TRANSMITTAL OF SPECIAL STUDY OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
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• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2000
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• Publication Date: August 5, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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REP 049A002800010001-9
5 AUG 1963
Transmittal of p.ctsi ttidy of the Trani
portatiOtt 5ystms of Southern Africa
I. In r.uvary of this year, yo
In depth of the transportation systems of southern Mr
now completed a prelimiaary study in response to your request en
2. Y012 'Pal Ttntiehi the Foreword a this stud
Offices of CIA bays contributed to its preparat
considered to be preliminary, even though the statistic
probably not to old to support the principal conclusions
More entreat data, particularly en the Congo. will give us greeter
coundooco in die 9* flags, and maks the study more useful for refer-
ence purpoises. There is ale* a greet need for current information
on railroad freight rates and ocean freight rates, as applicable to
the principal exports of various territories of southern Africa, and
the impact of these rates on the competitive position of their I:Mr:Mt
in 'world markets.
3. A general up-dating of this tu8
comMents on the various political, economic,
would be meet valuable. Particular attention t
ocean freight rate aspects is required for defini !Ark- analysis. n-
d4rtskitetity INR and other headquarters components of the Department
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SUBJECT: Trans
of Special Study of the Trans
Systems of Southern Africa
could also be of great assistance by reviewing and co
the present drsft.
. I suggest that of this Office continue to
work with Mr. Lovas of your organisation in bringing this prelim
inary study along to a more definitive state.
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR. RE
25X1A
PORTS:
Chief, Economic Re*earcb Area
c1osure.
Z5 copies, iconornic and $trstegic Cp.bllitiee and
Vulnerabilitles of the Transportation 5 stems of
St/P/C:
Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
2 - OAD/RR
1 - Ch/E
1 - MS/TR
2 - St/P/C
1 - Chrono
Aug 63).3(5160
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? Enclosure 2 '
z,...orpApia-rovecITFor,Release 2000/05/15: CIA-R0P79T01049A002800010001-9
THE SeCRIZIA121. 01 s rATF
1,A4li?.1"1 on! :5.
CONFIDENTIAL
TO
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASH I NGTON
25X1A
?30, 3FY7
2& FEB ify
February 19, 1963
Chief, Liaison and Collection Division
Office of Central Reference
Central Intelligence Agency
'SUBJECT: Request for Special Study
If in a position to do so, the Agency is requested to undertake
the preparation of a special study respecting strategic factors in
central African transportation. The guidelines for such a study are
contained in the attached copy of a memorandum from the Departments
Office of Research and Anaaysis for Africa dated February ill 1963.
No time limit is put on the completion of this study, since
the Department is more interested in comprehensiveness than in speed.
Your cooperation will be appreciated.
Enclosure:
Memo, INR/RAF to
INR/CS? Feb. 11, 1963
ClydV- Snider ,
Chief, Intelligence Liaison Branch
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
CONFIDENTIAL
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ItO
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CONFIDENTIAL
INR/C3 Ila Snider
INR/RAF - Robert C. Good
Request for Special Study Respecting Strategic Factors in Central
African Transportation
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February 11, 1963
Increasing nationalist activity in central and southern Africa highlights ?
the vulnerability and growing strategic importance of transportation facilities
in the urea. Railroads, in particular, are both vital to the economic health
of the area and ponuIer targets for sabotage by guerrilla forces.
, Ia order to establish a firm basis on which to estimate the impact of -
potential or actual disruption of such facilities, we should like to request
that the CIA undertake a fairly extensive study focusing upon the following
cuestioas:
1) that is the economic and strategic (e.g., for troop movement) importance
of the ? inter-territorial rail lines serving Angola, Mozambiqae, Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Republic of Louth Africa? ifinat would be the economic
and strategic implications of a sustained disruption of traffic over these lines?
2) 13 the event of the disruption of any one line, would sufficient alter-
native facilities be available to sustain the present and projected traffic load?
If not, what portion of present and projected traffic could be re-routed without
major difficulty?
3) How significant are these lines as strategic levers -- i.e., to what
extent could the local administrative power utilize control of the rail lines
to force concessions from or retaliate against neighboring territories? (For
example, Northern vs. Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique vs. Nyasaland, Angola vs.
Congo-a:atanga)
4) To whet extent should we expect governments of the "white redoubt" (Portuga),
t Federation, South Africa) to assist each other in talatainiug the integrity of
transport feel-II-tie:a
5) At what eoints are the lines most vulnerable to attack by a well-organized
guerrilla force) .Can we identify those portions of the rail complex, control of
which might give a guerrilla force a decisive military advantage?
By way of illustration, we are interested in the following: How much in-
come do 2ortugal and/or the Provincialadministrations derive from the Beira
and Benguela rail lilies? Vhat proportion (giving full statistical background)
of aouthern Kotanea's-and Northern Rhodesia's trade. flow through Benguela?
hat is the projected capacity of the Congolese Vole Nationale to absorb
Southern Eatanean and Northern Rhodesian exports:TIE:us relleVrng these area
of dependence on Portueuese facilities?
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CONFIDENTIAL
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In sumary, it would be most useful to us to have a political-economic
analy5is, exploring the known economic factors in relation to suCh contingencieS
as are imii.cated in the preceding paragraph. We envision this as a fairly
dofinittve study whiC4 would incorporate sufficient statistical data to pro-
vide benChnarks for tuture analyeis.
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INR:EAF/11:JCut.1s/pLtn
CONFIDENTIAL
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CIA/RR EP 63-51
10 July 1963
Dept. of State
GG/N
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Chief,
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Filed in St/P/C
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(When Billed In)
TRANSMITTAL OF DRAFT REPORT FOR REVIEW AND PUBLICATION
PROJECT NO.
30.3889
TO : Chief, Economic Research Area
THRU: Chief Planning and Review Staff
TITLE, OR SUBJECT, OF REPORT
Economic and Strategic Capabilities and Vulnerabil-
ities of the Transportation Systems of Southern
Africa.
CONTRIBUTING ANALYST(S)
25X1A
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ATTACHMENTS: ORIGINAL AND TWO COPIES / // /// ..,
RECOMMENDED PUBLICATION CATEGORY
ER RA EM CO OTHER: EP
COORDINATING ANALYSTS
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1. It is recommended that the attached
EP. Please see "Foreword".
2. Working level coordination in process.
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be published
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as a. preliminary
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"DRAFT COPY"
ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES
OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
CIA/RR EP 63-51
(ORR Project 30.3889)
10 July 1963
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
I --,,,,uP 1
? .t. tam idtdmatit
damp adIng Ed
dectudnIcric. 1
"DRAFT COPY"
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FOREWORD
This preliminary study has been undertaken by the Office of Research and
Reports with the assistance of the Office of Current Intelligence at the request
of the Department of State. The preliminary major findings and conclusions are
concurred in by the staff of the Office of National Estimates. It is understood
that the Department of State will disseminate this draft study to the field for
additional review, emendation and updating, after which the Central Intelligence
Agency will be requested to produce a definitive report on this subject.
The study is concerned primarily with the Portuguese provinces of Angola
and Mozambique, the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Republic of:South Africa. Tanganyika is con-
sidered because an alternate transportation route for the trade of the Congo
Republic and the Federation exists through that country. The high commission
territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland are included because of
their economic dependence on South Africa and their transportation relationships
,with that country.
Department of State dispatches, official reports of the various tervi-
tories, United Nations' publications, and military estimates produced by the
Department of Defense constitute tne
bulk of the source material used for the study. The specific sources are
available in the files of this Office.
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Summary and Conclusions
I. Introduction
A. Political Considerations
B. The Economy of the Area
C. The Transportation of the Area
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II. The Economic and Military Significance of the Transportation
Routes of the Area 18
A. Angola' 18
1. Economic Significance 18
2. Military Significance 22
B. The Republic of the Congo 24
1. Economic Significance 24
2. Military Significance 27
C. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 29
1. Economic Significance 29
a. Southern Rhodesia 30
b. Northern Rhodesia 32
c. Nyasaland 33
2. Military Significance 34
D. Mozambique 36
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SECREKO RaCql DISSEM
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1. Economic Significance 36
2. Military Significance 41
E. The Republic of South Africa 45
1. Economic Significance 45
2. Military Significance 47
III. Consequences of the Imposition of Various Potential Controls on
Transportation Routes 50
A. Embargoes on Traffic 50
B. Sabotage by Insurgents 60
1. Angola 65
2. Congo 66
3. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 67
4. Mozambique 68
5. South Africa 68
C. Seizure of Parts of the Transportation System by Insurgent
Forces 70
1. General 70
2. The Physical Setting for Insurgency Ti
3. The Congo-Angola Route 72
4. The Tanganyika4tozaMbique Route 74
5. The Northern Rhodesia-Southern Rhodesia Route 75
6. Outlook 76
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Political Considerations Within the Area
Appendix B. The Economy of the Area
Appendix C. Transportation of the Area
Appendix D. Military and Security Forces in Southern Africa
Appendix E. Sabotage Targets
Tables
L. Population, Area, and Density of Population in Southern Africa
2. Cargo Handled by the Principal Ports of Southern Africa
3. Route Miles of Railroads and Improved Roads in Southern Africa
4. Relative Development of Railroad Transportation in the Territories
of Southern Africa
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
Figure 5.
Figure b.
Figure 7.
Figure
Railroads
Railroads
Railroads
Railroads
Railroads
Railroads
Railroads
Railroads
Illustrations
of Southern Africa (map)
of Southern Africa - Flow of Major Commodities (map)
of Southern Africa - Angola (map)
of Southern Africa - Republic of the Congo (map)
of Southern Africa - Rhodesia and Nyasaland (map)
of Southern Africa - Mozambique (map)
of Southern Africa - South Africa (map)
of Southern Africa - Tanganyika (map)
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THE =GNOMIC AND STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES OF THE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
Summary and Conclusions
The white-dominated territories. of Southern Africa, through their command of
the transportation outlets to the sea, derive considerable economic and strategic
advantages over the independent and soon-to-be independent non-white dominated
neighboring territories.!! These advantages result from the high dependence of
the market economies of both the non-white and the white territories on mineral anu
agricultural exports, and on the ability of the white-dominated territories to deploy
and support substantial military and security forces on the inter-territorial and
other transportation routes in Southern Africa. The white-dominated territories
could affect the economies of the other territories materially by the imposition of
embargoes on export and import traffic moving currently over the inter-territorial
railroad system. This system, plus the roads, also has the capability of providing
considerable mobility and substantial logistic support for military and security
forces for use in combating uprisings, terrorist activities, and sabotage operatioris
which may be inspired by African nationalism.
Although the economies of the white as well as the non-white dominated terri-
tories are highly vulnerable to adverse seizure and sabotage of the transportation
system, particularly the railroads, several years will pass before non-White
supported guerrilla forces will be able to hold temporarily parts of the inter-
territorial transportation system. Small bands of well-trained saboteurs may
soon have the capability, however, to operate against the railroad systems in
Angola, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, and
!Angola, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa.
** The Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland.
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the Republic of south Africa, possibly supported by the Congo, Northern Rhodesia,
Nyasaland and other non-white African countries. At least a year or two
will pass, nevertheless, before such bands will possess the skill to
damage critically the key railroad routes.
The territories of Southern Africa possess an area roughly equal to the con-
tinental United States and a population one-third as large. The almost four million
white residents control most of the modern economic enterprises which are based
primarily upon the output of extractive industries. Agricultural products, minernls
and metals, moreover, account for three-fourths or more of export earnings for each
of the West
of the countries and territories in the area. The populous, developed countries(
constitute the most important markets and sources of supply. Trade with Western
Europe alone involves nearly 60 percent of the exports and imports, and when trade
with United States and Japan is also considered, almost 75 percent of exports and
imports are accounted for. Only an estimated 10 to 12 percent of the foreign trade
of the territories of Southern Africa is carried on with other countries of the
area. Transportation within the area is underdeveloped except in the Repub1i, cf
South Africa, but is more than adequate to support the market economies in their
present stage of development. Only 10 percent of the 58 million netive non-white
Africans are involved in the market economies; the vast majority of the economic-n.14
active Africans are engaged in subsistence agriculture.
The territories in the so-called "white redoubt" (the Portuguese provinces of
Angola and Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa) have
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intelligence fields as
overcome long-standing antipathies and have begun to cooperate in the defense And/
territories elisewhere have come under non-white Control and as African nationalism
inside their own boundaries has become more militant. There has been no indication,
however, that they have given much thought to coordinated economic sanctions, and each
government probauly would embargo traffic with the interior only if directly and severely
provoked by the non-white territory in question. If the "white redoubt" were to combine
in an embargo of railroad traffic against the Congo, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
the effect on the market economies of the latter territories would be devastating.
The Republic of South Africa is a special case, for this country is not dependent on
trade with the non-white territories and is not geographically situated so as to be aole
to impose an effective embargo on traffic with these territories. The vulnerability of
South Africa to external pressures stems principally from the importance of trade with
the West, primarily the United Kingdom and the United States.
The Portuguese provinces of Angola and MozaMaque, although only nominal producers
of minerals, lie astride major railroad routes over which the minerals of the Congo and
Northern Rhodesia are exported to world markets. If the Portuguese provinces were to
impose an embargo on traffic with the Congo and all or part of the Federation or Ruodesia
and Nyasaland, the consequences for the market economies .of the latter territories would
be serious. By means of an embargo of traffic with Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia,
acting alone, could effectively deny the railroad capacity heeded for one-third of
Northern Rhodesia's export-import traffic. The reluctance of the white-dominated
territories to act together in imposing an embargo ou, traffic or to act independently
will be influenced to some extent by the considerable revenues obtained from the transit
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traria of the non-white territories and to a lesser extent by the trading relations which
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exist between the two camps.
The fact that the vast majority of the native non-white Africans are engaged
in subsistence agriculture could make the African nationalists willing to sacrifice
the interests of the market economies of the area, and also poses problems in the
formulation of goals for African nationalism. If African nationalism should have
the choice to adopt as its goal the preservation of the market economies and the
introduction of more and more of its members into these economies, it would not be
rational to take actions which would invite embargoes on the traffic which normally
moves over the inter-territorial transportation system or to support sabotage and
guerrilla operations against this system. On the other hand, if African nationalism
should by chance or by design adopt as a goal the complete control over all of
Southern Africa in the shortest possible time regardless of economic cobsequen,..!es,
seizure and sabotage of the inter-territorial transportation system will become an
attractive target to use in furthering this goal.
In the event of a major uprising, the military and security forces of the
white-dominated territories will be unable to maintain the integrity of the some
20,000 miles in the railroad system, but at the same time they will be able to
operate against saboteurs and insurgents with only a slight reduction in capaoility
even though the transportation system is no longer able to support normal economic
activity. Thus the chief impact of a major uprising which succeeds in interrupting
transportation service would fall on the market economies of the region, and it
could also be serious enough to disrupt relations with the West. In this event
normal trade would be interrupted from time to time and private investments required
for the further development of the territories would probably be drastically reduced.
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I. Introduction
A. Political Considerations
The area encompassed in this report includes one independent, white-
dominated republie (South Africa), one white-dominated British colony with a long
history of self-government (Southern Rhodesia), two British protectorates whose
governments are dominated by African nationalists (Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland),
two Portuguese "overseas provinces" whose, white-controlled governments are closely
supervised from Lisbon (Angola and Mozambique), one independent but chaotic African
republic (Congo-Leopoldville) one territory governed by South Africa under a League
of Nations mandate (South-west Africa), and three backward high commission territories
which are governed by Britain but are economically dependent on South Africa (Basuto-
land, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland). The two Rhodesias and Nyasaland are joined at
present in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, but negotiations to begin the
Federation's dissolution are underway. The whites in Southern
Rhodesia are trying to persuade the British to grant them independence at the same
time as the Federation's. two African territories; Britain is holding out for greatly
increased African representation in the colony's legislature but has to move
cautiously for fear Southern Rhodesia will declare its independence unilaterally.
As territories elsewhere on the continent have come under African control
and as African nationalism inside their own boundaries has become more militant,
*Includes: principally Angola, the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Mozambique, and the Republic of South Africa.
The high commission territories andtAaganyikkareovered predominantly in Appendix
B and Appendix C.
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the territories in the so-called "white redoubt" (South Africa, Southern Rhodesia,
and the Portuguese territories) have overcome long-standing antipathies and now
bold discussions in the defense and intelligence sectors. Formal treaties of
cooperation -- much less such widely bruited amalgamations as that of Southern
Rhodesia with South Africa -- are unlikely to occur. South Africa, whose strong
and diversified economy includes a fairly substantial armaments industry, might
furnish economic and military assistance, including "volunteers", to white govern-
ments to the north in an emergency; it probably would send uniformed troops out of
the country only if its interests were directly affected, such as through the
seizure of Lourenco Marques, and if it thought there was a chance of turning back
an African advance. The other territories of the "white redoubt" lack the economic
and military strength to indulge in large-scale military activity beyond their
borders, although there is a remote possibility that Southern Rhodesia would feel
constrained to intervene militarily if the port of Beira in Mozambique were en-
dangered by African nationalist forces.
In their control of outlets to the sea, the white territories have considerable
leverage over their independent and soon-to-be independent African neighbors. There
d
has been no indication, however, that they have given much thought to coordinated
economic sanctions, and each government probably would embargo traffic from the
interior only if directly and severely provoked by the African territory in question
(far instance, if the territory provided a safe-haven for continuous insurgent
action which would win international notoriety for an insurgent group).
Insurgency and sabotage exists or is a possibility in much of the area.
The Angolan rebellion has persisted for two years in the northwestern corner of the
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territory; its chances of spreading are not good over the short term, but even at
its present level it constitutes a drain on the Portuguese economy. A similar
outbreak could occur in Mozambique, although Mozambique nationalists face serious
problems of training and unity of a type which have long plagued the Angolans.
Sabotage has occurred sporadically in South Africa and has also broken out in
Southern Rhodesia. Both governments, by harsh laws and rigid enforcement, have
sharply cut the number of Incidents. Nevertheless underground organizations in
South Africa still probably possess some sabotage capability and saboteurs based in
Northern Rhodesia might be able to do a certain amount of damage in Southern Rhodesia,
Sabotage in Southern Rhodesia would be more likely if the current talks between the
British and Southern Rhodesian governments break down. Sabotage forays from the
Congo against the railways in Angola or from Nyasaland against the railway across
Mozambique to Beira are possible. In both cases, the African governments in the
host territories have been compelled to be cautious in their encouragement of the
activities of anti-Portuguese militants, and the latter have shown no sabotage
capability. Africans from the territories of the "white redoubt" are undergoing
sabotage training abroad, however. Their training may be stepped up as a result
of the May 19o3 African "summit conference" in Addis Ababa, which took a militant
stand against the remaining white and colonial territories and urged black African
stateti to take positive measures to aid African nationalists from these areas. The
Nationalists' ability to disrupt the market economies of the various territories is
therefore likely to increase, although it will be several years before they con-
stitute a serious challenge to the present governments.
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B. The Economy of the Area
The countries in Southern Africa possess an area roughly equal to the con-
tinental United States and a population about one-third as large. The almost four
million white residents, i.e., those of EUropean progeny, control most of the modern
economic enterprises in the area. In contrast, only 10 percent of the 58 million
native Africans are involved in the monetary sector; the vast majority of econemi-
cally active Africans are engaged in subsistence agriculture. The Republic of South
Africa hac the highest population density of any major political unit in the area;
Angola has the lowest. Table 1 presents the population, area and density of popula-
tion in each of the territories.*
The economies of the area are based primarily upon the output of extractive
industries; this is true even for South Africa, which has a substantial and diversi-
fied manufacturing industry. Moreover, extractive industries also form the backbone
of foreign commerce: agricultural products, minerals, and metals account for three-
fourths or more of export earnings for each of the countries and territories in the
region.
Southern Africa produces significant quantities of strategic minerals as
shown by the following tabulation.
Southern Africa
Production of Selected Minerals
Thousand ghort Tons - 1961
Production
Percent of Free World Production
Copper
1,054.0
26
Manganese
858.0
29
Come
721.0
65
A
Vanadium
2.2
25
Cobalt
11.0
59
Gold
0.815
69
* Page 11 below.
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The populous developed countries constitute the most important market and
sources of supply for Southern Africa. Trade with Western Europe alone involves
nearly 60 percent of the exports and imports of the region. When trade with the
United States and Japan is also considered, almost 75 percent of exports and im-
ports are accounted for. The relative importance of Western Europe and the United
States in the total trade of selected countries is shown below.
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%nth 111,
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Percent of Total Trade with Western Europe
and the United States in 1961 for
Selected Territories*
Angola
Exports
Imports
66
21
72
79
10
46
Western Europe
United States
Federation
Western Europe
United States
1
Mozambique
Western Urope
56
67
United States
5
7
South Africa
Western Europe
54
55
United States
8
18
The above data illustrate the almost complete dependence of this area on
trade with West European powers and the United States, and the lever that these
trading relations could represent against the market economies in the various terri-
tories. They also point out, however, that the lever held by the United States
alone is not great. Moreover, as will be discussed more fully below, the existence
of a transportation network connecting the various territories in the area and the
established regional trade ties would probably make ineffective actual or threatened
cessation of trade on the part of a group of western powers with a single territory
in the area. The effect of such action could be circumvented by the simple expedient
of having a close neighbor assume the role of trade agent.
An estimated 10 to 12 percent of the foreign trade of countries in southern
Africa is carried on with other countries in the area. The relative importance of
1961
* The Republic of the Congo is omitted from the tabulation because/data are not
available for this country. In 1959 Western Europe accounted for 76 percent of the
Congas exports and the United States, 11 percent. In the same year Western Europe
supplied 67 percent of the Cones imports and the United States, 13 percent.
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intra-regional trade for selected countries is shown below.
avoramomomormonumnommilmall.,
Intra-regional Trade as a Percent of
Total Trade in 19o1
Country
Exports
Imports
Angola
7
4
Congo (Leopoldville)
34
21
Federation
10
34
Mozambique
10
lb
South Africa
12
6
Wantitatively, the largest trade accounts are those between South Africa and the
Federation, and oetween South Africa and the Congo.
Within the area under consideration, economic sanctions of a scope that wf,
be politically possible may not create severe economic disruptions, but insurgent
action oy African nationalist groups might well prove more deollitating. The abrupt
decline in investment and the consequent economic recession that followed the Sharpes-
yule riots in 1960 suggest that a far more serious crisis in confidence could result
from an organized and sustained insurgent campaign.
The prime casualty of prolonged insurrection would be the market sector, whizz'
provides the economic life blood of the white residents. The native non-whites who
rely heavily on subsistence agriculture, are in a far better position to survive even
the most severe economic repercussions.
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Table 1
Population, Area, and Density of Population in Southern Africa
eir
Territory
Nan-White
(EITI;;;)
Angola
Congo (Leopoldville)
Federation of Rhodesia and
4.6
13.8
Nyasaland
9.18
Northern Rhodesia
2.50
Southern Rhodesia
3.70
Nyasaland
2.97
Mozambique
6.501
Republic of South Africa
13.0
South-West Africa
.446
Bechuanaland
.319
Basutoland
.600
Swaziland
.269
TOTAL
57.9
Population Area Population
White Total (Square Ni.) La
(Thousands) (Millions) (Thousands) Square Mile
2oo.o/2/
140.0
310.0
77.0
223.0
9.40
,
99.0
2:800.0
78.7
1.0
2.0
1.0
3776-
4.8o
480.o
10.0
14.0
900.0
15.5
9.49
484.0
19.6
2.58
288.0
).0
3.93
150.0
6.2
2.98
46.0
64.8
6.60
300.0
27()
15.8
472.0
33.5
.525
320.0
1.6
.320
220.0
1.4
.602
11.70
51.5
.270
6.70
40.3
---75777
61.8
3,680.0
W All data are rounded to three significant figures. Totals and densities are
derived independently from unrounded figures and do not always agree with
rounded data shown.
12./ Includes some mulattoes.
11
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C. Transportation of the Area
Transportation service within Central and Southern Africa is provided
predominantly by several interconnecting, narrow-gauge railroad systems and some
ten short, disconnected, narrow-gauge railroad lines!' Over 95 percent of the
long-haul and intercity freight and a substantial share of the passengers are
hauled by the railroads, most of which are owned by the governments of the various
in the interconnected aystem
territories. All of the major railroads are operating at a profit. The railroads/
consist of about 20,000 route miles, about doable the length of the Southern Pacific
Railroad in the United States, and more than a third longer than the Japanese
National Railroad System. Almost two-thirds of the route mileage in the area is
Most of the rolling stock,
under the jurisdiction of the Republic of South Africa.\ 'about 3170C
locomotives, 133,000 freight cars, and 7,100 passenger cars in the area,
! 3' 6" gauge and interchangeable between systems. /n addition, there are
about 600 electric locomotives which are not interchangeable.
The road network consists of 10,000 miles of paved, all-weather roads,
60,000 miles of gravel-surfaced, and another 350,000 miles of improved earth roads
and tracks -- a total road mileage equivalent to that found in the States of Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia and Texas, but much inferior in quality. There are now at least
1,250,000 automobiles, 400,000 civilian motor trucks, and 24,000 buses, over three-
quarters of which are registered in the Republic of South Africa. The trucks and
buses are used primarily to provide local service and service to areas not served
by the railroads.
! The gauge of the interconnected railroad system is 3' 6". The gauge of the
railroads in the United States and in Western and Eastern Europe is 4' 8 1/2".
Japan is the only modern, industrialized country that relies exclusively on a
railroad system built to the gauge of 3' 6". The disconnected railroad lines
are of varying narrow gauge.
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Inland waterways are important only in the Repuolic of the Congo where,
during normal times, an integrated inland waterway and railroad network is the
principal form of transportation for long distance movements of freight. Coastal
shipping is important for Angola and Mozambique but only small tonnages are moved
by this form of transportation. There is only one pipeline in the area, a 200-mile
double line of email diameter which carries: gasoline and diesel fuel from the port
of Ango Ango to Leopoldville in the Republic of the Congo. The Republic of South
Africa has the bulk of the 11 well-developed seaports which have hip capacity and
cargo activity. In addition, there are nine seaports of secondary importance in
the area as a whole. Some excess capacity exists in all of the ports above the
requirements or current imports and exports. See Table 2 for the tonnage of cargo
handled by the principal ports of Southern Africa.'
At least 30. different snipping companies provide liner service between
southern Africa and the United Kingdom and continental Western Europe including
flag carriers of the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Norway,
West Germany, uhana, Nigeria, and South Africa. In addition, a large number of carriers
under various flags provide both liner and tramp service between Southern African ports
and various other countries of the Free and Communist world. Three United states
flag carriers provide liner Services netween the ports of Southern Africa and the
United States.
Seven airlines, local to the area, maintain service between the principal inland
cities and seaports. The South African Airways provides jet airline service to Nuropeo
the Middle Bast and Australia. International Free World air carriers also provide
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service to various cities in the area, and Aeroflot, the Soviet carrier, has recently
attempted to establish service to Stanleyville in the Congo. Nine of the 280 airfields
in the area are capable of handling jet transports, but the remaining fields are suitable
for at least DC-3 type aircraft. There are only slightly over 100 transport aircraft
of all types owned by the airlines of the area.
The development and use of transport varies considerably from one zone to
another in the ares under consideration. See Table 3 for the route miles of rail-
roads and improved roads in the territories of Southern Africa and the density by
population and area."' Is the northern tier -- Angola and the Congo (Leopoldville)
See Page 17 below.
. ,
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and considering Tanganyika for this purpose for it provides an alternate route
to the sea for the Congo -- the rail and road systems are not well developed.
Normally, however, they are able to support the needs of the economy and there is
some excess in capacity in all forms of transport including port operations. The
railroads have adequate and reasonably well-maintained equipment, although the
roadbeds are of relatively light construction and do not support heavy loads
and high speed trains. Currently, in the Congo, the integrated rail and inland
water network has been disrupted because three railroad bridges were damaged some
time ago and have not yet been restored to support traffic. Moreover, motor trucks
and roads, as well as the railroads, have deteriorated because of little or no main-
tenance. The lack of spare parts has also immobilized a large number of motor trucks.
Transportation in the Congo, therefore, is currently not supporting the economy.
The rail links to Angola and Northern Rhodesia are well-maintained but the railroad
to Lake Tanganyika, where steamers and barges connect with the Tanganyika railroads
providing access to the Indian Ocean, is not being used extensively.
The middle tier, consisting of the Federation -- Northern Rhodesia, Southern
Rhodesia and Nyasaland -- and Mozambique, has heavier and well-maintained railroad
systems with some advanced technology installed to increase capacity. Most of the
freight traffic in this tier, taken as a whole, is internal, but the economy is
supported Largely by railborne exports to the seaports of Mozambique. For practical
purposes, there is only one good main highway which extends in a north-south direc-
tion with a branch leading to the Mozambique coast. A small amount of local inland
waterway traffic moves along the Zambezi River on the separate stretches which are
separated by waterfalls and cataracts,.
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The final tier is represented by the transportation under the control of
the Republic of South Africa. Some examples of modern technology are apparent
on the railroad system, but for the most part the technology of the system is
comparable to that which existed on the U. S. railroads in the early 1930s.
Even so, the railroads are well-built, well-maintained, and are capable of support-
ing heavy loads moved at relatively hiph speeds. The main divisions on the system
are seldom overloaded even at seasonal peaks in traffic. The road system, the other
major form of transportation, is also relatively well-developed and maintained.
Road freight and passenger services, however, are regulated so that they supple-
ment rather than compete with the services provided by the railroad system.
Data on the relative development of railroad transportation in the terri-
tories of Southern Africa are presented in Table :! These data and the data
**
contained in Table 3 - also characterize the development of railroads in the three
tiers mentioned above. The northern tier has less railroads per area than that
found in the other two tiers. Even in normal times, the freight traffic density
per route mile of railroad is less than that found to the south. The low ratio
of freight cars to locomotives points up the light construction of the railroads
where short trains with small loads are operated. The progressive improvement of
the ratios in areas to the south emphasize the existence of better track, equipment
and operations in the middle and final tiers.
* Page _Ile below .
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Table 2
Cargo Handled by the Principal Ports of Southern Africa 5/
(Thousand Short Tons)
Port
Inbound
Outbound
Transshipped
Total
Durban
4,584
5,888
139
10,611
Lourenco Marques
3,221
4,598
N.A.
7,819
Cape Town
3,047
2,293
43
5,883
Beira
1,624
2,003
N.A.
3,627
Port Elizabeth
1,553
1,047
8
2,608
Lobito
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1,690
Matadi
927
598
N.A.
1,525
East London
999
354
3
10350
Walvis Bay
316
589
N.A.
905
Luanda
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
848
Nbssel Bay
149
15
N.A.
1e4
TOTAL
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
36,736
tJ Data are for the higheit yearly tonnage recorded during the period 1957 - 1962.
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Table 3
Route Miles of Railroads and Improved Roads 2/ in Southern Africa
and the Density by Population anri Area
Route Niles of Railroads
Route Miles of Roads
Interconnected
Per
10,000
Per
100
10,000
Per
100
Territory
System
Other
Total
Population
Sguare Mlles
Total
PopulAtion
Square Miles
Angella
879
907
1,786
3.72
' 0.37
8000
16.67
1.67
Congo (Leopoldville)
2260
927
S2185
2.28
0.35
25400
18.14
2.82
Federation of Rhodesia &
NyassIkila
2568
Nil
2,568
2.7
0.52
16250
17.10
3.36
- Northern Rhodesia
666
Nil
666
2.56
0.23
3000
11.54'
1.04
Southern Rhodesia
1586
Nil
1,586
4.07
1.06
12700
32.56
8.47
NyasAlAnd
316
Nil
316
1.05
0.69
650
2.15
1.41
Mozambique
1044
667
1,711
2.59
0.57
5800
8.79
1.93
Republic of South Africa
11754
44-0
12,194
7.72
2.58
101000
63.92
21.40
South-West Africa
1453
Nil.
1,453
26.91
0.46
4000
80.00
1.25
Bechnanalmo
400
Nil.
11-00
13.33
0.18
2500
83.33
1.14
Basutoland
Negligible
Nil.
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
900
15.00
7.69
Swaziland
140
Nil.
Nil.
Nil.
Nil.
1100
40.00
16.
Total
20198
2941
23297
4.18
.703
181,300
34.14
20.29
a. Includes roads surfaced with bitumen, or consisti
b. About 140 miles currently under construction.
of gravel or improved earth.
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S141 rn r, I ri
Table 4.
Relative Development of Railroad Transportation in the Territories of Southern Africa
Railroad
Route
Locomotives
Freight
Cars
Annual
Ton Miles
Route
Miles per
Freight cars
per
Territory
Miles
(Units)
(Units)
of Freight a/
Locomotive'
Route Miles
million
Angola
1786
180
2405
11130.1
9.92
1.35
Republic of the Congo pi
3100
464
8615
1,985.4
6.68
2.78
Federation of Rhodesia &
Nyasaland
2968
456
12,630
5,025.6 -
6.51
4:26
Northern Rhodesia
666
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Southern. Rhodesia
Total Rhodesias
1986 2/
2652
N .A .
424
N.A.
12,247
N.A.
4,934
6.25
4.62
Nyasaland
316
32
383
91.6
9.87
1.21
Mozambique
1711
220
5568
1:386.4
7.77
3.25
Republic of South Africa A/
1.3207
3390
liat000
25,600
4.00
8.33
Total
22,772
4620
139,218
35,127.5
4.6o
6.25
Ton Mlles
of Freight
per Mile
of Route
Ratio of FrSigh
cars to PI
Locomotive
632:754
13.36
'cg
0
640,452
18.56
cri2
11693:261
27.70
1-5
(7)
? ?
1,860,482
28.88
239,973
11.96
sc5
810,391
25.31
co?
C?1
1,938,366
33.33
cow
1,560l000
30.00
u_
a. Highest annual freight traffic in last five years.
b. Excludes Boma-Tchela railroad, 85 miles.
c. Includes 400 miles in Bechuunalard.
d. Includes all 3 feet 6 inch gauge railroads in South Africa
and South West Africa, but excludes 440 miles of lesser gauge.
?17a?
r- rrlf"!
;
w
0.
0.
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II. The Economic and Military Significance of the Transportation Routea of the
Area *
A. Angola
1. Economic Significance of the Transportation System
The transportation system of Angola is not well developed and is designed
primarily to provide routes for the extort of Angolan production rather than to
facilitate the over-all growth and development of the domestic economy. Almost all
of the transportation routes are oriented in an east-wept direction. The north-south
movement of goods is virtually impossible in the eastern Tart of the country and
these movements are largely dependent upon coastal shipping in the western part of
the country.
The railroads are the backbone of the transportation system and provide
the only significant 'maps for the movement of commercial freight traffic between
the major producing and consuming areas and between the seaports and the interior
of the country. The railroads consist of four basic narrow-gauge, single track,
unconnected routes which are described in detail in Appendix C. All railroadn aro
oriented in an east-west direction, a direction designed primarily to facilitate
the extort of Angolan products and, in the case of the Benguela Railroad which is
the only international route, to earn the considerable revenues from transit traf-
fic from and to the Congo and Northern Rhodesia.
The Benguela Railroad Company is a privately awned enterprise registered
* See Appendix C for a detailed analysis of transportation in the various territories.
or details on the military and security forces and logistic requirements for the
forces in the vari,ous territories, see Appendix D.
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1110111rtse I S. II ILI tr.? IVidliatil
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in Portugal and with headquarters in Lisbon,:
The African office for
management of the railroad is in Lobito, Angola. stock in the railroad company con-
sists Of 30000,000 shares with a value of $23,073,600. Almost 90 percent of the
stock, 2,693,750 shares, are owned by Tanganyika Concessions, Ltd., which is regis-
tered in the United Kingdom but with headquarterS in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia.
About 10 percent of the stock is owned by the Portuguese government and the remain-
ing shares, less than one percent, are held by 13 'Private individuals in varying
amounta. The railroad is operated on a 99-year concession granted to the railroad
by the Decree of 28 November 1902.*
The Benguela Railroad provides the shortest and the most economical
route between the southern part of the Congo and the Atlantic Ocean. About 73 per-
cent of the railroad's revenues are believed to be derived from transit traffic of
freight and passengers between Xatanga and Northern Rhodesia and the Angolan port
of Lobito. Revenues from mineral traffic alone from the Congo and Northern Rhodesia
in 1960 and 1961 represented 45.6 and 35.6 percent respectively of the total reve-
nues of almost 21 million dollars earned by the Benguela Railroad during each of
those years. The Angolan government does not subsidize the Benguela Railroad and
neither does it guarantee a profit to the railroad. However, government policy pro-
hibits competition from other modes of transport Which tends to insure profitable
operations; As a concessionaire, the Angolan government receives a share of the
* Tanganyika Concessions, Ltd. also obtains royalties from the exploitation of
mineral deposits by the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga.
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profits of the railroad. It appears, therefore, that a diversion of Congo traffic
away from the Benguela Railroad would mean riot only financial distress for the rail-
road company but a considerable loss of revenue to the Angolan government unless,
of course the Benguela Railroad could obtain a sufficient amount of traffic from
another source, say Northern Rhodesia, to offset the loss of Congo traffic. Apart
from the financial effects on the railroad, the loss of the transit traffic normally
handled by the railroad to and from the Tort of Lobito would result also in a con-
siderable financial loss in port fees. Over 40 percent of the traffic through
Lobito is Congo and Rhodesian transit traffic. Moreover, the loss in railroad and
port tonnage and revenue would result in a considerable reduction in employment in
the market economy.
Apart from the importance of the Benguela Railroad from an international
viewpoint, the railroads of Angola are the principal carriers of export goods.
Agricultural products account for 6o- percent and minerals 25 percent of the value
of Angola s exports. The producing areas are in the interior of the country and the
railroads carry almost all of the export goods produced to the ports. Inbound traf-
fic to the interior of the country is very light and, in the case of the Benguela
Railroad, represents about one-Sixth of the total traffic carried including inter-
national transit traffic.L.
i t
An examination of the Angolan budget for 1962 reveals that about 13
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percent of the total government revenues are derived from receipts from ports,
railroads and other transportation.
