private industrial and commercial
circles. In prescribing a course of action tobe pursued
under these circumstances, the editorial called for efforts
clearly to distinguish between those people who support so-
cialism but who harbor certain temporary doubts, uncertainties,
and reservations because of their temporary failure to conform
to changes, and rightists who are hostile to the socialist sys-
tem. The editorial concludes that "all those who are truly
patriotic and who are willing to stand on the side of socialism
should, therefore, draw a line of demarcation between themselves
and the rightists, so as to gain a clearer understanding of
questions regarding right and wrong." As for the rightists
themselves, "they have also finally come to realize that unless
they fundamentally change their attitude toward socialism they
will become an utterly isolated, pitiable group. In other words
they will be thrown out of the train of the times."
The following day, the People's Daily carried its final
editorial of the series on the a egrightist" attack on
Communist leadership and the principles of socialism as in-
terpreted by the Chinese Communist party. In this editorial
the leaders of the Communist party apparently attempted to pre-
vent the rectification campaign from becoming entirely displaced
by the antirightist campaign. Speaking for the Communist party,
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the editorial emphatically pointed out that "we must bravely
accept all correct criticism and promptly take measures to
correct all defects and mistakes in work." In conclusion,
the editorial said that "regardless of the attempt by.a
small number of rightists to disrupt our rectification move-
ment with their destructive opinions, we must carry out the
rectification movement." It added that the Communist party
must continue to enlist the aid of the masses outside the
party in.the rectification campaign.
Mao Takes a Hard Line, June 1957
With the Chinese Communist party's counterattack on its
critics; well under way as a result of a series of editorials
published by the People's Daily, the next major step~in the.
anti-rightist campaign was taken. This was the publication
on 18 June 1957 of an official "text" of Mao Tse-tung's Feb-
ruary speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions
Among the People." According to an introductory note,."The
author has gone. over the text based.on the verbatim record
and made certain additions." These "additions" somehow re-
sulted in a text that was much shorter than the original
speech.' Since portions of the published text were undoubt-
edly added as a result of "rightist" attacks, there must
also have been very substantial deletions from the speech.
as originally delivered.
During the months between Mao's delivery of the speech
and its publication, lengthy commentaries on its content ap
geared in the People's Daily and elsewhere. From these com-
mentaries and various ddirect and indirect quotations it is
possible to forma fairly accurate idea of the general im-
port of the speech. On the basis of this picture of the
speech as originally presented, it is almost certain that
,the published text went beyond the original speech in setting
limits to free expression of opinions. As far as the rectifi-
cation campaign is concerned, the principal changes in the
published version occurred, as might be expected, in those
sections dealing with the definition of contradictions, the
;application of the "hundred flowers"-and "mutual supervision"
policies, and the avoidance of waste.
In the opening paragraphs of the June version there ap-
pears a definition of "the people" which permitted the re-
gime to judge arbitrarily who might exercise the rights
guaranteed. by the Chinese Communist constitution. It thus
provides a doctrinal basis for confinement of the regime's
,tolerance to those who serve its ends:
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At'this stage,of building socialism, all classes,. strata
and social groups which approve, support, and work for
.the cause of socialist construction belong to the cate-
gory of the people, while those social forces and groups
which resist the socialist revolution, and are hostile
to and try to wreck socialist construction, are enemies
of the people.
In his general discussion of contradictions, Mao offered
,the example of the 1942 rectification campaign and the, "unity--
criticism--unity" formulas as the correct method for resolv-
ing contradictions among the people. "In 1942," he said, "we
used this method to resolve contradictions inside the Commu-
nist party, namely, contradictions between the doctrinaires
and the rank-and-file membership." As has been pointed out,
this view was consistent with the emphasis of the introductory
statements which preceded the new campaign, i.e., rectification
.was to be strictly a Communist party affair in which nonparty
people might assist if they wished. In the June text, how-
ever, this view was apparently qualified with additional re-
marks.
This apparent modification was introduced by an abrupt
statement that "we extended this method beyond our party."
It was then argued that during the anti-Japanese war the
rectification formula had been "used very successfully to
deal with relations between those in positions of leadership
and the masses, between the army and the civilian population,
between officers and men." It was even claimed that the meth-
od had been used since 1927 to deal with relations between the
Communist party and the masses and "in general with relations
among the people."
This portion of the published speech concluded with a
definition of future tasks which portended the extension of
the rectification campaign beyond the Communist party:
Now our task is to continue to extend and make still.
better.use of this method throughout the ranks of the
people; we want all our factories, cooperatives, busi-
ness establishments, schools, government offices, pub
li.c bodies, in a word, all the six hundred million of
our people, to use it in resolving contradictions among
themselves.
This statement heralded a fundamental change in the na-
ture of the rectification campaign. It was the beginning o:f,
a. movement which was to carry rectification to all sectors
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and allilevels of Chinese society. Because-of the size and
complexity of the task thus undertaken, the campaign was
initiated at. different times and carried out :to varying de-
grees in various parts of the country; eventually, however,
it penetrated,.in one form or another, to the most remote
areas and to the lowest levels of society.
The heart of the new restrictions placed on free expres-
sion in;the revised text of Mao's speech occurred in the sec-
tion on the "hundred flowers" and "long-term coexistence and
mutual supervision" policies. In discussing distinctions
between "fragrant flowers'' and "poisonous weeds," Mao pre-
sented a list of six criteria:
We believe that, broadly speaking, words and actions
can be judged right .if their:
1) Help to. unite the people of our various nationalities,
and do not divide them;
2) Are beneficial, not harmful to socialist transforma-
tion and; socialist construction;
3) Help to consolidate, not undermine or weaken, the
people's democratic dictatorship;
4) Help to consolidate, not undermine or weaken, demo
cratic centralism,
5) Tend to strengthen, not to cast off or weaken, the
leadership. of the Communist party;
6) Are beneficial, not harmful, to international social-
ist solidarity and the solidarity of the peace-loving peoples
of the world.
Maoiadmitted that these were political criteria but de-
'fended their their inclusion in a discussion of a policy that ap-
iplied to the arts and sciences. They were necessary, he
said,. in; addition to other criteria for judging the worth of
scientific or artistic activities: "In a socialist country
like ours, can there possibly be any useful scientific or
artistic activity which runs counter to these political cri-
teria?"
The June text proceeded to a discussion of the policy
governing relations between the Chinese Communist party and.
the "democratic" puppet parties which had been summed up in
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the slogan: `"long-term coexistence and mutual superv,s on.
The slogan was presented in somewhat defensive terms. In
the words' of ''the published text:-.. "The idea:. of long-term co-.,
t
t
_.
],as
existence had beefi, - in existence for a long. .time, ;;.,bu
the slogan was.set out in clear terms." The origin of the
policy wast.traded back as far as a statement made:by Mao..
in 1950.
commented on the value of outside
n the June text
Ma
,
o;
criticism~.'and expressed the wish that it be continued... The
published `version of'the speech, however,, left no doubt
that the survival of. the non-Communist parties was=dependent
on their observance of the six criteria previously presented:
Of course, advice and criticism exchanged between-the
Communist party and the other democratic parties will
.:play a positive role in mutual supervision only when
theyc6fiform to the six political criteria given above..
rties
ti
c pa
That is why we hope that the other democra
will all pay attention to ideological remoulding, and,
-term coexistence and mutual supervision;
r lon
f
t
i
g
o
ve
r
s
..,with the Communist party so as to meet the needs of=the
new society,.
This was a far cry from the calls for criticism which.
had been issued only a few weeks previously. The earlier
invitations had evidently been based on an assumption that
"ideological remoulding" had already taken place among prom-
inent non-Communists to such an extent that they could be
trusted to offer mild and perhaps even salutary criticism
of the Communist party. When it had become apparent by mid-
June that this assumption was wrong, the publication of a
revised version of Mao's February speech provided a means of
reimposing stringent limits on the freedom to criticize.
Throughout the June version of the speech there occur
statements which contrast with. assertions made during the
introductory phases of the rectification campaign. It seems
likely that these statements had been inserted in order to
counteract the overoptimistic mood in which the, campaign had.
been conceived. In the section on the suppression of counter-
revolution, for example, Mao is reported to have said that.
"even when all the counterrevolutionaries in existence, have
been rooted out, new ones may emerge. If we drop our guard
we shall be badly fooled and suffer for it severely." This
has the appearance of a hedge on the earlier insistence that
counterrevolutionaries had been "basically eliminated."
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_It was.also claimed in many:statements;- that preceded. the
rectification campaign that classes had been "basically wiped
Put-t' .. This, would, seem. to imply the. virtual elimination of
cl
t
u
ass s
r
ggle The J ttf M'
.?,uneex,oaos speech, however,
stresses the role s,till..to be played by 'the class struggle:
But remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador
c
asses still exist, the bourgeoisie still exists, and
the petty bourgeoisie has only just begun to remould
itself, . , Class struggle is not yet over. The class
st-Tuggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie,
the class struggle between various political forces,
and. the class struggle..in ..the ideological, field be-
tween,the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will still
,In its reaffirmationof earlier points . as
ell
s i
w
n
a
; its obvious revisions, the published text of Mao's speech
charted the 'future course of the rectification campaign. The
June version linked rectification with the task of "socialist
construction" and strongly urged "all the 600 million-people
of our country"'to increase production, practice economy,
and combat extravagance. In the months to follow:, this as-
pect of the rectification campaign achieved the status of a
Major nationwide campaign in its own right. After publica-
Ition..of.the speech,,it.was the "official" text rather that
the original version that became the basis of the rectifica-
-tinn campai
n
g
Others Echo Hard Line, June-July 1957
e
ubli
i
p
ca
on o a~ao s speenotr
c:. on cna
dictions,' the National People's Congress opened 'its fourth
session in Peiping on 25 June 1957. The congress had been
twice postponed and was preceded by an unusual "preparatory
meeting" at which, presumably, the proceedings of the forth-
coming session were carefully laid out. Both the delays and
the -_ preparatory. meeting probably were occasioned by the need
to allow delegates time to study carefully the official. text
Qf.Mao.'s speech and to acquaint those from distant places
with.othershifts in.a.rapidly changing line. Party leaders,
may have feared that too much of the :spirit of free criticism
which had prevailed,a month earlier might otherwise have per-
sisted into th
C
e
ongress session addb
.n prove emarrassing.
The.keyaote speech to the. congress was delivered by Chou
R.n-lai in ' the form of a "Report on the Work. of .the,,Government . "
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Although it dealt largely with economic and administrative
matters, the speech was studded throughout with statements
in defense of previous measures of the regime and attempts
to correct. the impression of tolerance of real criticism
which. had been created during the opening phases of the
rectification movement. In.line with the People.'s'Daily
editorials of early June and the official text of Mao's
speech, Chou also attempted to correct the overoptimistic
assessment of the docility of nonparty people which under-
lay the party's solicitation of outside criticism.
In the course of a. review of the events of the past
few years, Chou admitted that mistakes had been made dur-
ing the "socialist transformation" of agriculture, handi-
crafts, industry and commerce. He blamed these mistakes
largely on the mass nature of the movements and claimed
that the errors had been outweighed by the achievements
attained. As for those who had been unjustly harmed, how-
ever, "we should apologize publicly to those people who
suffered unnecessarily in the movement."
Chou reiterated earlier optimistic estimates of the
status of the revolution but emphasized the continuing
role of the class struggle:.
When we say that the socialist revolution has tri-
umphed in the main and that the turbulent class
struggle waged by the masses on a large scale has,
in the main, been concluded, we do not mean. to say
that class struggle has ended. When we now bring
to the fore the question of correctly handling con-
tradictions among the people, we do not mean to say
that there are no longer contradictions between our-
selves and the enemy.
Chou attacked critics of the regime in terms that left
little doubt as to the point at which their criticism had
overstepped the bounds of tolerance:
Certain right-wing elements have come out with quite
a number of utterances of a destructive nature, on
the pretense of helping the Communist party with its
rectification campaign. Not a few such views aimed
directly against the basic state system of our coun-
try.
What these critics were really trying to do, Chou said,
was "to get,our state-power away from the vanguard of the
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working class--away from the leadership piof thetyommunisto-
party." In defending the Chinese Communist
power, Chou cited the 1954 constitution which acknowl
edges the party's leadership. He also presented one of the
Communists! favorite circular arg dents, that the socialism"
ship of the party is necessary
and thus attain "the world of universal harmony of which the
Chinese people have always dreamed."
Finally, Chou reinterpreted the policy of "long-term co-
existence and mutual supervision" so as to leave no doubt
about the future role of the puppet parties and the terms on
which they; would be permitted to survive. He paid lip-service
to the importance of the "united front" but affirmed that "the
Communist party is the guiding force and the core of the united
front and the common goal of struggle for the people of the
eaatire country." As for the function of the united front:
Through the various democratic parties and groups and
people's organizations brought together in
front, it is possible to do better
cialist ideology, more effectively carry through so-
cialist transformation, and advance the cause of so-
cialist construction. This is the function and pur
pose.of the policy put forward by the Communist par-
ty for long-term coexistence with the democratic par-
. the people expect
tiesand mutual superv
of the democratic i parties siois thattthey should firmly
tdhere to the socialist stand and pay attentoni-
ideological remolding so that they can play a po
tive:role in state affairs to the fullest extent of
their capabilities.
