LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE TIBETAN CAMPAIGN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01049A001900130005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE TIBETAN CAMPAIGN
ARMY review completed
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ry and ConcJL tons .. y .y . Y r
Troop Strength in Tibet
Supply Requirements for Troops Stationed inTibet
Supply of Troops Stationed in Tibet by Motor T.
Highway Routes into Tibet .. . < . .
(1) Lan-thou--Lhasa . . . z . .
(2 Lan-chow- Yushu ? . . ,. . ..
(3) Y'a -an---Lhasay ,~ ? . ? 4 4
(4) sinkie g-Tibet a a. a, -r i i- i~ .. . - - ?
Factors Affecting Road Movement
(1) Basic Road Capacity
(2) 00perational Road. Capacity . z :
3 Consumption of Fuel . . ? . x
T r o o p s of et rt i .4 . . - . .i
1) The Present Garrison . . . .?
2) Increase in Size of Present Garrison ,., .
Impact of Logistical Support on Railroads.
on the Motor Truck Park . :. . x
1) Railroads
2) Motor Truck Park . ? . . *,
Supply of Trooiss Stationed in Tibet by A ,r
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LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS.OF THE TIBETAN CAMPAIGN
Summary and Conclusions
Chinese Communist ground force strength in the Tibet Military District
is currently-estimated at about 60,000 men. Present supply requirements
are approximately 64 short tons per day per divisjon of 15,000 men, or
,a total of 256 tons per day for the total force. Trucks moving over the
Lan-chou,- Lhasa road via Golmo are able to deliver 385 tons-per day in
Lhasa.
If the Chinese Communists should decide to double their present
strength in Tibet to a total of 120,000 men, the Lan-chow - Lhasa road
would not be adequate as.a supply route, since it can support only
90,000 troops for a sustained period (3 months or more). Logistic support
for the present force of 60,000 men could be sustained and 30,000 men
could be moved in over a 30-day,period. Following this the road.would
have to be used almost exclusively to resupply the 90,000 troop~,e in
position.
The Ya-an-Lhasa. road, the only, alternate route between China.anfl''the
Lhasa area of Tibet, has been closed for many months by. landslides and the
,activities of the Tibetan. rebels. If the Chinese Communists decide to
reopen this road they could probably do so within a.pert2U of 30 to 60 days.
Initially the capacity,of this road would be about half that of the Lan-chou
- Lhasa road, so it would be able to support logistically, only..a force of
45,000 men. Three to four weeks would be required to move 30,000 men to
Tibet.over.the road. Thus,. establishment and maintenance of a. force of
120,000 men.in Tibet would require the full. capability of the Lan-chou -
Lhasa road. via Golmoand the partial use of the Ya-an-Lhasa road and could
not be accomplished in less than 60 days.
.It would not be possible forthe Chinese Communists to support logisti-
cally a force of 180,000 men (triple the present strength) by. surface trans-
portationalone. The Ya,-an - Lhasa road after initial reconstruction could
only support an _additcional-'.15(,,000 meta for a total of 135,000 by both routes.
However, through extensive improvement and. construction extending over a
period ofmany months with some.disruption to the movement of supplies over
the route,.:it conceivably could be so improved that its capacity would be
approximately, equal to that of the Lan-thou - Lha.a.road, then 180,000 men
could be supported. During this extended periad-of time the only possibility
for additional logistic support for forces deployed in Tibet would be throw
air transportation.
The tonnage required to sustain 180)000 troops in. Tibet would not place
an undue burden on. the railroad. system of Communist China,, since no more than
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2 to 3 trains per day would be required to deliver supplies to the staging
areas, The impact on the combined divilianand military truck park of the
country would also be negligible. S fficient trucks exist in the Tibet
Tsinghai-Sinkiang, area to handle traffic on the Lan-chou - Lhasa route,
and enough trucks are available for use on the Ya-an-Lhasa route. The
limitation is not the number of trucks, but the capacity of the supply
roads.
The most serious vulnerability identified in this study is the limited
capacity of the suppl
'
t
y
..rou
es. The southern route from Ya-an to.Lhasa is
closed at present and would requi'eLa military campaign plus a period of
reconstruction before it could be used. The northern route from Lan-chou
is of limited capacity at best, and is subject to interdiction at several
points between Golmo and Lhasa. Only.a concentrated effort by the Chinese
at keeping the road o
e
ill
p
n w
permit a sustained flow of supplies to Tibet.