Eicluding those areas of Angola which are served by the railroads or
which are near the sea, large areas of the country are entirely dependent upon earth.
surfaced roads and tracks as the only means Of freight transport. There are 22,000
miles of roads in the country, a density of about 1.67 miles per 100 square miles
of area, and about 16.67 miles per 10,000 head of population. In the southeastern
area referred to by the Portuguese as the "fin do mundo" or end of the world, there
are no roads at all. The only north-south roads are in the western third of the
country and Only about 100 miles of these are paved. During the rainy season which
lasts from November until May, the major portion of the road net becomes virtually
impassable to commercial motor Vehicles and some areas are completely isolated for
days at a time. Motor vehicles registration amounts to about 43,000 vehicles or
1 to 107 head of population.
There is no developed inland waterway system as most of the streams are
remote from the centers of the economy and serve only as local transport arteries
for primitive river craft. In the absence of north-south railroads or even ade-
quate north-south highways, a considerable amount of traffic is carried by coastal
vessels and in 1962, coastal traffic through the port of Lobito alone amounted to
almost 100,000 tons.
The three principal seapOrts of Luanda, Lobito and Mocamedea are fairly
well developed and adequate for the current needs of the economy. Lobito is rated
21
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among theinFigfrolaetas9ASNIVPdactAfeRRIPErtgenCt2819PWAliPly operating
at well below capacity. Its capacity to handle mineral ore is believed to be at
least 100 percent greater than the ore traffic currently moving through the port.
The one international airport is at Luanda on the Atlantic coast. Prac-
tically all of the other airports are located in the western half of the country.
Some of these have landing strips 6,500 feet in length and the rest of the country
is served by mnaller airports with limited capacity capable of handling DC-3 and
smaller liaison type aircraft. The single airline in Angola (DTA) owns 14 aircraft
Of which three are EC-3s and the remainder are smaller.
2. Militarz Significance of the Transportation System
The transportation system of Angola is believed to be capable of sup-
porting a far greater military force than the Portuguese will be able to muster in
the country in the foreseeable future. This is particularly true of the railroads
and the ports. There would be some difficulty in supplying large forces in the
areas remote from the railroads during the rainy season because of the inadequacy
of the road net; however, the effects of bad weather are not as significant to a
military force with four-wheel drive, military-type vehicles as it is to commercial
type vehicles. Nevertheless, the employment of engineering troops capable of
repairing and maintaining roads and road bridges would be necessary to insure unin-
terrupted movement of heavy motor vehicles.
The Portuguese army strength in Angola is 1.n excess of 400000
troops. Air VOrce personnel number about 107000 and the Angolan Naval Command bat;
22
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about 400 officere and men. In addition, there is a local civilian volunteer corps
which provides defense for individual plantations in the pert of Angola where insur-
gents operate.
The general construction of the railroads is sound and the maintenance
of routes and equipment is good. The Benguela Railroad is the most important rail-
road route because it traverses the very heart of the country from Lobito on the
Atlantic coast to Dila? on the Congo border, a distance of 838 miles. The estimated
through put capacity of the route for military traffic is 1,800 tons per day which
is sufficient to supply a Portuguese security force of 144,000 men.* Moreover, the
present commercial traffic flow is heavily weighted from east to west at a ratio
of 5 to I.. As a consequence, much of the eastbound traffic is made up of trains of
empty freight cars. It is therefore apparent that a major portion of the military
supplied could be moved without seriously disrupting commercial traffic over the
route.
The estimated capacity of the Luanda Railroad which runs from the port of
Luanda to Malanje, a distance of 265 miles, is 960 tens per day, an amount sufficient
to rapport a force of about 77,000 at,Malanje. The estimated capacity of the Mo-
camedes Railroad from Mocamedes to Vila Serpo Pinto, 469 miles, is about 1,160 tons
.per day, an amount sufficient to supply a force of about 931000. Commercial traf-
fic flow- over these routes is also heavily weighted from east to west.
* Computed on the tMAiS of a logistic requirement of 25 pounds per ran per day.
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The capacities of the ports to handle military supplies using ship'is
gear alone is even greater than the capacities of the railroads which serve them.
The highway which parallel' the Benguela Railroad from Lobito to the
Congo border is capable of handling about 550 tons per day which is adequate to
supply a Portuguese security force of about 44,000 troops. Another example of road
route capacity is the route leading north from the port of Luanda to the Congo
border near Matadi, passing directly through the area of recent rebel activity. In
fair weather, the route is capable of sustaining about 140 vehicles carrying three
tons each per day. This is adequate to support a force of about 33,000 troops.
However, sections of the route may become virtrally impassable during the rainy sea-
son to anIthing other than four-wheel drive vehicles, and difficult even for them.
The international airport at Luanda has considerable military signifi-
cance particularly for the airlift of troops from Portugal, and for airlifting
troops' supplies to the other airfields in the country from Which supplies can be
further distributed by air drops.
B. Congo SLeopoldville)
1. Economic Signficance of the Transportation System
Prior to independence in 1960, the transportation system of the Congo
was well-organized and managed, and adequate for the needs of the economy in the
stage of economic development existing at that time. The system VISA a good example
of coordinated railroad and inland waterway system with one mode complementing but
not competing with the other. PUblic motor vehicle transport served primarily as
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a. feeder service to the railroads and inland waterways although many of the larger
farms and even some mines operated considerable fleets of motor vehicles over pri-
vate and public provincial roads to deliver their production to markets and to rail-
heads and river ports. The disturbed conditions which have existed since indepen-
dence in 1960 have not changed the basic pattern of the transportation system, but
the wanton destruction of railroad bridges, inadequate maintenance of route facili-
ties, rolling stock and locomotive's, a shortage of spare parts, and an almost com-
plete disregard for highway maintenance, have reduced the system to an uncoordinated,
disconneeted and relatively inefficient system.
The Congo giver and its tributaries forms the backbone of the system
with railroads providing by-passes for unnavigable portions of the river. The main
network Of railroads is in the southern area of the country where through rail routes
provide connections with the railroads of Angola and the Atlantic Ocean, and with
the Rhode alas and through Mozambique or South Africa to the Indian Ocean. Also,
the PM Railroad, running from the border of Northern Rhodesia, connects with the
'Congo River services at Port Francqui which, in turn, connects with a railroad at
Leopoldville running to Matadi, the principal seaport on the lower Congo River.
This route is commonly known as the "Route Nationale" and is the only through route
entirely within the Congo giving access to the sea for traffic from and to the in-
dustrial area in Katanga Province. The length of the Route Nationale from Elise-
bethville to Mhtadi is 1,7]3 miles. At present', damaged railroad bridges prevent
through traffic on the route and almost all export-import traffic from Katanga and
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parts of Resta Provinces is routed over the Angolan Railroad to the Atlantic Ocean
port Of Lobito., However, small quantities Of freight from Hatanga Province are also
moving over the Rhodesian railroads to Indian Ocean ports.
In 1961, the first full year after independence, the transportation sys-
tem carried only 60 percent of the tonnage carried in 1959, the last pre-indepen-
dence year. Moreover, traffic through the port of Matadi dropped from 1.5 million
tons in 1959 to only 850 thousand tons in 1961, a reduction of more than 45 percent.
The decline in freight traffic no doubt reflects, to some degree at least, a con-
current decline in the over-all economic posture of the country.
An effort is currently underway to repair damaged bridges on the rail-
roads in Ritanga Province and thus restore service over the "Acute Nationale", and
it is probable that the route will be restored in the late summer of 1963. However,
Other problems will continue to plague the Congolese for some time to come. Silting
of the lower Congo River between Matadi and the sea is a serious problem, and the
Congolese have not been able to obtain a sufficient supply of spare parts to ade-
quately maintain the dredges used to keep the channel clear. If this is not done,
access to the sea will be limited and large petroleum tankers may not be able to
deliver fuel, all of which is imported. Channel markers and buoys on the Congo
River above Leopoldville have not been maintained and some have even been removed.
In many' areas, jungle growth is reportedly taking over some of the roads in rural
areas. A shortage of spare parts and general neglect of maintenance has resulted
in many motor vehiOles being withdrawn from service. In general, it will probably
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take A long time, even years, to restore the transportation system to its pre-indepen-
dence state of efficiency.
2. Military Significance of the Transkortation System
When the transporation system is functioning properly, the access routes
to the Congo and the railroad and river routes leading to the principal population
centers within the country are capable of supporting a. far greater military force
than wOuld conceivably be deployed in any given area in the immediate future. Some
? difficulty will be encountered in rural areas rembte from the railroads and the prin-
cipal inland waterways because of the inadequacy of the highway net. This is partic-
ularly true during the rainy Aeason, not only because the road surfaces are washed
away but also because of the washing away of primitive timber bridges which predom-
inate in the remote areas. Therefore, large-scale military operations in parts of
the country that are dependent on roade for ground transportation, cannot be con-
ducted without the employment of engineering troops.capable of restoring, repairing
and maintaining the roads to that they will support heavy traffic by trucks.
The Congolese National Army consists of about 25,000 troops organized
into 24 battalions. The Katangan ?gendarmerie, which totaled 19,000 in December 1962
has in large part been dispersed as the result of conflicts with UN forces since
that date. Congolese Air Force personnel number only 300 non-whites and 6o whites.
As of May 1963, United Nation** forces in' the Congo numbered 11,000, but the current
plan calls for a reduction of these forces to 7,000 by 1 Jnly 1963 and their com-
plete removal by the and of 1963.
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The estimated military capacity of the railroad route leading from the
seaport of Matadi to Leopoldville, 227' miles, is 3,300 tons per day, sufficient to
support 4 force of about 264,000* in the Leopoldville area. Upstream on the Congo
River to Stanleyville, a distance of 1,082 miles, the through it capacity for mili-
tary traffic is 3,500 tons Ter day, adequate to supply a force of at least 270,000.
From Leopoldville to Port Francqui, the Congo and Kasai Rivera could carry about
3,000 tons per day and support a, force of 240,000. In the southern part of the
country, the military capacity Of the railreeds from the border of Northern Rhodesia
to Port Francqui, 1,138 miles, is 1,860 tons per day, adequate for a force Of about
1490000 at Port 'Franey'. From Dilolo on the Angolan border to Tanke, a distance
of 324 miles, a force of 124,000 could be supported, as the military capacity of
this railroad is estimated at 1,500 tons Ter day. The railroad between Kesaina in
Katanga Province, and Albertville on Lake Tanganyika, a distance of 447 miles, is
Capable Of: SUpporting a force of about 72,000.
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C. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
1. Economic Significancei
Transportation services in the Federation, both domestic and international,
are provided principally by railroads (almost 3,000 route miles). There is some
inOreasing dependence on airlines and buses for passenger transport-, but little
dependence on trucks for long-distance freight transport. There is generally ade-
quate service between all main centers of economic activity in the Federation, be-
tween those centers and adjoining territories, and through those territories with
major seaports of Southern Africa. Transport and communications account for about
10 percent of white and 3 to 4 percent Of African employment in the Federation and
in each of its component parts. The revenues of the Rhodesialtailways represent
about 6 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) of the Federation, and their operat-
ing expenditures about 5 percent. The Rhodepia Railways are especially essential
to the movement of copper, which is the major foreign exchange earner of the Federa-
tion. Copper sales in 1961 totaled more than 20 percent of the Federation's GNP.
Copper traffic (over a million tons in 1961 or about 8 percent of total tons carried)
is also the most important earner of revenue for the RhOdesia, Railways, having
furnished more than 27 percent of gross revenues in 1961. The Copper traffic is
even more important when the additional revenues from the movement of copper concen-
trate, the largest component of the "other minerals" category, is taken into account.
Highway development, while of secondary importance as compared to rail-
roads in the Federation, 'has furthered economic development in areas where lack of
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rail facilities was a limiting factor. The development of the highway network has
been considerable relative to the small number of people in a position to contribute
to the cost. Motor vehicle registrations in the Federation in 1961 totaled 193,7980
or about 45 persons per vehicle.
The Federation is land-locked and only inland water services of minor
importance are operated on a few lakes and rivers serving Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. A few steamers and barges carry passengers and freight on the larger
lakes, but there are mostly small native craft in use on the rivers.
Both domestic and regional air service is provided by Central African
Airways Corporation (CAA). The "Rhodesian Comet" service to London is operated for
CAA by the British Overseas Airways Corporation (B)AC). The domestic network serves
16 points in Northern Rhodesia, 4 in Southern Rhodesia, and 10 in Nyasaland. Most
of the domestic scheduled service in 1961 was performed by DC-3 type aircraft.
Air service has been especially important for rapid movement of passengers and of
high value - low bulk goods to remote areas such as Barotseland.
Continued supranational operation of the transportation facilities of
the Federation will be desirable in order to derive the maximum economic benefits
from the transportation system.
(a) Southern Rhodesia
Both railroads and highways in Southern Rhodesia, in keeping with
its more diverse and advanced economy, are better developed than in the rest of
the Federation (1,986 route miles of railroad, ai:CoMpir.iNith 666 in Northern
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? Rhodesia and 316 in Nyasaland). The lion's share of modernization of the Federation's
railroads has taken place in Southern Rhodesia in order to serve the growing industrial
sector. Centralized traffic control (CTC) has been installed on virtually all of the
single track mainline network of Southern Rhodesia, and a few short stretches are
double track. New diesel locomotives are also being gradually introduced to further
improve the service and increase capacity.
Railroads of Southern Rhodesia, as well as the transportation and commercial
centers of Bulawayo and Salisbury, are very dependent on the volume of transit
traffic between Northern Rhodesia and the ports of Mozambique. This transit
traffic accounted for more than 25 percent of all tonnage carried by the Rhodesian
Railways in 1961 and about 35 percent of the revenues. Exports in transit are
composed principally of copper, cobalt, lead, zinc and manganese, and imports of
machinery, transport equipment and other manufactured goods. Part of Northern
Rhodesia's copper export shipments have been carried by the Benguela Railway in
the past. Under an agreement entered into in 1950, 20 percent of the territory's
copper export traffic was to be assigned to this route. Other parties to the agree-
ment were the Rhodesia Railways and the Congo Railway authority. This agreement
was over-ruled by the Federal Government early in 1900 when it imposed a limit of
36,000 tons (or little more than 6 percent of 1962 exports of 560,000 tons) on
the copper tonnage which could be exported via the Benguela Railroad in any one year.
A new agreement' assigning a greater percentage to the Benguela Railroad or the
Lbngolese "Route Nacionale" is a possibility
!Table 6, Appendix Can, p. 215.
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after the breakup of the Federation.
Southern Rhodesia contains about 52 percent of the 55,267 miles
of maintained roads in the Federation, 73 percent of the miles of bituminous or
strip roads, and 71 percent of the registered motor vehicles. Total
motor vehicle registrations amount to 138,168 or aoout 23-person's per vehicle.
(b) Northern Rhodesia
Both railroads and highways became more scarce in Northern than
in Southern Rhodesia. The dependence on railroads: becomes even greater here be-
cause of the proportionately greater tonnage of heayy ore and mineral traffic trans-
ported. The copper industry, for example, which in recent years has contributed
about 44 percent to the net domestic product of Northern Rhodesia, could not func-
tion without railroad service. Railroad capacity continues to be improved by the
installation of modern signaling, although not yet to the extent that this has taken
place in Southern Rhodesia. There is also considerable interest in Northern Rho-
desia in the proposed extension of the railway to connect with the Tanganyikan rail-
way system.
About 39 percent (21,517 miles) of all the regularly maintained
roads of. the Federation are located in Northern Rhodesia, and 43,934 vehicles or
23 percent of the registered motor vehicles. This amounts to about 57 'persons per
vehicle. The Great North road provides a highway link with Tangamike* and there is
a1a5.7)a good road connection with Elisalethville in the Congo.
_
* See Appendix C.Vto p.
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The inland water service on the few navigable lakes of Northern
Rhodesia is small, and only of local significance to the various areas. Civil air
ia of relatively greater importance here than elsewhere in the Federation, largely
for convenient access to areas otherwise relatively inaccessible by other modem of
transport.
(c) Npsaland
Transportation services in Nyasaland are primarily in support of
the commercial agricultural economy which proVides most of the foreign exchange of
the country and in 1961 accounted for about 80 percent of the value of Gross Dames-
tic Product. Low posi; VIA rapid transportation must be provided from the various
producing centers to distant markets.
In Nyasaland, as in the rest of the Federation, primary dependence
is on railroads, with other modes acting as feeders or providing service to more
remote areas. The railroad system needs to .be expanded and modernized to meet grow-
ing traffic requirements although it is adequate for current traffic requirements.
Now wholly steam-operated, single track and manually fignaledy it is completely
NemAciia
dependent on imported coal mostly fronCif?in Southern Rhodesia. A few diesel
locomotives are on order from the UK.
Regularly maintained roads in Nyasaland amount to 5,150 or 9 per-
cent of the total mileage of such roads in the Federation. Motor vehicles registered
in Nyasaland number about 11,696 or 6 percent of the Federation total, and there
are about 250 persons per vehicle.
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The navigable lakes and waterways provide some service of mostly
local significance. Steamer service on Lake Nyasa provides the only commercial
link between the railroad and many towns and farm areas along the lake. Civil air
Is a small but necessary service to otherwise relatively inaccessible areas.
2. Military Significance
The transportation system of the Federation would almost certainly be
able to move and support any military or security force which could be mustered,
particularly on the railroad. Some difficulty would be experienced in remote areas
because of inadequate highways, but poor highways are not so significant to mili-
tary as to commercial vehicles.
Total active ground forces (51171) and police (10,945) number only about'
160000 men and there is an available reserve of about 60000 men. The active mili-
tary forces are well-equipped and completely mobile. The Rhodesian air force has
about 600 men and 182 aircraft of various types including 14 transport aircraft with
a total airlift capacity of more than 70 tons or about 350 troops. There are a
total of about1:57airfields in the entire Federation) of which probably only about
50 could handle sizeable military movements. The only international airports cap-
able of receiving sizeable movements of men and supplies from abroad are at Salis-
bury, iftlawayo, Livingstone and Gwelo, all in Southern Rhodesia; Ndola and Lusaka
in Northern Rhodesia; and Blantyre in Nyasaland.
Since only Southern Rhodesia has a white-dominated government, it is
here that disturbances would be likely to occur generated by African Nationalists
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and requiring the rapid movement of men and supplies to troubled areas. It is here
also that both the railroad and highway networks are relatively well developed and
could support movement of far greater forces than the relatively small but effi-
cient military and security forces in being in the area. Here also are all of the
major air force bases and airports capable of receiving additional supplies and
"volunteer" reinforcements from abroad.
Africans struggling among themselves for power in the Copperbelt area
of Northern Rhodesia could lead to demands for UN, UK or US intervention along the
lines of (1) the UN operation in Katanga; (2) the UK use of troops in Swaziland;
or (3) US troop landings in Lebanon. Should such action be required, the main
Rhodesian approach routes to the Copperbelt would be capble of supporting a much
greater force than would conceivably be employed. The Rhodesian railroad alone
could transport about 5,500 tons per day, which is the estimated requirement to
support a force of about 220,000 men.* The main highways northward from Bulawayo
and Salisbury could carry 240 through tons per day, enough to support a force of
about 9,600 men.
* Requirements calculated on the bals of 50 tons per man per day, estimated for
the modern, well-equipped US or UK type force envisioned here.
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D, Mozambique
1. Economic Significance
The inland transportation system of Mozambique is almost completely dominated
by the railways, due in large measure to the inadequacy of the existing roads, the
scarcity of roads in some areas, and the relatively minor use made of inland water-
ways. The complete absence of any north-south railroads in the country and the poor
quality of north-South highways makes coastal shipping an important segment of the
transportation system. In addition to their significance to the local economy,
the railroads and the ports are of considerable international importance because
they offer the shortest routes to the sea for the Rhodesias and the northeastern
areas of South Africa, and the only railroad route to the sea for Nyasaland. Transit
traffic from and to these countries and the seaports in Mozambique represents almost
90 percent of the total traffic carried by the railroads. Moreover, revenues from
international transit traffic over the railroads and through the seaports accounts
for upward of 30 percent of the Mozambique government revenues.
The railroad system is composed of eight railroads, three of which do not
connect with any other system. Only three of the railroads are international in
character and these account for 94 percent of the traffic carried on all of the
railroads combined. In 1960, the last year for which complete statistical data are
,with
available, the eight railroadsf7"\a total of 1,711 route miles, carried a total
of 11.2 million tons. The three international systems are: the Lourenco Marques
Railroad, the Beira Railroad, and the Trans-Dimbesia Railroad. An analysis of
1
financial reports indicates that these interne4ional railroads are consistent
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money earners with operating ratios in 1960 of about 39 percent, 51 percent, and
33 percent res;ectively., Al]. the other railroads are operated at a loss with
operating expenses exceeding their revenues by a wide margin. Taken as a whole,
the railroad system earned a net profit after operating expenses of $20.5 million
in 1960. The Lourenco Marques Railroad is government-owned so the net profits
would accrue to the government of Mozambique. The Beira and Trans,Zambesia Rail-
roads are privately owned and the government's share in their profits is not known.
The money losing railroads are all government owned, but the profits of the Lourenco
Marques Railroad were adequate to off-set those losses and still return a net profit
of $9.3 million to the government in 1960. These data point up the economic sig-
nificance of international transit traffit which represents about 90 percent of the
revenues earned by the railroads.
The capacities of the international railroad routes in Mozambique are believed
to be considerably above the traffic currently moving over them. For example, the
short, single track, 55 mile route from Lourenco Marques to Ressano Garcia on the
South African border, is currently carrying about 4 million tons per year. Single
track routes in the Congo were carrying 6.6 million tons per year in 1957. Moreover,
the Ressano Garcia route in MozaMbique is equipped with CTC signalling whereas the
Congo route is equipped with only a manual block system. The Beira and Trans-
Zambesia Railroad routes are also operated at well below the traffic density in
either Angola or the Congo.
Despite the importance of highway transport to the economy of Mozambique,
the highway network is seriously inadequate. There are no adequate north-south
!An operating ratio is the percentage ratio of operating costs to total revenues.
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routes through the country and transport in this direction is often compelled to
take routes through the neighboring countries of South Africa and Rhodesia. During
the long, rainy season, wooden bridges are often washed away by flood waters and the
dirt-surfaced roads which predominate become impassable. A program is underway to
improve the highway network, but a lack of funds has delayed its implementation.
However, recent political unrest, with its internal security problems, has enbasized
the need for a more adequate system and the government has accelerated the highway
construction program and incorporated it in the Second Development Plan for the
period 1959 - 1964.
The highway network consists of about 22,840 miles of roads. Only 720 miles
have a waterproof surface, mostly bitumen, and 620 miles of rolled stone surface,
while the remaining 21,500 miles are natural earth-surface roads. Highways are
classified according to their relative importance and not according to the type of
construction. First class or national routes link the capitals of the nine adminis-
trative districts with each other and with the seaports and neighboring countries.
Second class roads link the outlying towns and cities in each district with the
district capitals. Other classified roads are designated as regional or third class
roads. Unclassified roads are generally nothing more than tracks which are practi-
cally impassable for motor vehicles.
Rainfall in Mozambique varies from 39 inches per year in the north to 6o inches
in Beira and 30 inches in Leurenco Marques. During the long rainy season, October to
March, transport by road is virtually impossible. Traffic is disrupted for long
periods at a time through heavy rains washing away road surfaces, destroying wooden
bridges and closing ferries. During the dry season, unsurfaced roads corrugate
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badly and are subject to wind erosion, while sand surfaces in the coastal regions
are unstable.
Almost all commercial highway transport services are owned and operated by
the State Roadways, a Department of the Mozambique Administration of Harbors, Rail-
ways and Transport Services. This government-iewned service does not compete
directly with the railroads and is, in fact, prohibited from doing so. The service
operates primarily to feed traffic to and from the railroads or between producing and
consuming areas which are remote from the railroads. During 1961, the most recent
year for which statistics are available, State Roadways carried about 308 thousand
tons of freight. In 1960, the State Roadways owned about 280 trucks and buses,
9 tractors, and 60 trailers. The average carrying capacity of the trucks was
about 3 tons each and the trailers 5 tons each. There are an estimated 18 to 19
thousand trucks of all sizes registered in Mozambique but most of these are believed
to be small units not suitable for long distance transport of heavy cargo.
The two principal and five minor ports in Mozambique handled a total of
10.0 million and 11.5 million tons in 1960 and 1961. The major ports for inter-
national transit traffic are Lourenco Marques and Beira, and these two ports
handled more than 95 percent of the total traffic through all the seaports. Lourenco
Marques, the largest and busiest port in the country, handles about 64 percent of
Mozambique's seaborne commerce. More than 67 percent of the tonnage handled in 1960
was transit traffic. Mineral and coal traffic from South Africa represented nearly
2 million tons or 60 percent of the total outbound tonnage through the port in 1960,
and mineral traffic from Rhodesia was 687,391 tons or almost 28 percent. The port is
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one of the best equipped in southern Africa, with deep water berths for twelve
vessels. Ample cranes and other handling equipment are available and there is
storage space for 50,000 tons of coal and 160,000 tons of mineral ore. Net profits
in 1960 were almost $2.5 million. The port is undergoing expansion in order to cope
with additional traffic and, in particular, an additional 1 million tons of mineral
ore expected to move over a new railroad route presently under construction in
Swaziland and connecting with the Mozambique railroad near Goba.
Beira, the second largest port, handled 3.2 and 3.6 million tons in 1960 and
1961. About 56 percent of the total tonnage handled through the port is transit
traffic from and to Rhodesia. Rhodesian traffic in 1960 amounted to 983,000 tons
outbound and 835,000 tons inbound. The port is well-equipped with deep water berths
for 6 vessels. Two new wharves completed in 1962 will become operable as soon as
cranes and other cargo-handling equipment are installed.
Civil air transport has little economic significance in Mozambique. The
' government-owned carrier, DTA, provides passenger service to 14 points in Mozam-
bique and to Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia, and to Johannesburg and Durban in
South Africa. Also, the Portuguese flag carrier TAP, links Mozambique with Portugal
and with Angola. During 1961, DA carried 36,500 passengers. No scheduled air
freight service is available in Mozambique.
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2. Military Significance.
The transportation system of Mozambique is capable of supporting a
considerably greater military force than the Portuguese will be able to deploy in
the area in the forseeable future. As of 1 January 1963, the strength of the
army of Portugal was 102,000. More than 55 percent of it was employed in the de-
fentzie of overseas provinces and colonies. Portuguese ground strength in Mozambi-
que Consists of about 17,000 troops organized into 14 infantry battalions, and a
battalion each of armOr, artillery, engineering and signals. A mall air force
unit also provides some air transport capability.
7ie railroad systems are the most important mode of transport for
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the supply of military forces from Indian Ocean ports to major concentration
areas inland. In Northern Mozambique, the Mocambique Railroad extends from the
Oangcrenga
minor ports of Nacala and Lumbo to ;/, a distance of 402 miles. This route is
capable of delivering about 4 trains per day to Nova Freixo, 334 miles, with
sufficient tonnage to support a force of 120,000K From Nova Freixo to Congerenga,
a distance of 68 miles, the route is newly constructed and may have a tendency to
settle, thus forcing a reduction in the speed and weight of trains during heavy
rains. Nevertheless, it is believed to be capable of supporting about 60,000
troops at Congerenga, near the Nyasaland border.
From the port of Beira, the Trans-Zambesia Railroad running north to the
Nyasaland border, about 205 miles, can support a force of about 136,000. The Tete
Railroad which branches off of the Trans-Zambesia Railroad at Donn a and runs to
Benga on the Zambezi River, can handle 4 trains per day with tonnage for about
136,000. These two routes have been considered in isolation and the Tete Railroad
is dependent upon the Trans-Zambesia for a connection with Beira. Therefore, only
136,000 troops could be supported at Donna and 68,000 at each of the terminals of
the routes.
The Beira Railroad extending from the port of Beira to Macbipanda on the
Southern Rhodesia border, connects with the Rhodesian Railroad route which serves
Salisbury, the capital of Southern Rhodesia. This route has a military capacity
of about 3,200 tons per day, adequate to support a force of about 2560000. The
port of Beira is capable of handling about 5,600 tons per day using ship's gear only
for unloading military cargo. At that rate of d:scharge, the port could support a
force of 4481coo.
11- Oimputed on the basis of a logistic requireinurt of 25 pounds per man per day.
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In southern Mozambique, two main railroads extend inland. The most
southerly of these runs from the port of Lourenco Marques to Ressano Garcia on the
border of South Africa, a distance of 55 miles, and connects with the South African
. railroad which serves Pretoria and the Johannesburg area. This route is capable of
delivering enough tonnage from the port to the South African border to support a
force of about 840,000 or, 10,450 tons per day.
The northern route extends from Lourenco Marques to Malvernia on the border
of Southern Rhodesia where it connects with the Rhodesian railroad route which
serves Bulawayo, Wankie and Salisbury. From Lourenco Marques to Malvernia, the
route is 332 miles in length. The estimated military capacity of the route is 3,300
tons per day, sufficient to support a force of 264,000.
The capacity of the port at Lourenco Marques is adequate for the tonnage
involved, but if a debarking force should be compelled to use dhliA'gear only,
the port capacity would be sufficient to supply a force of about 756,000.
The highway network in Mozambique is capable of supporting a considerable
force during fair weather, but during the long rainy season, most of the roads
become virtuaM.V impassable for commercial vehicles and extremely difficult even
for four-wheel drive military vehicles. An example of a highway which serves a
remote area not served by a railroad is the highway leading from the minor port
of Quelimane to Milange near the border of Nyasaland, a distance of 215 miles.
In good weather, this route could support a force of 36,000. Assuming a reduction
of 75 percent during the rainy season, a force of 9,000 could be supported. The
highway from Beira to Madhipanda on the Southern Rhodesia border parallels the
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railroad route. In fair weather this highway could support a force of 613,000.
The highway from Lourenco Marques to Ressano Garcia on the South African border
could support a force of 267,000.
The international airports at Beira and Lourenco Mhrques have considerable
military significance, particularly for the airlift of troops from Portugal and
for the airlifting of troops and supplies to other airfields in the country from
which supplies could be further distributed by airdrops.
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Soutp. African Republic
1. Economic Significance
The railway system of South Africa provides more support to the
economy than any other mode of transportation. It provides service between the
completely separate and widely dispersed centers of prdluction and consUmption of
which the Witwatersrand is the focal area. Thus it facilitates production for local
consumption and for export as well as the distribution of essential imports to the
interior. Foreign trade moves by rail to and from the ports and by interchange of
traffic with the 'railroad systems of the Federation and Mozambique. The basic
wealth of the country is still derived from its output of valuable tinerals, chiefly
gold and diamonds, which can be moved easily by air, but the effort involved in their
production entails large movements of iron ore, steel, machinery and coal for electric
Power. Minerals otlier than coal and iron ore which are moved and exported in sub-
stantial amounts include chrome ore, manganese, asbestos, phosphate rock, limestone
and copper.
Agricultural products also figure prominently on the transportation
system of the country. Corn, raised in various parts but mostly in the belt of the
southern Transva.8.1 and Orange Free State, moves in large tonnages both for local
consuciption and for export. Sugar cane and sugar are traffic items of importance
on the Natal Coast. Cattle and animal products are Collected in South-West Africa
and the northeastern Cape area and moved both to ports and domestic consuming
centers. Cattle are also moved from one grazing area to another by railroad when
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their well-being is threatened by drought in grazing regions. Other important railborne
agricultural products are citrus and deciduous fruits, grapes, potatoes and other
vegetables, and fish. Timber is imported in order to supplement the insufficient
domestic supply.
Al]. petroleum and its products are imported by sea and the portion consumed
at interior points moves from the ports by rail. large amounts of machinery, consumer
goods and general merchandise are also imported and are moved to the hinterland by
railroad.
In addition to inter-city passenger service the railways also perform an
unusually extensive commutation function in the carrying of passengers between the
large cities and their places of residence. The government is promoting the movement
of urban residents to all-white and all-African communities at some distance from
the cities in order to implement its policy of race separation. Much new railway
equipment is being added and modernization of plant is being undertaken for this
purpose. The addition of new facilities and equipment, in itself, is a considerable
stimulus to the economy as most of it is being produced within the country from
indigenous materials. Modernization of the freight as well as the passenger plant,
is under way and through this program the South African Railways contribute importantly
to the living standard of the population and the pace of the economy as a whole.
Highways and highway transport are important to the economic life of
concentrated
South Africa, both where there are no railways and infi
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cellection and distribution centers such as cities, ports and mining areas. Highways are
built with local funds within the provinces, but the inter-regional highways some of whick
are bituminous surfaces, are built with revenues derived from a national gasoline tax.
Air transport serves the national economy through expediting internal and exter-
nal trade in high value and perishable goods and through more expeditious planning,
coordination and decision making resulting from fast passenger and mail service.
Regional trunk services are provided largely by jet aircraft in addition to the con-
ventional piston type. The transport aircraft inventory consists of 28 aircraft of
which 3 were Boeing 707s, 20 were 4-engine piston or turbo-prop aircraft, and 5 were
DC-3s. The three major airports in South Africa at Johannesburg, Durban and Capetown,
are adequate for present traffic requirements.
2. Military Significance
The transport facilities within South Africa would almost certainly be able
to handle all traffic needed to support the military and internal security forces
of the country. The role of ground transport in a military crisis conceivably would
fall into two phases, i.e., mobilization and sustained logistical support. The first
phase would involve a rapid assembly and delivery of essential types of equipment
through clearing the railroads and highways for priority movement of personnel and
materiel with the consequent delay of less pressing economic traffic. The second
phase would represent at least a partial return to normal operations, but with extra
trains and vehicles moving in addition to those needed by some areas which would have
to be expanded while others woad temporarily be reduced or suspended. The type of
transport pattern which would develop in either phase would depend upon a combination
of circumstances, but most particularly upon whether or not the Republic were or
were not threatened by a major world power or combination of powers possessing sea
or air strength.
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The South African Army has a strength of 12,000 men organized into a
mobile watch unit, a parachute battalion and 10 training units. In addition,
more than 50,000 men are enrolled in militia-type units known as Commandos. The
regular stir force personnel number 3/885 and there is a reserve force numbering
10,000. Naval personnel total about 1,700. The police force consists of 28,000
men of which 14,500 are non-whites, and would be of questionable value in suppressing
racial violence.
Should events build up to a combination of pressures from the Bantu and
other native African tribes only, there might come into being a combination of two
fronts, one to the north, and a more fluid one among Bantus within South Africa.
If the railroads can be secured so that they are comparatively free of sabotage,
they should be able to meet the requirements of both military phases with facility.
If a Bantu uprising included a wholesale abandonment of normal employment by the
non-whites, and flight to the north or to the protectorates ensued, difficulty might
soon be faced in obtaining sufficient coal to keep steam and electric powered motive
power in operation on the railroads. The diesel locomotives and motor transport,
barring economic sanctions on imports of fuel, could probably keep essential mili-
tary and a minimum of economic traffic moving, but lack of coal and power could
cause transportation supporting industries to shut down and maintenance as well as
the availability of supplies may not be sufficient.
In the initial phases of a localized front line conflict with native
African forces to the north, the logistical supply lines would probably extend as
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far as the Zambezi River. Extra heavy loads can be handled by both rail and motor
transport so that ample special military equipment could also be moved with dispatch
to the combat zone. A possible weak link in the line of communications which might
well need to be supplemented by air, road and sea transport, however, is the rail
connection with Southern Rhodesia. Normal economic traffic on this route is light,
and so there should be ample excess capacity for military supplies, but there could
conceivably be international political complications inasmuch as the line extends for
much of its length through the Bechuanaland Protectorate.
An alternate to this route for the movement of South African forces to the
Southern Rhodesian border and into Southern Rhodesia exists, however, by rail to
Beitbridge on the border, and thence by road to Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia. The
road from Beitbridge to Bulawayo would represent the limiting capacity for the supply
of South African forces but it has the capacity te supply a force of at least 25,000.
In a long, drawn out conflict of resistance, purely African in character, the
erosion on the white forces would probably take its toll in loss of life and productive
time on both sides, and in reduced economic output rather than in attrition to transport
Employment on the railroads is about 50 percent white, and conceivably both railroad
and road transport could operate on reduced schedules with sufficient capacity to
support military operations eten with the departure of a high percentage of the non-
whites. Thus the greatest threat to the South African military forces lies not in the
insufficiency of transport and the lack of ability of transport to support forces
holding militant African nationalism, but in possible eonomic sanctions or intervention
on the part of a non-African power or group of powers.
wrinkfi
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III. Consequences of the Imposition of Various Potential Controls on the Transporta-
Lion Routes
A. Ekbargoes on Traffic
1. Yollowing the imminent split of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land, it is conceivable that Southern Rhodesia would consider an embargo of traffic
with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as a countermeasure to the support by Northern
Rhodesia and Nyasaland of nationalist movements within Southern Rhodesia or as a
result of disagreements concerning tariffs, customs and other international arrange-
ments. Such action would have the following consequences:
(a) Southern Rhodesia would retain its access routes to the sea through
Mozambique and South Africa, but would be denied the existing market for about 30
percent of its manufactured goods (mostly consumer durables and non-durables) and
over one-third of its coal (about 1 1/4 million tons). It would also lose the
valuable transit traffic on the Rhodesia Railways which moves to and from Northern
Rhodesia and the Congo. In 1961 this traffic* amounted to an estimated 25 percent
of the total tonnage carried by the Rhodesian railroads and an estimated 35 percent
of gross revenues for the railroads. Loss of these substantial portions of the
markets for industrial goods and transportation services would result in large scale
unemployment, at least until the Southern Rhodesian economy were reoriented, having
increased its trade with other trading partners. Access routes to South Africa and
Mozambique woad remain open and trade would still continue with the UK and South
)(' See Table 6, Appendix C.III, p. 215 and section II.C.10 p. 29 .
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Africa, the most important trading partners, as well as with the rest of the world.
The net effect of the embargo, however, might be more unacceptable to Southern
Rhodesia than to Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland where standards of living are rela-
tively lower.
(b) Northern Rhodesia would suffer rather serious consequences. Denied
its principal access routes to the sea through Mozambique ports via Southern Rho-
desial the most logical alternate route is the all-rail (BK-Benguela Railways)
route through the Congo and Angola. The distance is not significantly greater via
the alternative route but the necessary additional capacity is lacking to handle
all of the tonnage that would have to be diverted (about 3 million tons) in addi-
tion to current traffic (about 3.6 million tons). The railroad carried nearly 4
million tons during the peak year 1960 and is believed capable of accepting at
least 6000000 tons in excess of current traffic, without substantial improvement.