In the unlikely event that any delegates had failed to
appreciate any of the points made by Chou En-tai, they
repeated and underscored in a. speech by the party's p p
ganda chief, Lu Ting-i, on 11 July 1957. Lu's long and de-
tailed article in the people's Daily in March had heralded
the rectification campaign.
Like Chou, Lu began on a defensive note. Some rightists,
he said, attributed the rectification campaign to insuperable
difficulties which confronted the Chinese Communist Party.
These rightists were quoted as having said that the Communists
had made mistakes in every field and that the country was in
utter darkness. On the contrary, Lu said, the rectification
eampaignihad been made possible by the decisive victory of
the socialist revolution, and because, "in the course of the
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struggle for this victory, democratic-parties and groups, the
national bourgeoisie,. and intellectuals had generally ac-
cepted or agreed to the socialist revolution." He claimed
that "the. overwhelming majority of the people see the campaign
and the policies of the party from the standpoint of love for
the country and socialism."
Why, then, had the antirightist campaign become neces-
sary?.. Because, said Lu, "a very few bourgeois rightists think
that the moment has come for. an upheaval and that a great of -
fensive.can be launched against socialism, against the peo-
ple's democratic system, and against. the Communist party."
Lu especially attacked rightist attempts to provoke stu-
dents to carry out disturbances. He accused them of planning
to use students as the spearhead of a movement which would
eventually attract workers and others and provide a pretext
for a rightist offer to. settle the disturbed situation. Lu
charged that. the non-Communist minister of communications,
Chang Po-chun, had connived at such a.plan during a talk with
six professors a few weeks earlier. One of the six, Lu said,
was the vice.minister of higher education. Lu was referring
obliquely to a sizable student demonstration which had taken
place in Wuhan about a month before his speech. Chang was
later accused directly of having been involved in inciting
this. demonstration.
The schemes of the rightists failed, according to Lu,
because they over-estimated their forces. He claimed that a
maximum of 1 to 3 percent of the students in higher institu-
tions had supported and followed the rightists and that of
these a mere handful remained. Although the rightists had
centered their hopes on the higher intellectuals, Lu said,
they had won the support of only a small percentage, most of
whom had already forsaken them.'
Lu also charged that. the rightists had expected help from
the capitalists but had only evoked a few scattered echoes.
The "democratic" parties also had failed to respond to rightist
overtures, Lu said, and many of them had decided to carry out
their. own. rectification campaigns. He thus acknowledged the
services of the many non-Communist delegates who had risen
to accuse their colleagues of "rightist" tendencies.
Lu also made it clear that the single standard by which
any. utterance would be judged was adherence to Communist goals
and methods:
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To reject socialism, to reject the leadership of the
working class, to reject the people's democratic dic-
tatorship and democratic centralism, and to reject
the alliance with the Soviet Union can only destroy
our country. What the rightists stand for is exactly
what will destroy our country and lead us to annihila-
tion,
In discussing the class struggle, Lu reversed the empha-
sis of his earlier article: "The exploiting classes have
basically been eliminated and the period of large-scale class
struggle is over. But this certainly does not mean that there
is no class struggle in a socialist society." He further as-
serted that this struggle "will sometimes assume a very ac-
tive form."
Lu Ting-i concluded his speech with a reaffirmation of
the Communist party's liberalization programs and urged "bold
encouragement of criticism and self-criticism to correct the
shortcomings and mistakes in our work." He made it clear,
however, that liberalization and criticism of the regime would
be allowed to survive in name alone: "The rightists must be
mercilessly criticized and the rectification campaign must
be resolutely continued."
A final feature of the National People's Congress ses-
sion was'the delivery of a number of abject confessions, spoken
and written, by prominent nonparty personages who had come in
for criticism as rightists. These included the three minis-
terial officials who had been especially sharply criticized
at the meeting. More than six months were to pass, however,
before they were formally dismissed from their posts.
The Communist leadership's concern over the political
s-ituation among students was again demonstrated on the day
following'adjournment of the National People's Congress. On
16 July 1957, both Chou En-lai and Peng Chen, a politburo
member and mayor of Peiping, addressed a meeting of 12,000
1.957 graduates of institutes of higher education in Peiping.
Chou exhorted the graduates to work in the interest of the
s; torte and ';society rather than seeking their own pleasure.
fie told them that he had high hopes for them and noted with
satisfaction that most graduates of institues of higher learn-
ing had been "steeled" in the recent political struggle against
rightists and that they had conducted themselves properly. Chou
expressed the hope that the graduates, after leaving school,
would continue to reform and temper themselves through politi-
cal struggle and also through participation in physical labor.
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The tone of. Chou's talk to the graduates was not at all
conciliatory. Apparently the student. disturbances during the
summer had not disposed the regime to make concessions to
student groups as a means of placating them. Chou did not
even hold out the hope of a future reward. To buildChina,
into a highly industrialized and advanced nation, he said,'
was a task that would require several decades. To the stu-
dents, as to other segments of Chinese society, the leader
sh.ip presented an appearance..of bland confidence that, ex-
cept for a few malcontents, the populace would be happy to de-
vote their lives to the aims provided for them by the Chinese
Communist party.
Peng Chen lectured the. graduates on the important educa-
tional significance of the antirightist struggle and called
on his hearers to associate closely with workers and peasants,
to. respect them and learn from-them, and to comply with the
work assignment given them by. the state. Peng maintained
that the great majority of students had been able to distin-
guish right from wrong during the antirightist struggle be-
cause of. the guidance of the Communist party and their teach-
ers. He, hoped that students who had committed mistakes in
the course of the campaign "would resolutely correct them and
would follow the path to socialist construction and socialist
transformation."
The unyielding line taken by Chou and Peng in their ad-
dresses to the graduates was confirmed,by a State Council di
restive issued the..following day which required stringent po-
litical investigation of all graduating classes. Students
whose attitudes were not acceptable would be placed on proba-
tion for periods of up to three years during which they would
perform menial tasks while undergoing "ideological correction."
The authorities avoided violent measures for the time being,
but some erring students were forced to forego their summer
holidays in order'to undertake special ideological studies.
By late July the antirightist campaign had reached into
the Communist party itself and. a number of party members in
journalism and publishing activities had been condemned for
their criticism of party.cadres. A basis for this phase of
the campaign was provided by a People's Daily editorial of
28 July. The, editorial began with a ustlfieation of the
antirightist.campaign on the grounds that it would be "im-
possible to consolidate socialist undertakings if the revolu-
tion is under way only in the aspect of ownership-of produc-
tion means without corresponding progress on the political
and ideological fronts." In order to carry out the political
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and ideological revolution, the editorial said, "everyone must
go throughthe gate of socialism."
Communist party members would not be automatically as
s6ed to be above question in these matters; the editorial as-
serted that for each party member, "the attitude to adopt with
regard to this struggle is a significant political test since
eery party member, too, must go through this gate of social-
ism." The editorial pointed out the seriousness of the situa-
tion:
Certain well-intentioned comrades seemed to be of the
opinion that the rightists existed only outside of the
party, and only among the bourgeoisie, democratic par-
ties, and the intellectuals who had never reformed them-
selves. This view, however, is not in keeping with the
facts, for the anti.rightist struggle under way in vari-
ous areas has exposed many rightists within the party.
In the heat of the fierce battle between the Chinese
bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the editorial said, the
rightists within the party began to show their true faces:
'?They joined rightists outside the party and took advantage
of certain individual and scattered shortcomings and defects
in party and state life to launch an attack against the par-
ty from within and without." The editorial said that, under
these circumstances, "in order to protect the party from right-
ist corruption and to maintain the ideological and political
purity of the party, it is necessary to develop an 'impartial
and equal.' struggle against the rightists within and without
the party:."
The People's Daily editorial cautioned, however, that
'.'oversimplified an -impetuous methods" should not to be used
against the rightists. Instead, the rightists were to be
isolated by persuasion and criticism. Party members were al-
go warned never to make false charges against nonrightists.
On the day after the publication of the People's Daily
editorial on rightists within the Communist party, the wang
Ming Daily, mouthpiece of the "democratic" parties, carried
a6ed or al entitled, "Why Is It Necessary for Democratic
Parties to Launch an Antirightist Struggle?" The editorial
pointed out that the events in the course of the antirightist
campaign of the past month had vividly proved that the strug-
le was of key significance to the puppet parties. These
. Parties were warned that they must go through this struggle
to "clarify their stands." In case there should remain any
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misunderstanding on the part of members of the puppet parties,
they were told explicitly that this was a matter of life and.
death for the parties.
Thus, by the end of July 1958,. the rectification cam-
paign which had begun as a Communist party movement had been
extended to the ranks. of the non-Communist political parties,
while the antirightist campaign which had at first involved
non-Communists had been extended into the Communist party.
The two.campaigne,.however, had not yet been formally merged.
During the next few weeks, the antirightist campaign in-
creased in scope and. intensity while the rectification cam-
paign was completely refashioned.
"Antirighti'st Struggle" Continues, August 1957
In an apparent move to intensify the campaign against
opponents of the regime, Chinese Communist authorities gave
increasing publicity to the capture of alleged conspiratorial
bands in widely separated parts of. the mainland during late
July and August 1957. After several bands had been broken
up, a link was established between such counterrevolutionary
activity and certain accused rightists. The leaders of a
band reportedly seized in the Hupeh-Hunan border area were
quoted as declaring that Minister of Communications Chang
Po-chun and Chu-An-ping, former chief editor of the "demo-
cratic" parties' Kwang Ming Daily, "belonged to their group."
Another non-Communist o cial who had criticized the regime.,
Minister of Timber Industry Lo Lung-chi,. was accused of hav-
ing formed an alliance with.Chang which had been responsible
for the two-day student riot in the city of Wuhan in June.
By associating these men with counterrevolutionary activity--
most heinous crime in the Communist code--Communist authori-
ties undoubtedly hoped to discourage other potentially disaf-
fected intellectuals and bureaucrats from openly expressing
opposition.
. Another cause for concern on the part of Chinese Commu-
nist leaders during.the late summer. of 1957 was the lagging
grain procurement program in rural areas.. The People's. Daily
in early August declared that the food question waasrimar y
an ideological problem. Three days later, the GCP central
committee ordered immediate action by all levels of. the party
to give the peasants a "true appreciation" of-the superiority
of cooperatives, the necessity for government purchasing and
marketing of grain, the. nature of the relationship between
urban workers and peasants, and the importance of suppressing
counterrevolutionaries. The directive linked the situation
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among the peasants with''the antirightist campaign and declared
that "reactionaries and' counterrevolutionaries" who raised
their voices were to be silenced at once. This was followed
by another long editorial in the People's Daily explaining
the party line put forth in the d re ve.
High-level officials.of the Chinese Communist party con-
tinued to take advantage of every possible occasion to pro-
mote the antirightist and rectification campaigns. The empha-
sis was still on the antirightist phase. On 4 August, polit-
buro member Peng Chen, mayor of Peiping, addressed a meeting
of the Peiping People's Congress. The purpose of the meet-
ing, Peng said, was "to expose further and criticize the re-
actionary heresies of the bourgeois rightists (and) to give
impetus to the progress of the rectification campaign." Peng
characterized the antirightist struggle:
It is a great debate of the whole people, a great po-
litical and ideological battle, a struggle between
capitalism and socialism; it is also a struggle which
concerns the destiny of the 600,000,000 people and.the
social development of our country, and a struggle of
great historical and international significance. So-
cialism will not triumph if we do not win this battle.
The term "great debate" quickly became part of the jar-
gon of the antirightist and rectification campaigns. Appar-
ently the authorities, in order to maintain a semblance of
the abandoned liberalization policies, sanctioned the use of
the word "debate" once it had been clearly established that
no real debate would bepermitted. The so-called debates
that were organized throughout the country from this time
onward served no purpose but to propagandize and justify the
policies of the regime.
Peng Chen went on to advise the rightists "obediently to
jay down their arms, raise their hands, express their determina-
tion to repent, and truthfully confess their crimes. If an early
offort is made, they can still expect to be saved." Peng then
proceeded; to refute rightist charges that the regime had made
"'a mess" of the country. He admitted mistakes and shortcom-
ings, "some of which are of a very serious nature," but.con-
tended that these were "incomparably insignificant when com-
pared with the successes achieved."
Although his primary stress was on the antirightist cam-
paign, Peng also called the attention of his audience to the
general aims of his rectification campaign. According to press
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reports.of his speech, he pointed out the main mistakes and
shortcomings of certain leading and working.cadres, both Com-
munist and non-Communist, and criticized their work and. their
working style. He was further reported. to have pointed out.
that "such mistakes and shortcomings were also perpetrated
by our leadership.". The names of the individuals whom Peng
criticized were not reported but tieir shortcomings were
described, in some detail. These faults were.,, for the most
part, those which had been singled out for criticism during
the introductory phases of the rectification campaign.
Peng urged that everyone diligently labor at the type
of work for. which he was best suited. In keeping with earli-
er directives on. rectification, he recommended that cadres
do a certain amount of manual work. Peng also proposed a
measure that was put into effect amidst a great deal of pub-
licity during the following months:
In the future, 30 to 50 percent of the working person-
nel of government offices and administrative personnel
of productive and nonproductive enterprises should be
dispatched to workshops, stores, farms, agricultural
cooperatives, handicraftmen's cooperatives, and other
basic-level units to participate in productive labor
and basic-level work for a comparatively long period.