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1,. Troop Strength in Tibet
Chinese Communist ground force stren th for the Tibet Military
District. is. now estimated at 8 00.
it is.estima e a og s c
suppor as to be provided a presen or about 60,000troops , or the
equivalent of 4 divisions at 85 percent strength. Consideration will
also be given in this report to the logistical situation if this number
of troops were to be doubled or tripled.
2. Supply Requirements for Troops Stationed in Tibet
ACSI, DDpartmen`I of the Army, has estimated that it would take
38.55 short tons per day to supply.a Chinese ;. i'nf ,n~rg- .division-,'of, l5;000
troops on garrison duty in Tibet. This-would be increased to 147 tons
per day for a full combat operation. For a situation such as exists
at present (garrison duty plus limited combat or "mopping up" type
operations) an additional 25 tons per day of POL would be required over
and above the supplies necessary for a garrison type of operation. Thus,
present requirements are approximately 64 tons per day per division of
15,000 troops, or a total of. 256 tons per day for the 60.,000 troops
estimated to be in Tibet at the present time. If the number of troops
were increased to 120,000 or to 180,000, the supply. requirement would
increase correspondingly to 512 or'768 tons per day.
3. Supply of Troops Stationed in Tibet by Motor Truck
a. Highway.. Routes. into Tibet
For purposes of logistical support, three alternate highways
lead into Tibet, One of these is operational at present, one could be
made operational. in approximately 30-60 days, and the other is of no
practical use in the present situation. An additional route extends to
the Tibet border but is of no value in providing support for troopsoper-
ating in the Lhasa area. The four highways are listed below in order of
their present importance:
(1) Lan-chow - Lhasa
The only land supply route of logistical import leading
into~Lhasa at present is the'Lan-chou - Lhasa highway. This route is
about 1,400 miles from the railhead at.Lan-chou in Kansu province to Lhasa.
The Chinese Communists give the eastern terminal of the road as.Hsi-ning,
about 100 miles. west of Lan-chou, thus reducing the total. length to about
1,300 miles from Hsi-ning to Lhasa. From. Hsi-ning the route passes
through Huang-yuan, Ch'a-k'a and Pa-lung to.Golmo. This portion of the
route is limited all-weather and approximately 26 feet in.width. An
alternate route from..Golmo leads .north to a railhead on the Trans-Sinkian
Railroad at Hsia-tung in.western Kansu province. The distance from the
railhead and characteristics of this road make it very comparable to the
Lan-thou.- Golmo portion of the route. It is believed at this time that
the Lan-thou - Golmo"highway is
pr ne pa og s ca rou e. Because efuthea i:eal exnatel-rout&a.:Aeading
into.Golmo, the critical section of the road is that portion from Golmo
to Lhasa.
*Tonnages are givers in short tons throughout this report except where
otherwise indicated.
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From Golmo to the Tang Pass (on the Tsinghai-Tibet border)
the road is limited all-weather approximately. 15-30 feet in width. A secticn
of the road from this point to the Tang-hsiung airfield is fair weather,
? 1 . ._
ab()Ii 1. JP_II; feet T.T4A- -44-1..