The port of Lobito is also believed th-have at least this much excess capacity.*
Since this is a nearly equidistant rail route with no transshipment, there should
be little if any additional transportation cost.
The next most logical alternate routing for Northern Rhodesian
exports and imports would be via the Congo's Route Nationale (rail-water-rail) which
is expected to be restored as a through route to and from the port of Matadi by
September 1963. Its reliability is questionable, however, because of the areas
of tribal unrest through which the traffic must pass. Capacity of this route is
* See Arpendix C.X., P. .72
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probably limited by the capacity of Port Francqui to about 1 million tons per year.
Traffic through Port Francgui in 1959, the last year of normal operations, was
about 412,000 tons. Additional capacity available is probably not over 600,000
tons without substantial improvement to the port and the segment of the BCK railroad
which serves it.
Another possible alternative is to route the traffic via the Congo
railways to Albertville, transship over Lake Tanganyika to Kigoma for further move-
ment by the Tanganyika railroad to Dar es Salaam. Maximum capacity of this route
for commercial traffic would probably be limited by the Lake Tanganyika service
between Albertville and Kigoma to nearly 6bolopoo tons per year. The most heavily
used segment of the route, however, is the Tanganyika railroad between Kigoma and
Dar es Salaam which carried over 540,000 tons in 1961 and is probably operating at
near-capacity. It is therefore doubtful whether more than 60,000 tons additional
could be accepted for through movement under present conditions. Introduction of
diesel motive power however would substantially increase the capability.
Another alternate possibility is the shipment of some freight over
the highway from Northern Rhodesia to Dar es Salaam. This highway is considered
an all-weather route but is limited to about 650 tons per day (nearly 240,000
tons per year) in both directions by low-capacity bridges on the TO mile stretch
just south of the Rhodesia-Tanganyika border. Through traffic in believed to be
very light and the estimated capacity may be consideed available if a fleet of
vehicles could be operated and maintained.
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Additional capacities available on all feasible alternate routes
between Northern Rhodesia and the sea are therefore estimated to be as follows:
(millions of tons)
linused
Port*
Route Capacity
Traffic (*a)
Capacity
Lobito
BCE-Benguela RR
4.5
3.4-3,
.6
Matadi
Route-Nationale
1.0
0.0
1.0
Dar es Salaam
Congo RR-Lake Tanganyika.
.6
.54
.o6
Tanganyika RR (via
Albertville-Kigoma)
Dar es Salaam
Rhodesia-Dar es Salaam
.24
neg.
.24
Highway
Total
All feasible alternatives
6.34
4.44
1.90
It may be concluded, therefore, that a Southern Rhodesian embargo
of Northern Rhodesian traffic would prevent the movement of one million tons or
more of export-import traffic, about 1/3 of the current export-import traffic.
The effects of such a reduction in foreign trade to a country so greatly oriented
to trade as is Northern Rhodesia would be serious. The copper industry alone ac-
counts for Over 50 percent of the Net Domestic Product of Northern Rhodesia, and
It exports nearly all of its production.*** There would also be a reduction in
cobalt
the volume of other exports such as 1T /
lead and zinc (See Appen-
dix B.III, Table 2 below). In addition, Northern Rhodesia would be cut off from
its only supplier of coal, the Wankie mines in Southern Rhodesia, Modern industry
* The capacity of the port is not believed to be the limiting factor on any of
these routes.
** Includes about 150,000 tons which might normally be expected to move via. the
Route-Nationale to Matadi, if it were open.
*** The Benguela railroad, since most of its excess capacity is available for
imports (See Appendix C.I)0 could accept not more than 20 percent of the Northern
Rhodesian copper exports unless it were relieved of some of the Katanga, copper
(about 600,000 tons) which it now carries.
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and transportation, almost totally dependent on this source of power, would be
seriously crippled after existing reserves were eihausted? although it would be
possible to import considerable coal (at much greater cost) over the inadequate
alternative routes. (Over 80 percent of estimated excess capacity is probably avail-
able for imports.)
Adding to the monstrous unemployment problem inherent in the above
situation would be the probable deportation of over 40 thousand Northern Rhodesian
migrant laborers who are normally employed in Southern Rhodesia.
(c) An embargo on trade between Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would
force the latter to adjust trading patterns but would have only marginal effects on
the generally subsistence economy. Of its total market for agricultural exports,
Nyasaland Would lose less than 10 percent which is marketed in Southern Rhodesia and
South Africa. Of more serious consequence, however, would be the deportation of
Nyasas working as migrant laborers in Southern Rhodesia, a number in excess of 130,000.
These workers would have to be incorporated into an economy where the rate of growth
is already barely adequate to keep up with population expansion.
The rail line to the Mozambique port of e1 would remain open,
unless Portugal also embargoed, and imports of railroad rolling stock, vehicles and
accessories, fuel oil, coal and construction materials could continue. A limited
additional amount of coal might be imported on this line to substitute for Wahkie
coal. The railroad, however, is only a single track steam operated, manually sig-
naled line with light axle loadings. It is ope4ed at slow speeds and capacity
511.
011.
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is estimated at about 3,000 tons per day in both directions (about one million
tons per year). Traffic in 1961 was about 973,000 tons, but dropped to about 936,000
tons in 1962.*
Considering the magnitude of the detrimental effects of such a
blockade on all concerned, such action especially by the conservative government
Of Mt. Field would probably be taken only as a last resort short of all-out conflict.
2. In support of African Nationalism, it is conceivable that the Republic
of the Congo might consider an embargo on traffic with Angola. Such action would
have the following consequences:
(a) Angola would lose the valuable mineral and ore traffic which moves
from Northern Rhodesia and Katanga to the port of Lobito over the Benguela, rail-
road. This traffic has furnished 35 to 45 percent of total ton miles on the rail-
road and about 38 percent of tonnage handled at the port of Lobito in recent years.
The Benguela railroad is believed to derive some 75 percent of its revenues fro;
transit freight and passengers to and from Ketanga. Although 90 percent of the
Benguela railroad is owned by Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., a British company (10
percent is awned by the Portuguese Government), it is nevertheless of great impor-
tance to Angola as its principal link to the interior-. In addition, the port re-
venues to the gOvernment from this traffic are considerable.
Angolavs foreign trade would be little affected. Access routes to
all major trading partners would remain open. Trade with the Congo accounts for no
* See Appendix C.YII0 Table 7 p. 216 .
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more than one percent of Angolats imports and about four percent of its exports.
The principal effect, then, would be the serious disruption of the financial posi-
,stion of the Benguela Railroad and the Port of Lobito together with decreased revenues
for an already hard-pressed government.
(b) The Congo by such action, would be virtually committing economic
suicide. Haying denied itself a major access route to the sea for the important
Katanga traffic, the Congo would be faced with probable retaliatory action by the
Portuguese who are in a position to cut off their only other Atlantic cutlet by re-
fusing to allow dredging of the Matadi channel, pert of which lies within Angolan
territory. A negligible amount of traffic might possibly be diverted through
Brazzaville to Pointe Noire, which route is believed to be operated at near-capacity.
Some traffic from Katanga might conceivably be routed over the Rhodesian Railways
for further shipment to South African ports, but only limited amount in excess
of current traffic could probably be handled by the railroad to Bulawayo -- the dis-
tance would be over 4o percent greater. The only other outlets remaining would be
the low-capacity, costly routes through Tanganyika discussed in 1(b) above, mince
the Portuguese would also deny the Congo the use of Mozambique ports. Additional
capacity on these routes through Tanganyika, which in 1961 handled only about 90,000
tons of export-import traffic for the Congo is estimated to be only some 300,000
tons per year (see 1(b) above). The serious effect on the economy is apparent when
it is realized, that, excluding diamonds, Which mOe by air, the total exports for
1959, the last year for Which reasonably reliable totals are available, were
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approximately 1.7 million tons worth about $423 million. Imports for the same year
were roughly $185 million. The money economy of the Congo is largely oriented to
foreign trade, and a major disruption of the money economy would doubtless ensue.
Considering the above, it is understandable that the Congolese
government has thus far adopted a. cautious attitude towards the support of nationalist
insurgency in Angola. It is believed that such an attitude is likely to continue
and economic blockade is not in the cards.
3. A more unlikely turn of events such as coordinated and concurrent sabo-
tage or insurgent action against the white dominated governments of Southern Rhodesia,
Angola, Mozambique and South Attica, supported by and based in the black dominated
territories of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and the Congo, might precipitate a
general embargo on traffic with these countries imposed concurrently by Southern
Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa, The Portuguese under these circumstances would
also be expected to interdict the Channel at Matadi. Consequences of such action
would be as follows:
(a) The effects on Southern Rhodesia would be the same as descriL...d
in 1(a) above.
(b) Northern Rhodesia would experience the same effects mentioned in
1(b) above but these effects would be magnified by the additional loss of the two
other alternative .access routes to the Bea which are estimated to have the most
excess capacity. That is to say that, in addition tO being denied access to Mozam-
bique and South Africa through Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia would now also
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be denied access to Lobito, Angola and Matadi, Congo. Only the completely inade-
quate routes through Tanganyika (see 1(b) above) with only some 300,000 tons of
excess capacity per year would remain open to handle the 3 million tons of Northern
Rhodesian export-import traffic in competition with Congo and Nyasaland traffic also
looking for an exit to the sea.
(c) The Congo and Angola would experience the same effects hypothesized
in pert 2 above, except that the Congo's situation, already described as disastrous,
would be slightly worsened by competition from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland for
use of the low-capacity costly routes through Tanganyika.
(d) Nyasaland would experience the same serious effects described in
1(c) above, worsened to the degree that it would not be virtually isolated by the
denial of its rail connection to Beira via the Trans-Zambesia railroad: Only low
capacity roads connect Nyasaland with Tanganyika, the only remaining route t) the
sea. Under a total embargo by all white-dominated governments, it would not eveA
be possible to import the small amounts of vehicles, railroad rolling stock and fuels
which were possible if Portugal did not embargo.
(e) Mozambique would be affected in very much the same way as Angola.
Trade routes with all major trading partners would remain Open, and it would ex-
perience the loss of less than 5 percent of its exports and less than 2 percent of
its imports which are accounted for by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and
the Congo. The principal effect (and this would occur even if only Southern Rho-
desia embargoed) would be the serious disruption of the financial position of the
,8
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railroads and the port of Beira because of the loss of the lucrative transit traffic'
originating and terminating in Northern Rhodesia, the Congo and Nyasaland. Here,
EIS in Angola, in the face of decreased government revenues from lost traffic,
additional expenditures would be required from an already hard-pressed government
to maintain and operate transportation services necessary to keep the rest of the
economy functioning. Nearly 30 percent of Mozambique's revenue is derived from port
and rail operations and about 40 percent of the development budget has been devoted
to transportation and communications facilities since 1956. Export-import traffic
through Beira for Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and the Congo amounted to an estimated
2.2 million tons in 19610 61 percent of total traffic through the port, and 69 per-
cent of the tains carried on the Beira. railroad. The traffic moving between Nyasa,-
land and Beira represents one-third of the traffic on the Trans-Zambesia railroad.
During 1960, of the total of over 4 million tons carried by the railroad serving
Lourenco Marques, however, over 90 'percent was transit traffic between South Africa,
and the port, earning perhaps 95 percent of the revenue. The port of Lourenco Mar-
ques therefore should not be seriously affected by the hypothesized embargo.
(f) South Africa would be affected least of any country in the area,
unless outside countries imposed boycotts or sanctions. The US and the UK together
.accOunt for more than 40 percent Of South Africa's foreign trade and this 'brae as
well as that with all other major trading partners would continue.. Trade with all
of the embargoed countries amounts to less than 4 percent of exports and less than
3 percent of imports, all of which could be obtained or marketed elsewhere. The
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principal role of South Africa in such an embargo would be to substitute insofar
as it would be able for markets and sources of supply lost to the other countries
of the "White redoubt." South Africa would also be expected to render extensive
emergency' aid to its suffering partners in the blockade.
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B. Sabotage by_ Insurgents
An objective of insurgents engaging in sabotage frequently is to disrupt
the economic life of a country to such a degree that chaotic economic conditions
will contribute to the overthrow of existing governmental authority. The dis-
ruption of traffic between producing and consuming centers, including export and
import traffic) is a principal means to this end and the transportation facilities
are a prime target for sabotage. Insurgents also attack transportation targets
for the purpose of attempting to deny their use to governmental military and
security forces, and to destroy these forces and their logistic support in transit.
The transportation systems of the countries of Southern Africa are highly
vulnerable to sabotage. The effects of sabotage of transportation facilities upon
the economy or the security of a country or a region within a country depends largely
upon the availability of alternate transportation routes and facilities, and the
recuperability of the transportation system after sabotage. In the territories of
Southern Africa, the railroads are the backbone of the transportation system and
neither the highways nor the inland waterways are capable of providing either an
adequate alternate or a substitute means of transport for commercial traffic. More-
over, with the exception of the railroad system of South Africa, all trunk line
railroads are single trauk and alternate rail routes over which traffic can be
diverted are non-existent. For these reasons, the railroads could be a most profit-
able economic target for sabotage by insurgents, and the loading and unloading
facilities of major seaports would be a close second to the railroads.. The highways
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may also become a target for saboteurs) but damage to highway facilities would not
have as serious economic consequences as damage to the railroads) because frequently
they serve only as feeders to the railroads) and in any event their capacities are
much lower than those of the railroads. The inland waterways should not represent
priority targets for sabotage because there are few physically vulnerable targets
along rivers and lakes) but damage to selected river and lake port facilities could
have considerable economic consequences in the Gengo and certain other parts of the
area.
The key bridges on the railroads offer some of the most profitable targets
for sabotage) as do power stations Which supply current to electrified sections of
the railroads. The bridges and power stations on the railroads are listed and dis-
cussed in Appendix and their locations are mapped on Figures 3 through 8.
The effective sabotage of a major bridge of steel or concrete construction
requires a relatively high degree of training in the use of explosives and also some
training and skill is required to gain access to the target. The demolition of a
major bridge on a route for which there is no alternate in the area could nevertheless
stop traffic for an extended period of time - a time period of from one month to a
year depending upon the repair resources of the territory in which it is located.
With the exception of South Africa) and to a lesser degree Southern Rhodesia) none of
the countries under consideration here are capable of producing the structural steel
bridge components with which to repair such a structure. Neither is there any evidence
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of the storage of structural steel bridging material in these countries which would
facilitate repairs. It is probable that engineers in some of these countries may
have the technical know-how to effect temporary repairs using timber instead of steel,
but this capability has not been evident in the Congo, however, because some key
bridges which have been damaged have not been restored to service for months although
timber there is plentiful. It is estimated, therefore, that the recuperability from
railroad sabotage in any of these countries except South Africa and Southern Rhodesia
is very low, and considerable time - extending up to a year - may be required to
repair major structures. The transloading of traffic using makeshift ferries or
temporary bridges to by-pass damaged permanent structures is possible. Neverthe-
less) even with the use of such an expedient, traffic movement would be drastically
reduced during the period of time the permanent structure is unusuable.
Sabotage targets are not limited to the major structures on a railroad route.
Motive power also represents a profitable target for the sabotage of a railroad
system. With the exception of South Africa, none of the countries under consideration
are capable of producing locomotives or their major parts, and even South Africa has
purchased large amounts of such equipment in America and Europe. Some replacement
parts will be available in each of these countries. However, the well-trained
saboteur will concentrate on the consecutive damage to only one or a very few identidal
component parts) which are difficult to replace, thas effectively reducing the capabilit3
Of the railroad shops to repair damage to locomotives and to keep them operational.
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Concurrent with the sabotage of locomotives a well organized operation would
also attempt to sabotage the machinery in the repair shops. Access to locomotives
and repair shops is, however, difficult and access may require the recruitment of
railroad employees as saboteurs or at least require the cooperation of such employees.
Recruitment Of these employees may prove difficult however, lbecause the railroad is
the employee's source of livelihood. Therefore, railroad employees would have to
be motivated by a strong sympathetic attitude toward the objectives of the insurgents
or they will be reluctant to accept the risks involved. A&?, a strong sense of
loyalty to the railroad is frequently found among railroad employees, particularly in
the less developed countries. The railroad workers have a status not shared with
common laborers. The railroad is a visible symbol of modern progress and railroad
employees are proud of it. They may not even know the name or the politics of national
government officials, and care even less, but they know the railroad officials and
are frequently quite lOyal to them and to other railroad employees.
The probability of sabotage and the courses of action Which may be expected
f.Southern Africa varies from country to country. The insurgents in
being in the various countries are discussed in above, and in Appendixes A and
D. An examination of these dissident forces, their current assets and state of
training for sabotage balanced against military and security forces in the various
territories, discussed in Appendix 11, suggest that they are unlikely to be able to
engage in critical sabotage against transportation for some time - at least a year
and possibly two years.
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1. Angola
The African rebellion which broke out in March 1961 under the leader-
ship of Holden Roberto has just barely managed to maintain itself and is presently
Confined to a relatively small area in the northwest section of the country bordering
on the Congo. Its spread to other areas has been and continues to be hampered by the
rebels' inadequate equipment and training, and the lack of outside support necessary
to obtain additional equipment and' to train a cadre with which to., recruit and train
additional followers. SO far, his following has been limited to members of the
Bakongo tribal group of northern Angola, and tribal differences between this group
and other tribal elements in .Central and Southern Angola has obstructed the spread
of the rebellion to other areas. The rebel group does not appear to have the degree
of sophistication necessary to establish a sabotage net in all target areas or, for
that matter, to engage in any action other than sporadic raids on rural farming
communities and acts of terrorism in the limited area in iihich they are presently
confined. It is unlikely that any appreciable effort to sabotage the railroads and
ports can be expected from this rebel group until there is a substantial improvement
in its capability.
Roberto has close ties with Congolese Premier Adoula and other members of the
ruling group in the Congo. They have given him a limited amount of aid and have
permitted him to set up a training camp about 70 miles south of Leopoldville.
Boberto has also received money and arms from Tunisia and some of his militants have
been trained there and in Algeria. Material and equipment from these sources has
been kept to a trickle by the problem of transportation from North Africa. If and
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'Olen Robertots group acquirea the training and equipment which will enable him to act,
he may attempt to engage in sabotage activity against the Luanda Railroad in northern
Angola with or without the blessing of his supporters in the Congo. The Congolese
may attempt to restrain him from acts of sabotage against the Benguela Railroad, at
least initially, because even in normal times over 75 percent of the mineral traffic
from Katanga Province moves over that route and the alternate route over the Congots
"Route Rationale" is none too secure. Should both of these routes be sabotaged) the
Congo's access to the sea would be limited to the more circuitous route through the
phodesias to ports in. Mozambique or South Africa, or the low capacity route through
Tanganyika to the Indian Ocean. The remoteness of the region in which the Mocamedes
Railroad in southern Angola is located suggests that it will not be quickly affected
by insurgency in the north.
2. Congo
With the end of military action in January 1963 and the reuniting of
the break-away province of Katanga with the rest of the Congo) organized rebel activity
has practically ceased. Railroad structures which were sabotaged or deliberately
destroyed by direct military action are in the process of being restored, and the
same groups who have been carrying out acts of sabotage since independence in 1960 now
appear to be, at least temporarily, aligned with governmental security forces to
protect against sabotage. Barring another attempted secession by Tahambe and the
ICatanganese and greater political unrest than mrrent4 exists, it is improbable that
organize& sabotage activity will occur in the 1.ongo. However, the railroads and in
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particular the "Route Nationale", which is the Congo's principal route of access
to the sea entirely under Congo control, runs through an area populated by a hodgepodge
of tribal groups which are frequently at loggerheads and these tribal groups may be
able to cause derailments or they may, through terrorist activity, create so much
fear among railroad personnel that serious disruption will occur through failure of
the staff to function properly. None of these tribal groups are currently believed
to possess the materials sr the skills necessary for the destruction of major
railroad structures, however.
3. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
With the dissolution of the Federation, which is imminent, Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland will be governed by authority with which the populace will be sympathetic.
/n the absence of internal dissident groups, it is unlikely that sabotage to the
railroads of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will occur. In Southern Rhodesia,
some acts of sabotage have occurred in the past but there is no organized group
currently within Southern Rhodesia capable of critical acts of sabotage. Moreover,
sabotage from African nationalists operating from Northern Rhodesia against the
railroads in Southern Rhodesia would not be in the best interests of Northern
Rhodesia because this territory needs the Southern Rhodesian railroads to provide
the traditional route to the sea as well as to facilitate trade with Southern
Rhodesia, South Africa and Nyasaland. In spite of these considerations -- and in
spite of the relatively mild attitude toward Southern Rhodesia taken at the Addis
Ababa conference,-the possibility of sporadic acts of sabotage against the railroads
of Southern Rhodesia cannot be ruled out. The non-white leaders may conclude that
the railroad are of so little importance to the vast majority of the non-whites
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who are a part of the subsistence economy that they can be sacrificed in the
cause of African nationalism. Such a conclusion would be encouraged if Britain
and Southern Rhodesia reached a stalemate on the colony's constitutional development.
4. Mozambique
Currently there are no active dissident groups or insurgency forces in
being within the country capable of critical acts of sabotage. Insurgents operating
from Nyasaland could conceivably mount a sabotage operation against northern Mozam-
bique, but that is unlikely because Nyasaland needs the railroads in Mozambique
for access to the sea as well as for trade with Mozambique, the Rhodesias and
South Africa. /n this connection, however, the same conclusion by non-white leaders
suggested in B.3. above, regarding Southern Rhodesia, may also apply to Mozambique.
There is also a possibility of sabotage to the railroads between South Africa and
Mozambique by insurgents operating from South Africa. That possibility is discussed
in 3.5. below.
5. South Africa
In the absence of well-organized and trained insurgents in being in South
Africa at present, and considering the efficiency of the South African security
forces, it is improbable that large scale sabotage of railroads and port facilities
will occur in South Africa within the next two years. Some acts of sabotage have
occurred to power stations on electrified roltes, but these sporadic incidents have
only served to alert the security forces to the need for guarding transportation
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facilities, thus making a repetition of such incidents even more unlikely and consider-
ably more hazardous for the saboteurs. Moreover, the existence of alternate routes
over Which traffic can be diverted, coupled with the capability of the railroad repair
organization to restore damaged installations and equipment, indicates that a major
sabotage program requiring a high degree of sophistication would be required to
seriously disrupt traffic in South Africa. There is a possibility that South African
insurgents might attempt to infiltrate into Mozambique for the purpose of sabotaging
the railroad route 41iich runs from the South African border through Mozambique to the
port of lourenco Marques. Almost four million tons of South African freight traffic
yearly moves over this route, and its sabotage would require the diversion of a
considerable amount of export mineral traffic originating in the area of Johannesburg
and import traffic destined for the same area. In the event of such an attempt at
sabotage in Mozambique, the South African security forces and the Portuguese in
MozambiqUe would probably cooperate to the fullest extent possible to secure the route
against sabotage. South Africa needs the route, and Mozambique needs the considerable
revenue from the traffic over the route.
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While there MAY be attempts on,tbe pert of non-white insurgent (guerrilla)
force to seize Tarts of the inter-territorial transportation system it does not
appear that a military advantage can be obtained thereby. There are alao other
considerations that would not make such action propitiOus.
Normally, guerrilla forces wish to establish their operations in areas
that (1) are advantageous from the standpoint of terrain, (2) are adjacent to safe
havens preferably across international borders in apathetic territories where
/training can be conducted, and from which forces can be deployed or to which guer-
rillas,can retreat in safety when Tressed by opposing forces, and (3) are connected
by some form of transportation to a source of logistic support and manpower rein-
forcements. There are no parts of the area up onsglaration that combine out-
standing terrain advantages for guerrilla *rat One; with the other two desirable
requirements for guerrilla warfare'.
Outstanding .terrain advantages would include
mountains with dense jungles or forests with underbrush covering the egress and
access routes to the mountains.
If insurgents should seize parts of the inter-territorial transporta-
tion system, even though lacking outstanding terrain edYantages1 the logistic
supply capability of :the routes in the bands of government forces would make it
possible for them to deploy Currently 412 force against the
uprising. n ad. ion, seiOgre
VI insurgents, end the
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conflict that would ensue, could deny the territories which may be hosta to the
insurgents their traditional trade routes to the sea. The consequences of such
action would be virtual stagnation in the market economies of these host terri-
tories. It appears, therefore, that insurgents cannot expect to gain a military
advantage by seizure of parts of the inter-.territorial transportation, and further-
more that the non-white governments which may be called upon to serve as hosts to
guerrilla forces should urge them to operate in parts Of the area somewhat removed
from the inter-territorial transportation system.
2.. The physical Bettin6 for Insurgency,
In the area under consideration, railroad and highway routes which tra-
verse relatively isolated, partially wooded countrysides, are found from Kolwezi
in the KStanga, across Angola to the port of Lobito; south from the Copperbelt to
Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia; and east from Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, to the
port of Beira, Mozambique. Grassland areas are traversed by rail routes in the
vicinity of Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia; between Kamina and Port Francqui; and be-
tween Leopoldville and Matadi, both in the Republic of the Congo. Grasslands be-
tween forests and deserts are subject to air observation during the day, but wooded
stream valleys could afford protection from observation by day, and cross country
travel at night under the open sky is practical and is difficult for security forces
to control. Very dry areas, such as parts of Sputh-West Africa or Bechuanaland,
however, offer few opportunities for concealment, present better operating conditions
for military and security forces, and are generally less favorable to insurgents
4
in terma of unassisted survival Dry areas, nevertheless, offer more suitable con-
ditions for air support than do wooded areas for both dissidents and security forces.
Heavily populated areas can be vulnerable to actions of dissident groups
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if the general population is unsympathetic to the mission of local security forces.
The semi-skilled industrial worker by day could very well be the man security forces
seek after dark. Nevertheless, industrialized areas of the Republic of South Africa,
the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia, and the Katanga Of the Congo, and most ports
are not suitable areas of operation for large bands of dissidents, but rather offer
opportunities for small well-trained groups that can mingle undetected with the
local population and engage in sabotage operations. In fact, most of the Tarts of
the transportation system do not contain the conditions normally regarded as impor-
tant for guerrilla operations in force.
3. The Congo-Anela Route
The most promising part of the transportation system which could be
used by a large scale guerrilla operation is the territory along the railroad line
from Kolwezi in the Kntanga, across Angola to the port of Lobito. With the consent
of the government of the Republic of the Congo, training bases for insurgents for
use against Angola could be expanded. Volunteers from other African countries could
be infiltrated and substantial logistic support could move into the Congo through
Matadi, Point Noire, and Dar as Salaam by sea and thence by rail, highway and water
transportation to training and staging bases, and by air transportation to the
principal airfields in the Congo. Insurgents and their supplies could be dispersed
along the railroad and road between Kolwezi and the Angolan border, and then tradi-
tional guerrilla operations could be mounted along the Benguela Railroad and the
parallel highway. A reliable transportation route from the Congo for insurgent
)
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, reinforcements and logistic support would be a:Tellable as well as a. safe haven into
which the guerrillescould retreat if necessary.
The railroad and parallel highway in Portuguese hands would also sup-
port logistically a tremendoua fOrce for the capacity of the Renguela Railroad, and
the road in Portuguese hands would supply Over 150,000 troops engaging in a secur-
ity type of operation against guerrillas. Although such a force is far in excess
of One that Portugal can deploy against insurgents (See Appendix D) there are other
considerations which would place Portugal in a favorable positon to counter insur-
gency in this territory. The chief current Outlet to the sea for Katanga's exports
-- the :Benguela Railroad -- would be denied the Congo. The Portuguese could also
counter by blocking the channel in the Congo. River between Matadi and the sea, and
thus deny the Congo the second most important Outlet when the "Route Nationale"
has been restored. Further, the Portuguese could deny the Congo the use of the
/ndian Ocean ports of Beira and toUrenco Marques which are reached from the Congo
by rail via the Rhodesias. The only remaining outlets for Congolese exports and
the receipt of imports would be the low capacity, Circuitous and oostly route by
way Of Albertville Lake Tanganyika, and Dar es Salaam; the long-distance route to
South African ports via the Rhodesiasthe "Route Nationale' using the port of
Rrazzaville rather than Leopoldtille; and the railroad and highway from Rrazzaville
to Point Noire rather than the routes from Leopoldville to Matadi.
The extent to which gouthern Rhodesia ilud the RepUblio of South Africa,
Would cooperate with the Congo in the face of imprestive Congo-supported insurgency
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against Angela is questionable. Moreover, the low capacity of the port of Irazza-
*ilia and the current use of the ArazzavilIe-Point Noire route by the Brazzaville
Congo mail not make this route an adequate substitute for the LeopoldviIleAstadi
tout". te. view of these considerations the Congo may find available Only One route
to the sea - Albertville, Lake Tanganyika, Bar ea Salam -- as a consequence of
the AUPTIort prOvided the insurgency along the Benguela Railroad.
4. The Tenon:Oka-Mozambique Route
There lea second transportation route libieh could be used by a large
guerrilla force and fromvhich operations could proceed against the Portuguese.
This rOUte extends by road from Tanganyika into the northeast corner of Northern
Rhodesia, and thence to the railhead of the Nyasaland Railroad at Salima. Insur-
ants and logistic support could be deployed from Tanganyika, a safe haven coUld
be provided in Nyasaland and Tangaartka, and Operations( could proceed along the
railroad against the Portuguese forces in Mozambique, although terrain instals area
is even lees favorable- than that available for the first route and is more open than
that normally regarded as favorable for guerrilla warfare. The capacity of the
road leading to the railhead is low, but could, nevertheless, supply a considerable
force of insurgents - say in excess of 30r0000*. Logistic support provided, by the
road could also be augmented considerably by the use Of an airlift in support of
* It is very difficult to quantify the size of this force. First, we have very
little information On the average daily capacity of the route, but 'believe it to
be in *Mewls of ,290 timiAt filecond4, we have little information- .the daily
wanly reqattimmente of insurgents. Assuniugt # that the !Immo) is 200 tons
and the Utter dna ton Verr day for 160 SSA or pounds per man per day, than the
ieenrgente that eoalL be soparted would be in mom Of 30,0004
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the insurgency. The Trans-Zambesia Railroad and the Nyasaland Railroad, to the
extent that they are held by Portuguese forces, and the road that leads from Mozam-
bique to Nyasaland would support a force in opposition to the insurgents numbering
alao in excess of 1500000 men. Nyasaland, the host to the insurgency, would be
denied the traditional and most economical route to the sea at Beira. Moreover,
normal and important trade by rail with the Rhodesias would also be interrupted.
The long, poor highway route from Nyasaland to Tanganyika would not provide the
alternate support needed for the economy of Nyasaland, even though new trading part-
nero cdUld be developed and access to world markets could be obtained through Dar
es Salaam.
5. The Northern Rhodesia - Southern Rhodesia Route
The rail and road routes leading from the Congo through Northern Rho-
desia into Southern Rhodesia might also be used by guerrilla forces. Here again,
the Congo and Tanganyika, as well as Northern Rhodesia, could be used as troop
training and staging areas as well as sources of logistic support. The transpor-
tation systems involved would provide impressive logistic support for both insur-
gents and opposingl:_
-
forces. Here also the cost to the market economy
of the host country of such massive insurgency operating along the transportation
routes of Northern Rhodesia into Southern Rhodesia would be great. Northern Rho-
desia wad be denied its traditional access to the sea and trade with Southern
Rhodesia the Republic of South Africa, and Nyasaland. The railroad route from
Northern Rhodesia through the Congo tO the Renguela Railroad and thence to Lobito
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would provide an alternate access route to the sea if the Portuguese were to
cooperate with Northern Rhodesia. It is doubtful that the Portuguese would cooperate,
but even if they were to do so, lack of coal from Southern Rhodesia would make it
impossible for the Northern Abodeoian railroads to move sufficient tonnage to meet
the requirements of the economy as well as the transportation requirements of the
insurgency.
6. Outlook
If insurgents decide to use the inter-territorial routes for their pur-
poses, pertly of the same routes caa\be used by the better trained and equipped mili-
tary and security forces of the various governments. As a consequence, the same
or greater capacity for logistic support will be available to these forces. It
would therefore appear to be a matter of years before insurgent forces can seriously
attempt to seize and hold /Arts of the inter-territorial routes. The inability to
seize and hold, however, would not preclude small bands of guerrillas operating out
of the Conga, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia from conducting sabotage operations
,N
against the routes leading into Angola, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia. Operations '
to seize and hold or to affect the routes through critical sabotage would both have
which
serious consequences on the market economies of the territoriesL;may be hosts
and sponsors of the insurgency.. These consequences for the MaXket economies will
be so great that it would be logical for theee territories to insist that no opera-
tions be conducted against the inter-tarritorial routes. If the tide of African
nationallosEleoomes great enough, nevirtheleos, the non-White governments mmr be
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unable or unwilling to prevent such operations. in this event they will have to
suffer the consequences which will fall predominantly on the market economies rather
than the subsistence economies.
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APPENDIX A
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS wiTarm THE AREA
I. ANGOLA
A. Internal
Angola is a Portuguese "Overseas province", tightly governed from Lisbon
by a policy *which :clacks of old-fashioned mercantilism. Occasional efforts to
give an appearance of liberalization notwithstanding, the Salazar regime has
refused to grant any significant autonomy to the province. Lisbon's attitude
has stimulated occasional thoughts of separatism, particularly among the 190,000
Angolan 'whites; its heavy-handed control of the 43,000 Portuguese troops in the
territory has aroused discontent among them in the past. There has been some
talk of an anti-Salazar alliance including oppositionists in Portugal, Angolan
White separatists, elements of the military, and perhaps some of the more
sophisticated Angolan mulattos and Africans. Such a multiracial alliance has
a better chance of developing in Angola than in South Africa or Southern
Rhodesia, where racial feelings are much more intense. However, pressure from
African rebels on all these discontented Angolan elements seems likely to keep
them from uniting, and the chance of effective active opposition to Lisbon from
these sources fairly remote.
The official Portuguete racial policy is one of complete assimilation.
Although it is true that races relations are better unier PortugUONe rule than they
are in Southern Rhodesia or fiwth Africa, in practice there is still a deep gulf
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between white Portuguese and the mass of backward Africans. Mulattos and the few
educated Africans occupy an ambiguous position, but most of the politically
articulate representatives of these communities appear to be identifying them-
selves with African nationalism.
The African rebellion which broke out in March 19o1 is barely maintaining
itself. After an initial rash of fairly widespread and largely spontaneous out-
breaks, it was confined to one relatively small area in extreme northwest Angola;
its spread to other areas has been hindered by the rebels' inadequate equipment
and training, by lack of sympathetic tribal support outside the present disturbed
area, and by the fact that much of the rest of the territory lacks the rough
terrain and dense ground cover which aids guerrillas in northwestern Angola.
This situation appears unlikely to change appreciably until Portuguese military
and economic resources are weakened by this and other rebellions, or until the
rebels have gradually acquired enough training and field experience to alter
the military balance.
The group behind the rebellion is Bolden Roberto's Union of Angolan
Peoples (UPA)? which is essentially the political and military organ of the Bakongo
tribal group of northern Angola. Roberto has close ties with Congolese Premier
Adoula and other Congolese leaders; they have given him a limited amount of aid
and have permitted him to set up a training camp about 70 miles south of Leopold-
ville. Leopoldville has also recognized Roberto's government-in-exile -- the only
government to do so thus far.
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Roberto has received mnall amounts of money and arms from Tunisia and
Algeria and his militants have been trained in both countries. Aid from these
latter sources has been kept to a trickle by the problem of transportation between
North Africa and the Congo, however. In addition, Roberto -- as well as the Con-
golese in Leopoldville -- has been reluctant to respond too favorably to offers
of massive aid from Algeria for fear of the influx of Algerian military men into
the Congo and Angola which would presumably follow. Thus a rapid increase in the
UPA's military capability is unlikely. Roberto opened an office in Elisabetbville
as soon as central government authority was established there, but be has not
managed to spark an uprising in neighboring parts of Angola. The UPA has so far
shown no capability for sabotaging the Benguela Railroad.
The UPAis rival, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA),
seems to have no effective following inside Angola. Its leaders, however, especially
such intellectuals as Agostinho Neto and Mario de Andrade, cut a more impressive
figure in foreign capitals than does the provincial and rather poorly educated
leadership of the UPA. Many of the top MPLA figures are mulattos (Neto, the president,
is an African), and several of them were educated at Portuguese universities where
they gravitated into Communist-influenced movements. The MPLA is still tinged
with Communism, although Neto seems to have bE en trying to move it toward neutralism
since he became ;resident a year ago. Roberto, oy contrast, was educated in Protestant
missions in the Congo and Angola and seems to lave a genuine distrust of Communists.
There have been recent indications of a split wiyhin the MPLA following the Con-
golese government's Mcognition of Rdberto's goOrrnment-in-exile.
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Most of the MPLA's training and material support has come from Morocco
and Algeria. So far, with the Congolese government favoring the UPA and with
the most easily accessible area inhabited by UPA sympathizers, it has not been
able to move its followers into Angola. If it should manage to do so) and if it
factionalism and its
can overcome the handicarsof its/predominantly mulatto hierarchy, the more
cosmopolitan nature of its leadership might give it a somewhat broader base of
potential support than the UPA.
B. Foreign Relations
The Portuguese maintain an embassy in Leopoldville which serves mainly as
a listening post. They probably will try to preserve at least a minimum of official
contact with the Adoula government. At the same time, however, Angola has allayed
thirty or more Katangan mercenaries to camp just over the border in eastern Angola
ever since the fighting stopped in January 1963. Portugal clearly stands to benefit
as long as elements unsympathetic to the Angolan rebels have some say in Congolese
affairs, and it presumably will try to support these elements to the best of its
limited potential.