On 15 August, a preparatory conference for another peo-
ple's congress meeting, in Shanghai, provided an opportunity
for Ko Ching-shih, secretary. of the. East China bureau of the
Chinese Communist party, to promote the antirightist and recti-
fication campaigns. Twelve days later, a lengthy resumd of
Ko's speech was published in the People's Daily, a significant
indication of high-level endorsement of is v ews.
Ko began with the familiar assertion that the rectifica-
tion campaign and the antirightist.struggle constituted a so-
cialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts
which had become necessary after completion of the revolution
in regard to ownership of.the means=ofproduction. Ko's dis-
cussion of the two campaigns followed lines that had already
been laid down but his treatment was,fresher and less cliche-
ridden than were most other statements on the subject.
Ko credited "the party's central committee and Chairman
Mao Tse-tung" with having devised.a series of policies which
would solve internal questions among the people and bring in-
to full play the energetic initiative.of the masses in build-
ing socialism., The party, he said, had started the rectifica-
tion campaign in order to be better able to cope with the new
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situation and unite all the forces that could be united to
slerve in building socialism. Ko maintained that these poli-
cies would be carried out by democratic. methods and persua.
lion rather than coercion.
Ko succintly summed up the aims of rectification:
Our objective is to create a political situation in
which there is both centralism and democracy, both
discipline and freedom, both united will and personal
ease of mind, and vitality to serve the interests of
the socialist revolution and socialist construction.
This will make it easier to overcome difficulties and
build China's modern industry and agriculture more
rapidly. Also the party and the state will be more
consolidated and more capable of weathering storms.
This. is the conclusion which our party drew by summing
up considerable historical experience.
Ko reaffirmed the validity of the liberalization poli-
dies as "guiding principles" for the rectification campaign.
these policies, he said, "certainly will not be stopped half
Way because of the struggle against the rightists." Ko as-
Serted that the struggle against the rightists was, in fact,
for the purpose of creating conditions in which the rectifica-
tion campaign could be carried out. It was apparent that Ko
hoped to prevent the antirightist campaign from completely
eclipsing the original rectification campaign. He assured his
hearers that, "at the present moment, while the struggle against
the rightists is going on, the party's rectification campaign
is also continuing."
Ko repeated the claim that the number of rightists was ac-
tually very small but urged that the struggle be carried through
to the end so as to secure complete victory. He described rec-
tification and the antirightist campaign as "a nationwide pub-
tic debate," on such questions as "whether our revolution and
construction work were correct; whether we should follow the
toad to socialism; whether we wanted the leadership of the Com-
munist'party, the dictatorship of the proletariat and democrat-
ic centralism; and whether the foreign policy of this country
was correct." By this time Ko was able to assume, apparently,
that his listeners would be well aware that the answers to
these questions had already been determined and that the "de-
bates" would serve only to reaffirm them.
Ko made a transparent attempt to attribute to the rightists
an error which had in fact been made by the Communists. The
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antirightist struggle, he said, had been instigated by the
bourgeois rightists who had "made a wrong assessment of the
whole situation." This interpretation of the campaign also
"explained" the embarrassing fact that the Communists had
been taken by surprise by the opposition expressed in the
early phases of the rectification campaign.
On the day following Ko Ching-shih's speech, the Peo-
ple's Daily published an editorial which summed up.the anti-
rist campaign, criticized its conduct by some units and
cadres, and indicated that the campaign would be a long and
thorough-going one. According to the editorial the antiright-
ist struggle had been instituted only in the upper levels of
the organizations concerned:
The antirightist struggle which was started in early
June has been going on for more than two months now.
At present, the top-level organizations of the central
government, the various provinces, municipalities, and
autonomous regions are all broadening this struggle.
This struggle is also being developed gradually among
the top-level organizations of special administrative
areas, hsien, and urban areas, as well as in major fac-
tories, mines, middle schools, and industrial and com-
mercial circles.
The development of the antirightist campaign, however,
had been "uneven," the editorial said. This was attributed
"not only to the difference of time in starting this struggle
by different units, but also to the difference in the seri-
ousness of the leadership and the extent of the work being
carried out." The directors of some units were even charged
with having "wanted perfunctorily to close the issue at an
early date." Thus notice was.served on the party leadership
at all levels that the energetic pursuit of the antirightist
campaign would be their primary duty. "In many cases," the
editorial said, "the lack of greater development of the anti-
rightist struggle is caused by the principal responsible cad-
res of the units concerned who failed to assume a serious re-
sponsible attitude in this matter."
The editorial presented the familiar arguments in justi-
fication of the antirightist campaign and described the strug-
gle as one "on which the destiny of our country hinges and
one concerning the life or death of the cause of socialism."
In conclusion, the editorial referred to the antirightist cam-
paign and socialist, construction as "currently two central
tasks of our country which must be considered as being of
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equal importance." The editorial failed to mention the recti-
fication 'campaign.
The promotion of the antirightist campaign continued dur-
j.ng this.period at a meeting of "teachers of Marxism-Leninism"
at Peiping. This meeting was addressed by the Chinese Commu-
nist party's propaganda chief Lu Ting-i and by politburo alter-
hate Kang Sheng whose public activities since 1956 have dealt
largely with educational matters. Lu Ting-i addressed the
more than 5,600 persons, at the meeting on the "situation and
significance of the current antirightist struggle and the rec-
tification movement, and called on teachers of Marxism-Leninism
and other, intellectuals to become intellectuals of the working
class." Lu stressed the need to create a working-class intel-
1igentsia, as-had Liu Shao-chi at the eighth congress of the
0CP the previous September.
Kang: Sheng devoted major attention to the general prob-
lems of teaching Marxism-Leninism and to methods of carrying
on the antirightist and rectification campaigns in educational
institutions. The "violent phase of the counterattack against
the rightists" had already taken place in most of the educa.-
tional institutes throughout the country, he said, and the
"'upsurge in the large-scale mass struggle to repel the right-
ist attack had ended." Kang cautioned his hearers, however,
that the rectification movement and the antirightist struggle
had not yet been concluded.
Taking the line of the People's Daily, Kang Sheng said
that the intensity and the scope of he antirightist struggle
had been uneven among the various schools. To cope with this
problem, Kang said, the propaganda department of the CCP cen-
tral committee, the Ministry of Higher Education, and other
agencies concerned had decided that political education would
be made apart of the formal curriculum of all schools in ad-
dition tocontinuing as a major extracurricular activity. Kang
described the nature of the new course:
This course is of the nature of class education in the
socialist revolutionary movement. It must not be re-
garded as an ordinary course in the general curriculum.
This is a course of the rectification movement and so-
cialist education and a component part of the great all-
people debate."
It is apparent from the remarks of Lu and Kang that the
regime was answering student discontent with increased attempts
at indoctrination, and discontent among intellectuals with a
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re-emphasis on the creation of a body of new intellectuals
rather than the "remolding" of existing ones.
Public statements on the two campaigns continued to urge
the use of reasoning and persuasion in order to convert peo-
ple who exhibited rightist tendencies. In the case of stu-
dents, however, one of the rare instances of intimidation by
bloodier methods occurred in early September. On 6 September
1957, the Chinese. Communist press announced that three ring-
leaders of the student; riot at Wuhan in June had been exe-
cuted on that day. The announcement was obviously timed to
coincide with the opening of the academic year so as to have
the maximum effect on returning students. Others involved
in the riot were given, sentences ranging from 5 to 15 years.
By early September, three months after it had begun; in
an atmosphere of surprise and haste, the antirightist cam-
paign had been formalized, channeled, and provided with its
own vocabulary of "newspeak" jargon.' During these three
months the rectification campaign almost disappeared in the
welter of speeches, articles, and editorials on the struggle
against the rightists. The two campaigns had been treated
as complementary but separate throughout this period. By
September, however, the leadership apparently decided that
the antirightist campaign had progressed to the extent that
more attention could be directed, safely to some of the origi-
nal goals of the rectification campaign, as Ko Ching-.ship
had hinted three weeks previously. Further: developments dur-
ing the month of September 1957, therefore, were to. open -a
new phase in the courseeof the rectification campaign.
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Rectification Reoriented
By the end of August 1957, the Chinese Communist lead-
ers had apparently decided that the "antirightist" opposi-
tion, which had risen so vigorously in response to the party's
bid for criticism, had been brought sufficiently under con-
trol that the rectification campaign could return partially
to its original aims and methods. The unexpected events of
the summer, however, had forced changes in the campaign which
were in some respects fundamental. During September the new
direction; of the movement was clearly pointed out to mem-
bers,of the non-Communist parties as well as to the rank and
file of the Chinese Communist party.
A People's Daily editorial on 5 September 1957 both ra-
tionalizea the of the early weeks of the campaign
and presented the official outline of the coming phases. The
most conspicuous new feature of the revised campaign was that
it would combine the original rectification movement with the
antirightist movement which had so unexpectedly interrupted
it. In addition, the campaign was greatly enlarged in scope.
In the words of the editorial: "The rectification movement of
the party and the struggle waged by the masses against bour-
geois rightists now are undergoing expansion to become a rec-
tification movement of all the people."
The editorial maintained that in addition to the anti
rightist struggle, a "great mass debate" would be developed
among all, groups to examine "fundamental questions concerning.
the socialist revolution and the socialist construction" of
the country. This description of the high-pressure propaganda
campaign to wipe out all overt opposition to the aims of the
regime became standard throughout the remainder of rectifica-
tion.
The "rectification movement of all the people" had two
major goals, according to the People's Daily editorial. One
goal was to "enable" the bourgeoisie, bourgeois intellectuals,
and the petty bourgeoisie to "accept socialist transformation
and to tread the socialist path." The working class and the
'!essential column of the Communist party," on the other hand,
were to rectify working styles and overcome bureaucratism,
subjectivism, and sectarianism. The editorial admitted that
these questions were different in nature but justified their
inclusionin a single campaign on the grounds that the same
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methods--"criticism and self-criticism, and the great mass
debate by reasoning through facts"--were to be used in each
cased
The editorial recounted the gains made by the party in
enabling "many people to raise their political consciousness
considerably within such a short period of time,,, This did
not mean, however, that there would be no further obstacles
in the path of the rectification campaign. "Even now," the
editorial said, "there,are still many comrades who are skep-
tical regarding development of the great mass debate in fac-
tories and rural areas.." These party members were described
as fearing exposure and criticism by the masses and arousing
rightists or "backward elements;"
To comfort those who harbored these fears, the editorial
put forward the official fiction that the reaction to the op
ening of the rectification campaign was due entirely to "those
smug rightists who were promptly surrounded by the masses and
who suffered attacks launched from all sides and quarters."
This reaction had been only a 'temporary phenomenon, according,
to the editorial; during the "struggle to repel the rightists,"
the rightists themselves "gradually realized their own mis-
takesand now stand at the side of the masses," This turn of
events, the editorial stated, "serves to illustrate that the
correctness of our undertaking is unquestionable," The edi-
torial asserted that the "broad masses have resolutely ac-
cepted Communist party leadership and have chosen the social-
ist path," Shameful defeat was said to lie in store for any-
one who attempted to resist this "will of the broad masses."
Somewhat inconsistently, the editorial also extolled the
advantages of "the turbulence of revolutionary struggle" and
maintained that the struggle against ",among, reactionary words
and deeds"provided cadres and the masses with the best educa-
tion and training. Alluding to the "hundred flowers" slogan,
the editorial pointed out that "flowers which are cultivated
in a hot house, free from wind and rain, may be fresh and
pretty, but they are not possessed of much vitality," Thus
the Chinese Communist party's official newspaper trod the
narrow line between the insistence that all was peaceful and
stable and the need to predict and oppose further struggle.
The editorial then turned to a discussion of the great
"mass debates" to be undertaken throughout the country; Cadres
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were urged to form the habit ,of relying on the masses and
consulting the masses when anything comes up." Criticism
should be'welcomed, the editorial said, because "the honest
and open criticism of others creates a favorable objective
condition,for one to rectify his shortcomings and mistakes
and effectively insures that he will push ahead and improve
his work."
In afurther attempt to encourage apprehensive cadres,.
the editorial made some unusually frank comments on rectifi-
cation in the armed forces. "Even in the people's army, the
possessors of weapons,",it said, "the party has carried out
thilitary, political, and economic democratization to a cer-
tain extent and under centralized guidance." As a result of
these moves, the editorial continued, relations between of-
iicers and soldiers and between the army and the people had
become very close, and the morale of the troops was high.
The editorial pointed out the applicability of this sit-
iation to the over-all rectification movement: "Since this.
nethod can be adopted even in the army, why can it not be im-
plementedin the factories and rural areas? How is it pos-
sible for; Communist party members to fear their own flesh-and-
1lood relations, the Chinese people, when they are not even
afraid of the imperialist reactionaries?" This question
throws a rare and revealing light on the actual relations
between the party rank and file and the populace whom they
ire supposed to cherish and assist.
In the event that any reader should be so obtuse as to
fail to appreciate tlielaid oliterthe editorial al interpretation of
with an explicit warning against a
current propaganda:
Of Gourse,-reliance upon the strength of the masses
and:the solution of problems through mass debate do
not mean abandonment of leadership, abandonment of
democratic centralization, and abandonment of labor
andpolitical discipline. On the contrary, the very
purpose of debate is to strengthen leadership, cen-
tralization, and discipline--not to weaken them. Even
in the course of debate, there is absolute necessity
to Observe definite centralization and'discipline, and
anyactthat will jeopardize production or create
anarchy will not be permitted. Furthermore, discus-
sions and debate must be conducted under proper lead-
ership and in a systematic and planned manner,
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Even the party's alleged reliance on the wisdom of the
people was subjected to qualification by the editorial
We cannot expect the people to understand the truth
of all.things all . bythemselves0. Therefore it is
natural for them to express erroneous opinions or
be. temporarily swayed by erroneous opinions. How-
ever, if only we strengthen leadership instead of.
abandoning leadership,. find how to educate the. masses
with. their own personal experiences, and actively
help the masses understand the over-all truth, the
great.majority of the people will undoubtedly stand
on the_correct.side after. holding discussions. and
debate.