the
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 The surface of the route from Lan-chow to,Lhasa is assumed
to be in fair to good condition with surfacing of gravel, crushed rock or
.improved earth. This route was hastily constructed and opened to traffic in
1954. Since that time constant improvements have been made with the
Chinese claiming that the entire route has been widened to 32.8,feet., 'Plans
were also made in. the winter of 1956-57 to reduce all
and make curve radii at least 410 Feet., but it is doubtful that this-standard
has been reached. -Most bridges along the-route are less than 100 feet in
length, characteristically of timber construction, and load eapacity,cf 8
,tons, although some small streams are
bridged include the Tung Tien (34-OON probably.stillforded. Mayor rivers
miles south-of Golmo) and the Chia ,-75-aC~~~' the Tot o (located 266
(30.12N, 90-25E). There are probably no
tunnels on this route. Little information is available concerning ferries,
although a ferry, was used to cross the Tung-Tien River after a flood had
damaged the road in late July 1957, The sections of this route most
susceptible to.interdiction appear to be the bridges, passes, and particularly
the section from the T'ot'o River bridge (266 miles south of Golmo) to Tang
Pass (328 miles south ofGolmo) where the road must Cro~s'thirteen rivers arr3,
two intermittent streams. The section of the highway from NagchhuDzong to
Yang-pa-ching might also. be susceptible to land slides and road blocks in t1
passes,
Central and southern Tsinghai is anextremely barren, high,
desolate plateau. Although this area is generally,f'ee of difficult passes
and mountains, ravines, and deeply entrenched streams, the high elevations
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(the plateau at about 15)000 feet and the mountains rising to 20,000 feet)
coupled with intense cold, frozen soil, and severe gales have greatly handi-
capped motor truck operation. Operating efficiency is cut down by altitude,
radiators boil at low temperature,. and fuel consumption is very high.
(2) Lan-chou - Yushu
This route begins at Lan-thou, follows the Lan-chou - Lhasa
route west through Hsi-ring to Huang-yuan, and then travels southwest to
-Yushu. The portion of this route from Huang-yuan of unknown width. A caravan route of questioabletmotorabilityaleadsawest
from Yushu to meet the Lan-chou Lhasa route between Tang Pass and Nagchhu
Dzong. This road can be used to supply troops.stationed.on the Tsinghai-
Tibet border opposite the rebels in the.Chamdo Area, but it is of no
significance in supporting general operations in Tibet.
(3) Ya-an - Lhasa
This . highway. is approximately 1,400 miles long extending
from Ya-an to Lhasa. Ya-an is connected by, road to the railhead atCh'eng--th,
100 miles to the. northeast. The route to the west passes through Tatsienlu
(K'ang-ting), Kan'tzu, Te'ko,, Chamdo (Ch'ang-tu) and Tt'ai-chao on its way
to Lhasa. FromYa-an to Chamdo (a distance of about 620 miles) this route
is a limited all-weather road 15-30 feet in width. From.Chamdo toLhasa the
roadis,fair-weather and about 15 feet in width.
Construction of this difficult route began in 1950 and
was completed in December of 1954. Three major mountain ranges and four
large rivers had to be crossed. The Chinese Communists have experienced
great difficulty in keeping this route open, especially, the section west of
Chamdo. In addition to naturalc.causes this portion frequently damaged or blocked by dissident groups. Inf'19the
een
55 road hin s the e
announced that the 186 mile section from Pomi (southwest of Chamdo) to
Kiangpu as to be reconstructed, and the plans for 1956 also listed improve-
ments to be made in the Pomi district. It is possible that the section
of this.route from.Chamdo to Lhasa was abandoned when the Sikang-Tibet
Highway, Bureau was abolished.in August 1957. If this is true, extensive
repairs would be necessary to reopen this portion of the route.
Analternate route (24+3 miles long) extending west from
Tungolo (a short distance west of Tatsienlu) via Batang to Patang (south
of Chamdo) may have been completed.* This route is fair-weather of
width. It is unknown
possible that-a small section of the road between Batang
and Ningphing,is still in very poor condition. It is believed that this
section is jeepable at the present time, but that additional work is
necessary to make it motorable for supply trucks. From Chamdo a route
is currently under construction to.intersect the Lan-chou
near Nagchhu Dzong. This .route hasbeen completed as a fair iweather groad
from Chamdo to Dine
y
hin
E roc s mo oxa e a It is doubtful t t s
present or at i could be made motorable in less than
30-60 days.
*On 20 Sep 58 the Communists announcedthat this route had been completed.
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(4+) SiA1iang.Tibet I
A fourth route, of-no practical logistical import, is the
Sinkiang-Tibet highway, route. This route extends from Ks:shgar (K'o.shih)
in Sinkiang toGartok in extreme western Tibet. This portion of the
road is considered to be fair weather with the exact width unknown. From
Gartok two routes of limited motorability,extend to Zhikatse and Nagchhu
.Dzong (Hei-ho). The route from Gartok to Nagchhu Dzong, a point on the
Lan-chou to Lhasa route, is thought to be little more than a course
marked across the plateau and of no logistical value. Although motor
vehicles have been operated between Gartok and Zhikatae, this route is
of questionable motorability and of no logistical value.
b. Factors Affecting Road Movement.