Angola holds considerable economic leverage over both Xatanga and Northern
Rhodesia in its control of the Benguela Railroad and the port at Lobito. There
have been no signs that Africans in either territory have worked out any feasible
way of exporting their minerals except via Lobito) Matadi) Beira) or Lourenco
Marques, although the Northern. Rhodesians are trying to promote the idea Of a
rail line to Dar es Salaam. Portugal would be reluctant to forego an important
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source of revenue by closing the rail line, but the mere existence of the threat
will probably inhibit the support which Africans such as Kenneth Kaunda give to
Angolan exiles.
Angolan authorities have joined in defense and intelligence talks with
other white-dominated governments in the area. These consultations will probably
become more comprehensive as African nationalist pressure increases.
C. Treaties AffectinOransportation
Most of Angola falls in the free trade area defined by the Congo Basin
Treaty of 1685. However, since Lisbon exercises tight control over Angolan trade,
by currency restrictions and other measures) the treaty is of little value. The
treaty, if faithfully followed, would prevent the Portuguese from interfering
with navigation on the lower Congo River, whose channel at one point passes
through Angolan territory. Portugal presently seems to lack the will or the
ability to interfere seriously with river traffic, however. All dredging) in
Portuguese as well as in Congolese territory, is carried out by Belgians. MO
other treaties affecting transportation are known to exist.
XX. inxInuIc CONDO (LEOPOLDVILLE)
A. Xnternal
Since the end of the fighting in January 1983, the Adoula government,
with UN aid, has established a presence of a kind in lligabethville. As is the
case over aost of the rest of the country, central authority can only be exercised
through local leaders, most of them tribally based and few of them with any inherent
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sympathy for the Leopoldville government. The Katangans? like other Congolese,
lack the power to rebel against Leopoldville and the UN; at the same time, the
central government and the UN cannot establish an effective provincial government
on their own. For these reasons the cast of characters in Katanga is changing
only slowly, and the new faces are unlikely to ameliorate Adoulats problems.
In the past few months, with Elisabethmille and Leopoldville politics
working directly on each other, each has become somewhat more unstable and
unpredictable. Tshodbe appears to have failed in his efforts to carve out a
niche for himself in national politics, and he is under attack from younger
elements in the Katangan legislature. In his efforts to stay on top, Tshombe
apparently has tried to lite up the support of everyone from radical Congolese
to the Yerwoerd government in Pretoria. The IeopOldmille government knows
something of his activities and may try to arrest him. Adoulal who recently has
shown no decisiveness or initiative, has nevertheless managed to weather a series
of parliamentary attacks on himself an his associates. An end to the drift in
central government policies is not in sight.
In this morass, Union Miniere and other mining companies seem to be trying
merely to go about their business with as little fuss as possible. Union Miniere
is now paying all of its taxes to IeopoldVille, and Adoula appears to recognize
the importance of this contribution. He has been highly reluctant to incur the
digpleasure of the mining companies, as he presumably would do if he insisted
that a signifitant part of their production be shipped out via the "Vole Nationale"
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to Matadi (in any case, this route reportedly will not be open until late August
1963 when two key bridges are scheduled to be replaced). The Angolan rebels
presumably would like to persuade him to undermine the Angolan economy by
diverting traffic from the Benguela Railroad, but so far they have had no success
whatever. If nationalist radicals in parliament continue to attack Adoula, he
might require a partial rerouting of traffic as soon as the route to Matadi is
open. Be probably would not try to impose on Union Miniere complete dependence
on the "Vbie Nationale", however.
B. Foreign Relations
Adoula has proclaimed a policy of non-alignment, but he is clearly pro-
Western. Be is usually preoccupied with local problems, however, and has not
given much attention to foreign affairs. ,Be maintains close ties with Bolden
Roberto of the UPA, but partly out of governmental inefficiency and partly
because the Congolese are unwilling to see the Angolan rebels become too powerful,
material assistance to the rebellion has been strictly limited. Roberto and his
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followers are also faced with the resistance of powerful Bakongo leaders in the
Congo, including President Kasavubul who would like to keep the Angolan Bakongo
weak in hopes of eventuAlly forming a unified tribal state.
C. Treaties Affecting Transportation
The Congo is, of course, within the area of the Congo Basin Treaty, but
customs is one of the government's main sources of revenue. Tariffs thus tend
to be higher than the treaty would permit. The government's tariff policy is
chaotic, and its application is Vitiated by smuggling, both into and out of the
'country. Financial experts advising the government hope to set up a more ordered
customs regime, one which will discourage the import of luxury goods for instance.
NO progress in this direction seems likely in the near future. No other treaties
affecting transportation are known to exist.
/III. FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYMAIAND
A. Internal
The Federation is a complex and unique constitutional phenomenon. Set up
in 1953 over African objectiOns, it amalgamates the two British protectorates of
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with Southern Rhodesia, a colony which has had
almost complete internal autonomy since 1923. The Federation is not independent,
even thoUgh the federal prime minister attends Commonwealth conferences; in
practice, however, Britain has very little direct influence on the policies of
either the federal or the Southern Rhodesian governments. In both cases it
remains theoretically the supreme authority, but it has never exercised this
authority without at least the acquiescence of the governments concerned.
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Africans (who number 3.7 million in Southern Rhodesia and almost 3 million
in eedh of the other two territories) have long held that the Federation was set
up to slordinate them to the some 225,000 whites in Southern Rhodesia. They
Amave, therefore, never become reconciled to it despite its obvious economic
advantages. Britain has allowed African-dominated governments to take office
in the two northern territories, and by the spring of 1963, it had acknowledged
the right of both of them to secede from the Federation as a further step toward
their full independence. These concessions presaged the end of the Federation as
presently constituted, and the process of dissolution is now scheduled to be com-
pleted by 31 December 1963.
Dismantling the Federation will be a complex and difficult Job. At present
. earths bare outlines of future interterritorial relationships can be indicated
with any assurance. It seems likely that Nyasaland will break its financial ties
almost completely. A, few financial and transport links (such as the railways and
airline, the power complex at Kariba Dam, and perhaps a common currency) may be
preserved between Northern and Southern Rhodesia, but the African nationalists
who will control Northern Rhodesia will probably try to limit imports from Southern
Rhodesia. Independence dates for the three territories cannot be predicted.
Southern Rhodesia is demanding independenc no later than either of the other
territories. Britain insists that substeurt%al concessions to Africans are a pre-
requisite to independence, but its room fo maneuver is limited by the possibility
that the White-supremacist government of Wihston Field will declare itself Indio
pendent unilaterally. At present it appear j probable that Field will back away
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from his independence demand for the time being. Britain hopes to grant
independence to all three territories at about the same time, but it may have
to pull out of Nyasaland before the other two territories are completely dis-
entangled.
At preeent, railways and airlines come under the jurisdiction of the
federal government (the railways in Nyasaland, a complex of privately-owned
companies, are a special case). Road construction and maintenance is a joint
responsibility of the federal and territorial governments, with the territories
doing most of the field work. When the Federation is dissolved, the railways
in Northern and Southern Rhodesia probably will retain some kind of unified
administration, and responsibility for roads will probably revert to the
territories. Political uncertainty will probably continue to limit the railways'
revenue and restrict road construction and repair expenditures.
Kenneth Khunda and many of his lieutenants in Northern Rhodesia have
been relatively moderate in their approach to the question of economic relations
with Southern Rhodesia. They appear to hold better economic cards than the Field
government, however; these are discussed in Appendix B. Thus, even if the
federal breakup proceeds peacefully, and the greatest possible number of economic
ties is retained, it seems doubtful that Southern Rhodesia will be permitted to
hold all the commercial privileges it now enjoys in Northern Rhodesia.
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Southern Rhodesia has been the scene of occasional acts of sabotagemost
of it even more poorly organized than that in South Africa. The Field government,
by harsh legislation and strict enforcement, has sharply reduced the incidence of
sabotage. It has also exposed the weakness and indecision of the present African
nationalist leaders, most of whom recently fled the country. Southern Rhodesian
Africans are receiving training in subversion abroad, but their effective employ-
ment inside the territory probably will have to await a shake-up and streamlining
in the nationalist movement. The extent to which the nationalists resort to
sabotage and other violence will also depend on the degree to which they believe
their desires are being protected by Britain in its dealings with the Field
government; a breakdown in these negotiations could lead to a resumption of
violence, especially if it were accompanied by a Southern Rhodesian declaration
of independence. If the nationalists are able to initiate sabotage and terrorism,
they might have a greater effect than in South Africa, since Southern Rhodesia
lacks South Africa's economic and military strength.
B. Foreign Relations
Formally, none of the three territories has any competence in the foreign
relations field, and the Federation itself exer:cises only such responsibilities
as are delegated by Britain. Informally, howeNor, each group of importance
in the Federation has ties abroad, particularly With neighboring countries.
The White-dominated federal and Southern Vriodesian governments (OhOse
officials usually are members of the same "Eitablment" or ruling group)
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have been in unofficial contact with defense and security organizations in South
Africa and the Portuguese territories for the past few years. These contacts are
likely to increase in the future, particularly since Southern Rhodesia occupies a
strategic position for intelligence-gathering purposes. Documents recently captured
by the Congolese government in Elisabethville reportedly indicate that there have
been vauge attempts at coordinated covert action involving federal Prime Minister
Welensky, Katanga President Tshombel and Portuguese and South African officials.
As African nationalism moves southward, activities such as these will probably become
more intensive but there is little likelihood that they will be particularly effective.
Nyasaland occupies a unique position among African-dominated countries, since
it is almost completely dependent on its outlet to the sea through Mozambique.
Nyasaland Prime Minister Hastings Banda, essentially a provincial figure who has few
,ambitions Outside his own territory, has worked out a correct and even cordial
relationship with Portuguese authorities in both Lisbon and Lourenco Marques, To
preserve his access to the sea he can be expected to restrict Mozambive African
activities, although he could not discourage them entirely without tarnishing his
reputation as an African nationalist. His principal lieutenants are far more radical
and ambitious than he, and if he left the scene (he is 57), Nyasaland's attitude
toward Mozambique would probably become more belligerent.
Africans in Northern Rhodesia have a cOMPlem array of ties with outside groups.
Harry NkuMbula of the African National Congress was subsidized for many months by
Tshombe and tried to promote the cause of Katanga secession; his current partner in
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the Northern Rhodesian coalition government, Kenneth Kaunda, has long favored
Katanga's integration with the rest of the Congo. Kaunda is currently president
of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECA),
which is trying to foster federal ties throughout eastern and southern Africa.
fikumbula has few ties with Africans outside of Northern Rhodesia. This dichotomy,
with Kaunda favoring federations in general and the Leopoldville central government
in particular, while Nkumbula takes a narrower outlook, is likely to continue until
a new constitution is worked out in six months or a year; thereafter, Khunda's
majority in the legislature will probably be large enough to allow him to form
a government of his own and Nkumbula's importance will decline.
Both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would like to form ties with African
states to the north and east, thereby reducing their dependence on Southern Rhodesia
and Mozambique. They have found an eager collaborator in Tanganyika President
Julius Nyerere, who has long been agitating for a federation which would include
much of east and central Africa. Kaunda in particular has close ties with Nyerere;
Banda himself has shown little interest, but some of his lieutenants seem to be
getting involved in the Tanganyika president's project. Formation of close
economic ties presumably would lag far behind the establishment of a loose poli-
tical federation.
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C. Treaties affecting tran_aportation
The federation is a member of GATT, and its trade agreement with south Africa
is mentioned below. The Congo Basin Treaty of 1885 and subsequent years, -which
forbids the establishment of hindrances to trade and transportation in the treaty
area, technically applies to all land between the Zambezi and latitude 50N.; how-
ever, it has not been applied to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (which otherWise
would be governed by it) since 1957. Details of treaties covering construction and
maintenance of an oil pipeline which is to transport crude oil from Beira to UMtali'
have not been divulged. No other government-to-government agreements regulating
transport are known to exist.
IV. Mozambique
A. Internal
Mozambique, like Angola a Portuguese "overseas province," is one of the most
backward territories in Africa. Wen more than in Angola, the 6.5 million Africans
lack the sense of national identity which is present to a significant extend in South
Africa and the territories of the Federation.
Of all the Africans in Mozambique, some Of the least advanced are those who
inhabit the borders near Tanganyika and Nyasaland, the two territories most often
named as potential safe havens for a rebellion like Angola's. Moreover) Mozambique's
economically important areas and its concentrations of white population are in the
southern half of the territory; this contrasts with northern Angola, which contains
the territorial capital and is also an important coffee-growing area. In addition,
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most of Mozambique's terrain, including almost all of that along the northern
frontiers, is too open for guerrilla warfare. lankily, Mozambique ports are import-
ant to the White-dominated inland areas of the Transvaal and Southern Rhodesia;
Beira and IoUrenco Marques, together with Lobito in Angola, are the only economic
outlets for Northern Rhodesian copper (although the reverse is also true, that
Mozambique iltofits greatly from the Northern Rhodesian copper that it handles) and
Nyasaland is completely dependent on its rail litm to Beira. Thus, a nationalist
rebellion has been even harder to stir up in Mozambique than it was in Angola; support
is not likely to be wholehearted from some of the Africans who dominate the neighboring
territories and. who Veul& be fearful Of Portuguese reprisals and whites in inland
areas can be expected to be deeply involved in the defense of the territory, or at
least of its southern half.
Mozambique African exiles are generally a disunited, unprepossessing lot.
Their organizations have undergone many metamorphoses. but the most durable group
is probably the Mozambique Liberation Front (Prelimo), Whose president is Eduardo
Mondlane, the only Mozambique Alrican with a doctor's degree. Prelim? meMbers are ,
undergoing military training abroad. Their capability for stirring up a rebellion
is highly questionable, but they Might be able to disrupt service on the Beira
raiIroad(or on the soon-to-be-built oil gpeline tocUatali, which will follow roughly
the same route) if they could persuade Banda to let them use Nyaswiwro as a base
for sabotage forays to the south. SO far Banda has been extremely circumspect in
his relations, with the Itortuguese authorities, but be presumably will feel constrained
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to conform to the canons of African nationalism and permit some exile activity.
Similar operctions T5be mounted, although with far more difficulty, from
Northern Rhodesia; again, however,: economic consideration will limit the willingness
of even a radical African government to countenance such activity.
B. Foreign relations
Mozambique's external relations are similar to those of Angola, with the
proviso that its strategic importance for neighboring territories is much greater.
and
Hence it is more closely tied to these territories. Defense [Ylintelligence coordi-
nation with South Africa and the Federation may be somewhat more intensive in
Mozambique than in Angola.
C. Treaties affecting transportation
The transportation treaty with South Africa is discussed below. As noted in
the section on the Federation, details of the agreement covering construction of the
Beira-UMtali pipeline are unaintilable. That part of Mozambique north of the Zambezi
is technically subject to the Congo Basin Treaty, but as in the case of Angola, the
treaty has little practical value.
V. Republic of South Africa
A. Internal
South Africa is an independent republic of nearly 16,000,000 persons (1960
census), whose political, social, and economic life is controlled by the white
grfoups
community of almost 3 million. The other principal racial 4_. ST7 are the Bantu or
Africans (11 million), the Asiatics (430,000)0 and the Coloreds or persons of mixed
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'blood (1.5 million). Under the doctrine of apartheid (separate racial development),
the South African government has enshrined each of these broad racial groupings in
law and is trying to separate them as completely as possible in fact. At the same
time there are cultural divisions within each grOup which have had almost as pro-
found an effect on the country's history as have the recta divisions. Thus the
tension between Afrikaners (60 percent of the whites) and English-speaking South
Africans (40 percent) was for years the most important fact in politics. Cleavages
renddred
within the Colored community have7, / it disunited and impotent. Rural Africans,
Who comprise some two thirds of the African population, are usually politically
inarticulate and are concerned mainly with local and tribal problems. Urban Africans,
although far more sophisticated than any group of comparable size anywhere else in
Black Africa, are still divided, poverty-stricken, and generally incapable of
presenting a united front.
In formal structure, South Africa is a parliamentary democracy modelled on
Great Britain, with a ceremonial president replacing the queen as head of state.
In fact, since 1948 the parliamentary structure has become little more than a shell,
with real power concentrated in the executive. Through a combination of good
organization, appeals to community solidarity, and gerrymandering in the constituencies,
the Afrikaner community's Nationalist Party has achieved an overwhelming parliamentary
majority (currently 105-51 in the all-iwportant lower house). It is now using this
majority to pass measures which transfei authority to the executive and insulate
the administration frOm inteference, eit,r from parlihment or from the independent
\\
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and highly respected judiciary. It justifies these measures partly on the ground
of necessity, following the recent upsurge in African nationalist activity, and
partly on the fundamental tenets of its apartheid policy.
The program of apartheid aims at setting up selfsufficient areas in which
Africans will have progressiTely greater amounts of autonomy. (Apartheid policy for
the other non-White groups has been equivocal, since these communities are too
small or too scattered to be administered in their own territorial units). African
workers in the cities, on whose cheap labor most of the economy is based, will be
allowed to remain, but reliance on them is to be reduced and they are to be encouraged
to help develop their own. "homelands" or"Bantustans." Although the government has
recently stepped up its development programs, full implementation of the "Bantustan"
policy would cost far more than the whites appear willing to spend and would also
drastically change the country's economic fabric. Nevertheless, the Verwoerd govern-
ment, glossing over these economic difficulties, is putting the political aspects
of the program into effect as quickly as possible. By November. 1962 six territorial
governments out of a planned seven or eight had been set up in the "Bantustans;" in
the spring of 1963 the most advanced of these, the Transkei, received a new cons-
titution which granted a severely limited amount of internal autonomy and provided
for an African prime minister.
Africans in the "Bantustans" have not accepted the political and economic
changes in their traditional way of life with complete docility; there are, in fact,
periodic attempts to assassinate the government-appointed chiefs, and the Transkei
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has been governed under emergency regulations since mid-1960. Security problems
In the rural areas have also been complicated by the presence of hoodlums and
African nationalists whom the government has been expelling from the cities for
"As
the past three years. The "Bantustans" are remote, backward areas, however, whose
main importance to the national economy is their value as a labor reservoir for
the mines and cities. Unrest in these areas keeps part of the security forces
tied down and provides ammunition for opponents of apartheid; otherwise it has
little bearing on politics in the rest of the country.
In the cities active opposition to the government is largely underground.
Most of the activists are non-whites, aided by the illegal and largely white
Communist Party and by some members of the anti-Communist Liberal Party. There
are two groups of activists: the African National Congress (ANC), principal com-
ponent of the Communist-dominated, multiracial "Congress Movement" and advocate
of a moderate approach to racial questions; and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC),
an anti-Ccamunist group which makes a strong appeal to African racism. Both these
groups in the past two years have men involved in acts of violence. The ANC,
operating through an action arm called "Spear of the Nation," has emphasized secure
conspiratorial techniques, tries to husband its resources, and concentrates on
sabotage with minimum danger to human life. It escaped police counteraction until
mid-July 19630 when its headquarters LOtr Johannesburg were raided. The PAC,
whose activist wing is named Pogo, atriums terrorism above sabotage. Its call
for racial violence has great appeal f r the mass be sea-educated Africans,
but so far it has been less well -disci than "lpear of the Nation"
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and Can do no more than stimulate short-lived, semi-spontaneous local outbreaks.
Neither group has any chance of overthrowing the government at present.
Nevertheless, both groups, and "Spear of the Nation" in particular, do have
some sabotage capability. Bombings, arson, cable-cutting, and similar acts have
been taking place sporadically since 1961, and in the past few months some of these
efforts?such as the blowing up of the offices of a pro-government newspaper in
Durban last January and the sabotage of military vehicles in March--have been effect-
ive enough to increase white uneasiness. The maiir target of the saboteurs seems
to be government installations, but there have been reports that "Spear Of the Nation"
and Pogo have also designated key targets in the transportation system, such as
power stations and toad and railway bridges. On two or three occasions earlier
this year, rail traffic in the Johannesburg area was disrupted byecplosions in
power substations. At one time the main line from Johannesburg to Durban was dis-
rupted briefly by a similar explosion.
Sabotage of targets outside the transportaton system has occurred fairly
frequently in Johannesburg and somewhat less frequently in Durban, Port aizabeth,
and Cape Town; there have also been a few amateurish attempts in most of the other
urban areas. Members of both PAC and ANC reportedly are taking sabotage training
abroad, notably in Ghana, Morocco, Algeria, Tanganyika, and possibly some countries
of the Sino-Saviet bloc. Outside assistance presUmbbly will be stepped up follow-
ing the recent Addis Ababa conference. There have been reports that trainees from
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both movements are beginning to return to South Africa. Anti-government groups
are still no match for the country's security forces, however, and are likely to
lack the ability to coordinate a widespread sabotage effort for several years.
Over the next three or four years, therefore, although occasional instances of
terrorism and Babotage are likely to continue) the government is not likely to be
Seriously threatened by internal subversion.
B. Foreign Relations
While South Africa's official ties with the Afro-Asian and Sino-Sotiet blocs
have long been bad or nonexistent and its relations with the West are steadily be-
coming more strained, the threat of militant African nationalism is forcing it into
cooperation with white-controlled governments in neighboring territories.
The Afrikaners who dominate the South African government have little in common
with either the PMrtuguese in Angola and MozaMbique or with the whites of Rritish
extraction in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Indeed, the ostensible
Portuguese policy of complete racial' assimilation and the Federation's widely proclaimed
multiracialism--however much they are contradicted in practice--are diametrically
opposed to the aims of apartheid. Moreover, the black-white ratios in the other
territories (almost 5 million to 200,000 in Angola, 3.7 million to about 225,000 in
Southern Rhodesia, 6.5 million to nearly 100,000 in Mozambique) are far from at-
tractive to South African whites.
It is only in the past two or three yearsliltra most of the other territories
on the continent have come under African control umi have stewed up their agitation
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against the "White redoubt" in the south, that the various white governments have
overcome their antipathies. They all appear reluctant to conclude a formal
defensive treaty; nevertheless, informal consultations among defense and security
officials have occurred with increasing frequency. It seems likely that South
Africa would provide considerable assistance to the white governments in the north
from its Own armaments industry if these governments were endangered by a serious
outbreak of insurgency. It probably would also acquiesce or connive in the recruit-
ment of "volunteers," as it did during at least part of the Katanga secession
struggle. If there is a prospect of African advance without a prolonged breakdown
In the security situation, as may still happen in Southern Rhodesia, Pretoria would
find it hard to intervene decisively and might haVe to withdraw to defensive positions
south of the Limpopo. In any event, South African troops in uniform and major pieces
of materiel would be sent out of the country Only if the government thought that
Its own interests were directly affected and that overt intervention would reverse
a deteriorating situation (for instance, if African nationalists appeared likely
to seize the port of Lourenco Marques, if a full-scale rebellion were to develop
In Southern Rhodesia, or just possibly if an African takeover appeared likely in
Angola.
The Three High Commission Territories (Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swazi-
land) are administered directly by the British Colonial Office but are integrated
. economically with South Africa. All three are dependent to varying degrees on
South Africa: and they all serve as safe-havens for African nationalists from the
Republic. The Verwoerd government has made vague hints that it will invoke economic
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sanctions unless these nationalist exile activities are curbed. Sanctions would
paralyze the economies of all three territories, except possibly Swaziland. Xt
seems likely, however, that the important rail line across Bechuanaland (operated
partly by South African Railways and partly by Rhodesia Railways) would be seriously
affected.
C. Treaties Affectin4LTransyortation
South Africa is a member of GATT, and it also has a special trade treaty
with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The only agreement directly affect-
ing transportation is a treaty between South Africa andPortugal, first signed in
1909 and renegotiated in 1928. Under this treaty 47.5 percent of the sea-borne goods
imported to the 3ohannesburg, Pretoria, and Yereeniging areas are routed through
tourento Marques. In return, the mines in the Transvaal recruit a large percentage
of their African labor framMozadbique. Routh Africa has long been trying to reduce
the tours= Marques traffic quota, and the treaty is presently being renegotiated.
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_THE ECONOMY OF TEE AREA
I. ANGOLA
GENERAL
Angola is populated by 4.6 million uneducated and unskilled Africans, living
for the most part in tribal societies on the subsistence level -- and by 0.2 million
.largely uneducated, very conservative and rather unimaginative Portuguese and
mulattoes. At least until recently, the Angolan economy has been shaped to serve
the interests of Metropolitan Portugal, producing primary export commodities and
Importing nearly all the manufactured goods which it consumes. Based thus on the
production of a small number of agricultural and mineral commodities, the country
is extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in the world market prices and to the
policies of Metropolitan importers. The government has restricted the entry of
non-Portuguese capital, erected barriers against competitive foreign imports, and
largely ignored development of the economy. It is still without the infrastructure
necessary forr a
----Iself-sustaining economic activity.
Some of the results of these measures can be seen from an examinatiol., of
their effect on Angola's currency and balance of payments. Angola customarily runs
?
favorable trade balances with non-Portuguese areas, e.g., the United States and
the United Kingdom; but these surpluses are usually cancelled out by the Province's
huge negative trade balance with Portugal. In addition, a large volume of inviible
transfers are made each year to Portugal in the form of profits, freight charges,
and personal remittances. Thus, Angola's over-all balance of payments is usually
very unfavorable -- a situation which recently has resulted in the imposition of
severe import and exchange restrictions by the Province.
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About 4800000 square miles in area, Angola is thinly populated -- about
10 inhabitants per square mile -- and the population is growing at a little more
than one percent a year. The greatest concentration of Portuguese and mulattoes
are found in the main cities and along the Benguela and Luanda rail lines which
serve the sisal, cotton and coffee producing areas. The principal cities are Luanda,
the capital, Ldbito, Benguela, and Zlocamedes, all on the Atlantic coast. The only
inland towns of any importance are Malanje, Nova Lisboa Silva Porto, and Sa da
Bandeira, all of which are sited on railroad lines. About 8 percent of the total
population lives in urban areas, with approximately 5 percent of the people residing
in Luanda, the largest city.
Since 1959 Angola has been experiencing an economic recession; since 1961
this has been complicated by a persistent native rebellion centered in the north
and supported by men and supplies entering from the Republic of the Congo. Direct
and indirect costs attributable to the rebellion are estimated at more than $200
million annually. The rebellion has resulted in an accelerated road building
program, and in somewhat greater Portuguese efforts to develop the economy and
improve the condition of the native Angolans. Recovery from the recession, however,
is far from complete and the economic prospects for this primitive and unsettled
economy are cloudy.
Sectoral Description of the Economy
Agriculture is by far the most important sector of the Angolan economy
and will continue so into the foreseeable future. It provides sustenance for both
African and Rime= farmers and is 0eource of nearly two-thirds of Angola's
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export earnings. In 1961, agricultural products accounted for more than 60 percent
of total exports and light manufactures for about 15 percent. See Table 1.* As ma
be expected for an economy based largely on extractive industries, Angola's main
imports consist of manufactured goods -- textiles, machinery and foodstuffs. In
addition, a shortage of locally produced fuels requires the importation of coal.
The main agricultural products are coffee, corn, sugar, palm oil and palm
kernels. Lesser crops include cotton; wheat, tobacco, cocoa, sisal, and wax.
Approximately. 2 percent of the total land area is used for cultivated field and
tree crops which produce about three-fourths of Angola's export earnings. Coffee
is the single largest export; European plantations and farms produca around 80 per-
cent of the entire crop. The European producers also are responsible for all the
sugar, sisal and wheat produced for export. Corn, cotton, beans and cassava are
produced mainly on African farms.
Agricultural export production is concentrated in the hinterland of the
Luanda port area; this region accounts for more than two-thirds of the coffee,
more than one-third of the sugar, and nearly all of the cotton produced. About
168,000 tons of coffee were harvested in 19611) a year in which somewhat less that,
20 percent of the crop was lost through rebel activities. Output rose to around
200,000 tons in 1962. The cotton crop also increased in the same period, production
rising from 13,000 tons in 1961 to 22,000 tons in 1962.
Minerals account for a small but growing share of Angola's exports and
offer some opportunities for the development of local industry. See Table 2."
* Page 109 below.
** Page 110 below.
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Diamonds have long been and still are the most important mineral export, but
*Ton ore, Copper and manganese are becoeing increasingly important. In addition,
oil has rece4tly been found in economic quantities and crude production in 1962
amounted to 489:000 tons. A. refinery established at Luanda is currently producing
11,000 tons of gasoline a year in excess of local demand, but gas-oil output is
20,000 tons short of annual requirements. These imbalances are being overcome by
barter trade with Katanga.
The locus of oil production is the Tobias reserve which was tapped in late
1961 by Petrofina. Nine wells have been drilled, two are in production, and the
other seven are expected to be brought in When the 8-inch pipeline linking Tobias
to the Luanda refinery is completed.
Transport facilities for iron ore improved in 1962 when the 41-mile branch
rail line linking the Cuima mines with the Benguela Railroad was opened in August.
Iron is mined at the Lobito Mining Company's mines at Cuima, Cassinga, Andulo and
Bailundo, as well as at the Angolan Manganese Company's mine at Quitota near Malanje.
The current annual production of iron ore from these mines in short tons is as
follows: Cuima mines, 551,150; Quitota mine, 220,460; Cassinga mines, 1430299.
The annual output of the Cassinga mines is expected to increase to between 3 and 4
million short tons.
Other mineral prodtption and the principal locations of significant
mining operations include: diamonds from mines near Portugalia in the northeast;
manganese ores from the Quitota mine; copper ores from mines at Bedbe. See Table 2.-
4! Page =below.
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Industry in Angola is confined largely to the processing of primary products.
The most important "industrial export" is fish meal. Other industrial exports of
note are dried fish) canned fish and fish oil, vegetable oil, and sugar. In addition,
small quantities of locally produced cigarettes and cement are exported.
Population and Labor Force
The available labor force in 1960 consisted of 56,400 Europeans including
mulattoes, and slightly more than 2 million Africans. Of the total, approximately
310,000 workers, most of them completely unskilled, had been drawn into the monetary
economy by 1962. Somewhat more than a million are thought to be self-employed on
farms which produce some Surplus for sale in good years. The rest -- nearly
three-quarters of a million -- are completely immersed in the subsistence economy.
Portugal has been severely criticized for its long-held policy of forcing
the Africans to work for at least six months. of the year an plantations, roads and
other establishments of the monetary economy. This policy of forced labor has been
relaxed, in principle, in recent months* Unemployment both of Europeans and Africans
has been severe since the onset of the recession in 1959, and the problem also has
been exacerbated by the rebellion. At the same time, plantations in the north have
been forced to import harvest labor for the last two years because a sizeable part
of the local labor force has fled the troubled areas. Plans to resettle these
people and to improve the state of African agriculture are now being put into effect,
but their impact on employment and agricultural output is not yet clear. Aside from
the shortage of capital and skills, one of the most serious impediments to enlarging
the monetary sector of the economy is the-feluctance of the African population to
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Work with or for the Portuguese. This reluctance could become extremely important
if the rebellion spreads or any other situation develop in which Portugal must
depend on the help and support of the native Angolans.
Transport Facilities
The inadequacy of Angola's transport facilities is a problem of paramount
importance to further economic development and to the maintenance of security.
The lack of an adequate highway network or of other suitable transport facilities
proved to be a severe Obstacle to the effective conduct of the military operations
against the rebels. Military needs and the high level of unemployment have combined
to place a priority on investment in transport facilities. Road construction is
expected to be most important, at least until the goal of 9,900 miles of all-weather
roads is reached; air transport facilities are second in importance; railroad ex-
pansion and improvement fall into third or fourth place with port improvements.
New additions to the railroad network are designed to open new areas to export trade
and to tap recent finds of minerals.
Slightly more than 20 percent of government expenditures were to be devoted
to transport facilities in the 1962 budget and 18 percent in the 1963 budget.*
A Road Board has been created to improve, repair and construct new motor roads.
Allocations to this alone were planned at over $15 million annually in 1962 and 1963.
Other investments in transport facilities provided in he development plan are
shown below.
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, ?04.
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Funds for Communication and Transport
(in thousand US dollars)
Total'
1962 1963
10,907 8,391
Of which: road Construction 5,244 5,593
railroad construction 2,167 1,224
port improvements 2,657. 734
.4
Further details on the 1962 and 1963 budgets are shown in Table 3. See Table 3.
Trade
The previous sections have indicated the importance of trade to the Angolan
economy. Production for export forms a very important part of the monetary economy's
activity, and the whole transport system has been designed to facilitate overseas
trade. Revenues from import and export duties together accounted for around 15 per-
cent of government receipts in 1962. See Table 3.
Angola's major trading partner is Portugal from whom it gets over 40 percent
of its imports and to whom it sends about 20 percent of its exports. Portugal's
role in Angolan trade and finance has been treated earlier in the paper. The other
major trading partners are the United Kingdom, the United States (which buys more
than one-half of Angolan coffee exports), the German Federal Republic, and the
Netherlands. Trade with other Portuguese territories, mainly MozaMbique, accounts
for roughly 3 percent of Angolan trade. The only other African country which pro-
vides a significant share of Angolan trade is the Republic of the Congo. Imports
from the Congo account for no more than 1 percent of Angolan imports; however,
about 4 percent of Angola's 1961 exports were destined for the Congo. In the main,
! Pagenibelow.
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such exports consisted of food items such as fish, beans, manioc, corn, rice
and salt.
Exports to all of Africa in the last few years ranged from $9.6 million in
1959 to $11.8 million in 1961; thus, exports to other countries on the continent
It-presented less than 10 percent of the total export. Imports from African
countries in the same years ranged from $3.6 million to $4.4 million.
Principal Angolan exports by value and by volume are shown in Table 1.
See Table 1.! Vajor imports by category in 1960 were as follows: machinery
and transport equipment, 33 percent; other manufactures, 22 percent; food
beverages and tobacco, 20 percent; and textiles, 12 percent.
Summary
The Angolan money economy, created and maintained largely for the benefit
of the Metropole, is heavily dependent on a railroad system designed to facilitate
the export of primary products. Interdiction or total disruption of the railroads
would thus lead to a breakdown of the money economy. Internal trade, however,
appears to be a relatively unimportant factor in the monetary sector. The very
large proportion of Africans in Angola still attached to the subsistence sector
would not be greatly affected, in the short run, by a collapse of the Portuguese-run
economy. In the long run, however, a disruption of transport and, with it, of trade
would undoubtedly cause great discontent among that part of the African population
VN,1
,
which makes individually sma4 taales ofArOrplus cash-crops for consumer goods.
The effect of economic disruption, especially if combined with a full-scale
rebellion, on Portugal's revenues from Angola, would be undoubtedly serious.
.111.1111?=1110..,
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Table 1
Angolan Agricultural and Industrial Exorts 1960-61
, 1960, - 111
Agricultural Products ShdirtTons US$' 000 :, Sbort.i Tons US' 000
Coffee 96,139 04,188. 130,206 $48,890.
Sisal 63,868 13,127. 64,791 xi,o34.
Corn
Wood
Beans
Cotton
Beeswax
Oleaganous Products
Beef
Manioc
Others (Rice, tobacco,
cocoa and hides)
7-70TAr .
Industrial Products
129,086
5,766..
178,115
100,696
3,414.
81,632
12,995
1,178.
10,435
10 097
5,146.
4,541
865
769.
757
15,940
1,827.
19,763
685
245.
2,619
64,395
2,714.
63,233
6,980
1,327.
6,116
501,746
79,701.
562,208
Dried and Fresh Fish
15,358
2,705.
21,783
Fishmeal
49,697
3,788.
55,489
Canned Fish & Fish Oil
8,624
1,444
5,056
Vegetable Oil
19,195
3?1707.
21,958
Sugar
41,197
3,276
40,353
Others (Seed cake,
cigarettes, cement)
15,448
767.
19,490
TOTALS
149,519
15,687.
164,129
Mineral Products(Total)
29,279.
GRAND TOTAL
124,667.
7:860.
2,588.
996.
2,413.
697.
2 984.
851.
3,140.
1,114.
81,567.
4,207.
4,713.
11150.
4,125.
3,435.
864.
18,514.
29,537.
129,618.
!Excluding cement, see Table 2, page110,be1ow for volumelby type of mineral.
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Production and Export of Principal Minerals in Angola 1961-1962
ishar-,_L-L_zons000USdonnrs
1961
Production
Export'
"Volume
Value
Volume
Value
Diamonds
(carats)
1014T,I539
21,227
1,,,276*573:
23,148
Iron Ore
895,228
2,039
545,079
5,010'
Crude On
115,113
10484
Copper
10,302
718
1,111
410
Manganese
22,695
299
24,447
478
Cement
172,537
NA
9,863
133
4' The apparent discrepancy between production and export cannot be explained.
1962
Production
Export
Volume
Value
Volume
Value
---1;Zp.:-Itg(;
21,930
_985.,05.,/
192436
830,714
2,034
503,133
4,684
519,448
6,698
144,668
4,829
18,815
537
973
397
14,089
165
5,937
191
186,727
4,025
NA
NA
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Table 3.
Angolan Budget - 1962-1963
(thousand US dollars)
1962
1963 (est.)
Ordinary receipts
77,391
114,980
Ordinary expenditures
76,812
114,900
Extraordinary receipts
27,238
29,873
Extraordinary expenditures
27,793
29,873
Total Receipts:
104,629
144,853
Total Expenditures:
1040625
144,773
Balance
+24
+80
Revenuesina_ag_Wenditures On Selected Items
(thousand US dollars)
1962
1963 (est.)
Revenue From:
Import duties
10,034
8,565
Export duties
5,769
6,084
Benguela Railroad - share of profits
770
944
Ports, Railroads & Transport
10,173
11,142
Empenditurea:
Ordinary expenditure on Transport
10,173
110142
Road Board & Road FUrd
15,627
15,627
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U. yhlitpublic of the ConeaLlemoldvillel_
The Congo has an area of about 900,000 square miles, about equal to the area
of the United States east of the Mississippi River. The population is estimated
to be about 14 million of which Europeans constitute roughly 1 percent.
The Congo is Potentially a wealthy country. It possesses an eighth of the
worlds known copper reserves, four-fifth of its located industrial diamonds and much
of its cobalt. Most of the land is fertile and it is not over populated. The
economy of the Congo is highly developed by African standards. The Belgians built
an extensive infrastructure including an integrated railroad and river transporta-
tion system, a large and modern mining and mineral refining industry, a commercial
agriculture and a well founded base of light industry. Despite three years of
political turmoil since the country received its independence in dune 19600 the
Belgian-built economy has continued to function. A few big companies do most of
the business and earn most of the foreign exchange.