Four months after the opening of the rectification cam-
paign, the editorial admitted that "many" cadres below the
provincial level were still not familiar with the nature and
importance of the party's mass line. The editorial all:too
accurately forecast the character of the propaganda output
over the following months: ."In order to familiarize the cadres
with the mass line, there is need to discuss it over and over
again,. After correctly. solving a number of questions, the
results should be carefully summarized and extensively pub-
licizedo" In an unwitting. commentary on Communist propaganda
technique, the editorial then remarked that "after a time,
the people will consider this a routine procedure.""
The People"s Daily editorial of 5 September 1957 dealt
largely with the problems of relations between party mem-
bers, especially cadres, and the nonparty masses. On 11
September another editorial appeared on the question of "right-
ists" within the party itself. Entitled "Handle Innerparty
Rightists Sternly," the editorial proposed to advance one step.
further the discussions on the matter which the newspaper had
initiated on 28 July.
Most of the innerparty rightists, it was claimed, had
joined the party "at about the time of. the nationwide libera-
tion" (i.e. 1949), The paper admitted, however,. that "there
are also many..of.them who are veteran party members of 10 or
20 years." In spite,of.the presence of.these:traitors.within
the ranks, the party was assured that "the overwhelming ma-
jority of our party members, especially the overwhelming
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majority of our veteran party members, have...been willing
to serve as staunch fighters for Communism."
The problem of innerparty rightists would always exist,
the editorial said, because however strict the selection of
members, "there would always be individual class dissidents
and opportunists who would succeed in sneaking into the party."
As for those already in the party, "there would also be cer-
tain party members, weak in will and vulnerable to corruption.
by bourgeois ideology, who would deteriorate and change their
characteristics." These circumstances made it certain, ac-
cording to the editorial., that in every revolutionary struggle
there would always be a group of party members who would be-
tray the party because their individual and class interests
clashed with those of the revolution. Cadres were thus in-
formed that their vigilance against betrayal from within could
never be relaxed.
The major purpose of the editorial appeared in its accus.a-
tiion that "certain cadres" had taken the struggle against in-.
nerparty rightists much too lightly. Even worse, "after the
party central authorities ascertained the characteristics of
the rightists and the guiding principle of meting out the
same treatment to them within and without the party, they
would tend to tolerate and overlook those 'party members' whose
political'features are completely the same as the rightists
outside of the party and would be reluctant to classify these
persons as rightists." The particular fault of these cadres
was that they "would wail and become tenderhearted over cer-
tain veteran party members who should have been classified as
rightists."
Since there were no differences in the characteristics of
rightists in or out of the party, the editorial said, "the
presence of rightists within the party is even more dangerous
to our party and revolutionary undertakings" than the exist-
ence of rightists outside the party. If the existence of
rightists in the party should be tolerated, it was asserted,
"these rightists will collude with rightists outside the
party to attack and oppose us from within." These innerparty
rightists were also considered more harmful because they could
masquerade as party members and thus increase their "political
capital" and more easily deceive the masses.
The editorial maintained that undue consideration for
"party standing" was partly to blame for an excessively tolerant
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attitude toward innerparty rightists. The proper attitude,
the editorial said, was quite the opposite since, "in view
of their long standing in the party and the service they
rendered, it is all the more expected" that those Communists
would not make mistakes. "Being rightist is therefore an
unforgivable state for them," the editorial maintained, and
"they are not worthy of our pity." Readers were reminded
that "we must realize that this party of ours is a revolu-
tionary fighting organ, not a sentimental faction."
The editorial ended on a note of caution. It recom-
mended that party members not be summarily classified as
rightists. Only after the collection and analysis of evi-
dence should such classification be made. The note of cau-
tion was nearly drowned out, however, by the exhortation to
pursue the stern struggle against rightists.
In the same issue of People's Daily, an article by the
Chinese Communist party's personnel chief, An Tzu-wen, also
dealt with the question of innerparty rightists and other
ideological weaklings The majority of the members of the
Communist party were proved resolute during the "blooming and
contending" campaign and the antirightist struggle, An said.
He stated, however, that these movements had also resulted
in the exposure of "a portion of Communist party members
whose stand is not firm, who are ideologically inclined to-
ward the right; there is even a very small minority of these
members who have betrayed the cause of the proletarian rev-
olution."
The article proceeded to an analysis of the origins and
motives of these innerparty rightists. It cautioned that so-
cial background does not determine everything about a party
member, although members of nonproletarian origin should be
subjected to especially close scrutiny. It was pointed out
that party members from nonproletarian classes had, "in the
absolute majority of cases, accepted Marxist-Leninist educa-
tion, changed their original character, and become fighters
of the proletariat--many of them having sacrificed their lives
for the cause of the party and the people."
An explained the persistence of nonproletarian view-
points as a result of the "peaceful" nature of the socialist
revolution in China. He noted that:
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Precisely because the change of our economic foun-
dation has been realized through peaceful means,
and!on the ideological and political fronts there
has not been a fierce class struggle--that is to say,
a thorough socialist revolution has not been carried
out !on the ideological and political fronts--those
people who do not support, or even oppose, the so-
cialist revolution still remain within the ranks of
the revolution though their hearts are away from it.
Though these people are inside the Communist party,
they dream capitalist dreams.
This. formulation, in addition to providing a rationaliza-
tion for the continued presence of unregenerate Communists,
linked the antirightist'struggle with'the rectification cam-
Paign, since the campaign had often been defined as "the so-
cialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts."
An Tzu-wen made another contribution to the introduction
of the t'new" rectification campaign in the form of an article
In the China Youth News of 20 September 1957. Entitled "Refu-
tation of die Rig zt a s on the Question. of Cadres Policy,"
the article was a declaration of the necessity for political
sophistication, as well as professional qualification, as a
riterionfor selecting cadres. The rightist criticism which
1he article purported to refute was that the Communist party
selected cadres solely on the basis of political reliability
and without regard to real talent. An accused the rightists
of maintaining that political conditions should not be stressed
during the period of construction and that the political sta-
tus of cadres should not be considered. "Obviously, such a
view is absurd", he wrote.
An'sargument against this view was that "if one is reac-.
tionary politically, then the greater his 'talent,' the great-
~Ir the harm to the people's cause. For his is not a 'talent'
to serve the people but a 'talent' to oppose the people." An
claimed that such cases had been numerous during the anti-
rightist struggle.
Another rightist criticism attacked by An was the accu-
sation that the Communist party was guilty of sectarianism in
its insistence that the vast majority of cadres in all activ-
ities be party members. An countered this accusation with a
simple and convenient redefinition of 'sectarianism' in such
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a way as to absolve the party of guilt. "Those who raise
this question," he'wrote,."confuse party leadership with
sectarianism. If this state of affairs is`represented and
opposed as a manifestation of 'sectarianism,' it would amount
to liquidation of the leadership of the working class and of
the Communist party." An also adduced statements that the
party was firmly opposed to sectarianism as evidence that it
could not. be accused of practising this sin.
An's article insisted on the fundamental importance of
cadre policy as a factor bearing on the success or failure of
the party's cause. Notice was served that the party would
remain.inflexible in this matter in the statement that "the
working class and its.political party will not waver on such
an important question of'principle." An's primary point--
that cadres must be politically qualified as a prerequisite
for responsibility--became a major tenet of rectification
during its latter stages under the slogan "Red and Expert."
Members of the non Communist "democratic parties;" which
had produced the most troublesome critics of the Chinese Com-
munist party and its government during the opening phase of
rectification, were also informed at this time of the official
rationalization of the past summer's events and bluntly warned
that compliance with the Communist party's program was the
price of survival. This indoctrination was presented in a
speech by Li Wei-han, chief of the United Front Work Depart-
ment of the central committee of the Chinese Communist party.
The speech was delivered on 15 September 1957 but was not
published until 16 November, when it'. appeared In the Kwangming
Daily--organ of the non-Communist puppet parties. It is likely
that the speech as delivered was even more firm and uncompro-
mising than the published version.
The topic;of Li's speech was the "self-remolding" of the
minor parties. Li began with the flat assertion that "all
the democratic parties in China have always been and are still
bourgeois political parties." They differed from ordinary
bourgeois parties only in that they had accepted the leader-
ship of the Communist party in 1948 and 1949, although their
"social basis" remained the same. Measured by the six cri-
teria laid down in Mao Tse-tung's speech on contradictions,
Li said, the democratic parties contained "a small number of
both leftists and rightists, with the great majority in the
middle. Most of these middle-of-the-roaders, he said, were
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capable, "under the leadership of the Communist party, of
Continuing to accept socialist transformation and changing
from 'a capitalist to a socialist standpoint. Indeed, a
section of them now is almost leftist.''
Li complained, however, that these non-Communist person-
ages, even though impelled by the prevailing wind to move in
the socialist direction, did not accept socialist transforma-
tion wholeheartedly. "Some even feel antagonistic," he ex-
claimed. This was a transitional state, Li said, and could
4ot remain unchanged. The only possible course open to these
bourgeois survivors was presented in unambiguous language:
!'As the tide of socialist revolution'sweeps forward, it is
i-rong and indeed impossible to 'act cautiously to save one's
skin,' to ''come to terms with the present,' or to 'straddle
the fence',.' There is only one way, and that is to accept
socialist transformation actively."
The existence of bourgeois rightists among the member-
ship of the minor parties was explained by Li as a result of
the "high; tide of socialist transformation" of 1955-56.
Since that time, he said, "a bourgeois right wing gradually
Crystallized out among the bourgeois elements." This right
wing, according to Li, reflected the stubborn opposition of
a section!of the capitalist class.
Li named three questions to be decided by the puppet
parties. These, with their self-evident answers, were in ef.-
ect a survival program for the non-Communist parties. The
first question was "whether to follow the socialist road."
dearly, no doubt could remain as to: the answer.
The second question involved the proper functions of the
non-Communist parties while their members were undergoing
socialisttransformation. These parties, Li said, naturally
represent the interests of the capitalist elements and bour-
geois intellectuals who make up their membership. He granted
that "during the period of socialist revolution, the various
democratic parties must follow the laws of development. of
history and represent those interests and demands of capital
.sts and bourgeois intellectuals that are in keeping with
1$he development of the socialist revolution." Primarily,
ii said, the parties should represent the basic, long-term
.nterestsjof their members by "helping them to accomplish
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socialist self-transformation, become masters of their own
destiny, and look forward to ,a bright future." That is, they
were to lead their members:to total surrender to the Commu-
nist party.'
The third question was "one of sincerity in accepting the
leadership of the'.Communist party." Li remarked that this was.
"the fundamental principle for judging whether the democratic
parties can proceed along the.socialist road, gain the peo-
ple's confidence, and permanently coexist with the Communist
party." Li removed any lingering misunderstanding by making
it absolutely explicit that the Communist party's slogan
promising "coexistence and mutual supervision" in its rela
tions with the minor parties did not include any implication
of coleadership. The rightists, he.said, had "wanted the
democratic parties to challenge the power of the Communist
party and share leadership with it." All in all, Li added,
"the political line of the rightist drags'the democratic par-
ties into the abyss of counterrevolution."
Li Wei-han concluded his speech by laying down for his
hearers the line by which they were to be guided during the
remaining months of the rectification campaign:
This rectification campaign is a great socialist rev-
olutionary movement, politically and ideologically,
It is of great historical import. For all the dem-
ocratic parties it is a severe test and a turning
point in their fundamental transformation. It is
necessary for all the democratic parties to go into
the rectification. campaign extensively and deeply,
successfully pass this test, and lay a massive mile-
stone on the route of their fundamental transforma-
tion.
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Teng Isiao-ping Keynotes New Campaign
The comments of the People's Daily, An Tzu-wen, and Li
Wel-han on 'the subject of the course or the rectification
campaign were, for the most part, addressed to specific audi-
ences or concerned only with limited aspects of the campaign.
The task of presenting a;detailed, comprehensive, and authori-
tative statement on the shortcomings of rectification in the
past and its proper course in the future was left to Teng
HOiao-ping, member of the standing committee of the Chinese
Communist party's politburo and chief of the party's secre-
tariat. The occasion for Teng's statement was the third en-
larged plenary session of the eighth cnetral committee of the
party, which he addressed on 23 September 1957. This was the
first plenary session of the central committee since November
1956, whenMao had announced that a formal rectification cam-
paign would be instituted.
Teng began with comments on the general situation of the
campaign. He described the spread of the campaign from party
and government organs to the lowest strata of society. Teng
reiterated the declaration of the People's Daily that the move-
ment was to be broadened into a nationwide reMication. He
cited the best possible authority for his remarks: "an over-
all appraisal of the nature and status of the rectification
movement and the antirightist struggle, and clear-cut princi-
ples for the development of the movement" offered by Mao Tse-
tting at a conference of "some provincial and municipal com-
mittee secretaries convened in July at Tsingtao." Teng added:
"The nationwide movement is now developing successfully in
cdmpliance:with the guiding principles of the central authori-
ties.