(1) Basic Road Capacity:
The basic capacity of a road is expressed as the number
of vehicles per hour each way that the road is physically capable of sup-
porting over a period of 3 months... In arriving at a capacity figure the
following fac=tors are considered; road construction; width, condition;
grades, curves and bottlenecks,; and effects of weather. The basic capa-
city is applicable during-daylight hours and under fair weather conditions.
It has to be reduced if operations take place at night or during bad
weather.; If essential road maintenance is neglected, the basic road capa-
city may be increased by 50 to 100 percent for a short period not exceeding
7 days
(2) Qperational Road Capacity.
The standard vehicle for purposes of assessing convoy
performance and densities in Communist China is the 3-ton truck. The
average load carried by a vehicle is assumed to be 3 tons.. This allows for
use .of 3/4-ton, 12-ton, 6-ton, and 10-ton trucks, as well as for local over-
loading. If it is necessary to use a road at its basic capacity over a
period of time, allowance must be made for road maintenance, administrative
traffic and other operatin factors. 25X1
110 hours per y is THE
maximum time that a road can be use or supp-Ly operations.: This allows 9
to 12 hours a day for road maintenance which is normal for China and South-
east Asia, 2 to 4 hours for administrative traffic, including supply of
personnel permanently stationed along. the road, and several hours for such
operating factors as realignment of convoy spacing and vehicle breakdowns..
Additional allowance would have to be made if civilian or operational mili-
tary traffic were also using the supply route.
(3) Con8tamption of Fuel.
In assessing the amount of tonnage which can be delivered
to a point, can: allowance has to be made for consumption of fuel along the
rou.te.- For this purpose the route should be divided into stages the length
of which will vary with the type of road and the terrain. Normally,, a
distance of about 100 miles per stage should be assumed.: The consumption
of fuel per stage is estimated to be about 5 percent of the total tonnage
available at the beginning of each stage, starting with the second stage.
Fuel for the first stage would be available from base supplies and would
not be part. of the basic load.
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Supply of Troops in Tibet.
(1) The Present Garrison.
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upp es presumably arrive at Lan-chou primarily by
railroad over the Lung-Hai or Pao-t-ou--Lan-chou lines. From Lan-chou
they move by truck via Hsi-ning and Golmo to Lhasa from which they are
distributed to individual units by local means of transportation. It is
estimated that the basic capacity of the Lan-chou to Lhasa road is 25
trucks per hour in each direction. This estimate takes into consideration
such factors as the moisture content of the soil, conditions of the road
surface, the terrain, and the width of the road. If the road is used for
a maximum of 10 hours per day, the daily capacity is 250 trucks moving in
each direction.
If, as is estimated the Chinese Communists are capable
of doing, 250 trucks are loaded each day in Lan-chou with an average load
of 3 tons, it is possible for the Chinese to dispatch 750 tons daily from
their supply base. The distance from Lan-chow to Lhasa is approximately
1,400 miles. Although the Chinese have reportedly been able to drive
this distance in about 11 days, for purposes of a sustained military
movement of the kind under discussion here, it is assumed that the trip
would take 14 days. Thus the total distance would be broken into 14
stages of 100 miles per stage. Assuming fuel consumption of 5 percent
of the total tonnage available at the beginning of each stage (except the
first stage), the original 750 tons would dwindle to 385 tons by the time
the trucks reached Lhasa. The 5 percent figure contains an allowance for
fuel consumption on the return trip, so the maximum effective load
delivered in the Lhasa area would be approximately 380 to 390 tons each
day. This amount of tonnage would be about 50 percent above the 256. ton
daily requirement of the estimated 60,000 troops currently stationed in
Tibet. Thus, under present conditions, the Chinese should have no trou-
ble supplying their troop strength in the area entirely by road.
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 (2) Increase in Size of Present Garrison.