The mineral wealth of the Congo is concentrated in Kasai and Katanga Provinces
although some tin is mined in Kivu Province Most of the mines and refineries are
operated by the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga. in Katanga Province. In 1960 Katanga
received 44 million dollars from this company, a sum equal to about half of the
budgetary income of the Congo during that year. In 1962 approximately US$ 250
million worth of minerals were Shipped from the Kitanga area and presumably the
royalties from that revenue accrued to the Kitangam government as the province had
succeeded from the Republic at that time. The production of minerals in 1959-1962
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and the location of the principal producing areas are shown in Table 1. See Table
1*. It is noteable that production has remained fairly constant and in some cases
has increased since independence. The rather sharp drop in tin production is due
to the fact that the smaller mines are remote from the railroads and dependent upon
truck transport to carry their production to the rail head. With the deterioration
of the road net, largely due to a lack of maintenance and tribal warfare in the
producing areas, some of the mines have ceased production. Coal production in the
Congo 1960 was Only 195 thousand tons all of which is used domestically by the
railroads and the cement plants.
Before independence about a third of the foreign exchange was earned by
agricultural products, chiefly ;palm Oil, coffee and cotton. Most of the larger
plantations are owned by Europeans while the smaller plantations and farms are
awned by Congolese. The large plantations are self sufficient and maintain their
own roads, schools and medical facilities. Moreover, most Of these are located
along the major rivers which have continued to provide an export route for produc-
tion. As a consequence the large plantations have managed to maintain production
at pre-iadependence levels but the smaller farms------ are out of
production for lack Of European assistance and trading facilities.
The production of selected agricultural products and the location of the prin-
cipal producing areaa is shown lathe following table:
* Page 115 ,/ below.
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Production of Selected Agricultural Products
and Location of Principal Producting Areas in
the Republic of the donso 1959-1961
(short tops)
Production
Product Location of Producing Area 1222 1262 1961
Coffee Equator, Orientale and. Xasai 59,300 66,900 . 66,14o
Provinces
Cotton 'Equator, Orientale, Xasai and 54,0000 60,140 41,880
Katange Provinces
Pala oil Leopoldville, Equator and 248,128 270,280 264,550
Orientale Provinces
Rubber Equator and Orientale Provinces 44,200 39,240
During the first year of independence, exports of agricultural products declined
sharply as shown in the following table.
Coffee
Cotton
Palm oil
Rubber
&ports of Selected Agricultural Products
Republic of the Congo 1959-1960
(short tons)
2222 1960
101,000 66,58o
55,115 45,745
202,710 184,300
44,310 38,600
Reliable data for exports in more recent years is not available but it is
reported that smuggling, increasingly widespread since 1959, has became a major
drain on the foreign exchange earnings from agriculture. Corrupt and inefficient
customs Officials allowed most of the 1962 coffee crop and Much Of the cotton crop
to be smuggled out Of the country.
[pry/ Lrillik19110.746.FA
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SECP7'"
Table 1
nrtri. nnrriki
Production of Minerals and Metals and Location
of 'Producing Areas in. the Republic of the Congo
1959 - 1962
(short tons except as noted)
Production
Mineral or Metal
Producing Area
1959
1960
1961
Copper - (smelted)
Katanga Province - Elisabethville south
to border of Northern Rhodesia
310,955
333,175
325,1400
Cobalt - (in concentrates)
ItlisabethviLle area Katanga Province
9,294
9,063
9,259
Tin - (in concentrates)
Elisabethvi_Ue, Central Katanga Province
and Krim Province
11,028
10,680
7,884
Manganese - (ore concentrate)
Southwestern Katanga Province
425,694
11.12,1511.
344,335
Zinc - coxtcentrates)
laisabethvill.e area, Katanga Province
77,130
120,352
109,692
Zinc - (smelted)
Elisabethville area, Katanga Province
60,418
58,817
62,799
?Gold W
Northeastern Orientale Province
34.7,965
316,195
232,611
Diamonds ?./
Kasai Province
0
0
0
1962 0
crli
325,178'c'l
T.
x
N a ci
-o
-4
81,06o T1
0
8
33y7868.11;'
0
183,073 Fe,
0
LA g
8
LA 8
_.
c:o
Industrials
13,040
17,738
14,393
Gem stones
413
405
263
a. Troy ounces.
b. 1,000 karats
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Part /II. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
The FederatiOn includes three territories: Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
British protectorates likely to get complete independence in the near future; and
Southern Rhodesia, a self-governing colony since 1923. The total population of
about 9.5 million is growing at an annual rate of 3 percent in Nyasaland and 2.5
'percent in: the Rhodesias. Landlocked, and mainly a plateau area, the Federation is
486,109 square miles in area roughly one-half the site of the United States east
of the Mississippi. It possesses a generally mild climate suitable for many types
Of agriculture, and is largely self-Sufficient in food production.
Southern Rhodesia, the most etonomically advanced of the three territories, has
a growing and diversified manufacturing sector, a well-developed and efficient
European agricultural sector which produces corn and tobacco for export, and a
relatively small tut growing mineral industry. Southern Rhodesia Serves as the com-
mercial, Manufacturing, and financial hub of the Federation, deriving much of its
income from such services to the Other territories. In additiOn, around 30 percent
of its manufactured goods are sold to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Salisbury,
the capital of Southern Rhodesia and alsd of the Federation, and Bulawayo are the
majOr transport and communications centers of the Federation and are also the only
two cities with population in excess of 100,000.
Northern Rhodesia, the richest and. least dentely populated area of the Federa-
tion, it Still almost a one-product ectinOmy. tta copper mining and refining indus-
tries protide nearly one-half ct the Net Domestic Product of the territory; almost
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one-half Of the wage earning Africans in Northern Rhodesia work in the Copper Belt
--a nariJw 200-mile long area running northwest from Luanshya in Northern Rhodesia
into ratanga. ?
Nyasaland is the smallest, poorest, and most densely populated of the Federation
territories. Its chief sources of foreign exchange earnings are tea and tdbacco
experts, and migrant workers who go to the two Rhodesias and into South Africa.
Remittances for the services of these workers form a significant share of Nyasaland's
Net Domestic Product?nearly 10 percent in 1957.
The economies of the Federation components are complementary in that Southern
Rhodesia supplies services and manufactured goods to the others Northern Rhodesia
supplies much of the trade surplus and attracts much of the foreign capital enter-
ing the Federation, and Nyasaland supplies labor and some foodstuffs for the other
two. With the advent of independence, the Federation is expected to dissolve. Re-
tention of economic ties, at least between Southern Rhodesia and the other two
regions, is not certain. Although Nyasaland would be adversely affected, Southern
Rhodesia itself would experience the most serious repercussions from a dissolution
of economic bonds with its present federal partners.
The creation of the. Federation in 1953 is said to have resulted in a certain
saving in administrative costs and to have enhanced the credit-worthiness of the
area in terms of attracting foreign capital. TO the extent that these advantages
may have developed, dissolution Of the Federal structure will result in additional
costs to the component Countries. The national airline -- Central African Airways
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the railroads, foreign commerce, defense, banking and currency, posts and tele-
graphs, and the interterritorial road system are all the present responsibility of
the Federal government.
Alter experiencing a relatively rapid rate of growth in the 1950180 the economy
of the Federation is currently rather stagnant. he drop in copper prices since
1957, the slackening pace of investment and construction following completion of
the first stage of the great Kariba dam, and the general loss of confidence in the
political future have acted as dampers on economic growth.
The high rate of EUropean immigration that prevailed from 1953 to 1958 slowed
down so markedly that by 1961-1962 it turned into a net emigration: This trend
is expected to continue, at least until the future policies of the new African
governments become clear. The European segment of the population is small -- about
three percent of the total -- and accounts for an enormous share of the investment
and production of the Federation. To illustrate: Gross Domestic Product attri-
butable to non-African agriculture in 1961 amounted to $149 million or about 47
percent of total agricultural output. The non-African share of total wages and
salaries in the same year was 60 percent. In addition, nearly all technical and
managerial personnel in mining, manufacturing, and large service institutions are
Europeans. Thus any series of events leading to the exodus Or immobilization of
this mall segment of the population would have. proportionally great effects on the
functioning of the !aeration's monetaryeconoy.
At the same time, a large mm4oritr Of the African papOlation -probably could
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feed itself and survive even if a total disruption of the monetary economy should
occur. Nearly 80 percent of the econdmically active population is engaged in
agriculture, and almost ane-fifth of Gross Domestic Product is derived from the
production Of African rural households for their own consumption.
Nevertheless, economic disruption would have severe effects on the Africans too:
about One million are employed in the monetary economy and many are migrant laborers
who might be forced to return to already overcrowded "tribal" areas. The extent
of labor migrations among the Federal territories and neighboring countties is il-
lustrated by the following employment statistics fOr 1956.
In Northern Rhodesia
In southern PhodeSia
(in thousands)
217.8 Northern Rhodesians
2.2 Southern Rhodesians
20.7 Nyasas
42.3 Northern Rhodesians
300.2 Southern Rhodesians
132.6 Nyasas
125.2 Portuguese Africans,
mostly Mozambicans
Nyasas abroad totalled 200,000. Of this number, 20,700 were working in Northern
Rhodesia, 132,600 in Southern Rhodesia, about 40,000 in the Union of South Africa,
and 40000 in Tanganyika.
Although unemployment has increased African employment for the past three
years has remained fairly steady and has been distributed as follows: about 32
percent in agriculture, mainly on European farms., and about 3 percent in transport
and Communications. /n the camvonent territarieep it has been as f011owst
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Total Employment
Percent in
Agriculture
Percent in Transportation
and Communications
Federation
1960 1,0450000
32
3
1961 1,0090000
32
3
1962 1,000,000 est.
32 (est.)
3 (est.)
Southern Rhodesia
1960 6470000
37
3
1961 624,000
38
3
1962 610,000 est.
38 (est.)
3 (est.)
Northern Rhodesia
1960
246,000
15
4
1961
238,000
16
4
1962
230,000 est.
17 (est.)
4 (est.)
Nyasaland
1960
152,000
39
4
1961
1470000
39
4
1962
134,000 est.
40 (est.)
4 (est.)
During the same period, a fairly constant 10 percent of the non-Africans were
working in the transport and communications industrieS.
Investment in transport, storage, and communications has accounted for an
average of 9 percent Of gross domestic capital fortation by use in the period,
1958-60. From 1958 through 1961, transport and communications have accounted for
about 7 percent Of Cross Domestic Product -- $80.6 million in 1958 and $106.4
million in 1961.
The economy of the Federation is highly dependent on foreign trade. EkpOrts
usually acctunt for about 40 percent of 0roSs:DOmeiltie Froduct. topper, tobacco,
asbestos, Cora, tea, and Chrome ore together accOUnt far Over 80 percent of total
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exports. Copper, the leading product of Northern Rhodesia and the Federation as a
whole accounts for more than 50 percent of all export earnings.
A very large share of the expOrts of the Federation are primary products, but
it is more fortunate than many similar economies in that it exports both mineral
and agricultural commodities and is thus not quite as vulnerable to price fluctua-
tions for single products. The mineral industry is the most dominant in the economy
of the federation, though this is not the case for each territory.* In 1961, this
industry consumed about One-third of the available coal and coke, paid around one-
half of the direct taxes levied by the government, provided for more than one-half
Of the railroad freight tonnage, consumed abOut two-thirds of the electricity pro-
duced, and accounted for approximately two-thirds of the total value of exports.
For the period, 1954-62, the copper industry alone accounted for between 30 and
55 percent of the Net Domestic Product of Northern Rhodesia, and for between 10
and 24 percent of the Net Domestic Product of the whole Federation; in 1962, these
proportions were 44 and 16 percent respectively. Statistical tables on mineral
production and exports by volume and value are shown in Tables 2 and 3 below.
Most of the minerals produced, with the exception of Southern Rhodesian coal,
are exported. Southern Rhodesian industry is beginning to consume a small share
of minerals produced, especially iron ore; nearly all of the coal mined is consumed
domestically by the copper refineries, the railroads, and the electric power plants.
* See Table 1 below or notes on the location and. concentration of commerce,
mining, industry and agricultural cash crops.
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Nyasaland, which currently produces no minerals, and Southern Rhodesia generate
most Of the agricultural exports of the Federation; tea and some tobacco are grown
in Nyasaland, whereas most of the tobacco, meats, and corn exported are produced
In Southern Rhodesia.
The Federation's Major trading partner for many years has been the United King-
dom Which buys over 40 percent of its exports and selIS the Federation around one-
third of its imports. The Republic of South Attica is the second most important
trading partner of the Federation, accounting for about one-third of imports but
only 6.8 percent of Federation exports. The principal commoditiea exchanged in their
order Of importance are general goods, minerals and iron and steel. Trade with
other African countries is minimal, the most important "commodity" being migrant
labor. Data showing major trading partners by valUel the value of total imports
and exports, and major export and import commodities by volume and value are shown
In Tables 20 4 and 5 below. Until a change in trade arrangements was effected in
the late 1950's? South Attica was a more Important trading partner than it is now;
between 1950 and 1957, it accounted for slightly more than One-fourth of the Federa-
tion's total trade. NipOrts to the Republic of Congo have risen since the 1960
disturbances in that country but still do not account for more than 2 percent of
the Federation's exports or one percent of its imports.
The Federation's imports have been declining since 1959 and in 1962 dropped
still farther. 'Thus, despite 4 very Unsettled chrome market and a reduction in sales
of copper, the FederatiOn has experienced a favorable' balance of trade over the
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last few years. Machinery and transport equipment constitute the largest category
of indrte; this also holds true for imports from the United States. About one-
half of the copper exports are sent to the United Kingdom as are most of the Federa-
tion's tea exports. The United States has been the major buyer of chrome ore,
although Rhodes Ian chrome is nOw suffering from competition from This sian chrome in
this IlLaxket. In addition to sales to the United tingdom, a substantial portiOn of
the fOod exports of the Federation, eSpecially corn, are sold to neighboring coun-
tries -- Bechumel
and, Tanganyika, the Republic Of the Congo.
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Coal
Copper
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Table 1
Location and Concentration of Commerce Minin
Industry and Agricultural Cash Crops
Notes
Found in several places in Northern and Southern
Rhodesia. Produced only at Wankie (2 collieries)
in Southern Rhodesia. Production declining with
dieselization of the railroads and the decreasing
number of thermal electric plants as Kariba pro-
duction increases. About 12 percent of coal raised
is exported.
Mined in Southern Rhodesia in the area around Sinoia;
in Northern Rhodesia in the copperbelt. Mines are
mainly along the road from Luanshya to Bancroft.
Cobalt Found at Chibuluma and Nkana mines in the copperbelt.
Uranium Found at Dana.
Lead, Zinc, and Manganese Found at Broken Hill, Northern Rhodesia.
Asbestos Southern Rhodesia, mainly in a belt running NE-SW
from north of Gwanda to Fort Victoria.
Chrome Mined near Kildonan, Gwelo, and Fort Victoria.
Iron Found at Redcliff near OW Qpe in Southern Rhodesia,
Tea Most is grown in Nyasaland in the Mlanje-Cholo area.
luropean Agriculture In Northern Rhodesia mainly along the rail line; in
Southern Rhodesia) cultivation is dispersed but generally
concentrated along the Salisbury-Bulawayo axis.
Industrial and Commercial Centres!
Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia Capital of the Federation. Industries include food,
beverages and tobacco, clothing, steel, concrete and
asbestos. Population of more than 250:000 contains
more than one-fourth of all Europeans resident in the
Federation.
Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia
r7:71-usaka, Northern Rhodesia
Ndola, Northern Rhodesia
Principal industrial and commercial centre of the
Federation; main communication junction (for rail,
roads and air). Industries include steelworks, tires,
asbestos, cement, concrete, food, clothing, steel
rolling and fabricating facilities.
Capital of Northern Rhodesia. Industries include
fertilizer, constructionrmaterials, and grain storage.
Main commercial and industrial city of the Northern
Rhodesia area; main distributive center for the
copperbelt. Factories produce mining equipment, sheet
metal products, refined sugar, copper and special
steels.
;31.
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SECRETS!A
r:errlf 4,! nmenki
_
Table 2
Value and Tonnage of Selected Exports, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1961 - 1962
Copper W - 13/4 refined)
1/4 blister
Zinc -a-/ .metW
Lead W - (metal)
Cobalt - (metal alloys)
Volume
(Thousand tons)
1961
Value and Tonnws of
Selected Mineral Exports
Value per ton
(US Dollars)
Volume
(Thousand tons)
1962
Value Value per ton
(Million SUS) (US Dollars)
Value
(Million *US)
610
28
12
.6
313.6
5.3
2.
1.7
514.10
189.28
166.67
2,833.34
603. 31a-F8
46 6.7
16 2.0
1 3.1
517.14
145.65
125.00
3,100.00
Manganese W - (Concentrates)
47
1.4
29.79 '
51
1.4
27.41
Asbestosg - (bag fibers)
134
23.5
175.37
145
21.3
146.90
Chrome ore
- (Concentrates)
476
8.4
17.65
432
7.3
16.90
Value and Tonnages of Major Agricultural Exports
Tea
15
12.3
820.00
14
10.1
721.43
Tobacco
105
117.6
1,120.00
108
114.8
11062.96
Corn 12/
311
12.6
40.51
450
17.6
39.11
s/
Peanuts
Meats
26
4.2
161.54
45
6.7
148.89
16
9.2
575.00
16
10.1
631.25
aj Originates mostly in Northern Rhodesia.
from Northern Rhodesia for which the value is not available.
Ili-Originates mostly in Southern Rhodesia.
2/ Originates mostly in Nyasaland.
In addition, 787 thousand tons of high hulk-law valua copper concentrate were exported
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Table 3
Mineral Production, Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, 1.58-62
(in thousand short tons)
Total
'Federation
Total
Northern Rhodesia
*
'Total
Southern RhodeSia
Southern Rhodesia
Coal
1958
93,570
68,238
25,332
3,897
1959
143,968
118,965
25,003
4,143
1.960
154,772
128,392
26,380
3,923
1961
148,717
.121,501
27,216
3,387
1962
142,505
117,416
25,089
3,115
* Including coal'
Table it
Nderation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Total
Tmports and tiports, 1958-62
(in million VO)
core
Xrnyorts
1958
380
441
1960
577
439
1961
58o
434
1962
586
400
sL,
a 1-7"-
?,.
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Table 5
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland/ Major Trading
Partners and Trade vith Neighbors, 1958-62
United
Kingdom
South Africa
Percent of Total Exports to
Tanganyika
Portuguese
cdngfa (pea) Africa Kenya
1958
48
10
1
1
Neg.
Neg.
196C
44
8
1
Neg.
Meg.
Neg.
1961
47
8
2
Neg.
0.6
Neg.
1962
42
8
2
Neg.
Neg.
Neg.
Percent of Total Imports from
United
Kingdom
South Africa
Congo (Leo)
Portuguese
Africa
Kenya
Tanganyika
1958
31
32
1
1
Neg.
Neg.
196o
33
33
1
1
Neg.
Neg.
41,
1961
33
31
1
1
Neg.
Neg.
1962
33
30
1
1
Neg.
Neg.
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XV. Mozambique
Mozaibique, with an area of approximately 297,700 square miles, is the second
largest Overseas province of Portugal and has the largest number of Portuguese
inhabitants outside of Metropolitan Portugal. Africans comprise about 97 percent
of the 6.6 million population, Europeans l percent, and Asians (including Indians-1f)
percent.
The economylof Mozambique is basically agricultural and is one of the least
developed in central and southern Africa. Climate, topography and transportation
are such that many parts of the country are inaccessible during the rainy season
or accessible only by air. As a result, exploitation of mineral resources and
establishment of local industries are seriously impeded. Same 6000.000 Africans,
?
less than 10 percent of the total population, are thought to be incorporated in the
monetary economy. Somewhat more than two million people comprise the economically
active population; of this total, well over three-fourths are engaged in agriculture,
which is by far the dominant sector of the economy.
Export crops are raised mainly on Portuguese-ovned plantations, some of which
were brought under Portuguese government control, as late as 1942. This plantation
economy is based on cheap labor and depends on su)Adized prices and protected. markets.
The main export crops are cotton, sugar, tea, lass., copra, and cashew nuts'. nod
crops for local consumption include corn, rice, peactts, beans and bananas. Xozarabique
If After India occupied. Goa, all the Indians were deVeted from Mozambique.
128
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vomptioigiall
appears to be largely self-sufficient in food production, but imports relatively
small quantities of flour and rice.
Coal is the most important mineral product of Mozambique. Mined at Tete, output
does not meet domestic consumption requirements. Coal production during 1959-1962
Ima as follow-at
Short Tons
.1959 1960 .161 1,262
282,870 297,210 353,840 385,800
Gold, graphite, iron ore, and radioactive minerals are produced and exported, but
in relatively small quantities.
Industry in Mozambique is mostly concerned with processing locally produced
materials such as sugar, cotton, tobacco, and asbestos. Timber is produced in
quantities sufficient for local needs and is exported to Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
and to the Republic of South Africa.
Apart from coal, Mozambique imports manufactured and semi-manufactured goods
including textiles, railroad materials, agricultural and industrial machinery, iron
and steel, motor vehicles, gasoline, hardware and footwear. As in Angola, duties
on imports from Portugal are lower than those from other suppliers by as much as
50 percent.
Mozambique consistently runs a deficit in her balance of trade, as is illustrated
by the table below.
In million US dollars).
12.213
19,59
Imports
119
122
.1960
127
Ekports
?1t-9
_13
-43
Malance
-44
-54
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Six agricultural commodities account for 66 percent of total export earnings in 1962 .
The production and export of these commodities are shown in Table 1.11`7.:
The most recent data on Mozambique' a trade with countries in southern Africa
indicate a substantial imbalance.
Trade With Countries in Southern Africati
(in Million US dollars)
*61
120
Country
Exports
Importa
Exports
Imports
South Africa
3.2
14.2
7.0
18.6
Angola
1.4
2.4
0.6
2.6
Federation of Rhodesia
& Nyasaland
3.8
2.0
2.4
2.4
January-June at annual rates.
Trade with African countries comprises less than one-fifth of Mozambique's total
trade. Her single largest trading partner is Portugal; the common market countrls
provide some 8 percent of her imports and buy around 20 percent of her exports, the
United States accounts for about 6 percent of both imports and exports, and the
United Kingdom for some 14 percent of Mozambique's imports and 8 percent of her exports.
One of the most important revenue producing "exports" of Mozambique is the move-
ment of laborers to South Africa aid the Federation of Rhodesia and. Nyasaland. A
contractual arrangement tetween the Government of Mozambique and the Republic of
South Africa provides up to 90,000 Mozambicans for gold and coal tints on the Rand.
in return for routing via the port of IOnzencd Marques about 50percent of the seaborne
traffic destined for the TransVaal-Swaziland area.
* page 131 tellitr.
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SECREUru
Table? 1
Toduction and Export of Selected Agricultural Commodities
Mozambique, 1961-1962
eSeeleti -10d peAoiddv
ommoditx Production Export 'Value of Exports
Short Tons
Short Tons (Million US Dollars)
414 January-November 1962
414 January-November 1962
* Calendar year.
1-1725 28,843 20.36 17.48
Sugar 102,903 2092437 N.A. 133,119 11.20 11.00
Cashew Nuts 99,207 99,207 82,415 78,160 8.58 7.58
Copra 88,184 88,184 59;859 54,727 8.41 6.61
Tea 8,5614. ja.0240-1, 5,707i7 10,518 8.12 5,89
Sisal N.A. N.A. N.A, N.A. 5.58 5.33
414 January-November 1962
* Calendar year.
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V. Republic of South Africa
A. General
South Africa consists in the main of a narrow coastal strip near sea
level, with ahbigh interior table land separated from the coastal strip by mountains
which rise from a mile to almost two miles in height. The climate is relatively
dry, but in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, seasonal raipall in the summer
occasionally is so heavy as to cause flash floods. There are extensive areas of
poor soil with very little vegetation. The few rivers, none navigable, provide
main supplies of water; but a shortage of water is frequently a threat to the
economy.
The Republic of South Africa possesses the most developed economy in
the entire continent: it has the largest industrial establishment, the highest
per capita income, and the greatest degree of urbanization. Nevertheless, this
developed and highly integrated economy is vulnerable to a disruption of its
essential domestic and foreign transportation links.
Internally, reliable long distance transportation is vital in link-
ing widely separated industrial, agricultural, and commercial centers. Externally,
an estimated 15 to 20 percent by volume of South A&ica's commodity trade moves
by way of foreign railways and ports. Most of this tonnage goes through the port
of Lourenco Marques, which handles a large part of the external traffic of the
132 .
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northeastern region.
Although a significant part of South Africa's external trade transits
Mozambique, only a minor and declining portion of its total trade by value is
carried on with other African countries. Most of the Republic's commerce is
with Western developed countries; the United Kingdom and the United States to-
gether account for 40 percent. These two countries plus those in the European
Common Market supply two-thirds of South Africa's imports and purchase well over
one-half of its exports.
The Republic usually runs a deficit on merchandise account. This,
however, is more than offset by heavy sales of gold, which provide between 30
and 40 percent of total export earnings. As a result, the favorable balance in
. its current trade account is sizeable.
The diversified and substantial output of its industry and agriculture
enables South Africa to satisfy much of its internal demand. Nevertheless, it
must import many products some of which are critical in nature. As in other
developed countries, industrial growth requires the acquisition of some types of
specialized machinery and equipment from abroad. On a more elementary level,
South Africa is completely dependent upon foreign sources for crude oil and avi-
ation gasoline.
B. Population and Labor Force
The population of South and South-West Africa is usually divided into
four main groups: White, Colored, Asian, and Bantu. South Africa has by far the
largest white population on the continent -- almost one-fifth of the 15.8 million
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reported in the 1960 population census. The percentages of other groups were:
Bantu, nearly 70; Colored, nearly 10; Asian, about 3. In South-West Africa,
the total population was about 525,000 of which the Bantu accounted for 80
percent, the Whites for 15 percent and the Colored for 5 percent.
South Africa has a number of large cities: the population of Johannesburg
numbers 1.1 million; Cape Town, 730 thousand; Durban, 655 thousand; Pretoria,
415 thousand; Port Elizabeth, 270 thousand; Germiston, 205 thousand. These
and other urban areas contain more than la percent of South Africa's population;
The greatest concentration of Whites is in Johannesburg, but Pretoria has the
highest ratio of Whites, roughly 50 percent. The country is divided into four
provinces: Natal, the most densely populated; Transvaal; The Orange Free State;
and The Cape. In addition, South-West Africa, a League of Nations Mandated
Territory, is now administered virtually as a fifth Province.
The population of these provinces, as recorded in the 1960 census, was as
follows:
Total population
(in millions)
Non-whites as a
percent of total
The Cape
5.3
81.
Natal
2.9
88
Transvaal
6.2
77
The Orange Free State
1.4
80
The 195l_cens0 of the economically active pop4tion showed that Whites made up
21 percent and Bantu 66 percent. The number utile in various sectors
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and the proportion of this number consisting of Bantu is shown below.
Number active Bantu as a percent
Economic sector (in millions) of number active
All sectors 4.6 68
Agriculture, forestry,
and fishing
Mining
Manufacturing
Commerce
Transport, storage,
and communication
Other
1.5
0.5
0.5
0.3
0.2
1.6
83
88
45
31
36
69
The Bantu population is about equally distributed among those work-
ing in urban areas, those working on rural farms owned by Whites, and those resi-
ding on Native Reserves that are not economically self-sufficient and are now
considered to be overpopulated. It is the policy of the South African Govern-
ment to reduce the ratio of Bantu to Whites in urban and industrial areas, and
to return many Bantu to the Reserves. Industry is being encouraged to locate on
the borders of the Reserves in order to provide employment for the returnees. A
recent survey, however, indicates that about half of the Bantu now working in urban
areas have long resided in the cities and consequently have lost all land rights
in the Reserves. In addition, the wage earnings of most urban Bantu households
are at or below the minimum subsistence level. Thus, any significant decrease
in the level of employment is apt to cause great hardship and consequent unrest
among this segment of the population. In the 1960-62 recession, unemployment
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among both the Bantu and the Whites increased. The recovery, fully underway by
late 1962, seems to have reduced the level of unemployment, but at the expense of
"foreign" workers from Mozambique, the Federation, and the High Commission Territories.
It is government policy to reduce the number of these Migrant workers, except in the
gold fields. These migrants form a substantial part of the labor force in South A
Africa's mines; in 1957, for example, they outnumbered native South Africans 2 to 1
in the gold and coal mines.
C. Economic Sectors
The National Income of the Republic of South Africa has doubled in the
-pust decade. Output in manufacturing increased fatter than in agriculture and mining
as the econobecame more diversified. Now, with the exception of a few imported
commodities, it has become a aalf-sufficient and well integrated economy. The shares
of Net Domestic Product as shown below have remained fairly constant for the last
three years.
Net
Domestic Product for Selected Sectors, 1961/62
in billion US dollars)
Total
Value
cent of yotal
7.01
100
Private manufacturing
1.69
214,
Mining
0.94
13
Of which: gold
(0.72)
(n)
Trade
0.88
13
Agriculture
0.75
11
Transport
.0.56
8
Of whiCht Rails & Harbours
CT
Private Transport
An atmosphere of'growing tension offer nationalist activity and the
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34 A
'1
19
possibilities of repeated sabotage and viOlence is reflected in the 1963/64
budget. The most outstanding feature is a further increase in defense expenditure
up 28 percent from 1962/63 and now equal to nearly 13 percent of the total
budget. The Police budget, which is not included in the defense budget, is
greater for 1963/64 than total allocations for Bantu Administration and Develop-
)
For the economically active Bantu, agriculture is the most important
occupation. It is almost the only activity in the Reserves and employs about
40 percent of all Working Bantu. The most important single crop is corn; yields
are usually sufficient to provide a surplus for export. In recent years, corn
surpluses have become burdensome. About one-third of the white-owned farm raise
corn. European farmers produce nearly 85 percent of the total crop, while nearly
all the rest is grown by Africans who work subsistence plots on white-owned farms.
The main areas in which the principal crops are grown are shown below.
Crop, Area
Corn Transvaal, Cape, Natal, Orange Free State
Wheat Cape (southwestern region)
Sugar Natal (coast), Zululand
Fruit Cape
Tabacco Transvaal (Rustenburg area)
Wool, which accounts for nearly 17 percent of total exports by value,
is the largest single agricultural export and the second most important in the
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whole economy. Some 65 percent is produced in Cape Province, and about one-
fifth in the Orange Free State. Cape Province also leads in numbers of cattle,
and is by far the most important province in terms of agricultural output.
Although it employs fewer people than agriculture, mining is of
great importance to the South African economy. Gold is the single largest expoil,
and the most important mineral in terms of its contribution to national income.
Statistics on the production and export of gold and other minerals may be, found
in the Appendix. Most of the "foreign" workers in the Republic are employed in
the mining industry, usually under short-term contracts.
Private manufacturing is the fastest growing and most important
sector in the South African economy; nearly every major form of industry is re-
presented. Industrial production is concentrated in four areas: (a) southern
Transvaal, (b) Durban - Pinetown, (c) western Cape, (d) Port Elizabeth -
Ultenhage. In 1956/57, they accounted for 41, 16, 13 and 5 percent respectively
of industrial output. Over half of the metal working and engineering industry
is located in the Transvaal; industries in Durban and Pinetown include chemical,
paint, paper, and pulp factories, sugar refineries, hardware and furniture plants;
western Cape specializes in clothing, textiles, canning and food processing,
distilling, printing and boat-building. Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage specializes in
footware, automotive asseaPstyres, and wood-processing.
There are Mee oil refineries in .tbe Republic, none of which produce
aviation gasoline: one is located at Sasolburg, ark. produces oil from coal; the
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others are in Durban and Boksburg. Total input in 1962 amounted to 476 million
imperial gallons of crude oil.
Transportation in the Republic of South Africa is characterized by the
fact that its principal industrial area -- Witwatersrand, in the Transvaal --
is located far from the ports, from the major livestock areas and from other
industrial centers. In these circumstances the railroad network is the primary
means for moving bulk traffic. Consequently, investment in transportation has
formed a large share of public investment in the last decade.
Average Annual Public Development EXpenditure by Sector, 1946/47 - 1956/57
Sector
Transportation facilities
Agriculture '
Education and Social Services
Industry
Communications
Other
Percent of total
14.0
14
14
8
9
15
Total investment in motor roads and bridges Outside of urban areas is
estimated at about $1.05 billion. National expenditure, however, has been devoted
primarily to constant expansion and improvement of the railroads.
EL Foreign Trade
The United States and the United Kingdom together account for more than 40
percent of South Africa's foreign trade and about 70 percent of total foreign in-
vestment. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has been an important outlet
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in the past, but recent increases in Federation tariffs an manufactures and semi-
manufactures have significantly reduced South African sales in this market. The
following tabulation gives a comparison of shares of South African import and
export for 1959-61/
South African Foreign Trade
S_in billion US dollars).
3.15.2
Imports&j..
Thrporta
."..."-"--
1 0
2229---M0---1961
Total World
1.4
1.6
Lit
1.2
1.2
1.3
Percentage with:
United Kingdom
31
28
29
25
25
26
Common Market
18
19
20
21
24
21
USA
17
19
18
8
6
7
Federation of B &
2
3
3
12
12
10
In terms of value, the principal South African export is gold; other
important export commodities include wool, diamonds (both cut and uncut), radio-
active minerals, asbestos, machinery, and fruits. The major imports are wood and
wood products, gasoline, motor vehicles and parts, and cotton textiles.
With respect to trade with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and
with the Congo, the following values were reported for 1961.
South Africa
Congo
consisting of: Metals
Minerals
Federation
eonsisting oft Metals
Minerals
Tdbacoo
Imports from
$33,200,000
5,600,000
26,200,000
$441400l000
20,000,000
41600l000
3,900,000
Exports to
$9,6001000
Foodstufftt&igr. $4,500,000
Machinery &Mfg's. 700,000
- *135,000,000
Mfg. and machines $60, 600,000
Foodstuffs & Agr. 19,200,000
Fibres 13,600,000
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Most of the traffic was handled overland, but owing to the high unit
. value of the commodities, the tonnage involved was relatively low.
X. Vulnerability of the South African Economy
South Africa is vulnerable to external economic pressure in at least
three forms: (1) interdiction of rail links with Lourenco Marques; (2) denial
of foreign sources of crude oil and aviation gasoline; and (3) institution of a
general trade embargo by the UK and the US. Interdiction of rail links between
the northeastern region and Lourenco Nhrques would require re-routing this large
volume of traffic over railroads in Transvaal and Natal Provinces, thus greatly
increasing the transport costs.
Imports of Crude oil and aviation gasoline are essential to the domestic
transportation system. Denial of crude oil to the Republic would shut down two
of its refineries (the other converts coal to liquid hydrocarbon fuels). In ad-
dition to losses resulting from idle plants, South Africa would be forced to
purchase, at a greater total import cost, the refinery products it could no longer
produce itself. If no supplier could be found, the availability of fuel oil for
industrial and railroad use and gasoline for motor transport would be sharply
reduced. Cessation of aviation gasoline imports would force domestic air service,
including police aircraft operations, to draw upon stocks already on hand. When
such stocks were depleted, these services would cease..
Institution of a trade embargo by the UK and the US would have even more
serious effects. At the very least, it would require the development of new export
markets - a feat that would require considerable time if it feonld be accomplished,
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If a redirection of trade could not be- accomplished, South Africa would lose
nearly one-half of its export earnings and would hxve to do without about one-
third of the goods now purchased abroad.
A collapse of this magnitude in its foreign commerce would seriously
weaken its external financial positionl curtail new foreign investment in South
African industry, and lead to a deterioration of the economy. An embargo that
could produce such effects, however, would exact a heavy toll from UK and DS
investors who iresently account for an estimated TO percent of total foreign
investment in therftpublic.
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Basutoland
A. General
Basutoland, the poorest of the High CommissiOn Territories, is an enclave
of about 11,716 square miles entirely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa.
The western region is a continuation Of the Orange Free State Plateau and has an
average altitude of 5,000 feet. The eastern pert is even higher with peaks in the
Maluti mountains rising above 11,000 feet.
Basutoland is under the control of the British Colonial Office, and has a
Legislative Council which makes laws for the territory; excepted are spheres such
as defence and external affairs which are reserved for the British High Commissioner.
The Basutoland Congress Party is pressing for early independence, although the terri-
tory may never be economically independent. The capital is at Maseru, 92 miles
east of Bloemfontein, with which it is connectedby rail.
B. PopulatiOn and Agriculture
Basutoland depends mainly on peasant agriculture and On the export of labor
to the Republic of South Africa. Taking into consideration the habitable areas
only, Basutoland is the most densely populated area in south Africa, and all arable
land is under cultivation. The European Or white poPulation consists mainly of
government officials, missionaries, traders, and labor-recruiting agents. The 1956
census reported about 2,000 Europeans, over 600,000 Africans and nearly 900 other
residents in the territory. The census also reported that more than 150,000 Basutos
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were working abroad; this migrant labor force is one of the greatest economic assets
of the country. Remittances from the 100,000 to 150,000 Basutos working in the
Republic of South Africa amount to about *2.8 million annually.
Land is held communally and there are no European landowners or settlers.
The principal crops are corn, Wheat, and sorghum. Other grains and vegetables also
are grown. Animal husbandry is one of the most important economic occupations.
There are no forests, and no mineral production, but diamond prospecting is
continuing and 0008 stones have been found. A geological survey is being made, but
development plans concentrate On the improvement of agriculture and livestock. Zn
19620 twelve small industrial establishments were being planned; the Vasutoland
Development Corporation is expected to supply the necessary capital.
C. Transport
A railroad, built by South African: Railwaro, 16 miles long connects Maseru
with the Bloemfontein - Natal line. Only one mile of this line lies within Basuto-
land. There are about 560 miles of gravel surfaced roads along the western border
of the country. Zn addition, there are about 340 miles of lesser roads leading to
trading stations and villages. The mountains of the interior are accessible only
by jeep and pack animals,but air transport is becantagincreasingly important.
Basutbland has long been a refuge for defeated tribes and fugiti/es, and in recent
year has given asylum to many fleeing from South Africa.