Teng's opening comments dealt with the antirightist as-
pects of rectification. He pointed out that "the significance
o1 this criticism against the capitalist rightists should not
be underestimated," giving as a reason the fact that "the
socialist revolution on the economic front alone in 1956--
cdncerningthe ownership of the means of production-is in-
adequate and not consolidated." Teng made enthusiastic use
of the jargon which had developed in connection with rec-
tificationand the antirightist movement. He credited "the
great national debate currently under way" with having solved
some of the major questions concerning the correctness and
iiportance of the Communist program.
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Although Teng claimed that "the development of the move-
ment during the.past four months and more has been fully com-
patible with the analysis by the central committee and Com-
rade Mao Tse-tung,'" his ' definition of the aims of rectifica-
tion provided a concept of the movement that differed markedly
from that presented during the introductory and early phases
of the campaign. Teng said that "this movement aims at re-
solving two sorts. of contradictions--contradictions between
our enemies and ourselves and those among'the people them-
selves.". This is in considerable contrast to the banner
headlines of the People's Daily-for 1 May 1957, which had
proclaimed that rec ficcat on would resolve contradiction
"among the people" only. The question of contradictions "be-
tween our enemies and ourselves" had been treated as es-
sentially solved and given scant attention at that time.
As noted previously, the movement had evidently been conceived
and initiated as a means of improving the "work style" of
Communist party members in order to better relations between
the party and nonparty masses and to make the party a more
efficient tool for carrying out the ambitious economic plans
of the regime.
Teng, however, mentioned among the motives of rectifica-
tion the "extreme necessity of conducting.a large-scale rec-
tification movement among the fundamental column of the Com-
munist party." The first necessity, he said, was to wage
"a resolute. struggle. against the capitalist- rightists and
other antisocialist elements." The reason for this, he said,
was that these elements were "extremely wanton and vicious in
their attack against the socialist path and the leadership of
the Communist party. They have a .platform, organization, and
plan. They aim at the restoration of capitalism and reaction-
ary domination." He failed to point out that this alarming
situation had apparently been discovered only after the rec-
tification campaign was under way, and that it had not'been
taken into account in the original plan for the campaign.
Teng echoed earlier statements in his assertion that
"the party is fundamentally healthy and the overwhelming
majority of party-member cadres are good." -He justified
continuation of rectification within the party, however, by
stating that ''during the great blooming and contending of the
masses, a considerable number of shortcomings in our work
and in working styles were exposed--some of them quite seri-
ous." Meanwhile, he said there was still a small number of
rightists among the party members and youth league members,
and there were some others.who harbored serious rightist-in-
clined ideas.
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Teng outlined the "correct methods" for handlingcontra-
!idictionslamong the people in the familiar vocabulary of rectifi-
;cation: "To practice great blooming, contending, and debating;
to state!the facts and to explain the reasons; to produce posters;
land to hold symposia and debate meetings." During the great
blooming; and contending, he said, "we light the fire to consume
our enemies and our own shortcomings as well. Both these.things
!we :want . !' Tang described fear of criticism and failure to. "trust
the masses" as rightist-inclined views, thus emphasizing the
seriousness with. which the party would regard cadres' failure
to expose themselves to and accept criticism.
The changes in the aims and methods of the campaign between
May and September were also apparent in Teng's division of rectifi-
cation into stages. Earlier commentaries on rectification had
spoken of three stages (see p.11), in which the emphasis lay
entirelyon the correction of faults within the party. Teng
!named four stages through which rectification would be required
,to pass in party and government agencies from national to county
.levels. These were: (1) Blooming and contending--with simultan-
eous rectification and improvement; (2) Repulsion of rightists
--with simultaneous rectification and improvement; (3) Vigorous
rectification and improvement; and (4) Study of relevant docu-
!ments, criticism and introspection, and individual elevation.
It will be seen that Teng's fourth stage comprised all of the
rectification campaign as originally conceived; the three pre-
ceding stages became necessary because of the unforeseen reac-
.tion aroused during the opening weeks of the movement.
Teng implied that some agencies had successfully completed
the first two stages by the time of his speech. "In all agencies
where the antirightist struggle has gained a decisive victory,"
.he said, efforts should be -exerted to make the
timely transition to the third stage of emphasizing rectifica-
ltion and improvement, as well as to conduct systematic criti-
cism of bourgeois ideas." He took the precaution of adding,
however,!!lthat "if more rightists are discovered during the
third and fourth stages, or if known rightists remain with
their heads held high, opposition to these rightists would
naturally remain a task. Accordingly, these four stages must
not be regarded too rigidly."
Teng also declared that rectification need not run its
full course down to the lowest levels. He acknowledged that
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"some situations are. different from those. in official , agencies,,
and the stages in the development of.their movements are thus not
entirely the same." While it,is necessary to conduct socialist
education among farmers and workers, he said, "only a small part
of them should conduct criticism and self-criticism, just as,
it would be impossible to require everyone to follow the ex
ample of the official. agencies in studying..documents, criticism,
and introspection;." Teng also included students, those,.
who "should continue blooming and contending anshould urge.._
and assist the leading cadres during the stage of rectifica-
tion and improvement.; they themselves, however, are not re-
quired.to emphasize rectification and improvement as much as
the leading cadres are." His hearers were thus reminded that
cadres would not be permitted to overlook their own faults in.
their zeal to correct the faults of.others;
Teng next,discussed rectification as it applied to the
bourgeoisie and intellectuals. In accordance. with Communist
dogma that intellectuals do not constitute a class in themselves,
Teng was compelled, to justify treating the two groups together.
This he did: by asserting:, "In the . present. situation of. our
country, most intellectuals do come from bourgeois and petit-
bourgeois family backgrounds, and the education which they re-
ceived was in the bourgeois style,,. For the sake of convenience
they are therefore, grouped together with the bourgeoisie"" Teng
announced unequivocally their ultimate fate: "Elimination of
the bourgeoisie is a fundamental question of the socialist rev-
olution,"
Teng's remarks reflected the disillusionment of the party
leadership with respect to the degree to which the bourgeoisie
and intellectuals had been persuaded to accept Communist leader-
ship. "The bourgeoisie, especially their intellectuals," he
said,. "now constitute the main force that can challenge the
proletariat.. Politically they still have status, capital,
and influence, and the proletariat needs their knowledge." The
only way for bourgeois intellectuals to avoid a fatal clash with
the proletariat, Teng added, was to transform themselves so as
to serve the interests of the socialist economic foundation.
Teng maintained the'pretense that the bourgeois "democratic"
parties might, still play a meaningful role. He reiterated the
claim that "the. party, carries out the guiding principle of long-
term coexistence and mutual supervision with regard to the demo-
cratic parties. Within the academic and cultural fields, the. party
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calls on all schools of thought to contend and all flowers
to bloom.'! He added the restriction, however, that "so-
cialism is the premise for all these guiding principles and
policies." Teng repeated the official explanation of the
abortive "liberalization" policies of the early phases of
riectification in his assertion that "encouraging 'poisonous
weeds' togrow is done only to educate the masses through
negative examples and to use them as fertilizer in the train-
of the proletariat and the masses."
Tenggave a great deal of attention to the shortcomings
of the intellectuals. Only a small number of them had be-
come leftists, he said, while many were still "thoroughly
immersed in the bourgeois world outlook." To reform the
intellectuals ideologically, Teng stated, was a long-term
task which might take ten years or more. Meanwhile, he
advocated the creation of a new group of intellectuals of
working-class origin:
With 'a view to the successful building of socialism,
the working class must have their own technical
cadres; they must also have their own professors,
teachers, scientists, journalists, men of letters,
artists, and Marxist theoreticians. A group on
suchia scale cannot be formed with a small number
of people. The whole party must endeavor to cul-
tivate revolutionary experts.
This"virtual abandonment of the attempt to convert
existing intellectuals in favor of a drive to cultivate
a group of thoroughly proletarian intellectuals--a drive
characteristic of the latter months of the rectification cam-
paign--againillustrates the profound changes which had taken
place in the campaign since its inception and which the party
leaders were attempting to gloss over.
Teng's speech dealt at length with the problems of
political, and ideological work in rural areas. The emphasis
was largely on the need to strengthen and consolidate agri-
cultural cooperatives, especially by increasing capital funds
and development of cooperative-owned capital construction
pro ects.' Teng foreshadowed the "leap forward" of 1958 by
declaring that, following the "great debate" between so-
cialism and capitalism, another such debate on agricultural
production and construction "will give impetus to an up-
surge" during the winter.
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Teng, of course, strongly urged rural cadres. tofollow
closely the party's "mass line" in.the course of their opera-
tions. In advocating the mass line., Teng made an unusually
frank statement regarding oneof the principal motives be-
hind this method of encouraging mass participation.in party
programs:
If we allow the broad masses to discuss and make
decisions on the undertakings launched by..us,.all
will bear the responsibility of, failure and a lesson
will thus be learned. Such a practice is of great
importance to the consolidation of unity and the.
correction of errors. Cadres on the basic level
should be trained to pay close. attention to this
at all times.
Teng's remarks on rectification among the working class
were relatively limited,,presumably because this aspect of
the campaign. had"Mot,produce'd.the 'd t f:icul`ti_es` `that . had :-a`risen,
with respect to the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals, nor
was it as important to the economy as the stabilization of
agriculture. Teng urged that cadres participate regularly
in physical labor and that they "plunge deeply into actual
production,.. establish close relations with the workers, and
show concern for the pain-and hardship of the masses, so
that they may make the worke.rs.feel at home while living
with them. All privileges in livelihood enjoyed only by the
cadres should. be resolutely abolished."
Teng. touched lightly on the question of rectification
among the minority nationalities. He particularly attacked
local nationalism and "great. Han. chauvinism," the two bug-
bears of minority policy. Teng demonstrated a willingness
to recognize realities regarding these matters by declaring
that "it should be pointed out to cadres and members of the
upper strata=of the minority nationalities" that these two
tendencies were a "danger to the.unity and unification of
the various nationalities of'the socialist motherland."
Teng also dealt-briefly with rectification among the
armed forces. A few rightists had been discovered, in the
armed forces, he said, "but the composition of the armed
forces in general is comparatively pure." Teng commented
that after the conclusion of the antir?ightist struggle,
rectification in the armed forces should concentrate on the
working style of the officers. He noted, for example,, that,
!'relations between the forces and local party and government
organs have. not been close."
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In discussing the specific application of rectification
to problems within the Communist party, Teng returned to a
considerable degree to the original aims of the campaign.
He attributed the party's difficulties to three factors: first,
most of the party members came from nonproletarian families;
second, party organs were developed at such a speed that the
quality of members was neglected and ideological and political
work failed to keep abreast of development; and third and most
important, the great majority of party members, admitted
to the party in an environment and at a time when victory had
already been achieved, lacked genuine socialist awareness at
the time of admission.
During the third and fourth stages of rectification,
Teng said, problems within the party should receive more at-
tention than those outside. He urged that the party "hence-
forth endeavor to choose for promotion to cadres persons of
fine character who are of worker and peasant origin." This
was to correct a situation arising from the fact that "during
acertainperiod in the past we absorbed too many young in
tellectuals who had not undergone productive labor, steeling,
and actual struggle for work." Teng also declared that "an
appropriate plan should be mapped out to enable graduates of
universities, colleges, and technical schools to do manual
work in production organizations suited to their specialties""
for at least one year after graduation.
Teng devoted disproportionate attention to a question
which was not a major part of rectification and must there-
fore have been one which was proving troublesome to the party
at the time of his speech. This was the so-called "local-
ization of cadres" which Teng defined in his complaint by
stating that "some people even hold the sentiment of wishing
to cast out cadres from other localities." Teng declared
that party: cadre policy had never been governed by the prin-
ciple of localization of cadres. He justified assignment of
"outside" cadres to certain areas by stating that "localism
and Communism are incompatible," and that selection and pro
motion of local cadres must necessarily continue to observe
the principle of the dual requirement of political and pro-
fessional qualification.
A re-emphasis on the original aims of rectification--
after three months of concentration on the antirightist.
struggle--was especially apparent in the final section of
Tong's speech devoted to the party's faults and the methods
td be used in overcoming them. Pointing out the party's
mdre glaring defects, Teng rioted that "many regulations and
systems are unreasonable, impractical, and redundant," and
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that there were "indications g f.; excessive, centralism as. well
as divisionism." Healso,,noted.that 'many organizations and.
persons had shown indications of, .."seriously, alienating them-,
selves from reality and the. masses.". These , people,:. Tang
said, had been busy with their functional duties and. had had
few contacts with the masses; therefore they had little under-
standing of the problems confronting the. masses, The third
major def'ec:t among.party_member.s was that "numerous cadres.are
arrogant and self-satisfied, think of themselves as always
right, ignore the mass line, and fail, to. consultthe masses
on all matters.,''
Teng presented a three-point. program for correction of
these faults within the. party during the remainder, of the
rectification campaign. Under the heading "overcoming Sec-
tarianism and the Deviation toward Special Privilege," he
observed that members of the Communist party "must be just
and selfless, join the masses, and share the bitter and
sweet in life." .,Party members,Teng said, should have more
friends and closer associations with the nonparty masses
and personages. He.declared that there should not bea great
difference between the living standards . of cadres and.masses.