If the Chinese Communists should double their present
estimated troop strength in Tibet to 120,000, their estimated daily sup-
ply requirement would be 512 tons. This is about 33 percent above the
daily capability of the Lan-chou- Ihasa road of 385 tons. The tonnage
requirement for 120,000 troops could be delivered for a short period of
time, perhaps:. week. or two, but could not be sustained indefinitely.
Therefore, without use of the southern route"from Ya-an to Lhasa, it is
estimated that no more that 90,000 troops could be supported in the
Lhasa area by road under present conditions. If the present Tibet gar-
risen were tripled (180,000 troops), it would be necessary to open the
southern route or place reliance excessively on an air lift. The prob-
lems,associated with an air lift are discussed below.
If the Chinese move additional troops from Lan-chou or
Golmo to Lhasa, there will be some interference with the supply opera-
tion currently underway while the operational traffic is-on the road.
However, there appears to be enough of a cushion between the 256 tons
per day required by the troops currently in Tibet, and the basic capa-
bility of the road of 385 tons per day delivered at Lhasa, to allow for
the simultaneous movement of supply traffic and operational traffic.
Once the new troops reach a total of about 90,000 the entire capacity
of the road would have to be used for resupply. Under those circum-'
stances there would be little or no capacity available for civilian or
operational military traffic..
The movement of 30,000 additional troops to Lhasa
under present conditions would take aboiit.a month if the staging area
were in. Lan-thou. ~7ut two-thirds of the daily capacity of the road
(165 trucks) is used to supply the 60,000 troops presently in position
in Tibet. This would .leave a capacity of 85 trucks per day to be used
by the new units moving into position.. If each infantry division of
15,000 men moved on its organic transportation it would take about 5.3
days to get all elements of the division on the road. Leading elements
,of the division would begin to arrive in Lhasa in 1.4 days. By the
middle of the 19th day the entire division would be in the area. The
next division would begin to arrive on the 19th day and would complete
its movement on the 24-th day:. These calculations do not take into
consideration the resupply problems.of the first elements: to arrive
which would complicate the movement of the last division. Thus, it is
estimated that it would take at least a month and possibly somewhat
longer to move 30,000 men to Tibet by truck under present conditions.
Once these troops were in position the entire capacity of the highway
would have to be used for resupply. If the Chinese should decide to
move 30,000 troops to Lhasa in excess of the 90,000 troops which can
realistically be supplied by the Lan-chow--Lhasa road, they may be
able. to do so on a crash basis. Such action, however, would probably
result in such severe damage to the road that it would not be able to
support logistically the troops in Tibet.
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In order to move realistically the remaining 30,000
troops into Tibet and supply a total of 120,000 troops by road, the
southern route from Ya-an to Lhasa must be reopened. This would require,
first, a military operation of some magnitude to reduce the rebel activ-
ity in the area. Secondly, several sections of the road would have to be
completely rebuilt. These two operations would probably take at least
30 and possibly 60 days. Once the road were opened, its capacity would
initially be about half that of the Lan-bad ..-Lhasa road. Thus, if
30,000 troops began moving from a staging area around Ya-an, they would
be in position in Tibet in 3 to 4 weeks. The capacity of the road would
then be sufficient for resupply of this contingent.
If the Chinese desire to triple the number of troops
presently in Tibet (60,OQQ to 180,000), 15,000 men above the 120,000,
discussed previously, could probably begin to move in over the recon-
structed southern route from Ya-an, a month after it has been opened to
traffic. These troops could also be supplied by this route. The remain-
ing 45,000 men would have to wait, however, upon substantial improvement
of the Ya-an route, an operation which would take several months.
d. Impact of Logistical Support on Railroads and on the Motor
Truck Park.
(1) Railroads.
A logistical build-up of the type discussed in this
report would have no significant effect on the railroads of Communist
China. Even if the Chinese reached the point where they were using the
Lan-thou--Lhasa road to capacity for purposes of resupply, no more than
the equivalent of one freight train per day would be needed to haul the
supplies to the staging area in Lan-chow. Under these conditions a total
of 750 tons would have to be moved daily into Lan-chou, an amount which
could easily be carried ?o train. Although the Lung-Hai line carries
heavy traffic between Lan-thou and Cheng-chou and congestion often exists
in the classification yards along the line, trains carrying military
supplies would be given such a high priority that they would not be
affected by these local conditions. Washouts dnd local flooding occa-
sionally occur on the line, but never to the extent that traffic is
impeded for any great length of time.