D.lfrp.de and !ice
Bout oland customs are administered for the 'Nrritory by South Africa, Which
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gives it .85575 Percent of annual South African customs revenues. 'Phis amounts to
nearly one-half of Basutoland's total revenues; domestic sources account for a
relatively small share sometimes as low as 10-15 percent. Revenues and expendi-
tures in recent years are shown below. The anmaI deficit has been covered by
United Kingdom grants-in-aid.
Revenues and EXpenditures
. Fiscal /ear
Vevenues
In thousand
US dollars)
Bkpenditures Deficit
1959/60
5,812
6)554
742
1960/61
60628
6,970
342
1961/62
5,599
8,971
3,372
South Africa provides nearly all of Basutoland technical services and
transl0rtation0 and is its most important trading partner. Imports and exports in
thousand 110 dollars are shown below.
Imports
Exports
1958
8,252
4,044
1959
(80103
4,626
1960.
8,800
4,125
While the most important "export" by value is probably Basuto labor, commodity ex-
ports in 1960 included wool valued at two million dollars, mohair worth almost one
million, cattle worth more than one-hAlf a million, and Teas valued at $147,045.
Imports consisted mainly of blankets, ploughs, clothing, tin were, And food stuffs.
General merchandise imports in 1960 were valued at oVer six million dollars, corn
at more than One wheat at *324,9000 and -sorghum at *440300.
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Bechuanaland
About 220,000 square miles in area, much of it desert, Bechuanaland is the
largest and most sparsely populated of the Sigh Commission Territories. The 1956
census recorded a population of 320,000 Of which 4,000 mere Buropeans and. Asians.
The country is a protectorate ruled through the British Commonwealth Relations
Office, and administered by a Resident Commissioner, assisted by an Xxecutive and
a Legislative Council. Government headquarters are at Mifeking in the RepUblic
of South:Africa.
Most of the population is concentrated along the eastern and northwestern bor-
ders, and more than one-half live in villages of 1,000 or more inhabitants. Stock
raising and agriculture occupy almOst 90 perdept of the popdlation. The few Afri-
can wage earner:4 are employed mainly in trade and in the small processing industry.
Wage earner% in 1959 were distributed as follows:
Government services
2,500
Agriculture
5,000
Trade and industry
2,000
Domestic services 0000
Construction 500
Xn addition, nearly 22,000 worked in the RepUblic of South Africa in 1959; their
remittances totaled more than 000000.0. By 19610 the number of these workers had
risen to around 30,000.
Animal husbandry and dairying are the chief OccupationS of the Dedhwemas; inas-
mudh as rainfall is by, the country is more pastoral than agrioultural. Corn,
Cldkir r
t.
.4004
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)
sorghum, beans, pumpkins,
and melons are grown, and in good years a considerable
Surplus has been available for export. Bechuanaland has a small mining industry,
concentrated mainly in the Tati concession area where gold, some copper, and other
base minerals are found. Asbestos is mined near Kanye; manganese also is mined in
the southeastern part of the country.
Most bulk traffic is carried on the single track railroad, nearly 400 miles
long, which passes through Bechuanaland parallel to the eastern border at an average
distance of 50 miles inland. South African:Railways administers and staffs that
part of the line south of Mahalapye; the northern part is managed by the Rhodesian
railway system. A through road, parallels the railroad, and branches connecting
the rail line to points in the hinterland extend inland an average of some 40 miles.
Livestock, as well as Meat and other animal products are the main exports of
Bechuanaland. In 19601 these constituted 86 percent of total exports by value.
The Republic of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland are the
chief markets for Bechuanalandls expOrts. As in the other High Commission Terri-
tories., customs are administered by South Africa which forwards .27622 percent of
its total import and excise duties to Bechuanaland; in. 1958/59 this amounted to
over $700,000, or about 23 percent of total government revenues in Bechuanaland.
In 19600 imports totalled more than $9 million and exports amounted to $7.9
million. The Main import are grain, blankets, clothing, and foodstuffs: the
chief exports aside from meat and animal products, are asbestos and manganese.
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The value of major export and import categoriee for 1960 are shown below in thousands
of US dollars.
lmpOrts
Exports
General merchandise
2,962
Carcasses
4,417
Yehicles
1,557
EIdes and ekins
947
Textiles
1,366
Meat byproducts
TV
Corn
1,223
Cattle
422
Asbestos
370
Xangsneae
198
?
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Swaziland
? A. General
Of the sigh Commission Territories, Swaziland is the smallest, wealthiest,
And the least dependent on South Africa. It is MOO square miles in area (about
the size Of Connecticut) and has a population of 2T0,000, of which only 3 to 4
percent are white. Swaziland is administered by the British Government through the
Colonial Office and has recently been granted a constitution providing for internal
self-government; however, no date bas been set for implementing this provision.
As in the other two territories, there is a considerable demand for independence.
B. The Economv
Swaziland's basic wealth lies in its rich: and varied mineral deposits. Of
these resources, asbestos is the most important; the Havelock mine in north-western
Swaziland is one of the world's largest asbestos mines, providing almost 60 percent
of the government's revenues from income taxes. The asbestos is moved by cable-car
across the Transimal to the railroad at Barberton. 'Very rich kaolin deposits also
are present; several Companies are planning to set up ceramica plants. Small quan-
tities of tin are currently being" mined, and there are encouraging prospects for
the development of coal and iron mining. Iron ore deposits of very high quality
are to be exploited in connection with a purchase agreement with Japan calling for
deliveries in 1964. A $27 minion rail line-is being built to Ilior the iron mines
with LourencO Marques, this line will be operated by the Mozambique railway system.
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result, trade statistics are incomplete. Prin6ipa1 imports are general merchandise,
mining stores, construction materials, motor vehicles and spare Tarts. Total exports
in 1960 amounted to about $12.5 million; the chief items were asbestos (32,026
short tons)) slaughter stock, bides and Skins tobacco (48o short tons), seed cot-
ton, rice, and sugar (36,500 short tons); asbestos alone accounts for nearly one-
ba1f of the territory's export earnings.
South Africa is probably Swatilandts most important Oustomer, and a number
of major products, including fruit, asbestos and Sugar, are marketed through South
African organizations. For its eagm TOrdhasea, South Atrift Offers an 800000 ton
quota at higher than world prices-.
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Part n. Tanganyika
flumnary
/be economy of Tanganyika is heavily dependent on foreign trade. About 40
percent of the money Income is derived from exports and 8a percent of the export
from agriculture and livesta-ek: Most agricultural exports are bulk
Oroducts grown in remote and widely separated areas. /bete areas are served par-
tially by road. but mostly by rail. Important cotton graving areas are located
development plans
along the southern shores of Lake Victoria and there are other cotton, / /lo-
cated 100-200 miles inlend from Dar as Salaam. /bm port of Tinge serves the coffee
growing regions around Arusha and Moshi near the Nenya border and the sisal planta-
tions along the Pangani River. Mtwara is the chief port for the soya and cashew
crops grown in the Masasi-Lindi-Mtwara triangle.
General
Tanganyika covers an area of 341)150 square miles, roughly 30 percent larger
than Texas. /be land, however, is largely arid bush; more than 60 percent is ren-
dered virtually useless by the endemic animal-killing -- and sometimes man-killing
tsetse fly. Thus, much of the population is concentrated along the lower reaches
of Lake Victoria, the upper shores of Lake Nyasa, and the northeast and southeast
corners of he country along the Indian Ocean. There is also a relatively dense
population belt along the Central Railroad, which connects Der es Salaam with Wanes,
the capital of the Lake Pravince. Africans Constitute 08 percent of the total perin-
latien Of 0.5 -minion; most Of the remaining two percent consist of 22,000
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Europeans, 87,000 Indians and Pakistanis, and 25,000 Arabs.
Peasant farmers and semi-nomadic herdsmen form the largest part of the popula-
tiOn; in 1962, less than 500,000 Africans, only five Tercent of the population,
were listed as wage earners. Trade is dominated by Indians', Pakistanis, Goans, and
Arabs; Europeans hold most of the administrative and technical positions own the
large agricultural estates, and are also active in business and industry.
Despite the disadvantages of land, climate, and insect pests, Agriculture is
the mainstay of the Tanganyika economy in both the monetary and subsistence sectors
Agricultural and livestock products together account for about 80 percent of export
earnings; mineral exports, while slowly increasing in importance, contribute lets
than 15 percent.
Although subsistence farming and marginal animal husbandry occupy a major wr-
ticin of the populace, such activity has declined in importance. The subsistence
sector, which accounted for about So percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
in 1955, generated less than 65 percent in 1961. In absolute terms, output in the
subsistence sector increased about 13 percent, while output in the monetary sector
increased almost 40 percent between 1955 and 1961. The Gross Domestic Product for
1962 is estimated at *544.3 million, or 4 percent above 1961. Most of this increas(
was the result of higher wages and an improvement in earnings from certain export
crops. The Blight &Cline in mineral production, especially diamonds, was more thaJ
offset by the Sale Of larger tonnages of sisal and cotton at higher prices than in
1961.
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44111?
roreign Trade
In 1962, Tanganyika recorded exports of $156.2 million and imports of $114.2
million in trade with all areas. Commerce with Kenya and Uganda, which are
Tanganyika's partners in the Nast African Trade Zone accounted for five percent
of total exports and 23 percent of total importe.
The composition of Tanganyika's export trade is dominated by agricultural corn-
moditea, primarily eisal,,cotton, and coffee. Mineral producta, consisting almost
/entirely of diamonds and gold, represented only 12 percent of total exports in 1962.
A decline in mineral exports below the 1961 level was wholly the result of a deci-
sion not to work the less profitable diamond mines. The major exports by tonnage
and value are shown in Tables 1 and 2 below.
? Import trade in 1962 was characterized by an increase in moat consumer items
coupled with major decrease e in investment items such as farm tractors, railway
track material, billding material, and machinery for commercial establishments. The
only investment item to show a significant increase was railroad rolling stock.
For political reasons South African products were boycotted by important groups and
imparts from this somrce dropped to $1.2 million last year compared with $3.4 mil-
lion in 1939. The major cceponents of export trade by value and tonnage are in-
eluded in attached tables.
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?
Table 1
Velogaqtrika: Principal Agricultural -Exports'.1.1/
Selected Years, 1951-62
Year
Sisal
Cotton
Hulled Coffee
Cashew Nuts
Tea
1,000
Long Tons
$1,000
1,000
Long Tons
1?000
Long Tons
$1 000
1,000
Long Tons
$1,000
1,000
Long TOW
$1,000
1951
1955
1959
1960
1961
1962
1955
1959
196o-
1961
1962
142.2
173.7
208.8
207.2
200.9
219.5
66,180-
27,877
36,560
43,238
39,278
44,o8o
,$1,000
8.3
T20.4
30.7
38.9
29.7
32.6
Peanuts
7,750
15,495
18,640
24,716
19?o23
20,700
18.4 19,312
19.5 15,985
25.1 20,513
24.6 18,934
25.7 18,410
Castor Seed
18.2 2,433
33.2 4,239
36.7 5,953
4o.o 5,054
59.0 6,538
Sunflower Seed
1.7
2.7
3.2
3.2
3-9
1,498
2,159
3,223
3,744
4,514
74,000
Long Tons
$1,000
1,000
Long Tons
$1,000
1,000
Long Tons
$1,000
5.6
12.1
14.6
3.4
6.4
969
2,1*;
21. :
650
1,103
7.9
14.2
18.4
10.7
13.4
868
1,725
2,447
1,537
1,677
12.5
5.7
12.4
10.7
11.8
1,056
479
927
935
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A. Excluding exports to Kenya and Uganda.
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APPENDIX C
TO TRANSPORTATION OF THE AREA
I. ANGOLA
A. Transportation System
The transportation system of Angola is oriented in an east to west direction
connecting the interior of the country with Atlantic Ocean ports. The principal
Angolan ports, because of their proximity to the main ocean trade routes, provide
an Atlantic coast outlet for Angola and for other countries of Central Africa.
The absence of good-north - south land transportation routes makes coastal traffic
by sea one of the main avenues of domestic north - south transportation. A large
iliortion of the traffic passing through Lobito, the principal port, is transit,
consisting principally of mineral traffic from the Congo and Northern Rhodesia,
but local exports and imports are increasing. The railroads and highways extend
inland from the Atlantic ports and provide access to the agricultural and mineral
areas of the interior. There is no developed inland waterway system in Angola.
The principal waterways are coastal rivers extending only short distances inland
and other navigable streams are remote from the centers of the economy and serve
only as local transport arteries. Civil air transport serves a number of localities
in Angola and also provides a scheduled service to Leopoldville in the Republic of
the Congo. All public transport services are under the administration and control
of the Department of Ports, Railways and Transport Services.
B. Railroads
The railroads are the backbone of the transportation system in Angola and
consist of. four unconnected basic routes, 1,786 miles in length, extending inland
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from Atlantic Ocean port terminals to agricultural and mineral areas in the interior.
See Table 1-. In 1961 they carried 4.5 million tons of freight and almost 800 thousand
**
, passengers. See Table 2.-- Two of these routes, the Luanda and the Mocamedes rail-
roads, are government-owned, 316r gauge routes extending inland for 265 and 469
miles respectkrely. A third route, the Amboim Railroad, is privately owned. It is
a 2, gauge route extending inland from the Tort of Amboim to Gabela, a distance of
76 miles, and is of Slight importance, handling less than 40l000 tons of coffee and
palm oil Per year. The fourth route, the Benguela Railroad, is also privately owned
and is the only international railroad route in Angola. It is by far the most
important railroad in Angola and handles more than five times as much freight traffic
as all the other Angolan railroads coMbined. For the purpose of this report, the
Benguela Railroad is the only Angolan railroad which is studied in detail.
1. Benguela Railroad
The tenguela Railroad is a privately owned company. Ten percent of the
company's stock is owned by the Portuguese government and ninety percent is Owned
by Tanganyika Concessions, Ltd., a British company which also operates the railroad.
The head office of the company is in Lisbon, Portugal, but the African office for
management of the railroad is located in Lobito, Angola.
The Benguela Railroad provides the Atlantic Ocean link in an extensive
trans-Africa network of 3'6" gauge routes. It extends from the Atlantic Ocean
port of Lobito eastward for 836 miles tYrough Nova Lisboa, Silva Porto, Mnnhango
and Vila Teixeria de Sousa to the borde of the Republic of the Congo. At Dilolo
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?41 Page170 below.
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on the Congo border, it connects with the Bas Congo - Katanga Railroad (BCK) which
is also a part of the trans-Africa network of 3' 6" gauge routes linking Angola, the
Republic of the Congo, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Mozambique and the
Republic of South Africa. A 41-mile branch line runs south from the main line at
Vila Robert Williams, 248 miles east of Lobito, ) to the principal iron ore deposits
at Cuima. This line was opened to traffic on 9 August 1962. Prior to its opening,
iron ore was carried by truck from the mines to Vila Robert Williams and thence by
rail to Lobito for export to Europe.
The entire route of the Benguela Railroad is single track. Passing tracks
with an estimated minimum length of 1,600 feet, are located at all stations along
the route and the maximum distance between passing tracks is 17 miles. The manual
block system of signaling is used to dispatch trains. Under this system, the
statio
ster must obtain permission by telephone or telegraph from the next station
in the direction of travel before permitting a train to enter a block. The maKimum
grade on the route is 2.5% and the maximum axle load is 14 short tons. There are
130 bridges and numerous culverts along the route. The longest bridge is 512 feet
in length and is located about 14 miles east of Vila General Machado crossing the
Cuanza River. This is a combined rail - road bridge of steel truss construction
and may be considered a critical point in the railroad and highway routes. Other
major bridges are the 340 foot bridge and the 380 foot bridge located 2 and 10 miles
respectively from Benguela. There are no tunnels on the Benguela Railroad.
All main-line locomotives are steam powered and the principal fuel used is
wood which is obtained from tree farms located along the route and owned by the
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railroad, but it is believed also that a few steam locomotives have been converted
to burn fuel oil. Water stations are spaced at 30 mile intervals along the route
and are essential to the operation of the railroad. The main shops for the maintenance
and repair of locomotives and rolling stock are located at Nova Lisboa. Power to
operate these shops and also for the city of Nova Lisboa is provided by a hydro-
electric plant using water from a dam which was built by the railroad company on
the Cuando River about 30 miles from Now, Lisboa. The rolling stock consists of about
1,500 freight cars, over 50 percent of which are open gondola cars of 40-ton capacity.
The total staff employed by the Benguela Railroad in 1961 was 17,629. No late
statistics are available regarding the color of the employees. However, during 1959,
official reports listed 3,000 as senior and junior employees and 11,600 as "African"
employees, If the term "African" as mentioned in reports connotes colored African
employees, then almost 80 percent of the employees are colored. Should black
African nationalism become a factor in the stability of Portuguese authority in
Angola, the predeminantly native railroad labor force could effectively disrupt
railroad operations if there should be a desire to do so.
Freight traffic on the Benguela Railroad is increasing, but passenger traffic
has declined rapidly during the past four years. Selected statistical data for the
period 1958 through 1961 are presented in Table 2. See Table 2.4! Westbound traffic
is about five times as heavy as eastbound traffic and consists predominantly of
mineral and ore traffic. In fact, mineral and ore traffie from Angola, Katanga and
Rhodesia represents 28 -.30 percent of all tonnage bandied by the railroad as re-
flected in the following table:
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Mineral and Ore Traffic
]958 1959 9?1961
of total --% -of total %-of total % of total
Tons tons Tons tons Tons tons Tons tons
carried carried carried carried
Angola
217,273
7.0
270,866
9.0
484,887
12.0
419,565
11.0
Khtanga
459,207
15.7
476,671
15.6
640,051
16.0
6600742
17.0
Rhodesia
52,050
1.3
90,255
3.0
690594
2.0
22,850
.05
Totals
728,530
24.0
837,792
27.6
1,1940532
30.0
1,103,157
28.5
In terms of ton miles, mineral and ore traffic from Katanga and Rhodesia in transit
through Angola amounted to 45.6 percent of the total traffic in 1960 and 35.6 percent
in 1961. Assuming that revenue per ton mile on mineral traffic is equal to average
revenue per ton mile, then revenues from Khtanga and Rhodesia mineral traffic were
also 45.6 and 35.6 percent in these years. It is apparent, therefore, that diversion
of this transit traffic to another route would seriously impair the financial
position of the Benguela Railroad.
The Benguela Railroad appears to be efficiently operated and fully adequate
for the needs of the economy it serves and for the international traffic currently
moving over the route. In fact, it is not intensively used. In 1961, traffic density
on the route was only 1.2 million net ton miles per mile of route. By comparison,
the Beira Railroad in Mozambique, which is also a single track, steam-operated rail-
road, had a traffic density more than twice as high or 2.5 million net ton miles per
mile of route. This comparison suggests that the Benguela Railroad is operating at
well below the capacity of the route although an investment in locomotives and rolling
stock maybe required to improve performance substantially.
The standard military formula for estimating the capacity of railroad routes
for military traffic yields an estimate of about 1,800 tons per day for the one-way
military capacity of the Benguela Railroad in either direction. However, analysis
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of statistical data indicates that at a ratio of 1 ton eastbound to 5 westbound,
the railroad carried an average of 1,760 tons eastbound per day during 1961.
Moreover, considering the fact that a large number of empty freight cars move
eastbound to compensate for the heavy loaded movement in the opposite direction,
the military estimate should be considered as a? minimum capacity for military
traffic.
There are no known inter-governmental agreements between Angola and
the Congo pertaining to traffic or transportation. However, an agreement exists
between the Benguela Railroad and the ECK in the Congo providing for the interchange
of rolling stock between the two systems. Moreover, the BCK: provides the Benguela
Railroad with advance notice of the movement of mineral traffic so that adjustments
can be made in the assignment of empty freight cars. Also freight cars of the
Rhodesian railrOads operate over the Benguela Railroad and are treated as BCK
rolling stock.
C. Highways
The road network of Angola is underdeveloped and consists of about 22,000
miles of various classes of roads and tracks. For administrative purposes these
classes are 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and Unclassified. However, only about 100 miles of roads
are paved with a thin coating of asphalt, and the standard of surfacing over the
entire system varies considerably even along a single route. Most of the system
has a dirt surface, and the entire system 113y be considered fair-weather system
because various segments of any given route become impassable during the rainy season
Which lasts from November until May.
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Two main routes traverse the country from west to east, and these routes
converge at Vila Teixeira de Sousa on the Congo border. At that point these routes
connect with the Congo highway system. The northern route, 821 miles in length,
originating at Luanda, has a military capacity of up to 4,000 short tons per day
for the first 40 miles to Catete which is paved. However, other sections along the
route have a capacity of only 500 short tons daily, thereby limiting through put
capacity to the Congo border to 500 short tons per day. The southern route, 697
miles in length, which roughly parallels the Benguela Railroad, is also limited
to about 550 short tons daily. Thus the two west - east highways are capable of
delivering 1,050 short tons daily of military traffic from the ports of Luanda and
Lobito to the Congo border. During the rainy season, this capacity may be reduced
to zero for from 1 to 7 days at a time. In the event of a partial or complee
disruption of railroad traffic in the Congo and in Rhodesia, these highways could
conceivably handle an equal amount of commercial traffic in westbound transit through
Angola. At the rate of 1,050 short tons daily, a total of about 190,000 tons of
cargo could be carried during the six month period of fair weather, May to November,?
provided, of course, that a sufficient number of trucks are available. The policy of
the government of Angola has been to restrict truck transportation that would compete
with the railroads for traffic.
Highway transport of goods and passengers in Angola does not appear to be
organized into large-scale commercial enterprises. Trucking rates are controlled
by the government and they are increased, if necessary, when truck routes parallel
the railroad routes.? The government policy regarding truck transport is set forth
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in a government decree which states that the Port, Railroad and TZansport Services
are to propose means Of protecting the railroads against competition from other
means of transport, having in mind the capital investment of the State and the danger
to this investment from "parasite" services serving the same region. Nevertheless)
highway transport is the only means of transport in areas remote from the railroad.
Rawever, in the absence of a network of all-weather roads, it is doubtful that high-
transport can play a significant role in international transport. Statistical
data on the amount of freight carried by motor vehicle in Angola are not available.
In 1962, the motor vehicle census was about 43,500 of which 12,000 were trucks and
buses. Detaila of the size and capacity of trucks are not available but it is doubtful
that the number of heavy duty trucks available for long distance transport of commercial
cargo would be adequate to provide a significant substitute for railroad services.
D. Ports
The three principal ports serving Angola are Lobito, 'sandal and Nbcamedeaf____
located about 250 to 300 miles apart along the Angolan coast line., Cabinda, a small
,ort an the coast of the Angolan enclave north of the Congo River, and Novi, a small
port on tie Congo River, are of minor importance. Selected data an the operations
at the three principal ports in Angola are shown in Table 3; See Table 3.*
1. Lobito
Lobito is the most important of the Angolan ports and is the western terminus
t of the Benguela Itailroado the only railroad connecting with any other gyitem. It
is located about midway between the northern and southern boundaries of the country.
The harbor, whith covers two'square miles, is protected by t natural (sandapit) break-
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water three miles long. The port handles between 55 and 66 percent of the country's
seaborne commerce (65.8% in 1961), Specific data on inbound vs. outbound tonnage
is not available; however, mineral and ore traffic for export constitutes almost
two-thirds of the total? tonnage handled at the port. Moreover, during 1961 and 1962,
mineral and ore traffic from Khtanga and Northern Rhodesia in transit through Angola
Via the Benguela Railroad made up about 38 percent of the total tonnage handled at
the port. Ore loading equipment at this port consists of a conveyor gallery with a
capacity of 400 tons per hour. With a 25 percent factor of down time for maintenance
of the conveyor and berthing and dispatch of vessels, capacity would be reduced to
300 tons per hour or about 2.6 million tons per year. This is about 138 percent
more than the total mineral and ore traffic handled by the port in 1961. The port
is well equipped with berthing facilities for 7 to 8 vessels, so it is probable that
it operates at well below actual capacity. The, capacity of the port to off-load
military cargo IA estimated about 5,000 short tons per day. This estimate is predicted
on the utilization of ship gear Only and discounting the potential of port equipment
such as cranes. Port labor consists of about 1,000 Africans; also a force of about
500 Portuguese supervisors and semi-skilled Africans operate the port's mechanical
equipment.
2. Luanda
Luanda, the second largest port in Angola, is located about 325 miles
north. of Lobito and handles about 30 percent of the country's seaborne commerce.
The port is served by a railroad which extends eastward to Mhlanje, a distance of
265 miles. A main highway extends eastward through Malanje to the Congo border,
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a dirtaias of 821illes. The?port is 441 equipped with about 4 000 feet of usable
whFt460 with alongside depths ranging tram 8 to 33 feet, and a total of 23 cranes
of up to
it?. The port WW1* about 200 African sterdores. Military
capacity is estimated at 1,0O0 short tone per day,
o
The port of Mocemsdes handled about 3 percent of the seaborne commerce
in 1961. The port is situated about 235 miles south of Lobito and is served by a
railroad which extends eastward to Vila Serpa Pinto, a distance of 469 miles. The
port is undergoing expansion ad at the preeient has alongside berthing facilities
? for vessels of uP to 10,000 tons. Bertha for 10 to 12 vessels are available with
alongside depths of 10 to 34 feet. Th e iort employs about 250 African stevedores.
Military capacity is estimated at aboUt.30400 short tons per day.
E. Civil Alt.
There *Only one civil air carrier in Angola engaged in domestic air
tz'ansportti?ri. This carrier is the Air TranspOrt Operations Division (UTA).
The4i2A-is Operated by the Civil Aeronautics Service as a division of the Depart-
ment of Ports, Railways and Transport Services of the government of Angola. The
Civil Aeronautics Servicecoastructeand operates airports, licenses pilots, establishes
standards and regulates theioperations of airlines operating in Angela. With the
-
approval of Lisbon authorities, it establishes rulec for Angola but more often, it
. .
is consulted by-Lisbon authorities before Lisbon promulgates regulations so that
changri-will be adaptable to conditiansl'in Angola. The Angolan government does
not give a direct subsidy to DTA but tienia funds to MA either interest free or at
low interest rates. Moreover, the Department of Ports, Railways, and Transport
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Services of the Angolan government maintains a contingency fund out of profits
from the operations of all modes of transport which the DMA may draw upon as required.
The only international airport is located at Luanda. Its 6,000 foot landing
strip is being supplemented by a new 12,000 foot landing strip which is under con-
struction. The new landing strip will be completed in 19630 at which time the
airport will be capable of handling long range jet aircraft. Also, 6,500 foot
landing strips were completed in 1962 at Regave, Henrique de Carvallo, Nova Lisboa,
Lobito and Benguela. Practically all of the major airports are in the western half
Of the country, while the rest of the country is served by airports with a limited
capacity capable of handling C-47 or liaison-type aircraft.
Despite limited facilities, the importance of civil air service to isolated
areas in Angola was according to various reports, dramatically emphasized during
the rebellion in the northern districts in March 1961. Rebel activity combined with
the rainy season's usual effect on the dirt roads to cut land routes to various
communities. Supplies were carried to those communities and casualties were evacuated
from them by civil aircraft. Statistical data on those operations are not available
but it is probable that air transport is the only means of transport available during
the rainy season to many remote areas not served by the railroads.
The DTA does not operate a regular air freight service. Such cargo as is
carried consisting of perishables, medicine, spare parts and other light cargo,
is carried as an adjunct to regular passenger service. As of March. 1962, DTA
operated a total of 14 aircraft. The fleet consisted of 7 DC-3s, 4 Beechoraft
D-18Ss, 1 Dragon Rapid and 2 PT-26As.
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It is doubtful that DTA could make a significant contribution to the
movement of commercial cargoes as an alternate to the railroads and. highways.
It could., however) contribute significantly to the movement of troops and light
military cargo from the ports to the interior. Statistica1 data on the lil5k traffic
are presented in Tillie 14. See Table 4.11
* j. 173 below.
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Table].
1%/A1roads of Angola (1962)
Miscellaneous Data
Benguela Luanda Mocamedes Amboini Total
Total Tradk Miles N.A. N.A. N.A. W.A. N.A.
Total Route Miles 2/ 879 265 566 76 1,786
Gauge:
31 6" 879 265 469 lone 1,613
Other None None 97 76 173
2.5 3.2 2.8 N.A.
6o 40-60 40-60 LA.
14 14 14 N.A.
Maximum Grade (%)
Weight of Rail (pounds per yard)
Maximum Axle Load (Short tons)
Maximum Distance between passing
tracks
Locomotives (units)
'Freight Cars (units)
Passenger CoRrbes
Passenger Motor Cars
17 27 17 N.A.
102W 37 31?! 10 18a
1,553 9./ 501 303 48 2,405
46 55 25 3 129
None 15 6 N.A. 21
a. All railroads in Angola are single track, steam operated and with manual bloc signaling.
b. Includes two diesel hydraulic switchers.
c. Includes 23 steam, three diesel-electric, and five steam locomotives for narrow gauge track.
d. Includes 800 open freight cars.
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SECRE1/3 FORE ESE'
'Table 2
Railroads of .Angola
Selected Statistical Data, 1958 - 1961
TOTAL ALL RAILROADS
1958 159
1,6o
1961
C14
0
0
0
0
0
Csi
0
0
?Zr
4059,615
NA
4,019,885
989,266
18,099,314.
NA
IA
1,031,393
NA
4,769,788
1,130,143
23,164,004.
IA
IA,
799,363
IA
4,529,167
1,130,104
23,237,376.
NA
IA
Passengers Carried (number)
Passenger Miles
Tons-Carried (short tons)
Ton Miles (000 snort ton miles)
Revenues (Js) .41
Expenses (sUS)
Operating Ratios
Benguela Railroad
765,196
36,238,203
2,980,333
786,795
529,330.
14,020,912.
435,193.
14,985,435.
9,122,498.
6o.8
14,495
725,705
37,445,702
3,023,196
824,797
563,867.
14,734,081.
441,339.
15,739,314.
9,609,455.
61.o
14,703
244,550
/A
448,605
47,552
1,624,000.
IA
IA
IA
725,500
36,242,927
3,985,108
1,018,846
546,750.
19,687,291.
470,282.
20,704,323.
11,362,682.
54-9
16,100
221,941
IA.
491,597
52,107
1,709,020.
IA
IA
NA
0
622,271 CL
31,092,088
3,870,334 c:k
1,039,979
1.0
449,723.
176
20,165,465. 0
297,103. 0
0
20,912,291.
12,496,666.
U)
59-7 U)
17,629
108,301
NA 0
s-
440,853
46,730
I
1,456,399.
NA
IA
NA
Passengers carried (number)
Passenger Miles
Tons Carried (short tons)
Ton Miles r0 s49rt ton miles)
Revenues: SUS) JJ
Passenger
'Freight
Other
Total Revenues
Operating Expenses ($US)
Operating Ratio (percent)
Personnel
Luanda Railroad
Passengers Carried (number)
Passenger Miles
Tons Carried (short tons)
Ton Miles (000 short t9n miles)
Total Revenues (is) li
Expenses ($US)
Operating Ratio (percent)
Nersonnel
?
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plimq?%1:20!
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Table 2 (continued)
Railroads of Angola ?
Selected Statistical Data, 1958 - 1961
Weamedes Railroad
1958 1959
1961
79,339
NA
73,706
wA.
62,443
IA
Passengers Carried (number)
Passenger Miles
Tons Carried (short tons)
511,133
255,597
186,767
Ton Mlles (000 short ton miles)
115,516
57,765
42,209
Total Revenues ($US)
565,000.
559,115.
670,428.
Expenses (SUS)
NA
lti
NA
Operating Ratio (percent)
IA
NA
NA
Personnel
NA
KA
HA
Amboin Railroad
10,021
NA
10,246
Nit
6,348
NA
Passengers Carried (number)
Passenger Miles
Tons Carried (short tons)
36,951
37,506
31,213
Ton Miles (000 short ton miles)
1,401
1,425
1,186
Total Revenues ($US)
1710000.
191,546.
198,258.
Expenses (us)
NA
NA
NA
Operating Ratio (percent)
IA
NA
NA
Personnel
NA
NA
NA
21= Revenues and Expenses converted from Escudos at the rate of 1,000 Escudos = 1 Conto = $34.96
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Table 3
- Peaports of Angola
Traffic and Revenue
Ports
1960 (% of total)
1961 (% of total)
LOBITO
1,056
1,889,526
(66.8%)
1,013
1,784,405
(65.8%)
Number of ships entioring
Tons handled (short tons)
of which coastal traffic was
95,116
105,625
Receipts (PS) 1/
2,8870172.
57.00
2,755,512.
(53.9%)
LUANDA
Number of ships entering
1,015
1,007
Tons handled (short tons)
Receipts (OS) 1/
MOCAMEDES
847,948 (30.0%) 837,884 (39.9%)
2,046,628.(40.4%) 2,224,470. (43.5%)
Number of ships entering
Tons handled (short tons)
622
90,759 (3.2%)
497
86,667 (3.2%)
Receipts ($US) 1/
1300925. (2.6%)
1300366. (2.6%)
Total Tonnage Handled (short.tons)
2,828,233 (100%)
2,708,956 (100%)
Total Receipts ($us) 1/
5,064,725.4000
5,1100348.400P
1/ Converted from Escudos at the rate of
0000 escudos I. 1 Con.0 ill $34.96
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Table 4
Selected Statistical Data of
Angolan Airlines, 195971961
Passengers Carried
Tons Carried (short tons)
1959
40,662
631.8
1960
44,024
576.5
Mail Carried (pounds)
316,468
555,335
Revenue ($US)
$1,188,000.
$11370,397.
Miles Iflown
1?412,9o2
1,3741660
night Hour
9,383
8,809
onverted from scud00 a rate Of
escu 00 con
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II. epdblic of the Congo*
A. Transportation System
The inland transportation system of the Congo is a closely integrated
system of railroad and river routes in which highway transport provides a feeder
service to and from river ports and rail terminals. Almost all of the freight
traffic originating in the interior of the country must move over a combination
of railroad and water routes to reach a Congo seaport. The only alternatives to
a combination of railroad and Water routes are direct railroad services through
Northern and Southern Rhodesia to seaports in Mozambique and South Africa, or
through Angola to the Atlantic Ocean port of Lobito. The main transportation artery
is the rail-river-rail route from the northern Rhodesian border through Elisabeth-
vile and Port Francqui to Leopoldville and Matadi, often referred to as the Route
Nationale. However, the shortest route to the sea is the rail route from Elisabeth-
vile through Tehke and Dilolo to Lobito in Angola. Before 1962, about 75% of
the Khtanga mineral traffic reached the sea over this route and the remainder by
way of the longer and less convenient Route Nationale. Since independence, almost
all of the Khtanga traffic has been diverted to the route through Angola because
of the destruction of railroad bridges in north Khtanga and in Kasai provinces,
but a small amount has moved throut Northern and Southern Rhodesia to Mozambique.
All public transportatita services are under the jurisdiction of the
-Ministry of Transport and CommuniMtion of the Government of the Congo at Leopoldville.
* Formerly the Belgian Congo
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All public transportation services, except air service, are provided by four
transportation companies, one of which is government-owned, and the other three
are owned by private Belgian interests. The four transportatbn companies are as
follows:
1. Office d/Exploitation des Transports aa Congo (OTRAC0).
OTRACO is a government-owned company with headquarters in
Leopoldville. It operates the Matadi-Leopoldville Railroad (CFML), the Boma(.
Tschela Railroad, and about 8,000 miles of river routes on the Congo River and its
tributaries.
2. Compagnie du Chemin de Per du Bas Congo au Khtanga (BCK)
BCK is a privately owned Belgian company with Congo headquarters
in Elisdbethville. It is entirely a railroad operation.
3. Compagnie du Chemin de Per du Congo Superieur aux Grands Lacs
Africans (CFL).
CFL is a privately owned Belgian company, but the Congo govern-
ment owns 25 percent of the stock. Its Congo headquarters are in Albertville.
The CFL is primarily a rail road operating company but it also operates river and
lake services in conjunction with the railroad operations.
4. Societe des Chemins de Fez' Vicinaux du Congo (VICICONGO).
VICICONGO is a Belgian Company with Congo headquarters in Aketi.
It operates rail, river and road services. VICICONGO serves only a small area of
the country and is almost completely isolated from the other transportation systems.
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It is not considered in detail in this report.
The total staff employed by these four companies in 1959 was about
32,5000 of vhich only 1,252 were Europeans and the remainder Congolese.
B. Railroads
There are five railroads in the Congo with a total route length of 3,186
I
'miles. One of these ip a short, 85-mile, 2' gauge route running from Boma on the
lower Congo River to Tshela an agricultural community near the border of Cabinda\
vhich is an Angolan enclave on the Atlantic Ocean. It is a part of the OTRACO system
but does not connect with any other railroad and neither does it connect with the
main inland water system of the Congo. In the absence of reliable data pertaining
to the Boma-Tshela roUte, it is not considered further in this report. The other
railroads consisting of 3,100 miles of various gauges* (see Table 1) comprise the main
1
railroad system and in 1961 they carried about 5.7 million tons of freight and 1.6
million passengers. (see Table 2**)
1. CFML (OTRACO system)
The CFML is a Tart of the OTRACO system and its headquarters are
at Thysville, It is a 3'6" gauge route 242 miles in length'vhich connects Leopoldville
with the lower Congo River and the port of Matadi. Although the an is the shortest
of the 3'6" gauge-routes in the Congo it is one of the most important segments of
the entire Congo transportation system because it plovides the final link in the system's
?19O below.
4*[ ..tage_34_belOi?
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Only outlet to the sea which it entirely under the control of the Congo. It is, in
effect, the neck of the funnel that is the Congo transportation system. In 1957
this railroad handled over 3 million tons of cargo for a daily average of about
8,000 tons.* In 19590 the first full year after independence, tonnage dropped to
974 thousand tons -- just over half of the pre-independence tonnage and only one-third
of the 1957 figure. Moreover, all of the Katanga copper which represented about 14
percent of the revenues earned by the railroad in 19590 was diverted to other routes
in 1960 and 1961 and where the railroad had been a money maker in earlier years, it
was reportedly operating at a loss of between 400 and 600 thousand dollars per month
in 1960. The principal reason for the drastic reduction in tonnage handled by the
CFML was the destruction of some of the bridges, particularly the Lubilash bridge on
the BCK railroad in Katanga Province.