The second part of the program presented by Teng was
concerned, with correcting irrational practices,, making "ap-
propriate adjustments".i.n, the relations between the party and,--
the government and between higher and lower levels, and correct-
ing excessive centralism. Teng cited As a basis for effecting
these improvements, three documents which had been drawn up
by the politburo and submitted to the plenary session of the
central committee prior to his speech. These documents con-
tained the decentralization plan, under which a considerable
amount of authority in certain types of enterprises would
be shifted fr6m higher to lower levels. "'Such change,"
Teng said, "'definitely means an improvement in the present
systems."
Under the second part of his program, Teng discussed
at some length the necessity for a "vigorous retrenchment"
in the "excessive number of functionaries in party and gov-
ernment organs and nonproductive personnel in enterprises and
public institutions." These "inflated and overstaffed organi-
zations," he said, "had also contributed to the growth of sub-
jectivism and bureaucratism," This enforced migration of
cadres from urban centers to the countryside became a cons-
picuous feature of the rectification campaign during the fol-
lowing months. Tong pointed out and subsequent rectification
propaganda endlessly reiterated that these measures would
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have two beneficial results: the efficiency of the organi-
zations involved would be raised through savings in man-
power and money, and an army of "steeled cadres who are de-
voted to the cause of Communism and can weather storms"
would be created.
Teng's third proposal was for the purpose of "broaden
ing democracy among the people and continuing to strengthen
the democratic system." This meant, in effect, methods for
putting the regime's programs into effect with the least
possible resistance among the people. Teng stressed the use
of persuasion and education as a means to this end. He
repeated the slogans with which the campaign had opened:
that rectification would be conducted like a "gentle rain or
mild breeze" and under the banner of "unity--criticism-
Unity.
Tengclosed his speech with a plea for greater attention
to work improvement. Pointing out that performance in this
regard had been better in some areas than in others, he
warned against using the -antirightist struggle to cover
up mistakes and to "evade rectification and improvement and
sneak over the hurdle." In the course of improving work,
Teng said,,, "our slogan for the masses should be: Express
your opinions resolutely, boldly, and thoroughly. Our slogan
fOr leading personnel should be: Improve work resolutely,
booldly, and thoroughly.'
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High-level Promotion of the Campaign, November 1957
The People's Daily editorials of'early'September 1957
and Teng s ao-p ng, s report to the third plenary session
of the eighth central committee of the Chinese Communist
party set the course which the rectification campaign-was
to follow during the remainder of the year and, in many
important respects, throughout the remainder of the cam-
paign., The only further fundamental development which the
campaign was to undergo began early in 1958, when rectifica-
tion was merged with the "great leap 'forward" in economic
progress. During the intervening months, however, the
rectification movement continued to dominate domestic pro-
paganda and. its doctrinal basis was' elaborated by comments
in the People's Daily and statements by major leaders.
The People's Daily editorial of 1 November 1957 was
entitled he ll- eeople Rectification Campaign Is an Im-
portant Development of the Socialist Democracy of Our Country
The editorial followed Teng's example'by setting "contradic-
tions between the enemy and ourselves" ahead of "contradic-
tionswithin the 'ranks of the people" as targets for the cam-
paign. The methods used to resolve these contradictions, the
newspaper said, had given rise to "a new type of socialist
democracy compatible with the current political and ideological
socialist revolution.
The editorial harked back to the rectification campaign
of 1942 in order to demonstrate the innovations of the current:
movement. ' The former movement, it said, had been carried
out by means of systematic criticism and self-criticism,
and had enabled all Communist party members to correct their
mistakes and raise their ideological standards. The earlier
campaign was also characterized by the use of wall posters
and the convocation of symposia, according to the editorial.
The paper stated that subsequent reform programs had used the
method of "reasoning struggle" and that mass criticism and
self-criticism had been "universally adopted" in factories,
rural areas, schools, and the armed forces,
These "traditional democratic methods," the editorial
said, had recently developed into "a complete new form of
socialist democracy characterized by 'contending, blooming,
and debating." By these methods, it was claimed, "all problems
are solved quickly, totally, and finally."
The'editorial disparaged those who feared, this process
and claimed that the regime's, program had the support 'of the
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great majority of the people. In support of this contention,
the editorial gLsserted that the'main force of the revolution
inChina had been "the most oppressed and suppressed strata
inthe old society --the workers, poor peasants, and lower-
middle peasants." These and others who support 'socialism
were said to account for approximately 90 percent of the
country's population. As for the remaining 10 percent, the
editorial stated,,not all "were resolutely opposed to social-
o
fm, either,." In fact, t socialism, and claimed,
those only been isolated
of ;the people opposed among the masses.
The editorial described the inception of the antirightist
campaign in somewhat sanguine terms: "At the height of the
'contending' and 'blooming' by the rightists, there seemed
to'be a little turbulence in the revolutionary regime." The
silver, lining in this cloud was revealed, however, when "as
soon as the masses clearly identified this enemy and launched
an attack on him, the revolutionary regime not only stopped
the turbulence but also became 100 times more consolidated."
Should "blooming and contending" not be permitted, the ed-
itorial said, minor disturbances, and perhaps even major ones,
would break out.
The editorial admitted that the campaign had departed
at times from its intended gentle nature. This was justified,
however, because "since the outset of the rectification cam-
paign, theirightists have attacked us with stormy force."
Although the masses had been obliged to retaliate in kind,
the newspaper said, "this campaign will eventually return to
its 'breeze and gentle rain' character in the end."
Another significant comment on rectification appeared
on 1 November in the form of a statement by Ko Ching-shih,
first secretary of the Shanghai Communist party committee.
Several ofIKo's pronouncements on rectification received
national attention, and he was elevated to the party's polit-
congress.
art
f th
y
e p
buro at the May 1958 session o
Ko observed that 1,000,000 people in Shanghai had joined
iii the rectification campaign and that "over 1,000 units"
in the city had entered the third stage of rectification and
improvement. Ko?pointedout, however,` several significant
faults in the movement. Most noteworthy was his statement
that "a majority of leading cadres hesitate to admit their
mistakes and shortcomings and thus hesitate to reform." A
large number of leading cadres, Ko said, had "committed form-
alism and; bureaucracy in accepting proposals and criticisms
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of the masses and in carrying out.the work, , of ,rect if i:cation
and improvement." Many units, he added, had taken action to
overcome mistakes and,shortcom.ings, "but their.actions were
only superficial and not basic."
Ko demanded that. leading cadres be the first to improve
their work and rectify their working styles, since rectifi-
cation and improvement' means to improve work and to rectify
the working style of the whole party.'.` He implied a tendency
toward complacency by declaring that "it is wrong to think that
the rectification campaign is over as soon as the 'blooming'
and 'contending' and the antirightist struggle have been con-
cluded."
Ko called attention, as had the People's Daily editorial
of the same day, to the "illogic, impracticality, and contra-
dictions,in many regulations and systems." He asserted that
many leading cadres allowed important matters to be disposed.
of by lower-level personnel, called too many meetings to dis-
cuss matters. both essential and nonessential, did not follow
the "mass line," or failed to practice diligence and thrift.
Leading cadres should not only overcome such defects,.Ko said,
but should. also strive to raise. their ideological level.
. Ko referred also to,the. ,,"problem of cadres participating
in manual and production-work." He pointed out--somewhat
inaccurately--that this was the basic system of the nation,
and he called upon leading cadres to. practice frugality, im-
prove their relations with the masses, and train themselves
in factories, in schools, or in the countryside.
Mao Tse-tung himself provided an interpretation of the
rectification campaign on 6 November 1957 in the course of
a speech in Moscow on the occasion of the celebration of the
40th anniversary of the October. Revolution. While granting
due deference`to the example of his. Soviet hosts, Mao assert-
ed: "The Chinese revolution has its own national characteris-
tics, and it is entirely necessary to take these into considera-
tion." He spoke with pride of his regime's accomplishments,
claiming that "in the short period of eight years, China has
already achieved in various fields of construction results in
it was not able to achieve in the past 100.-years." Mao dis-
missed rather casually the severe criticisms directed against
the Communist party during.., the previous summer'-
In China a. handful of bourgeois rightists try to oppose
taking the path to socialism and oppose the leading
position of the Communist party.in national life, as
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well as the close union between China and the
Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.
Their vain efforts have been utterly defeated by
the, counterattack of the people throughout our
country.
In describing the rectification campaign, Mao returned
to the emphasis with which the campaign had begun and men
tioned only that it was "a campaign to'resolve correctly
the contradictions which actually exist among the people
and which have to be resolved immediately by means of a
.nationwide debate which is both'guided and free, carried
:out in the urban and rural areas." Mao did not refer to
.the need to resolve contradictions between "ourselves and
.the enemy" which had been given primacy by the People's
:Daily and Teng Hsiao-ping during September--an omission
whin may have been due to a desire to place China's in-
ternal situation in the best possible light for his non-
Chinese audience.
Maoclaimed great successes for the rectification cam-
paign and added: "We are now carrying forward this people's.
self-education campaign among our 600,000,000 people, stage
by stage:and section by section, and it is probable that in
.another few months nationwide success will have been achieved."
He failed to explain the circumstance that six months pre-
viously the campaign had been intended to last only six months.
Maodiscreetly claimed credit for invention of the rec-
tification method: "In many years of revolutionary practice
we have developed the method of the rectification campaign
in accordance with the Leninist principles of keeping in
close contact with the masses, recognizing the initiative of.
the masses, and practicing criticism and self-criticism."
He announced that in the future there would be periodic rec-
tification campaigns "every year or every other year" as one
of the main methods of resolving various social contradictions
in the country "during the whole period of transition." He
said, however, that these subsequent campaigns would be much
short: than the current one.
On the same day on which Mao spoke in Moscow, Liu Shao-
chi delivered an address in Peiping celebrating the same oc-
casion. Liu paid perfunctory respects to the occasion and then
turned to a discussion of the current situation in China and
the progress of rectification. He declared that although the
"socialist revolution in our country in the ownership of the
means ofproduction was in the main completed in 1956," a
mere change in the economic system was insufficient and that
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"the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working
class is not yet at an end." Only socialism could save China,
he said, and it was a."sheer hoax" "that' socialism could be
built without party leadership or without the dictatorship of
the proletariat.
Liu identified the unforgivable sin of the "bourgeois
rightists" when he said they "actually oppose Marxism-Leninism
itself." They were certain to be defeated, he said, because
of the general; trend toward the road'to socialism which must
be taken--"the only difference being that the majority are
going ahead on their own accord, while a minority do so under
compulsion." Liu presented this process as an inexorable one
in which "there may be a difference in precedence, but no
freedom of standing still."
Liu discussed rectification itself in terms of the ac-
cepted cliches, defining it as "a full and frank expression
of opinions, general debates, wall posters, discussions, forums,
and so on." He defended the "democracy" embodied in the rec-
tificationprocess and attacked those rightists who complained
that there was'only,centralism but no democracy in the country.
Liu resorted to the same imagery which Teng Hsiao-ping had
used in September in his declaration that "the flames of full
and frank criticism will burn out not only the enemy, but our
own shortcomings and mistakes as well."
Liu gave considerable attention to the need for rapid
economic progress. He urged "quantity, speed, quality, and
economy" in building socialism--a slogan which became the
watchword of'the latter.stages of the rectification campaign.
Liu spoke of the necessity for austerity and increased ac-
cumulation onthe part of individuals and organizations as a
condition for achieving these. goals.
Liu also touched on the "red and expert" theme, stating
that the working.ciass must have its own force of scientific
and technical personnel, its.own pkofessors, teachers, scien-
tists, journalists, writers, artists, jurists, and Marxist-
Leninist theorists. He acknowledged that this force would also.
include "all those~intellectualswho, though coming from the
old society, have been-really remolded and firmly take the
working-class stand."' 'This force of working-class intellectuals,
Liu said, must be 'a vast one, a small number would not do.
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Vigorous Implementation of the Campaign, November-December 1957
On 21 November 1957, Hsi Chung-hsun, secretary general of
the State Council, delivered his "second rectification campaign
mobilization report." nisi spoke to a meeting of cadres of the
various offices and organs under the direct control of the State
Council. The party organization of these governmental offices
became the spearhead of the campaign, and periodic reports on
the progress of rectification at this level were used as guides
for forthcoming developments atlower echelons.
Hsi 'began by stating bluntly that it could not be assumed
that all personnel of state organization were serving the cause
of Communism devotedly and responsibly. "The state demands the
,roper transformation of each and every one of us," he said.
This was'to include the eradication of even the smallest short-
comings,Hsi stated, since "a number of veteran cadres of from
10 to 201, years' standing sometimes commit mistakes because of
these 'small shortcomings.' Hsi admitted that there were also
:'some cadres who have not been transformed at all."
Hsi.Chung-hsun described the rectification campaign as only
a transient matter, while the struggle between the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat--"particularly their struggle on the polit-
ical and; ideological fronts"--was a long-term task. The "up-
surge inithe present revolution," however, was an opportunity
for the party to conduct "a systematic and thoroughgoing social-
ist education program among the great masses of cadres and the
people. Hsi'!s report, like Teng Hsiao-ping's in September, fore-
shadowedthe coming link between rectification and the "great
leap forward." Hsi declared that "without a number of revolu-
tionary,sudden progressions, it would be impossible to build
socialism." He stated that in his opinion, "the all-people
rectification campaign this year is a sudden revolutionary pro-
gression. The forthcoming upsurge in socialist construction in
rural areas will constitute another sudden revolutionary progres
pion."