An alternate rail route to Lan-thou is the Pao-t'o.V--
Lan-chou line which was completed and opened for traffic in 1958. Al-
though this line is not as high a capacity line as the Lung-Hai, it
would provide an acceptable alternate way of getting supplies to Lan-
chou.if the Lung-114i, line were closed down for any appreciable length of
time.
POL, for an operation in Tibet, probably would be
supplied by the refinery in Lan-chow. Crude petroleum for the Lan-chou
refinery is hauled from the Yu-men field along the eastern section of
the Trans-Sinkiang Railroad. This traffic does not place a great strain
on the railroad line in this area and thus would not be a critical factor
in the situation.
Approv CIA-REYP
 If the southern road to Tibet were opened and it became
necessary to open a staging area in the Ya-an or Chengttu areas, supplies
would move by rail to Cheng'tu over the Lung-Hai and Pao-chi--Cheng'tu
lines. Approximately 375 tons per day would be required, This amount of
tonnage would place no great burden on the Lung-Hai line nor even on the
Parr-chi--Cheng'tu line which is. a much lower(:.,capacityy line., The latter
line, however, is much more subject to washouts and landslides and. con-
ceivably could be closed indefinitely under certain conditions. If this
situation occurred, the necessary supplies would have to be trucked,
around the break in the line. This would be a time-consuming operation
but would not seriously affect the flow of supplies to the staging .area
at Cheng'tu or Ya-an.
(2) Motor Truck. Park.
In order to supply 90,000 troops in. Tibet, the Lan-chow
--Lhasa road would have to be used to capacity.. This would require con-
tinuous use of slightly less than 7,000 trucks per month. About 5,130
trucks would be on the road at one time, 380 would be loading or unloading,
1,100 would be undergoing repairs or maintenance and 330 would be required
for vehicle replacement. This would.amount to about 8 percent of the
90,000 trucks in the civilian truck-park at the end of 1958. Since an
equal number of trucks are owned and operated by the military, an opera-
tion of the magnitude contemplated here would not place an undue strain
on the total truck park of the country.
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If the Chinese Communists should consider using an airlift to
augment the Lan-chou--Lhasa road for the supply of 120,000 men in Tibet,
they would find that it would be necessary to lift 128 tons per day --
the supply requirement for 30,000 men. It has been estimated earlier in
this report that the Lan-thou--Lhasa road can support 90,000 men.
The most practicable airfield within the interior of China for
ani'.airljft to Tibet is the rail-served field at Ian-chou, 1,380 air kilo-
meters (850 statute miles) from the Lhasa airfield. It is estimated that
on the westbound trip (Lan-chou to Lhasa) at the high altitude of flying
necessary, an I1-14 could carry a supply load of two tons and a Tu-4,
5,5 tons. It is further estimated that the average aircraft performance
would be more than one round trip daily. Therefore, to lift 128 tons to
Lhasa, each day, would require 64 I1-14's or.24 Tu-4's.
If an airlift to augment the Lan-chow--Lhasa road for the
supply of 180,000 men in Tibet is considered,, the Communists would find
that it would be necessary to lift 384 tons per day -- the supply require-
ment for 90,000 men.. The Lan-thou--Lhasa road can support 90,000 men..
An airlift of this magnitude would require the use of at least 20 mi_)1+s
In view of the above, it is estimated that the Chinese Com-
munists would not rely on an airlift to augment the Lan-chow-Lhasa road
to support a troop strength in Tibet of the magnitude of 120,000 or
180,000 men. To support a force of the latter size, additional aircraft
would have to be importedt the aviation gas requirement would be extremely
large and the scheduling of the arrival and departure of aircraft at the
Lhasa airfield may be beyond the capability of the Chinese.
It is within the capability of the Communists, however, to use
an airlift tosupplement the logistic support provided by road transport
to a moderate extent, possibly by as much .as 64 tons per day -- the
requirement for one division of 15,000 men. If the Chinese were willing
to commit their entire Air Force transport capability to this operation,
they could supply the Lhasa airfield with about 150 tons per day, enough
support for 35,000 men..
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