Under normal conditions, a large portion of the freight traffic
originating in the southern half of the Congo is delivered to Port Francqui for
movement by river to Ieopoldville and thence via the CFML tO Matadi for export. Most
of that traffic has been diverted to the rail route through Angola. With the restorat-
ion of the bridges mentioned above, that traffic which included about 660 thousand tons
of mineral traffic in 19611 could be diverted to the Route Nationale. The CFML is
fully capable of handling the traffic from Leopoldville to Matadi because the mineral
traffic from Katanga combined with other traffic persently moving over the CFML would
amount to only about 1.5 million tons yearly, well below the 3 million tons handled
In 1957 and about equal to the tonnage handled in 1959.
* Fags i,?11 below.
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The CMG has 136 locomotives of which 28 are diesel. It is believed,
however, that current train service over the route is almost entirely diesel operated,
with steam locomotives being used as switch engines or held in reserve. The railroad
owns 3900 freight cars of various types.
The control-pf"the am by Congolese forces is absolutely essential
.if the Congo is to maintain its own outlet to the sea. Otherwise, all traffic would
be forced to routes passing through Angol4 Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Abzambique
South Africa, or Tanganyika.
2. BCK
The BCK, with headquarters in Elisabethville, operates 1,661 miles
of 3'6" gauge route of which 328 miles in Katanga are electrified. The BCK runs from
Sekania on the Rhodesian border, where it connects with the Rhodesian railways, in a
northwesterly direction through Elisabethville, Tanke and Kamina to Port Francqui,
where it connects with the river services of OTRACO and thence to Leopoldville. At
/canine, a branch line extends northeast to Kabongo where it connects with the CFL
serving Albertville on Lake Tanganyika. At Tetkel the line branches west to Dilolo
on the Angolan border where it connects with the Benguela Railroad serving Lobito on
the Atlantic Ocean. The BCK is the only railroad route in the Congo which connects
directly with the railroad systems of neighboring countries, Rolling stock is
interchanged with the railroad systems of Angola aid Rhodesia. The Dilolo (Angolan
border) to Bakania (Rhodesian border) line is the C ago link in the trans-African
network of railroads serving Angola, Congo, BbodesSel Mozambique and. South Africa.
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The BCK provides the shortest rote to the sea through Angola
(Elisabethville-Iobito, 1,309 miles) (Elisabethville-Matadi via Route Nationale,
1,713 miles, about 1/3 longer). Moreover, the tail-river-rail route to Matadi is
much slower and requires two transloading operations. The cost of transporting cargo
by river is usually less than by rail) however, the cost of the translOading required
In this instance would probably negate any savings realized on the water portion of
the movement, so it is probable that the longer Route Nationale would, from an out-
of-pocket cost standpoint, be more costly than the shorter route through Angola.
Even before independence the government appears to have acknowledged the cost differ-
ential, because over 75 percent of the mineral traffic used the shorter route through
Angola. Imports, however, were in large part funneled through Matadi and over the
Route Nationale by the expedient of compelling the BCK to assess a 12.5 percent sur-
charge on freight rates on cargo routed inbound through Angola.
Statistics on the total tonnage handled via the Route Nationale in
recent years are not available. However, some order of magnitude can be obtained
by analysis of the traffic handled at Port Francqai, the point at Which traffic on
the OTRACO river system is interchanged with the BCK railroad. The following data
Indicates the tonnage handled at Port Francqui daring the period:1959-1962:
Year
Short Tons Handled
1959
412,213
1960
288,945
1961
82,256
1962
132,276
The drastic reduction in tonnage handled in 1961 is explained by the fact that some
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of the railroad, bridges on the route serving Port Prancqui were destroyed during
that year. In October 19620 the Iubilash bridge was restored, which may account for
the increase shown in 1962. However, the bridge was again damaged in January 19630
. and no Katangan traffic is reaching Port Francqui at present.
Tbtal traffic handled by the BCC in 1961 was 4.2 million tons, about
3 times as much tonnage as was handled by all other Oongo railroads combined. (see
Table 2) 117he military traffic capacity of the segment of the BCK railroad 'which
serves Po Francqui is estimated at 6 trains each way per day with an average of
330 tons er train. At that rate the railroads could deliver about 723 thousand tons
per year to Port Pratcqui for movement by river to Leopoldville. This is well above
the 660 thousand tons of mineral traffic which was carried on the BCK railroad and
through Angola in 1961. The port capacity of Port Francqui is estimated at about
3,000 tons per day or in extess of 1 million tons per year. It is conceivable there-
fore, that the Route Rationale could accept and handle the traffic presently moving
through Angola, in the eveht that the Angolan route should be denied and provided
that bridge damages are repaired.
3. dPla
The CPL is a combined river-rail operating company serving the
eastern part of the Congo. A 78 mile 3t3/8" gauge line connects with the river
services of OTRACO at Stanleyville and provides a portage around the Stanley Falls
section of the Ina-Ube itiVer to Ponthierville. A 'iver service is operated from
POnthierville to Xindu t which point it connects 1:.th the mein CFI railroad route.
Ii4age 191, ?below.
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The =railroad is a 3'6" gauge route 598 miles in length. It connects with the
BCK railroad at Kabongo. At Kabalo, a section of the main route runs eastward to
Albertville on Lake Tanganyika. A lake service operated by the CFL provides a
connection with the railroads of Tanganyika at Kigoma and thence to the Indian Ocean
port of Dar es Salaam.
The destruction of a major bridge at Kongolo, north of Kabalo, has
brought through traffic on that section of the route to a virtual standstill, and it
is expected that two years will be required to :restore the bridge. Other sections
of the CFL route, including the route from BC1Esystem terminal at Kabongo, to Albert-
ville, are expected to be fully operable by August 1963. The importance of the CFL
route connecting with the BCK at Kabongo and running to Albertville lies in the fact
that it offers an alternate to the Route Nationale, the route through Angola, or the
route through Northern and Southern Rhodesia to Mozambique. Should the use of these
routes be denied by either political or military action, the Kabongo-Albertville
route offers the only rai oute for the export of Katanga mineral traffic.
The throughput capacity of the route fortiahilitary traffic is
estimated at 3 trains and a total of 900 tons per day. At that rate, 328,500 tons
of Katanga traffic could be transported to Albertville yearly. This is only slightl:
Over half of the mineral traffic presently moving over the Angola route. The
estimated military capacity of the port at Albertville is 1,500 tons per day. How-
ever, the largest amount of traffic handled at Albertville in recent years was in
1958 when about 250 thousand tons were recorded inbound and outbound (an average of
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685 tons per day). The tonnage has declined steadily since 1958 and in 1962, only-
an estimated 50 thousand tons were handled.
4. vicicaNGo
The vicicoma is a combined rail-river-road operating company
Serving the northeastern areas of the Congo. Its only connection with the rest of the
Congo is via the Itimbiri River which connects with the OTRACO system at Yambinga
On the upper Congo. The railroad segment of the VICICON00 is a l' 11-5/8" gauge
route about 522 miles in length and is not considered in detail in this report.
C. 'plaid Faterwaypi
The inland inttricky system of the Congo is comprised of a vast network of
rivers a-ld lakes extending into all sections of the country. In many areas, river
transport is the only means of transport available throughout the entire year. The
Congo and the Kasai rivers and their tributaries, and Lake Tanganyika, form the back-
bone of the system. The routes which carry most of the all-water traffic are, in order
of importance:
The Congo River from Leopoldtille to Otanleyville.
The Kasai River from Leopoldville via the Congo to Port Francvi.
The Upper Congo (Lualaba) from Ponthierville to Bukama.
lake Tanganyika.
Upstream from Stanleyville on the Iualaba, navigation is interrupted on two sections
of the river by rapids, and railroad service provide a by-pass for those sections.
A similar situation prevails below Leopoldville on 1:le Congo River where the rapids
are?hir
by-passed the Matadi Leopoldville railroad.
*principal companies monopolize the tmlsportation services on the
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th.
waterways. They are/ -0TRA0O and CF.L. OTRACO. operates services an the Congo from
Ieopoldville,to Stanleyville and on the Kasai from the Congo River junction to Port
Francqui. It also operates the Matadi-Boma-Banana services on the lower, maritime
reaches of the Congo.** The CFL operates all service on the upper reaches of the
Congo above Stanleyville, and the services on Lake Tanganyika.
The capacities of the various waterways varies because of the different
types of river craft assigned to the various sections and the limitations imposed by
the capability of river ports to load and unload the cargo carried. it is estimated
that the Leppoldville-Stanleyville route can handle 3,500 tons of military cargo each
way per dayltiria-POii7capacities at each end of the route are believed to be adequate
for that tonnage. The through military capacity of the Leopoldville-Port Francqui
route, Yellen is the Kasai River portion of the Route Nationale, is limited to 3,000
tons per day which is the maximum capacity of Port Francqui. The capacity of Port
Francqui is, however, greater than the capacities of railroads and highways to clear
the port. In any event; the throughput capacity of the route between Port francqui
and Leopoldville is welll above the 660,000 tons of Katangan mineral traffic presently
moving from Katanga Province over the rail route through Angola.
The capacity of the Lake Tanganyika services to transport cargo between
Albertville and Kigoma, the lake port in Tanganyika, is estimated at 1,500 tons per
day which is well above the papability of the Congo railroad services (an) to deliver
-1*---Te;K7E1=C, iage 175 above.
*If See Table 40 page 194belov.
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cargo to the lake port at Albertville.
D. Highway
The highway network of the Congo consists of about 100 thousand miles of
all types of roads of which about 95 percent have only a natural dirt surface. Less
than 1,500 miles have a waterproof, all-weather surface, and about 3,900 miles have
a rolled gravel surface. Numerous bridges of low capacity restrict through movements
and during the rainy season from October through April, most of the road net becomes
virtually impassable for extended periods of time. As late as Wirth 1963 qua1i4ied
American observers reported that the condition of the net and truck fleet in the
former province of Kasai could only be regarded as disastrous, and that extreme
difficulties were experienced even in distributing food supplies. Similar conditions
have been reported as existing throughout all of the Congo. Some of the smaller
mines and isolated agricultural enterprises which are dependent upon bighwy transport
Ito market their production, have almost ceased production since independence due to
a shortage of trucks and the deterioration of the road net. About half of the VIVI-
CONGO fleet of 525 trucks are inoperable for lack of repairs due to inadequate main-
tenance and a shortage of spare parts.
Detailed statistical data on commercial freight traffic over the highways
in recent years are not available for analysis. However, in 1958, commercial high-
way transport accounted for only 375 thousand tons of freight. No doubt this was in-
creased substantially up to 1960 because a major effort was made to improve the high-
ways and to build bridges. Since 1960 little has been done, and it is doubtful that
commercial highway transport offers anything more than limited farm-to-market service fox
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agricultural products or a short haul feeder service.c.o and from railroad and river
'terminals.
The truck inventory in 1963 is estimated at about 31 thousand vehicles of
all sizes and types as compared with about 36 thousand registered in the state of
Rhode Island, USA. Many of these are reportedly inoperable for lack of adequate
maintenance and a shortage of spare parts. Although additional vehicles could be
imported, it is doubtful that the road net could be brought up to the standards
necessary to sustain heavy commercial freight over long distances without a major,
time-Consuming construction program.
It is concluded, therefore, that with few exceptions, highway transport
does not offer a potential substitute for railroad or river transport of commercial
cargo within the Congo or for international transport of commodities in import or
export traffic. One exception is the 680 mile highway leading from Elisabethville
to Albertville on Lake Tanganyika. This route could conceivably be made to supplement
the railroad services between these points and offers a limited capability for export-
import traffic aver Lake Tanganyika and to Dar es Salaam.* The capacity of the high-
way is estimated at about 160 trucks each way per day or about Boo tons per day at
5 tons per truck. The limiting factor on this route at present is a ferry over
the Luvua River near Kiambi which requires 20 minutes for . the round trip, carrying
only one truck thus limiting the route to 72 trucks each way per day. An increase
in the capacity of the ferry at this point could bring the daily capacity of the
route up to its limit of 160 trucks and 800 tons in each direction.
* In this connection, consider also the highway from Elisabethville to Dar es Salaam
via Rhodesia which is discussed in the Tanganyika section of this appendix, page .
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A second exception is the 21l mile route between DeopoldvilIe and Matadi.
This all-weather route was recently imploved and is believed to be capable of
sustaining about 600 trucks each way per day or from 1,500 to 3,000 tons depending
upon the nature of the cargo carried.
In spite of he limitations imposed by the highway network for movement
of commeicial cargo, it is probable that highway transport is capable of contributing
significantly to the support of military operations in the Congo. Modern military
vehi4es with 4-wheel drive and high horsepower in relationship to load capacity
operations over highways which could not sustain large scale commercial
operations yith conventional commercial vehicles.
14. Ports
The lower reaches of the Congo River provide the only access to the sea
for the Congo. Matadi the principal Tort, is the upstream terminal for all navigat-
Ian on the lower or maritime reaches of the Con4o, and is the only port which provides
rail and road clearance to or from the interior of the country. About 90 percent
of the port traffic of the Congo excluding petroleum products, is handled at Matadi.
About two miles downstream from Matadi is the port of Ango Ango, which is used
primarily as a receiving port for petroleum porducts. Other ports are Boma, Banana,
Binds, *elite. and Wanda/ all in the Congo River estuary but none of these offer
direct railroad or 'tied connections with the principal inland areas of the Congo
and. are therefore not ennaldered in this report.
Matadi ia located about 87 miles upstream from theL mouth of the Congo
River and about 227 miles ,by railroad) downstream from Ieopoldville. The capacity
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of the port for the discharge of military cargo is estimated at about 7,900 tons
per day utilizing ships' gear only for cargo handling. The real capacity of the
port is porbably well above that figure however. There is a usable wharfage of
about 6,000 feet, With berths available for 10 vessels of 460 feet each in length.
The minimum depth of the approach channel is 28n4'eet, but vessels must be capable
of a speed of at least 10 knots because of strong current int the river leading to
the port. Numerous Cranes are available, the maximum capacity of which is 50 tons.
About 4,000 laborers are available regularly for cargo handling at theport.
Ango Ango) the petroleum pert, has about 1,000 feet of usable wharfage.
It has a storage capacity for about 860 thousand barrels of petroleum products.
During 1959, the Matadi port handled 1.5 million tons, and an average of
about 5,250 tons per day consisting of 1,640 tons (31.1%) outbound and 3,610 tons
(68.9%) inbcfundLAft_Tahle 3*._. The total has dropped consistently since independence
and in 1962, the estimated annual total based on a three month average was only
921,180 tons. Moreover, the direction of flaw has changed to 53.3% outbound and
46.7% inbound. The capacity of the port is believed to be well above the tonnage
handled in recent years (1959-1962)
An interesting, and What could prove to be a significant aspect of
navigation in the lower Congo, is the location of the Angolan and Congo borders in
relation to the navigable channel of the Congo River. In 1891, the Belgian and
Portugese governments agreed to use the then.existing navigable channel of the
river as the boundary between the Provinces of Angola and the Belgian Congo. It
1.7.4 ?
Age -156, below.
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WS further agreed that the boundary would remain fixed regardless of changes in
or to, or the r4,1064alkon of the navigable channel. The agreement was never ratified
by either government. At present, at least three sections of the navigable channel
lie within Angolan territory and these sections require constant dredging to maintain
a satisfactory depth for ocean shipping. At present this dredging is acCompliebed
by Congo Hydrographic Services which maintains the entire channel from Matadi to the
sea. There is little or no possibility of relocating a channel entirely within
Congo Waters. The toortugese are, therefore, in a position lo restrict or disrupt
dredging operations in those waters controlled by them, and in so doing could effect-
ively disrupt sea traffic i to and from the Congo ports of Matadi and Ango Ango.
Such action would, however, abrogate an international treaty since the Portugese are
'signatories to the Congo Basin Treaty Of 1095 'which prohibits restrictions on
commerce in the Congo Basin.
Y. Civil Air TransRort
Civil air transport in the Congo is conducted by three air carriers.
These three carriers are: Air Congo, Sobelair and Air Brousse. Air Congo was
established in June 1961 as the national airline of the Congo with headquarters at
Leopoldville. Sabena, the Belgian airline, provides technical assistance, personnel,
and equipment. Aircraft are on lease-purchase from Oabena. The Congo government
has subscribed 65 percent of the capital, Sabena 30 percent, and BObelair and Air
A-rousse jointly percent. Statistical data on operations are not available. The
SECILla MINN DISSEM
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aircraft operated by Air Congo consist of 2 DC-6s, 5 DC-4s and 8 DC-3s.
Sobelair operates a charter service in the Congo with 3 Cessna 310 aircraft.
Operational data are not available. Air Btousse operates Charter and local scheduled
service in the Congo. The head office of the company is in Leopoldville. During
1961, the company carried 13,455 passengers. Aircraft consist of 6 Beechcraft D-las,
4 Rapide, 2 Aztec, 2 Apache and 1 Piper Pacer.
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LUttt1 P.1:7'1.-
brcluding the Boma-Tahela Railroad, 85 miles long and 21 gauge.
1)/ Diesel and steam.
IV Switching locomotives.
Includes: CFML - 3 railcars; BCK - 3 raiicars; and VICICONGO - 1 rail
cr;
Dolible:track- 49 None None 149 ZE,
Mnitiple,track None None o
o
Type of traction: (7)
None
Steam None
676 522Y o
None o
lone
Blectric 1,3398
None op
C?1
Diesel 242 None None 522 g o
o
Gauge: .4
-3" 6" (standard) .242 1,661 598 None 2,501 ?zra)
None o
Other None 78 522 6coo
(7)
Maximum Wade (percent) 3.2 2.3 2.0 4.0 1-
cr)
Signaling: r-
AlAnuAl bloc 199 10661
None 676
NO:: 3,058 ca-
CTC 43 43 ct
Wight of -*ail (pounds per yard) 36 - 67 88 None
48 - 60 33 - 67 ci
Maxim= axle load (short tons) 8 - 18 16 - 20 11 - 16 8 cr)
"
Maximum distance between passing tracks 10 - 15 17 19 - 33 32 - 40 u.)
.-
Locomotives:
Steam 62 115 36 8 221 0
BlectricNone 33 None None 33 8
Diesel1 28 2 10 11 51 2
Other SI 46 66 33 14 159 114
Total 136 216 79 33 464 2
Freight Cars: Tv
Box 1,454 1,471 344 151 3,420 ct
I_
Open 1,607 2,280 163 17 4,067 2
Tank 191 26 - 2 7 226
Other 417 318 91 76
Tots].Tots].3,669 ../ 41095 600? 251 On ?
,
Passenger Cars 107' ?V 11.5 ?V 42 2TP 351 a
-
-o
Selected Statistical Data, 1958 - 1261 -o
> -s
0
TS <
TS CD
-s
O 0-
< ......_._1.,V...._._., 19591960 1961 -n
o o
a TOTAL ALL RATIROADS , n
71 X
O , M
-s Passengers Carried (number) 2, 2541844 2,293,911 2, 584,831 NA c7
XNA o)
(,)
o Passenger Miles 120, 587, 508 119,906,359 127, 158, 051
c7 Tons Carried (short tons) 10, 396,493 10, 076, 962 n1195,999 NA o
U)
r..)
m Ton Miles (000 short ton miles) 1, 315, 922 1, 273, 148 1, 386, 382 - NA 0
CD 0
r..) Total Revenues (*US)W 35,113,593. 331729,285. 38,14-46,147. NA o
so
o 17, 55b, 154. 17,881,724. NA
o Expenses (*US) 15,405,443. al
o Operating Ratio (percent) 43.87 52.05 46.51 NA crIll
o
c.ri ..
crn1 0
A. lourenco Marques System (4 routes) 0
T.-0
x ???1
O Passengers Carried (number) 1,423,951 1, 450, 072 1,663,946 1,708,722 op
-o 35,614,480 37,624,664 1361535,3118= -1
???1 Passenger Miles 47,844,216 o
cs)5,843, 303 5,597,612 6,199,934 6,424,672 8
Tons Carried
-1 (short tons)
o Ton Miles)00 sirprt ton miles) 619,308 588,128 661,153 NA op
"o Revenues (j. S) -EY >
o
CD 619,701. 632,077. 685,915. 0
> Passenger 535,158. r..)
o Freight 1418451048. 14, 235, 502. 15, 984, 306. co
o 16, 140154-3. o
r..) Total Revenues 15, 380, 2C6. 141855, 203. 16,616,383. 16,826,458. o
o
co 8
oipenses 5,6311 389. 6, 488, 191. 6,444,421. NA
o E (*US)
Operating Ratio (percent) 36.61 43.68 38.78 XL o
o
o
_. _.
o Personnel XII NA 7,813 NA cks
o
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4
4
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rotlIstr
tl..).1,.,*; Ufa Llti
A. Lourenco Marques System
Table 2, (continued)
1960
1961
Railroads of Mozambique
Selected Statistical Data, 1958 - 1961
I:?58
1959
1. Ressano - Garcia line
Passengers Carried (number)
672,802
510,899
716,744
NA
Passenger Miles
-16,425,504
13,261,645
20,331,283
NA
Tons Carried (short tons)
41236,156
3,742,817
45.160,273
NA
Ton Miles0 slgort ton miles)
228,571
195,010
220,164
NA
.7
Revenues ( S) 21
Passenger
224,064.
203,664.
257,690.
NA
Yreight
6,464,964.
5,928,757.
6,660,450.
NA
Total Revenues
6,629,028.
6,132,421.
6,918,140.
NA
Expenses ($US)
2,161,144.
2,348,072.
2,539,679.
NIL
Operating Ratio (percent)
32.6
38.3
36.7
NA
Nrsonnel
Nk.
NA
NA
NA
2. Gobs line
Passengers Carried (number)
61,546
117,026
111,050
NA
Passenger Miles
1,283,396
1,780,915
1,687,436
NA
Tons Carried (short tons)
172,228-
236,646
311,714
NA
Ton Miles VO slgort ton miles)
4,049
5,706
6,040
NA
Revenues ( ON
Passenger
17,328.
26,007.
26,369.
NA
freight
101,607.
156,967.
149,413.
NA
Total Revenues
118,935.
182,974.
175,782.
NA
-Operating Expenses ($US)
94,073.
142,485.
116,171.
NA
Operating Ratio (percent)
79.1
77.9
66.1
IA
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Table 2 (continued.)
Railroads of Mozambique
Selected Statistical Data, 1958 - 1961
A. Lourenco Nerves System (conit) 1958 1959 1960 1961
3. Limpopo line
Passengers Carried (number)
Passenger Niles
Tons Carried (short tons)
Ton Niles Vo sloprt ton miles)
Receipts ( 21
Passenger
Freight
Total Revenues
Expenses (SUS)
Operating Ratio (percent)
Personnel
163,253 206,245 731,658 Nk
11,325,309 14,236,027 18,619,506 NA
1,377,390 4486,065 1,407,163 NA
385,367 382,752 423,414 NA
155,181. 207,137. 228,002. NA
8,252,997. 8,059,482. 8,943,851. NA
8,408,178. 8,266,619. 9,171,853. NA
3,195,545. 31682,444. 3,554,237. NA
35.3 44.5 38.8 NA
NA NA NA NA
4. Xinavane line.
Passengers Carried (number) 526,350 615,902 104,494 NA
Passenger Niles 10,223,853 12,195,31)4. 10,657,978 NA
Tons Carried (short tons) 57,529 132,085 320,785 NA
Wimi NilesOt1).1:0 84,ort ton miles) 1,321 4,660 11,535 NA
Revenues ( ) N
Passenger 2011514. 182,883. 231,188. NA
Freight 85,460. 90,298. 230,603. NA
Total evenues 286,994. 173,181. 461,791. NA
Expenses (SUS) 180,627. 315,192. 1314,3146. NA
Operating Ratio (percent) 62.9 182. 29.1 NA
Personnel NA NA NA NA
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6-1.0001.0008ZOOV61701.016/dCIU-VI3 91./90/000Z eseelati Jod peAwddv
SECF'"
rP,17.11
Table 2 (continued)
Railroads of Mozambique
Selected Statistical Data, 1958 1961
B. Beira Railroad
1258
1952
1960
1961
Passengers Carried, (number)
294,685
271,648
276,524
NA
Passenger Miles
30,071870
27,690,111
25,439,509
NA
Tams Carried (short tons)
31069,192
3,056,180
3,239,919
NA
Ton Miles short ton miles)
4821477
480,339
495,680
NA
Revenues ( ;.:01100
Passenger
NA
292,755.
280,554.
NA
Freight
Na
11,160,770.
12,198,033.
NA
Total Revenues
12,124,858.
11,453,525.
12,478,587.
NA
Ekpenses ($US)
57530,563.
6,257,456.
6,366,636.
NA
Operating Ratio (percent)
45.61
54.63
51.02
NA
Personnel
KA
4,733
5,050
NA
C. Thana-Zembesia Railroad
202,333
38,018,371
805,058
136,296
190,811
186,975
34,960,707
1,075,664
151,106
193,170
30,298,000
938,244
145,004
Passengers Carried (number)
Passenger Miles
Tons Carried (short tons)
Ton Miles 009 Short ton miles)
Revenues ( gi
35,850,1001
789,194
133,646
Passenger
3,259,144.
3,029,824.
3,750,868.
lui
Freight
2,775,2811.
2,799,389.
3,879,124.
3,821,353.
Total Revenues
6,034,428.
5,829,213.
7,629,992.
NA
Tenses ($US)
2,321,836.
2,308,071.
2,485,831.
NA
Operating Ratio (percent)
38.5
39.6
32.6
NA
Personnel
NA
RA
NA
NA
6-1.0001.0008ZOOV61701.016/dCIU-VI3 91?/90/000Z eseeieu iod peAwddv
31. Gaza Railroad
Passengers Carried (number)
Passenger Mlles
a Freight Tons Carried (short tons)
Ton Miles O s4Ort ton miles)
Revenues (us) .941
Passenger
Freight
Total Revenues
Expenses (SUS)
Operating Ratio (percent)
Personnel
cri
Inhambane Railroad
th0
???1
CD
0
cs,
0
0
co
0
0
Passengers Carried (number)
Passenger Mlles
TOns Carried (short tons)
Ton Mlles ..10700 sb,ort ton miles)
Revenues (,3 ) Pd
Passenger
Freight
Total Revenues
Expenses (*5S)
Operating Ratio (percentage)
Personnel
Railroad
Selected
Table 2 (continued)
- 1961
1961
Railroads of Mbzadbique
Statistical Data, 1958
1958
1959
1960
27, P12
27,452
60,880
WA
749,248
732,595
1,469,540
NA
26,756
181394
23,939
NA
887
993
1,106
NA
18,673.
19,368.
24,507.
NA
28,243.
28,282.
26,674.
NA
46,916.
471650.
51,181.
NA
105,397.
123,514.
120,157.
NA
2214..6
259.2
234.8
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
,697 101 A NA
24,895 25
821,150 787,537
111-4Z' 1891395
28,586 25,610 27,270 45,726
996 784 11066 NA
16,416. 16,851. 19,039. 54,608.
25,465. 291716. 30,975. 48,035.
41,881. 116,567. 49,014. 102,643.
1111659. 132,288. 1148114.05 NA
266.6 284. 302.8 NA
IL la EA IA
oF. Quelemane
Passengers Carried (number)
Passenger Miles
Tons Carried (Short tons)
Short Ton Miles
Revenues OUS)
Passenger
Freight
Total Revenues
Expenses (*US)
Operating Ratio (percent)
Personnel
199,243 123,660 137,256
6,265,895 6,136,650 NA
118,762 115,959 119,740
6,280 5,668 NA
85,03. 85,372. 82,836.
1:48,b5p. 1351540. 113,026.
233,813. 220,912. 195,862.
517,792. 5231.001. NA
221.4 236.7 NA
NA _ 1,9c17 NA
102,320
5,1128,743
158,324
7,666
85,385.
174,191.
259,576.
372,863.
143.6
NA
etrfter:;* *
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G. Mocambijue Railroad.
Passengers Carried (number)
Passenger Niles
Freight Carried (short tons)
Ton Miles VO ort ton miles)
Revenues ( S
Passenger
Freight
Total Revenues
Ifipenses ($US)
Operating Ratio (percent)
Personnel
SECRFT7 77771 7-17121
Table 2 (continued)
Railroads of Mozambique
Selected Statistical Data, 1958 1261
1958
1959
154,878
71929,412
157,629
172,492
8 643,878
158,285
22,203
19,045
116,096.
128,198.
587,153.
582,014.
703,249.
710,212.
8250665.
1,094,178.
117.4
154.0
xii,
xA
IL Tete' Railroad
24, 570
1,968,234
33,656
2,310,875
Passengers Carried (nuoiLer)
Passenger Miles
Freight Carried (short tons)
307,645
312,925
Ton short ton miles)
46,089
43,931
Revenues $US) Pal
Passenger
29,664.
29,751.
Freight
492,725.
523,351.
Total Revenues
522,389.
Expenses ($US)
506,091.
334a:
Operating Ratio (percent)
96.9
114.7
Personnel
NA
NA
ej Revenues and Expenses converted from Escudos at rate of 1,000 Escudos = 1 Couto = $34.96
-235-
>
TS
"0
n
0.
<
M
0-
TV.
0
n
X
M
1960 1961 67'
m
U)
m
189,656 216,836 r..)
o
o
91040,934 NA 0
8 ,
184,465 159,983 th
22,859 NA cl,
-
134 1430161.
,351. 0
671,232. 592,922. 5
i3
8050583. 736,083.

,086,137. NA 0
1 "0
?-?1
334.8 NA cmi
5,1g38 NA -1
0
0"
4:.
CD
>
0
0.
r..)
35,286 39,040 co
0
2,428,935
328,849 380,412 0"
NA o
0
47,744 NA o
o
"
cl,
594,495. 573,11:
5631:Pt:
77163.-36. 611,974.
NA
NA
6,047 NA
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Ports of Mozambique
Traffic and Revenues) 1958-1962 1-1/
1958 (% of total) 1259 (% of total) 1960 (% of total) 1961 (% of total) 1962 (% of total)
IDTAL ALL PORTS
Tata Tons Handled. (ort tons) 9,376,079 9;332,590 9,999,451 11,542,112 NA
Total Revenues SIIS 12,877,155. 14,164,320. 14,1301487. NA NA
Total Expenses SUS NA NA NA NA IA
Lourenco Marques
Tons Inbound (short tons)
Tons Outbound (short tons)
Total Tonnage Rand1ed
Neyenues
Expenses
2,898,293
3,226,332
6,124,625 (65.4)
6,798,926.
4,247,956.
2,745,080
3,028,093
5,773,173 (61.9)
6,788,730.
4,973,054.
3,008,977 3,287,059 3,220,921
3,313,414 4,091,831 4,597,693
6,322,391 (63.2) 7,378,890 (63.9) 7,818,614
7,692,1441. 8,461,718. NA
5,444,606. NA NA
Beira
Tons Inbound (short tons) 1,483,291 1,442,709 1,519,278 1,623,688 1,603,847
Tons Outbound (short tons) 1,295,923 1,610,420 1,690,039 2,002,879 1,830,920
Total Tonnage Handled 2,779,214 (29.6) 3,153,129 (33.8) 3,209,317 (32.1) 3,626,567 (31.4) 3,434,767
RevenuesMIR/ 6,078,229. 6,598,059. 6,900,335. NA. NA
Expenses S NA NA NA NA NA.
Other Ports (combined)
Total Tonnage (short tons) 572,240 (5.0 406,288 (4.3) 467,743 (4.7) 536,695 (4.7) NA
Revenues WS b 935,071. 777,531. 907,761. 895,710. NA
Expenses ($US) IA NA NA NA NA.
W Inclues revenues from passenger traffic
1/ Revenues and Expenses converted from Escudos at rate of 1,000 Escudos = 1 Conto = $34.96
Sr
,? ? 11.4
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Approved For Release 2000/05/21!5nas_4'6$19-ijoIlatakiMicki_9
Appendix C
Part V. The Transportation System of the Republic of South Africa.
A. Introduction
Transportation service for the Republic of South Africa and South-West
Africa is provided by all forms of modern transportation except inland waterways
and pipelines. The "Republic of South Africa Railways and Harbours" owns and
operates all railroad facilities and ports, some motor transport, and coastal
shipping services as well as the commercial air lines. Private interests own
and operate additional motor transport services and the bulk of the merchant
marine. The railroads account for 95 percent of the internal freight transpor-
tation service measured in ton-miles, although motor transport carries more than
twice the nukber of tons. The latter service, however, is for the most part in
short haul local distribution. Coastal shipping accounts for a small amount of
the total. The merchant marine carries no more than five percent of South Africa's
imports. Over 95 percent of the passengers carried in the country are transported
by the railroads. Motor transport and civil aviation share the balance of the inter-
city transportation market.
Railroad freight service within the country is characterized by fairly
long hauls between centers of major industrial and commercial activity such as
between the Rand area and the principal ports, and short hauls of mineral and agri-
cultural products within the Transvaal and Orange Free State and in the areas adjacent
!This appendix includes also a discussion of transportation in South-West Africa
and the Protectorates of the UK.
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to the ports. The South African Railways provider most of the long-distance motor
freight service primarily between areas not serveciby the railroad while the private
motor carriers concentrate on urban and short distance feeder service to the rail-
roads. Over 90 percent of all passengers carried by the railroad are commuters who
travel daily between suburban towns and reserves and the cities and other areas of
emiloyment. In spite of strenuous efforts on the part of the railroads, logg distance
passenger traffic is being lost gradually to motor and air transportation.
B. Railroads
I. Track, Motive Power and Rolling Stodk
The South African railroads are composed of some 13,615 route miles
of track, of which 13,175 are Afoot gauge and 440 miles are 2 fobt gauge; Originally,
commenced in 1860 with European and American standard gauge, (4 feet, 8i inches),
the lines were regauged about fifteen years later to 3i-feet because of the heavy
investment in roadbed and clearances necessary to reach the interior. The railway
system developed into a pattern of lines leading from the ports to the Orange Free
State and Transvaal. With the discovery of gold and later of other mineral deposits
tOl_
in and near,/Witwatersrand, new lines were added, many of them of comparatively short
length within the areas of greatest mining and industrial activity. The Mozambique
port of Lourenco Marques came to supplement the ports of the Republic of South Africa
by affording short rail and road connections between the sea and the Rand district.
During World. Weir I0 .a connection was made with the 1 foot 115/8 inch
(.6 meter) gauge system of what had been German Southwest Africa. e5FI96E7L, the
AtatiAseen
Southwest African System4V77conmerted entirely to the aifoot gauge. South Africa
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Railways operate a 200 mile stretch of the RhodesiaiRailway extending from Ramatlhabama
to Mahalapye in Bechuanaland. South African equipment is exchanged with Rhodesia
but normally does not move beyond Bulawayo. A tabulation of the principal railroad
routes is included in Table 1 .*
Rail used in the 3i foot gauge portions of South African Railway System
varies from 96 lbs. to 45 lbs. per yard. There are over 14.600 miles of 96 lb. traA.
Nienty-five percent of the railways have rail of 60 lbs. or heavier. New track is
being installed using welds, with sections up to one half mile in length and sliding
joints to allow for expansion. Ties are mainly of imported wood,- but stretches of
track, have been laid with steel and prestressed concrete tiewAnd are undergoing
testing. All main lines are ballasted with crushed hardstone. A Class I roadbed
consists of 96 lb. rail, 2376 ties and 2200 cubic yards of ballast per milew It per-
mits axle loads of 23.5 tons, and passenger, speeds of up to 60 miles per hour. Higher
speeds for diesel and electric powered passenger trains are being planned, and the
stresses involved were investigated in a recent visit to japan by a South African
Railway delegation. (Japan also uses a 3i foot gauge, and runs a number of trains at
speeds somewhat in excess of 60 miles per hour).
As of 31 March, 1962, the South African railways had electrified route
mileage of 1,486 miles and electrified track mileage of 3,278 miles. There were about
1,000 miles of double and multiple track in the system, and at least 220 miles of
single track with tentraized:traffic control. Aside from double and multiple trackage
in the Rand, the principal stretches of double track extend from Germiston to Bloem-
fontein and from DUrban to NewcaStle. Electrification is concentrated on the commuting
Nge70 below.
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lines around Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban. and Capetown. The through line from
Johannesburg to Durban has been almost completely electrified. Authorization has been
granted for finishing the electrification of this route as well as the line from the
Rand to Komatipoort on the Mozambique border, which handles traffic to and from
lourenco Marques. The main line from the Rand to Capetown via KiMberley has been
electrified for a considerable portion of the distance. All electrification consists
of an overhead catenary system of 3,000 volts direct current.
In 1961-6, along with completion of regauging, the Southwest Africa
railway was completely dieselized. This line runs through arid country where water
is a preblem,aand locomotive coal has had to be transported to the area. Electrifies,-
tion and dieselization elsewhere have resulted in a saving in coal movement for railway
purposes, hut South African coal is cheap ($1.85 per ton in 1961 at the mine head)
and most tonnage in 1961-62 was still moved by steam. A further conversion tel diesel
and electric power for many lines is, however, contemplated.
Motive power as of 31 March 1962, consisted of 560 electric, 168 diesel
and 2,572 steam locomotives for Afoot gauge, as well as 439 electric powered)
multiple unit, suburban passenger cars. The last steam locomotives were purchased in
1958-59.
Passenger equipment other than the multiple unit cars already counted
consisted of 3974 cars of various types, including 1190 suburban trailers and baggage
ears. There were OVeT 1C9,000 freight cars, about a third of which were 2-axle cars,
Vow the 2 foot gauge, there were 73 steam locomotives, 115 passenger
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cars and 1700 freight cars. Selected track, locomotive and rolling stock data are
presented in Table 2 4*
2. Traffic
The fiscal or reporting year of the South African Railways and
Harbors closes on March 31, the end of the summer. For the years ending on March 31st,
1957 and March 31, 1962, ton miles of freight moved by the railways amounted to 20.6
billion and 25.6 billion respectively. Fiscal year 1962 was the year of highest
attainment up to that point, and the increase of 24.2 percent over Fiscal year 1957
is indicative of the general rise in the economy during the five year period. Tonnages
carried for the same two years were 75 million and 89.7 million respectively.**
Average lengths of haul were 274 and 285 miles respectively.