Hsi criticized the progress of "contending and blooming" and
complainejd that some units imposed restrictions regarding matters
to be discussed. Even the private lives of cadres should be dis-
cussed, he said, "if the private life involves the violation of
aw and discipline." Hsi said that within the secretariat of the
State Council the major fault in criticism and discussion was
that few:big issues which needed radical correction had been
;touched on.'Such issues were'the most difficult',to talk about, he
added, and thus this situation was natural. InJthe future,
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however, "blooming.'and contending',' should'be carried out more
deeply and in. a mor,e. thoroughgoing, manner."
As for-methods of conducting"blooming and contending,"
,'Hsi recommended wail posters as "not merely one'wayp'but,the
principal way." He;said the-various-state organizations had
posted more than 220.,000 such posters and advanced more than
380,000 "rationalization proposals." The number of wall posters
and the number of problems. they subf-it, Hsi claimed, would de-
termine the extent of an upsurge. in. contending sand blooming.
"The masses.," he stated,-"hold that 'symposia serve the purpose
ofgiving a warning in. comparative privacy and wall posters
serve the purpose of doing so in public'; this shows that wall
posters are. loved by the. masses." For this reason, he continued,
"wall posters should be used a.s the principal means of conduct-
ing contending and blooming. Symposia aid debate conferences
can only be'considered as'auxiliary means for doing so."
Hsi found fault with the progress of rectification and im-
provement as well as with contending and blooming. The leaders
of some organizations, he said, "should realize that contending
and blooming has been conducted solely for the purpose of recti-
fication and improvement. For this reason,.after contending
and blooming, rectification and improvement must follow. If
they fail to dovetail with eath other, the campaign will cease
to progress."
Hsi cited three reasons why the campaign seemed to have
lost must of its vigor.: "l) lack of experience; 2) the inepti-
tude of the leadership in treading the mass line and its lack
.of courage and resorcefulness in carrying out this work; and
3) the practice of treating this work in the same way as common
matters are treated." This last'practice, he said, was tanta-
mount to attempting to overcome bureaucratism by bureaucratic
means.
Hsi reminded his listerners that rectification was a revo-
lutionary movement and that "we should not be too gentle in this
work." On the contrary, he said, "we should break out of the
old rules with which we used to confine ourselves in the past."
If the leadership adopted a "great, fighting spirit in conduct-
ing this campaign," the faults noted above could be corrected.
Hsi cautioned, however, that the work of the campaign should
be carried out systematically as well as seriously.
Hsi discussed at some length the policy of sending cadres
.to lower levels for physical labor. A number of units had taken
advantage of this work simply to get rid of some cadres, he said,
but "this is not correct." The policy was not intended to "get
rid of the bulge" or to "haul in the sails," Hsi maintained, but
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to "make over-all arrangements for over-all transformation."
It would result, he said , in the establishment of "an army
of cadres who have,struggled for the cause of Communism, who
have been trained, and who are able to survive trying circum-
stances" He added that it would be only matter of time
before "each cadre, particularly each young intellectual, under-
goes this course." '
Hsi was frank in his presentation of the difficulties of
the program. He said that "some have painted a beautiful pic-
ture ofliving conditions in rural areas," but that "this is
not realistic." If the picture is.,too beautiful, he claimed,
the. cadres are bound to be diga,ppointed when they get there.."
Hsi admitted that transfer. to rural areas involved a "cata
clysmicchange" for the person concerned. Therefore, he said,
"it is better to tell them realistically and to prepare them
mentally!; otherwise, after you push them into that envioronment
they will one day come back and grumble at you." In another
note of 'realism, Hsi recommended that the transfer of cadres be
done selectively "so as not to add to the troubles. of the peas-
ants."
In another statement on 5 December 1957,before a conference
of the. Communist party committee for the central government
agencies!, Hsi Chung-hsun again spoke bluntly on the progress of
the rectification campaign. He said that inadequate rectifica-
tion and!improvement remained the major shortcomings,. and that
as a means of correcting this situation, leading organizations
!should "master the trends in the wall posters" by assigning
them serial numbers and organizing them into sequence for anal-
ys.is .
Hsi again concluded his statement with a reference to the
downward transfer of cadres. Notice was served unequivocally
on those in authority that no delay would be tolerated: "This
is a rather urgent problem--one in which the leadership either
takes the initiative or else loses it, with the consequence of
hindering progress in the rectification campaign." Hsi claimed
that many persons had "applied" for transfer to lower levels
and that the various localities had made preparations for them.
"Any lack, of enthusiasm in this matter," he threatened, "would
result in undesirable consequences."
The Chinese Communist press reported about this time that
more than 810,000. personnel had been transferred to lower levels
throughout the country. In the future, it was predicted, the
number of, persons to be transferred to the "labor front and to
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lower levels for practical training" would far exceed this
figure. Some of those already transferred were said to be
intellectuals who had not had any experience in productive
labor, -Others were cadres from "administrative organs,
business- units, and enterprises, and personnel holding such
positions as, messenge_rs,, servants, and probational employees,"
who.were "comparatively more familiar with rural and low-level
work."
In the 15 major provinces and three major municipalities
of China a total of 575,000 persons were reported to have been
'sent down." Some 303,000 of these had been assigned to the
"labor front," while the remainder had obtainedwork.in,basic-
level organizations., The report spoke enthusiastically of the
results of this, movement, claiming that "many intellectuals who
used to find it hard. to identify the five, grains and ,who used
to 'take wheat sprouts for leeks' had now gained much agricul-
tural knowledge," Many of the.cadres who used to "cover their
noses with handkerchiefs when they.came across a dunghill now
scramble to carry baskets loaded with dung," according to the
report o
On the other side of the picture, it was reported that
state-owned enterprises in Peiping had reduced the ration be-
tween administrative cadres and workers from 38,4 to 11.2 per-
cent. In Tientsin, it was claimed, 80 to 90 percent of the
cadres in some government organizations had applied for "pro-
ductive-labor-in factories or farm work.in the countryside."
Comparable statistics were (cited for many other areas through-
out the country.
Another major statement on the progress of rectification
was made on 9 December by Chiang Hua,. first secretary of the
Communist party committee of-Chekiang Province. The signifi-
canceof this report is indicated by the fact that it was?sub-
se.quentlypublished by the People's Daily,-which allotted 'it
two full pages and commented editorially that "the questions
dealt with in the first part of the report are nationwide, not
just local in character.,"
Chiang reviewed the course of the rectification campaign
with the customary bland assertion that the antirightist aspect
had been intended from the beginning As for the current
status of the campaign in his own province, Chiang said, most
of the leading organs above the-county level had obtained "pre-
liminary experience," and that cadres had "begun to master the
new working style of socialist democracy." Practice had shown
that the instructions. of the Communist party central committee
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and of Chairman Mao had been absolutely correct, Chiang said,
but "it must be pointed out that the socialist revolution we
have carried out on the political and ideological front during
the past year is still in the process of gradual development
on the basis of studying, practicing, and accumulating ex-
perience."
The heart of Chiang's report lay in his discussion of cer-
tain "diverse views" which had existed in the party. With un-
usual candor he admitted that "in the course of this great
.change, the understanding of certain questions has not been
entirely; unanimous in the party." Citing the authority of
"the directive of the party central committee and Chairman
Mao"--presumably the directive which inaugurated the recti
f ication campaign on 1 May 1957--Chiang offered four "expla-
nations": in connection with these divergent views.
First,Chiang said, "there appeared an extreme rightist
tendency, and a 'leftist' tendency" during the first half of
1957. Those guilty of'the extreme rightist tendency failed
to discern that contradictions "between the enemy and our-
selves" still existed, while the second tendency exaggerated
such contradictions. Both of these views were held within
the party, Chiang stated, and should be corrected by a care-
ful assessment of the motives of those who offered criticism,
so that those who were merely confused or mistaken would not
.be wrongly regarded as "enemies."
Chiang next pointed out that "many comrades" failed to
realize 'that "the situation develops with intermittent tensed
.and relaxed periods along a winding and complicated path of
progress." For this reason, he said, "with the decisive vic-
tory ac'ieved in the antirightist struggle and with the class
enemies forced into retreat, relaxation may appear in the
struggle at certain periods." Chiang warned, however, that
under certain conditions the rightists might again launch new
attacksagainst socialism and that "fluctuations of this kind
in the struggle will occur repeatedly for a number of years."
Chiang's third point referred to the significance of civil
disturbances--a rare admission that such disturbances had oc-
curred.; Chiang mentioned specifically certain incidents which
had resulted in "the disintegration of many agricultural co-
operatives" in one country of his province. This had been bad,
he said, but it had had a good effect in the end.
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After the. provincial. and district committees dispatch
functionaries to strengthen leadership and sum up ex-
periences and lessons, it became possible to rectify
effectively'the'rightist ideas and the bureaucratic and
commandist working :methods on the part of certain func-
tiona res,, to strike down the destructive activities
mounted by the enemies, and to develop the socialist
education campaign in the rural areas.`'
Chiang's fourth "explanation" dealt: with the ."new form'
of the mass lime--large scale blooming, contending, debating,
and posters." Many comrades had not yet fully realized the'
advantages of these methods, he said, while some "appeared
to lack determination and. confidence" in them "for fear that.
they would incur difficulties, would lose out in debates with
others, or would 'draw fire on themselves." -Chiang advised
the universal panacea of "confidence'in the masses" as a remedy.
Chiang;. concluded. his report with a,reminder that. "improve-
meint in work is equally as important as the antirighti.st strug-
gle." He said that work improvement was only beginning, and
that leading organs should conscientiously strengthen leader-
ship over this . aspect of the campaign'.
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"Rectification" Firmly Linked to Economic Upsurge.
With the opening of the new year the rectification cam-
paign entered its last major phase. This was heralded in the
People's Daily editorial for 1 January 1958 entitled "Ride
to Wind an reak the Waves:" The editorial began with the
observation that "the thoughts of man usually fall behind
realitywith respect to an adequate estimation of develop-
ments affecting the objective situation." In a mood of
exuberant optimism the, paper maintained that the events of
1957, both international and domestic, bore out this conclu-
sion. With regard to the international situation, the
editorial quoted the slogan used by Mao in Moscow that "the
east wind prevails over the west wind"; domestically, the
rectification campaign was cited as one of the "brilliant
victories" achieved by the people during 1957.
The editorial pointed out that the rectification cam-
paign was not over, however, since "what remains to be done
is to resolve contradictions between the remaining bourgeoisie
and the proletariat and between the capitalist path and the
socialist path during the period of transition." This strug-
gle between the capitalist and socialist paths was a con-
tradiction "between the enemies and ourselves" in compara-
tively few instances, the editorial said, "while in the
greater number of cases it proves to be a contradiction
within the ranks of the people."
The editorial declared that the current task of the
rectification campaign was to strive for complete victory
on all fronts before May 1958. The campaign, it said, had
been a "motive force pushing forward the work in all fields,
and should be regarded as the 'key to all activities."' The
paper urged all-out efforts to carry the,., rectification cam-
paign to';people throughout the whole country. The editorial
expressed the conviction of its writers that "victorious
completion of this campaign will give our society a new
appearance and stimulate the energetic initiative of the
people as never before. It will unleash an immense tide of
growth in industry, agriculture, and all other constructive
work."
Therectificatiopcampaign was thus officially harnessed
to the drive for economic progress. "Using the great achieve-
ments of',the rectification camapign, the successful completion
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of the First Five-Year:', Plan, and other favorable, conditions,"
the paper said, "'we must mobilize all positive factors and
apply ourselves to all the construction projects, with in-
dustry and frugality as the guiding principle.., and,'on the
basis of quantity, speed, quality, and economy, create a
victorious beginning for the Second Five-Year Plan."
On 19 January 1958, Hsi Chung-hsun, secretary general
of the State Council, spoke again on the subject of rectifica-
tion. His words, blunt and to the point as usual, indicated
clearly the new direction which the campaign had taken. Hsi
criticized the campaign's progress.in familiar terms and
emphasized the continuing danger of rightist errors both
within and outside the party. These errors, he said, were
evidenced by undue conservatism and failure to keep up with
the masses (i.e., the demands of the party) in the headlong
plunge toward socialism.
Hsi then specified the first step by which rectifica-
tion would be called upon to aid the economic drive. "At
the advanced stage of the rectification campaign,"' he said,
"an antiwaste movement should be carried out." Hsi declared
that "all our central state organs, whether they be indus-
trial, cultural, or educational, are guilty of some waste in
spending their construction and administrative funds." This
state of affairs, he said, must be "clarified from an ideo-
logical point of view and solved once: and for all.'" Other-
wise, he stated, it would be "impossible for us. to carry out
the policy of the Communist party central committee to build
our country industriously and economically and to do so on a
larger, quicker, better., and. more economical scale."
It was. apparent from Hsi's final remarks that pursuit
of the rectification.campaign.had been causing interference
with the performance of day-to-day functions. Hsi advocated
equal attention to the tasks of handling rightists, carrying
out the rectification campaign, and continuing regular opera-
tional work. He said it should be possible for these tasks
to be carried out without their interfering with each other.
Hsi pointed out, however: "It should be realized that it
is possible to make up for regular operational work later
on, if such is sacrificed for the, sake of the rectification.
campaign. But if the rectification campaign is sacrificed
because of operational work,-it may become,impossible to
solve some ideological questions--a matter of much greater
importance."
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Perhaps as a counterbalance to Hsi's remarks, __P_____e__o__p~le's
Daily a .few days later published another report by _~,~ Ching-
shih, first secretary of the Shanghai Communist party com-
mittee,calling attention to some of the original goals of
rectification. The paper endorsed Ko's views highly, saying
that his report was "worthy of conscientious study because
it is filled with revolutionary spirit." Ko particularly
attacked the bureaucracy of some cadres, pointing out that
"the views voiced by the masses highlight their dissatisfac-
tion with the 'bureaucracy' practiced by these party cadres."
People's Daily commented that this passage of the report
was very good and went on to offer some further comments on
the subject.
The paper observed that the "bureaucracy" which Ko
Ching-shih had attacked was, in fact, "our most dangerous
enemy." It defined this bureaucracy as "a working style
which is divorced from the masses." The paper pointed out,
however, that since "as little as 10 percent of our working
personnel are guilty of this working style," people should
not make the rightist mistake of regarding all Communist
party members and government personnel in that light.
The editorial warned that the struggle against bureaucracy
would be a long one since "in a socialist society, or even in
a Communist society of the future, contradictions between the
leaders and the led may exist for prolonged periods." Such
contradictions were said to belong to those within the ranks
of the people, however, and should be treated according to
"democratic methods through logical reasoning, not by force-
ful suppression as exercised against the enemy."
On 2 February 1958, People's Dail formally launched the
antiwaste campaign which had been anticipated by Hsi Chung-
hsun a fortnight earlier. Citing a report delivered before
the National People's Congress by Li Hsien-nien on the previous
'day, the editorial proposed the slogan "Oppose waste and
Ibuild the country on the basis of industry and thrift" as a
,guide for action for people throughout the country.
The days preceding the fifth session of the National
.People's Congress in February were utilized by the "democratic"
parties for meetings at which each party formally expelled
from its ranks those who had been accused as rightists dur-
!ing the months since mid-1957. On the day before the congress
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officia--llyconvened, the standing committee announced the
removal from office of the three non-Communist ministers
who had been the principal subjects of attack during the
early phase of the ""antirightist struggle."
As its first item of business, the congress considered
a credentials report which stated that 16 rightists ""who
had betrayed the fundamental principles of the Constitution"
had been recalled by their electoral districts. Another 38
rightists whose constituencies reported that they should
be recalled were cited in the credentials report. Ten of
the latter had held posts on the standing committee of the
National People's Congress and on the National Defense
Council.
On its opening day the congress also heard a report by
Li Hsien-ni.en, vice premier and minister of finance, on the
implementation of the 1957 state budget and the proposed
budget for 1958. Li praised the achievements of 1957 which,
he said, had overfulfilled the economic plans for the year
and thus assured fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan.
These achievements, Li said, were also ""eloquent proof of
the immense vitality of the socialist system and a rebuff to
the slander of the bourgeois rightists regarding our country's
financial and economic condition."
Li admitted there.had been some temporary and local
difficulties in carrying out financial and economic plans
and said the rightists had "rejoiced at our temporary
troubles."' They had been proved wrong, he asserted, and now
"we even want to thank them, because like poisonous weeds
turning into fertilizer, their attacks have greatly helped
to raise the consciousness of the working people to new
heights and thus have greatly pushed forward the movement
to increase production and practice economy."'
The final section of Li's report was an appeal to "op-
pose conservatism and.waste, and ensure the implementation
of the 1958 state budget with a large-scale movement to in-
crease production and practice economy." The situation was
favorable for such developments, he said, since "on every
front of our national economy there has now arisen a gigantic
upsurge for socialist construction, aiming at greater quantity,
faster speed, better quality, and greater economy." Li said
that rectification had contributed to this situation because
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"in the process of rectification, the broad masses of work-
ers and staff members made many proposals to overcome waste
and to'do more things with less money.,,
Li claimed that "the rectification movement is develop-
ing and penetrating into the basic units, the factories, mines
and enterprises, and the agricultural producers' cooperatives."
The campaign, he said, would "continue to impel leading per-
sonnelat various levels to rectify their style in work, to
go down among the masses and into the actual work of produc-
tion.": Li had high praise for this program and added: "This
kind of change in the style in work of leading personnel at
various levels will certainly help bring about a tremendous
growth of industrial and agricultural production in 1958."
Li stressed the need to expand and develop the movement
to increase production and practice economy in order to ren-
der possible the "gigantic leap in production" contemplated
for 1958. In the course of the rectification campaign, he said,
it would be necessary that "every enterprise, every economic
department, and every unit should set aside ten days or so to
launch frank and full expression of opinion and debates on the
question of opposing waste and mobilize the broadest masses to
wage an uncompromising struggle against all waste."
The other major report to the National People's Congress
was that delivered by Chou En-lai entitled "The Present Inter-
national Situation and China's Foreign Policy." Chou began
his report with a tribute to the rectification campaign, al-
though it was not precisely germane to the matters under con-
sideration. In the latter half of 1957, he said, the Chinese
people,"led by the Chinese Communist party and Chairman Mao
Tse-tung," had "repulsed the frenzied attacks of the bourgeois
rightists." Chou stated that the rectification campaign, "which
continues with growing intensity, enables our people to take
great forward leaps in construction, filling them with enthu-
siasm and fresh ardor and infusing an unprecedented new spirit
into our work in various fields." Echoing the exuberant tone
then prevalent in official statements, Chou added: "Our nation
rides the rising tide; it is driving full steam ahead in the
work of!socialist construction."
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Economic Goals Emphasized,. Other Reaffirmed
"The rectification campaign is giving rise to a new 'flood
crest' in all enterprises, undertakings, and government organ-
izations,".announced a People's Daily editorial on 18 February
1958 That is, the newspaper continued, "a new high tide of
contending and blooming and a new high tide of administrative
improvement designed to combat waste and conservatism are be-
ing raised.'"The editorial reported that in. the course of
this.high-tide the personnel of, governmental organizations
in Peiping had put out 250,000 wall posters, and. the workers
and office employees of 31 enterprises in the city had put out
200,000 posters and offered 430,000 suggestions--all within
a period of 20 days. This .''grand movement" was said to be
aimed at;+thoroughimplementation of the principle of doing
.more, faster, better, and more economically in national con-
struction and at the promotion of a big leap forward in pro-
duction and work!'
The editorial declared that combating waste and conserva-
tism had become the central problem of the rectification cam-
paign. "Judging by what is taking place in various districts
and government organizations and enterprises," it continued,
"the present movement against waste and conservatism differs
from all previous increase-production and practice-economy
movements in that it has actually become a struggle against
all backward: phenomena in the ideological, political, and
economic fields and that it has brought about a high tide of
emulation." It was claimed that the movement was "obviously
an outgrowth of the socialist revolution on the political and
ideological fronts which began last year throughout the coun-
try.'
While reaffirming the emphasis on economic matters, however,
the editorial reminded readers that the original goals of rec-
tification could not be ignored. The editorial accused some
units of lacking a thorough knowledge of the situation with the
result that they neglected "ideological work, concerned them-
selves only with economic problems, and simply took some tech-
nical measures instead of seriously developing popular debate
and completely changing the methods of work and style of lead-
ership." The proper procedure, the editorial said, was to
tackle: both the economic problems and the ideological and po-
litical problems so that "through contending, blooming, and
debate we should not only combat waste and conservatism but
also combat bureaucracy, sectarianism and subjectivism."
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The campaign to "combat waste and conservatism"--pro-
moted on a national scale by the People's Daily on 2 Febru-
ary 1958 apparently to last a few weeks--was extended on
3 March by a Communist party central committee directive
lengthening it two or three months. During the last days of
February and the month of March, the "leap forward" received
added impetus as the production goals which had been set forth
at the National People's Congress were surpassed verbally by
new "fighting targets"--supposedly advanced by the workers
themselves in individual factories and in whole industries
throughout the country. By early April, Hu Yao-pang, first
secretary of the Young Communists League, spoke of a new
"workers' target" of an increase of 33 percent in industrial
production for 1958--a considerable contrast with the goal of
14.5 percent presented to the National People's Congress in
February.
Further reports on the number of cadres "sent down" to
work in the countryside, factories, or in basic-level organ-
izations at this period indicated the rapid pace at which this
part of the program was being carried out. The New China News
Agency; reported on 23 February that 1,300,000 cadres had al-
ready departed for the countryside or lower levels, more than
half a million more than in December. Reports indicated that
a total, of about 2,750,000 cadres were slated for such treat-
ment in the various provinces and municipalities throughout
the country. It was announced that the program was to be com-
pleted by April 1958.
At the end of February 1958, People's Daily published an
article by Chou Yang, a deputy direr or of tie Communist party's
propaganda department. The article was said to have been written
"on the basis of a speech made at an enlarged session of the
Communist party group in the Union of Chinese Writers on 16
September 1957, with revisions and additions, and after ex-
changes of opinion with comrades in literary and art circles."
Chou Yang has frequently been given the assignment of laying
down the law in cultural circles for the apparent purpose of
correcting any misapprehensions that might arise regarding the
means of distinguishing "flowers" from "weeds."
Chou Yang justified his attention to the "great debate on
the literary and art front" by asserting that "literature and
art are the barometer of the times; whenever any drastic change
is about to take place in the situation of the class struggle,
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signs of it may be seen on the barometer.." He then proceeded
to embed nuggets of advice to authors in a matrix of illogic
and propaganda which repeated and exaggerated the official ex-
planations of the "rightist attacks" of the previous summer.
Chou Yang declared that "one's attitude toward the Hun-
garian episode has become an important criterion by which one
.maybe judged as to whether one is a true Communist and a true
revolutionary." He returned to this theme repeatedly through-
out his long and rambling article. Chou, aftor asking rhetor-
ically whether one ought to. be a revolutionary or a reaction-
ary,.answered his own question unequivocally: "Now that we
are at the stage of socialist revolution, we must oppose cap-
italism and follow the socialist road if we are to remain
revolutionaries. If you want to follow the capitalist road,
then you are a reactionary. These.are the only alternatives;
there.is no middle road." This provides a good example of
the sort of."debate" which characterized the latter stages
of rectification.
Chou Yang enunciated another rule that furnished the text
for many pious sermons on the function of the arts in the new
society: "In a socialist society individualism is the root
of all evil." He solved the many contradictions in. his theses
by ignoring them:
Socialist literature and art must take over all the.
fine traditions of the past literature-and art, and
our writers must learn.from their predecessors. But,
since our literature and art are called socialist
literature and art, they can only take the Communist
world outlook as their ideological basis. Therefore
they must, as the "Communist Manifesto" points out,
effect "the most radical rupture with traditional
ideas."
Total Capitulation of the Puppet Parties, March 1958
The. final phase of the rectification campaign was marked
by the complete submission of the "democratic" parties to the
overlordship of the Communist party. The minor parties had
never had any real independence, of course. The most embar-
rassing.of the attacks on the Communist. regime during the
early days of rectification, however, had come largely from
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men who occupied prominent positions in these parties, and
the surrender of the 'puppet parties to their Communist mas-
ters in mid-March 1958 was a complete, final, and highly
publicized conclusion to that troublesome :phase of rectifi-
cation
The necessity for sincere acceptance of Communist lead-
ership.had been one of the essential points made by Li Wei-han
when he lectured the non-Communist parties in September 1957
on their future conduct. From that date until January 1958
these parties maintained a silence that was broken only oc-
casionilly by the exposure of some newly discovered rightist.
As noted above, all eight democratic parties met in January
1958 and dismissed their rightist members from office. on
March 1958, the standing committee of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Council,official mechanism of the united
front, dismissed its rightist deputies. Their rightists hav-
ing been disposed of, the puppet parties could then turn to
the second requirement laid down by Li Wei-han--the "self-
transformation" of their members.
The movement for self-transformation was ostensibly set
in motion on 24 February 1958 by a resolution of 17 scientists
in Shanghai who challenged their colleagues to become truly
"red" experts by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan. The
challenge was taken up by one of the democratic parties on the
next day, and on 28 February representatives of all the dem-
ocratic parties and of the "nonparty bourgeoisie" met and de-
cided to launch a national competition in self-transformation.
A mass meeting was held on 16 March as the first step in the
campaign, and a charter was adopted which was intended to pro-
vide the bourgeoisie with a standard of conduct and ideology
by which to guide their progress.
The charter opened with a reference to the "inspiring
leadership of the Chinese Communist party and Chairman Mao
Tse-tung," under which "the people of our great motherland are
moving 'ahead along the socialist road like 'a ship riding the
waves with full wind in its sails.", The charter pledged the
democratic parties and "unaffiliated democrats" to work "with
revolutionary drive so that we may as quickly as possible
change ourselves from bourgeois to working people living by
our own labor, from bourgeois intellectuals to working-class
intellectuals who are ideologically socialist and profession-
ally expert." The charter then listed a number of specific
pledges of action by which these goals would be attained.
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A gathering of 10,000 non-Communist."leaders" of the.
bourgeoisie was held on the day following adoption of the
charter in,the great square which is the usual scene of mass
demonstrations in Peiping. The parade was amply covered in
the press, most fulsomely by the Kuang Ming Daily, spokes-
man for the democratic parties. According to that newspaper:
"The parade is beginning. Men's hearts are leaping, their
blood is boiling, their feet move toward the left,'" As the
demonstrators entered the squarey..the paper said, they lifted
their heads and gazed "at the spot from which.Chairman Mao
reviews the October and May. parades."" and seemed to say,
"Revered and loved Chairman Mao, and.you other comrades of
the. central committee, please review our parade?