The pattern of movement of freight tonnage on the railways consists
of (1) movement of major tWmmodities front mines or producing areas to industrial
centers and port areas partially for export, (2) imports of petroleum and miscellaneous
freight from the ports to major inland cities and centers of consumption, (3)
movement of industrial freight within the Transvaal and Orange Free State mining and
manufacturing areas and (4) movement of railroad coal from mines to coaling poinLs on
the lines. (See Figure 2.***) There is generally a movement of sheep and cattle from
drought stricken areas to greener range land in Southwest Africa, which although
not large in comparison with total freight carried, may create problems in obtaining
sufficient numbers of railroad cars because of its urgency.
* Page258.
** _Traffic on the Railroads of South Africa, 1958-62 is shown on Table 3, page 259.
*** iftgoref. mokp
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Commodities which represent the largest tonnages moved are coal and
coke, ores, petroleum, corn, sugar and other agricultural products. The category
of general merchandise ale? represents a large Tort of the total. Principal types
of goods hauled in the fiscal year ended 31 March 19624 art shown below in millions
of total
Coal and coke
30.6
Minerals, excluding coal
15.3
Agricultural produce
13.5
General merchandise
11.1
Manures and fertilizers
3.1.
Building and fencing materials
3.2
Timber
3.2
Commodities moved to the ports, mostly for export, were iron and man-
ganese ores., cOrn, sugar, wool and citrus fruits. The largest single import is
petroleum. In the 1962 fiscal year 2.3 million tons moved inland from the ports by
rail, principally from Durban and the Mozambique port of Lourenco Marques. Under
a long-standing agreement with the Government of Mozambique, 47.5 percent of import
tonnage destined for the Witwatersrand-Vereeniging-Pretoria industrial area must
come in 'Via LOUrenco Marques; in practice this quota is usually exceeded. Other
international traffic moved by rail in recent yttro is 01:Own below.
4 Also referred to herein as nodal Mar 1962.
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Traffic lEnttarcIlangett vith Foreign. Railroads*
In thousands of tons
Rhodesian Railroads Traffic forwarded. tO Traffic received from Total
Fiscal Year
1959
1960
1961
1962
690
723
662
650
Mozambique Railroads
Fiscal Year
1959 1,562
1960 1, 789
1961 2,267
1962 2,607
1r /fiscal year ended_ 31 March.
463
341
263
285
1,331
1,292
1, 342
1,365
1,153
1,364
925
935
2,893
3,081
3,609
3,972
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Greatest densities of rail movement occurred on the lines in the
Rand district exoluld Johannesburg, which sport industries, mines, power plants,
consuming centers and the railways themselves. The main lines running inland from
the ports to the Rand carried tonnages which are estimated at about 16 million tans
per annum in both directions combined. for Durban, 5 million for Port Elizabeth, 9
million for Capetown and 4 million forLaurenceiMarques. The capacities of these lines,
on which there was considerable electrification and double trackage, were not approached.
In the 1962 fiscal year 93 percent of all passengers carried on the
South African Railways were commuters. Out of nearly 316 million passenger journeys,
294 million trips were commutation movement. The remaining 7 percent were medium and
long distance intercity movements. Despite strenuous efforts to hold the longer haul
passenger business by increasing speeds and indroducing modern equipment, the South
African Railways are affected by the world-wide trend away from rail to highway and
air travel for these movements. Between 1956-57 and 1961-62, ordinary intercity
and long distance passenger journeys decreased by about 6 million, or 21 percent,
to 21.7 million. Cammutationt trips on the other hand increased 24% (i.e. 56 minion
net gain) to the 294 million total already stated. Over 90% of the gain in commu-
tation took place in the Rand population concentrations of Johannesburg and Pretoria.
The remaining centers, chiefly Capetown, either increased very little or fell off.
The phenomena of heavy suburban mOvements are exblained by the
South African policy of strict segregation of races. On 1 lrebrnary 1958, the Rand
?11.
services were changed by reuirIng all white commuters to travel first class, and all
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non-whites to travel second or third class. In addition, traffic in the area was
affected by the movement of both whites and non-whites to homogeneous suburban
towns, communities and reserves, and by the general growth in the tempo of the
economy. Second class was eliminated entirely in the Capetown area. In consequence,
much capital has had to be provided in improving commuter services. Monumental new
stations have been built at Johannesburg, Pretoria and Capetown. Nearly all commuter
lines out of Johannesburg have been electrified and a considerable amount of new
suburban passenger equipment has been procured and put into service. New, faster
trains have been added, but also on a few lines, suburban rail services have been
discontinued in favor of the use of buses.
3. Finance
The financial account of the railways is included in that of the administra-
tion which also embraces harbors, steamships, highways and airways. The administra-
tion has no borrowing power independent Of its relationship with the government of
the South African Republic, and is required by law to fulfill its capital require-
ments from the Republic governmental treasury which can float internal and external
loans. The administration may,Allowdver with parliamentary authority, employ net
income to reduce interest-bearing capital held by the government.
The amount of interest-bearing capital owed the government by the adminis-
tration on 31 March 1962, was almost $2.1 billion. The government in turn owed
the World Bank about $137 million for the purchase of electric and diesel
locomotives in England and the United States. Other governmental
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loans were outstanding against a large pmportion of the capital, over 90 percent
of which were held in South Africa.
liarnings of the Railways fluctuate with business activity. In 1956-
591 a deficit of over *14 million after interest requirements was recorded. This
occurred in the Midst of an extensive capital improvements program slated to be
completed early in 1963 and to cost in all about *700 million. In 1961-62, a profit
of *14.5 million was earned after *100 million of interest payments to the govern-
ment and *38 million of depreciation.
The property of the South African Railways as of 31 March 1962,
represented an accumulated investment less depreciation of *1.9 billion. In 19620
average revenue per ton of freight vaa *5.50 for revenue freight only.* The average
revenue per ton mile for revenue freight was 1.78/. Average revenue per passenger
journey, on thec other hand, was less than 19 cents. Selected financial statistics
for the Railroads of South Africa, 1958-62 are presented lh Table 3.**
4. EValuation of the System
The South African Railway System has an efficient passenger service.
Its trains are generally prompt and run at fair speeds. The intensive, cheap
commuter traffic is being encouraged by government policy, but it is expensive for
the railroad in that more modern, new equAament and improved stations and other
facilities are constantly needed. Reverieless, this additional heavy investment
acts as a stimulus to the national econo4. the railways by themselves would undoubtedly
ytc ear 1962, the South Africanikways hauled 12.2 million tons of non-
re4enti70 ffe-17
4-* Page 259.
t) mostly for own account.
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show a greater profit if the passenger business were not encouraged in this manner,
but heavy industry) machine building) housing and other sectors of the economy could
not benefit as they do from the subsidy provided by the low cost commutation service.
The net result is large expansion of railway facilities) principally around Johannes-
burg, and substantial additions of new suburban passenger equipment.
Shippers of. freight are reported to complain that there is insufficient
rolling stock to support all the needs of industry and commerce at the time and
place needed. This condition is not a unique complaint in that it occurs in all
industrialized countries, and it should not be regarded as a reflection on the sub-
stantial ability of the railroads to support the economic development of the country.
The railroads in their present stage of development are also able to support vig-
orously the social and security policies of the government.
No trunk route has had difficulty in providing sufficient line
capacity to handle the traffic offered, but there have been seasonal peaks on the
Capetown route which have strained facilities. In May 1962, traffic south from De
Aar reached a level of over 23,000 tons per day. Capacity of single track main lines was
repOrted in a South African trade publication of January 1960) to be 25,000 tons
per dec55smd of double lines, 45,000 tons) but these figures were based on steam
operation on line's without special signaling. In the cited instance, the strain was
relieved by supplementing steam power with diesel locomotives surplus to southwest
Africa. The Capetown route is graduallybeing electrified.
The route from the Rand to DUrban) which is the most heavily used,
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is being both electrified and double tracked. That from the Rand to nsmatipoort
on the Mozambique border is scheduled for electrification but not double tracking.
In 1961-621 the traffic in the controlling direction amounted to about 2.75 million
tons over this line. Owing to a movement of empty cars of different types in opposite
directions, it is estimated that 10,000 tons of capacity or about 330 cars average
had to move in each direction Every day. Thus the capability of the line was not
approached. The main need of the whole system on a long term basis is for improved
utilization of existing freight cars, additional freight cars and a larger inventory
of electric and diesel locomotives. There are no financial obstacles to obtaining
the equipment, but governmental policy of supporting the domestic car building
industry makes it neuessary to defer placement of orders for that portion of the
currently needed equipment vtlich is in excess of the home industry's annual productive
capacity, even though such equipment could readily be obtained abroad.
5. Labor Policy
It is difficult to forecast the future attitude of the non-white
railroad workers who constitute about half of the roughly 200,000 personnel currently
employed* by the railroads but steps are being taken to maintain their loyalty to
the enterprise. Notwithstanding segregation, conditions for non-white employees are
being improved in a number of ways. The railways are building better housing for
them and are conducting schools for their training. Mixed.race work teams are being
organized and trained to operate as units. Pay levels are being improved. Railroad
pay is considerably better than pay in the mining industry, which is the largest
employer of Bantu labor in the Republic. Provision is being made for the prompt airing
4 Selected statistics on personnel and wages, 1958-62, are presented on Table 31 p 259.
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of grievances. Non-whites are being incorporated into the railway police. Good
personnel relations are stressed in training and guidance literature. Schools for
training of employees are conducted by the Railways and Harbors. 2,620 employees
received training at the Railway College at Esselen Park in 1962 and classes for
training non-whites were provided at a number of other points.
C. Motor Transport
The roadway system consists of some 200,000 miles of roads and tracks of all
types. There are about 12,000 miles of bituminous main roads, 100 miles Of concrete
highway, 58,000 miles of gravel and 31,000 miles of improved earth roadway. The 7. 7
remainder may be classified as tracks. Because of the relatively dry climate, the
earth roadways serve their purposes fairly well. The national roads lead from the
ports to the Rand. There is also a coastal road running from Capetown to Durban and
a main highway running from Johannesburg and Pretoria to the border of Southern
Rhodesia near Messina. South-West Africa has a limited system of inferior roads.
A description of the motor road network including mileage of each type may be found
in Table 4.!
The national roads in general are surfaced with bitumen with a base of
8 inches of crushed stone. They vary from 18 to 22 feet in width. Vertical
clearances are 16 feet. Passing is to the left. There are numerous bridges, prac-
tically all of which are substantially built. Aside from the national roads, the
road network is considered to be inadequate to handle a large increase in heavy
trucking service. The gravel highways will not be rapidly changed to roads of
bituminous surface
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because of the attitude the government in directing heavy traffic to the rail-
roads.
On 1 January 19630 there were registered in South Africa just over
one million private automobiles, 275,000 trucks, 20,000 buses' and about 100,000
motorcycles. The largest concentration of motor vehicle registrations is found
in the Transvaal. Motor transport services and privately operated vehicles carry
about 200 million tons of freight annually or about twice the tonnage carried by
the railroads. The bulk of this traffic is moved in short haul delivery service
by private carriers. These are strictly regulated by the government in order to
prevent competition for the railroads on longer hauls.
The South African Railways operate their own buses and trucks over
about 32,000 miles of routes. In 1962, more than three million tons were moved
by inter-city trucks and &bout four million tons were carried in local cartage
service. Some 8,000 vehicles were used by the Railways for this purpose. About
half of the total freight tonnage was represented by grain, fertilizers, fruit,
sugar and livestock. The remaining tonnage consisted of a wide variety of items.
Eight million passengers were carried by the Railway bus services, using 460 vehicles.
The Road Transport Establishment of the Railways had a capital investment account
of almost 41 million dollars at the end of March 1962. Vehicular operation had
gross revenues for 1962 of 22 million dollars, *cclusive of the revenues from
tourist buses, but an operating loss of over one million dollars was sastained.
There are adequate vehicle repair and fueling facilities distributed
throughout the country.
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D. Ports
The principal seaports of South Africa have been developed to handle
two-way general cargo, exports of dry bulk commodities such as coal and ore, and
imports of petroleum. Docks and quays are under Control of the South African Rail-
ways and. Harbours administration, and their improvement is included in the current
program of expanding transportation facilities. Routes for the movement of individual
export commodities are carefully developed, and certain ports are specified for their
handling. In view of the importance of foreign trade to the Republic, the ports are
a vital link in the economy.
Following is a list of the: principal ports, together with trade handled
in 1961-62 in thousands of tons.
Landed
Shied
Transhipped
Totfil
Durban
7-.3E34--
TBEU--
139
io,611
Capetown
2,390
2,154
30
4,574
Port Elizabeth
1,290
1,116n
7
2,413
East London
692
656
1
1,349
Walvis Bey
316
.
589
-
905
Wssel Bay
149
15
-
164
v---
Port Nolloth
68
8
-
7'6
Ldderitz
18
12
-
30
Total 24591 10,417 20 1P2
?4........:-......_
Lourenco ,Marques in Mozambique also handled for South Africa about 1.4
million tons of imports and 2.6 million tons of outbound shipments in 1961-62, so South
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Africa overseas and coastal trade excluding transshipments at ports was about
24 million tons. Principal imports consisted of general Cargo, petroleum, timber and
grain. Leading exports were ores, coal, general cargo, corn, sugar, fruit and wool.
A large portion of the exports originitedl in the interior of the Republic and had
to be shipped by railroad to the ports. Most of the imported cargo moved inland to
final destinations-.
Total port traffic (exclusive of activity at lourenco Marques associated
with South Africa) consisted of 14,200 vessel arrivals, comprising 61,860,000 ORT of
shipping. Of the arrivals, 6,300 were ships in international trade, 2100 were coasters
and 5800 were whalers and trawlers. The ports can handle a considerable increase of
traffic without much difficulty. There were a few delays during the year 1961-62,
but improved performances generally were shOwn over the previous year. At most ports
further expansion of facilities is possible. The major project under construction
the
during 4962 fiscal year consisted of two Ore-handling berths at Port Elizabeth.
Progress also was made on new berths and terminals at Durban, and the entrance to
Table Bay Harbor at Capetown was widened.
The following are illustrative of the controlling depths and berthing apace
? at the principal portst
Durban
Capetown
Pbrt Elizabeth
East London
Walvis Bay
Mbssel Bay
Depth Berthing Space
4o feet 858 feet
36 feet 1200 feet
38 feet 900 feet
4o feet
36 feet
35 feet
35 feet
18 feet
1200 feet (Bulk Handling)
1700 feet
1660 feet
1750 feet
700 feet
4f tow water ordinary spring tide.
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The South African ports in fiscal year 1962 had revenues of $25,886,000
and expenses Of $19)723,000, 4.141ding a profit of $6,163,000 or about 23 percent
of gross income. The largest singleitem of income was from wharfage. Maintenance
of facilities represented 21 percent of operating expenses. natal capital investment
in harbors was $122,000,000.
There were 5,184 employees on the staffs of the South African harbors in
1961-62, of which 2,262 were white and 2,922 were non-white.
E. Coastal Shipping and the South African Merchant Marine
There is comparatively little coastal shipping along the shores of South
Africa. For many years thelmovement was confined almost exclusively to the shipment
of sugar from Durban to other South African ports. After introduction of new rates
in 1954, the traffic increased both in tonnage and diversity. In 1961-62 the total
amount of goods transported in coastwise movement was 1,070,000 tons, of which 966,000
tons were conveyed in coasters and 104,000 tons in other ships', Tankers carried
336,000 tons of petroleum products from the refinery at Durban to other South and
Southwest African ports. Railroad coal shipped through Lourenco Marques to Capetown
on the B.S. Hangklip owned by the Railways and Harbours Administration and on 3
in
chartered ships;15 voyages amounted to 160,000 tons. The balance of tonnage moved
consisted of sugar, Wool and a variety of different items.
Apart from the ships owned. by the South African Railways and Harbours, the
small merchant marine of South Africa is privately owned. It consists of about 30
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ships of over 1000 gross registered tons each with a total gross registered tonnage
of approximately 200,000 and a total deadweight tonnage of about 280,000. It moves
no more than five percent of South Africa's seaborne foreign trade. South Africa is
therefore heavily dependent on shipping services provided by foreign flag carriers.
lc South African Airways
South African Airways was started in 1934 as a local airline owned by the
Government. It is operated by the South African Railways and Harbours Administration.
There are now three types of service, the internal, regional and trunk
services. The last two types fly jet and other aircraft to points outside of the
country. The regional air route pattern includes flights to Rhodesia and Mozambique
3 times per week, and weekly jet service to Rhodesia, Kenya and the former French
Congo in Attica. Trunk service is provided to Athens, Rome, Frankfurt, Amsterdam,
Zurich, Paris and Iondon in Marope. A hi-weekly service to Australia via Mauritius
and the Cocos Islands is also operated. Internal, regional and trunk lines, total
over 400000 miles. Passengers flown during the 1962 fiscal year were: internal
services 330,717, regional services, 27,996 and trunk services, 50,8380 for a total
of 4090551.
Freight ton miles flown totaled over 12 million, of which 87 percent were
provided by the trunk service. Encouraged by special commodity rates designed to
boost exports, there were important increases in shipments of karakul pelts, fresh
vegetables and fruit, (including avocados and tangoes)) cut flowers and other perishables,
wmtly for the London and. Amsterdam :markets.
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South African Airways had revenues of nearly 39 million dollars and expenses
of almost 37.5 million dollars, yielding a net profit of about 1.5 million dollars.
The investment account stood at about 59 million dollars including an increase of
$350,000 during the year 1961-62.
The total inventory of aircraft consisted of 28 aircraft, of Which 3 were
BeAtaifi 707's, 20 were 4-engine piston or turbo-prop aircraft and 5 were DC-3's.
There were 3,382 employees, of which2,914 were white and 486 were non-white. Flying
personnel numbered 400 and maintenance and servicing personnel, 1,308.
Following are the principal operating statistics for 1961-62.
South African Airways Qperatin-62
Passenger 14il
Freight
Ton Miie
Mail
Ton Miles
(thousand)
(thousand)
(thousand)
Internal
174,297
1,437
799
Regional
13,941
147
83
Trunk
223,,23Z
10,449
2,614.O
Total
411,475
12,033
3,532
The three major airports in South Africa, i.e., Johannesburg (Jan Smuts,) Durban
(Louis Botha), and Capetown (D.F. Malon), are operated and maintained by the Air-
ports Authority under the Department of Transport of the Government. Minor airports
are operated by the Railroad and Harbours Administration.
The route to Western Urope formerly.eMbodied a stop at Leopoldville, but
this service was Shifted to Brazzaville, French Congo, after the Belgian Congo obtained
its independence. Recently Portugal and South Africa have agreed that South African
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Airways may use Portuguese airfields, beginning in October 1963, when a new, jet
strip will be completed at Luanda, Angola. Flights to Lisbon via Luanda and Sal
(Cage Verde Islands) will alternate With the present service through Brazzaville
and Kano, Nigeria. The new route would replace the latter should the African nations
iMplement the Addis Ababa resolution for a diplomatic ad economic boycott of South
Africa.
G. Pipelines
At present, there are no pipelines for petroleum or gas transport in the
South African Republic. On December 20, 1962, the Minister of Transport announced
.that he had approved in principle the construction of a pipeline for the conveyance
'of petroleum products from Durban to the Witwatersrand, provided the cost of construc-
tion could be economically justified. The pipeline would, be built via Kroonstad in the ?
Orange Free State, which would make it about 500 miles long. The rail distance from
Durban to Johannesburg is 487 miles.
There is one large refinery at Durban, and construction of a second is
planned. One official South African report has concluded that the pipeline would
not be economical to operate until 1971. The rate of petroleum movement from both
Lourenco Marques and Durban to the Rand in 1961-62 was about 1800 tons (150 cars)
diameter
per day. A 10-12 inchMpeline could handle this traffic.
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Table 1
South 'African Railways
Approximate Distances of Principal Railroad Routes
Route
Miles
Bloemfontein - Johannesburg
260
Bloemfontein - Kimberley
100
Bloemfontein - Ladysmith
310
Bloemfontein - Port Elizabeth
450
Capetown - Johannesburg
970
Durban - Colela (N. Coast)
250
Durban - Johannesburg
490
Johannesburg - Komatipoort
300
Johannesburg - Mafeking
170
Johannesburg - Pretoria
45
Komatipoort - Soekmekaar
255
Noupoort Walvis May
1200
Pretoria - Beit Bridge (So. Rhodesia)
360
Ramatihabana (Bechuanaland) - Warrenton
200
Springfontein - last London
310
Tbtal Principal Routes
5,670
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Table 2
South African Railways
. 31 March 1962
Total Trackage Operated (miles)
Total Route (miles)
Single Track
Double Track
TriPle Traak
RgAakuple'Track
Quintuple Track
Steam Operation
Diesel Operation
Electric Operation
4.........??????????????????????????..mommomemmoa.
18,422
13,615*
12,624
923
40
4
10,907
1,453
1,486
Operated with Centralized Traffic Control
Signaling 220
Gauge: 31 6" 13,175
21 4-4o
Maximum Grade (percent) 3.3"
Weight of Rail: 31 6" gauge 60-95 lbs. per yard
2' 46.5 lbs. per yard
Maximum axle load 23.5 tons
Locomotives (units)
Steam
Diesel
Electric
Cranes
3' 6" sage
2' gauge
2,572
168
560
169
73
Freight Cats (units)
109,645***
1,707
Box
4,865
Open
76,384
Tank
3,296
Refrigerator and insulated cars
7/751
Special
423
Caboose and. guard cars
3,120
Passenger Cars (units)
Motor
439
Non-Motor
5,974
115
Multiple unit trailers coach
2,387
Multiple unit trailer-baggage
7
Regular baggage
379
Regular saloon
2/593
Regular Diner
177
Regular inspection
446
Other
85
Includes 26' miles o line operated bhttnot owned by South African Railways,
under agreement with the Rhodesian Railways, and 32 miles of privately owned RR also
operated by BAR.
** Maximum grade for new crlastruction is 2 percent. Ruling grades are from 1.6 to 1.9
percent.
*** Total capacity Of 31 6" gauge freight car peek is 3,300,000 tons.
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MitLI ut
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5EC,
Table 3
? it, r for
Railroads of South Urica, Performance and Personnel, 1959 - 1962
(Fiscal Year ended 31 March)
?Traffic:
1959
1960
1961
1,62
Tons carried (thousand.)
79,722
81,942
88,092
89,668
Ton miles (million)
22,285
23,112
24,623
25,558
294,711
Passengers carried (thousand)
274,359
309,419
315,638
Revenues: (gross)
Freight (thousand $US)
339,527
362,319
383,699
395,392
Passenger (thousand $US).
53,343
59,577
58,813
59,214
Other (thousand $US)
41,041
14.0L178
Total (thousand SUS)
-1_,/.11.
200633
_32.2.11_11
144.1,3u
483,553
495,41i
? Average Revenue per Ton-Mile (US cents)
Including Free Freight
Revenue Freight only
Average Revenue per Loaded Ton ($us)
Including Free Freight
Revenue Freight only
Average Revenue per Passenger Journey (US cents)
Operating expenses (thousand aUS)
Operating ratio (operating expenses to gross revenue)
Average Turnaround Time of Freight Cars (days)
Personnel (persons).
Wages and Salaries _($uS)
Average WRge ($US)
Personnel:
Colored
White
1.55
1.63
1.56
1.55
1.83
-1.86
1.82
1.78
4.26
4.42
4.36
4.41
5.01
5.15
5.07
5.10
19.44
20.22
19.00
18.77
381,800
373,800
379,251
401,367
88.66%
81.03%
78.43%
81.02%
8.87
9.01
9.01
8.87
217,010
207,548
207,511-8
206,339
231,982
226,734
228,237
235,073
1,069
1,080
1,100
1,139
108,096
104,666
102,359
100,794
108,914
105,215
105,489
105,545
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Table 4
Net Mileage and Tpes of Roads (Excluding urban) in the Republic of South Africa as of March 311 1962
Class
Mc4.
Cape -
Province
Transvaal
Orange
Free State
Natal
Total
National Roads
(Mileage)
Bitimtinized Dual Highway
33
40
-
32
105
N
Wo-lane
2545
950
756
492
4743
Total Bituminized
2578
990
756
524
4848
Gravelled or under construction
463
n
14
124
628
Total Mileage
3041
1017
770
648
5476
Special Roads
(Mileage)
Bituminized Two-lane 255
Gravelled or under construction c2
Total Mileage
273
-
526
235
236
182
1162
235
509
182
1690
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Provincial Main.
Roads (Mileage)
Bitinnini zed.
Concrete
Gravel
Total Mileage
1924
159
15394
2571
4 1
17387..
770
-
164
510
4960
-5775
159
24741
? ? ?
934
5470
3o675
District Roads
(Mileage)
Bituminized
? Concrete
Gravela and Earth
Total Mileage
266 374 - 640
55
23460 23oTt8 13800 1900 62208
23731 23422 13800 1900 62853
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vi.v .2 I!,
Table 4 (Conrt)
Net Mileage and Types of Roads (EXcluding Urban) in the Republic of South Africa as of March 31, 1962
Mrz
Cape
Province
Transvaal
Orange
Free State
Natal
Total
Total Roads Under Road Authorities and Systema-
ticaliy Maintained.
44923-
31558
16013
8200
100694
Estimated Local Roads - Unimproved Earth, approx.
45000
30506
15800
8000
99306
Grand Total of Roads in South Africa - approx.
89923
62064
31813
162040
200000
IVRes of Surface of Roads - Mileage
5023
3935
1799
1034.
11791
Bituminous
Concrete
164
-
-
-
164
Gravel - Approx.
28006
16099
7314
6216
77635
Earth - Approx.
730
42e3G
22700
8950
130410
9923
62064
31613
16200
200000
6-1?0001.0009ZOOV6170
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Part n. Tanganyika
A. The Transportation System
Tanganyika is served by three major railroads extending to the interior from
the ports of Tanga, Dar es Salaam and Mtwara. A connection from the Tanga-Arusha
railroad serves the port of Mombasa in neighboring Kenya. The first lateral con-
nection, between the Tanga line aftd the Dar es Salaam line (11T miles) was almost
completed by Eebruary 1963. There are few roads, particularly in the south-central
and western parts Of the country. Wand water transport services operate primarily
on lakes, and combination rail-water routes provide connections to the Republic of
the Congo, Uganda and Kenya. Some twenty cities and towns are served by scheduled
air services.
The operations on waterways, railroads, ports and some highway transporta-
tion in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya were united in 1948 under the East African
Railways and Harbours Administration (RAM). The EABAH is set up to function with-
out being limited by territorial boundaries or by political division of the three
territories. As of 1 January 1962, RAM employed a total staff of 49,691: 88$
Africans, 9% Asians and 3% Europeans.
B. Railroads
There are some 1,750 route miles of railroall in Tanganyika, all 3, 3 3/8"
(metre) gauge and virtually all single track. The difference in gauge from the
uniform 316" gauge of the railroads in the buil of Southern Africa is not yet an
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operational disadvantage, tut it would be if the East African system were linked
up with the Rhodesian, Congo, Sudan and other neighboring systems. With this in
mind, all new track and rolling stock of the East African Railways is designed so
as to be convertible to 3'6" gauge. A link between the Tanganyikan and Rhodesian
rail systems was proposed as recently as 2 June by the Northern Rhodesian Nationalist
leader, Kenneth Kuanda. Nyasaland is also cOnsidering the construction of a rail-
road from Lake Nyasa to Mbeya, just inside the Tanganyika border.
All trains are completely air or vacuum braked (remaining vacuum being con-
verted to air) and are equipped with center hook and buffer type couplers. EAR&H
railroads are mostly operated by steam-traction, but are gradually converting to
diesel traction with the ultimate possibility of straight electric traction. Oil,
coal and some wood are used fOr fuel. The cOal and oil must be imported. Water
supply is a serious problem. Seasonal droughts often lead to slowdowns and Curtail-
ment of service.
The single track system was said by an official of the EARIE to have reached
near-capacity operation with steam traction by 1958, and conversion to diesel trac-
tion was decided to be the lowest cost first step to increased capacity. This con-
version is still underway and presumably just keeping up with gradually increasing
traffic requirements. (See Table 2 below). The level of traffic in 1961 remained
at about the level of 1960 largely because of uncertainty accompanying the granting
of Tanganyikan independence. An increase in traffic resumed and reached a new high
in 19620 however. Commodity flows are shown in rianre 2*. The predominant types
* Page 270.
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of freight carried are grain, petroleum, cement and coffee.
Traffic on the Dar es Salaam - Kigoma line (779 miles), part of a possible
alternate route to the sea via Lake Tanganyika for traffic from Northern Rhodesia
and the Congo, increased to 328 million ton-miles tn 1961.* Moved into Dar es
Salaam were 216,000 tons, of which 45,000 tons were transit traffic from Kigama on
Lake Tanganyika. Traffic from Dar es Salaam to the interior totaled 328,000 tons,
of which 106,000 tone VAS petroleum. Also included in the total were 44s000 tons
of import for the Congo moving via KigamalLake Tanganyika and Albertville. Esti-
mated military capacity of this railroad is 1,000 short tons each way per day, or
365,000 tons per year in each direction.
The increase in capacity for the railroads of Tanganyika which would remit
from the installation of the modern types of signaling has not been undertaken be-
cause there is no readily available electric power source and also because of the
difficulties of track circuiting for these types of signaling on steel ties which
are used extensively in the territory.
RAM railroads employ over 480000 people and the railroads are the largest
single employer in Tanganyika. The railroad workshops in Dar as Salaam are the
largest industrial establishment in the country.
C. Ports
Tanganyika hal, one principal, two secondary, and four minor ports, the
latter are of no commercial importance. MMr es Salaam is by far the most important
Includes branch lines.
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with an estimated military unloading capacity of 1,350,000 short tons per year.*
Mtwara and Tanga are of secondary importance with an estimated military unloading
capacity of 720,000 and 525,090 short tons per year respectively. Commercial ton-
nage (thousand of tons) moved through these porta in 1960 and 1961 was as follows:
Year
Dar as Salaam
Tanga
Mtwara
Dry Cargo
1960
603
182
65
(Imports and
exports)
1961
531
209
71
Bulk Oil
1960
235
17
16
(Imports)
1961
218
17
6
Dar es Salaam has modern alongside berthing facilities for oceangoing ships.
The port can accommodate three large ocean-type cargo vessels, two small coaster-
type cargo vessels and one standard ocean-type tanker alongside the wharves in
addition to several lighters at shallow-draft bertha. The port has adequate mechan-
ical handling facilities and extensive general-cargo storage facilities. Dar es
Salaam handles most of the import-export traffic of Tanganyika and to a much lesser
degree those of the eastern provinces of the BepUblic of the Congo.
Tanga has no alongside berths for ocean-type ships, and all cargo is light-
ered. The port has berths for 10 lighters alongside and has many anchorage berths
for ships of all classes. Covered storage and other facilities are adequate for
the current operations of the Tort.
Mtwara has facilities in excess of current requirements. The Tort can
* If Dar es Salaam shOuld become cOngested or unavailable for any reason, it will
soon be possible to reroute KigOma - Dar es Salaam traffic through the Tort of
Mombasa, Kenya via the nearly completed rail connection between the lines serving
the two ports.
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accommodate two large ocean-type cargo vessels alongside the wharves, which have
adequate ancillary facilities. Rail service vas discontinued to the port of Mtwara
in July 1962 and the constructiOn Of an improved road network connecting the port
to the nearby agricultural regions is under active consideration.
In recent months labor ;emblems have hampered Tort operations. Mock workers
now receive the highest rate for unskilled workers in the country but productivity
has fallen sharply; workers handled 438 tons per ship per day in 1961, but only 368
tons per ship per day by the end of 1962.
D. Highways
Highway transport in Tanganyika is essentially a complementary service to
the railroads. While the road system is not well integrated or uniformly distributed,
being particularly sparse in the south central and western Tarts of the country,
it does provide connections with Northern Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda and FtuandaUrundi.
In January 1959 the Tanganyika road network totaled 19,143 miles, of which
541 were bituminous surfaced, 2,401 were gravel surfaced, and the remaining 16,201
miles were imprOved earth. In January 1961 there were 33,512 vehicles registered
in Tanganyika of which 15,994 were passenger cars, 16,037 trucks and 1,481 buses.
Construction and maintenance problems are caused by the nature of the ex-
isting terrain and by seasonal rains. Principal bottlenecks which impede traffic
include numerous low-capacity ferries, fords, narrow causeways, low-capacity bridges,
narrow stretches Of road, sharp curves and steep grades. During the rainy season
sections of roads in the low-lying areas .become impassable because of surface
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inundation.
A principal international highway connects the port of Dar as Salaam with
the Ndola-Broken Hill area of Northern Rhodesia (about 1,135 miles) and with Elise-
bethville in the Congo via Northern Rhodesia (about 1,350 miles). This route is
generally two lane gravel surfaced with regular maintenance except for about 120
miles of hard surfaced two lane highway from Dar es Salaam to just beyond Morogoro
and other short hard surfaced stretches in the vicinity of larger towns. Other
short stretches in remote areas deteriorate to dirt roads improved only on difFi.ult
.sections. The latter sections are considered subject to interruption in bad weather.
Military through capacity is estimated at 237,250 short tons per year, limited by
low capacity bridges on the Tunduma-Teoka road (70 miles) in Northern Rhodesia near
the Tanganyika border. At Nakonde in Northern Rhodesia a'branch road leads to Fort
Hill in Nyasaland and thence to Salima the terminus of the railroad in Nyasaland.
E. Inland Water Connections with Southern Attica
The only water connection with the southeastern part of the Congo is
afforded by inland water service on take Tanganyika between the railheads of Kigoma,
Tanganyika and Albertville, Congo. This service is under the control of the Repub-
lic of the Congo and is disbussed in that section of this report.
Service between Northern Phodesia and Tanganyika is furnished by EAR&H
vessels on take Tanganyika. YAM traffic on the lake is mostly passengers (22,000
in 1961); most Of the small amoant of cargo carried (7,200 tons in 1961) is to or
from MpuIungu, Northern: nodesia.
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Total route mileage for the round trig between Xigomett Tanganyika and
Xpalungu, Northern Rhodesia is 674 miles and takes about six days on the SS Liemba.
Mpulunga is not served by- rail.
31'. Civil Air
Local scheduled air services are provided by the East African Airways
Corporation (EAAC) which is owned jointly by Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. Civil
aviation is administered by the Regional Representative (in Tanganyika) of the
Directorate of Civil Aviation for the East African Territories (DCA-EA) at Nairobi,
Kenya. The EAAC serves some 20 cities and towns and scheduled air services are
operated over a network of approximately 5,500 unduplicated air route miles. Most
of the internal services are conducted with Douglas DC -3 aircraft. EAAC's regional
services between Tanganyika and other African areas are flown with 1)0-3, Fokker 7-27
and Comet IT aircraft. Other than the aircraft of EAAC used in Tanganyika, only
about nine civil aircraft were based in the territory in 1961, all privately owned.
Selected statistics for EMC in 1961 are presented in the following tabulation:
Passengers carried 173,811
Paesenger miles (thousand) 151,900
Seat miles (thousand) 254,000
Sett load factor (percent) 60.6
Load ton miles (thousand) 18,087
Capacity ton miles (thousand) 30,000
Weight load factor (percent) 60
Aircraft owned (units) 15
Comet IV 3
PC-3 9
Mao F'-2T 3
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Table 1
Railroads of East Africa, Perflirmance and
Personnel, 1958-61?
1221 19,59 2.262 1961, w
Traffic: lil
Tons Carried
(thousand)
5,645
5,591
5,377
5,418
Ton-Miles
(million)
1,726
1,802
1,851
1,834
Passengers Carried (thousand)
5,221
5,086
4,648
4,310
Gross Revenue: (thOusand US$)
All Railroad ,Services
53,003
54,639
55,084
54,818
Freight Service
41,985
43,558
44,444
44,333
Passenger Service
5,615
6,058
6,018
6,012
Other
4,870
4,582
5,063
5,006
Operating Expenses
(thousand US$)
44,534
440447
46,326
46,513
Operating Ratio
84.0
81.3
84.1
84.8
Personnel 2/
(number of
employees)
48,109
49,825
47,555
48,126
Wages and Salaries
(thousand US$)
21,035
21,552
23,591
23,756
a. Preliminary reports indicate that 1962 traffic increased about two percent in
tons and nearly 2.5 percent in ton-miles over 1961.
b. Includes cattle at 900 lbs. per head, using the average length of haul for all
freight.
c. Railroads in 1961 employed 97 percent of all EARN! employees; 88 percent of
which were African, nine percent Asian, and only three percent EurOpean.
.Includea Konya, Tanganyika and Uganda.
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Table 2
Nast African Railways 1961*
Total trackage (miles) 4,152
Total route (miles) 3,490
Single track 3,486
Double track 4
Gauge (metre) 3' 3-3/8"
Weight of rail (pounds per yard) 40.3 to 55
Maximum axle load (short tons) 10 to 22
Dar es Salaam - Kigoma 13.2
Maximum distance between
passing tracks (miles) N.A.
Dar es Salaam - Migoma 37
Maximum grade on main line (percent) 2.2
_
Dar es Salaam - nom 2.2
Locomotives (units at end of year) 470
Steam 414
Diesel 56
Freight cars (unite at end of year) 9,4011/
Pox 4,293
Open 2,650
Tank 839
Other 1,619
Passenger cars (units at end of year) 979
Coaches 344
Mail and baggage 339
Other 256
a. About one -thira of these are two axle types.
4.! Includes Xanyas Tanganyika and Uganda.
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APPENDIX D
IIIIPTMANDURITY FORCES IN SOUTHEELIEEIgA
I. Summary and Conclusions
A. The Situation
The provinces of Angola and Mozambique, The Republic of South Africa,
and the Colony of Southern Rhodesia have been described as the "White
Redotibt", that is the last stronghold of a white minority's supremacy over
non-white
an ?!!Si.2-., majority on the continent. In South Africa, whites totaling less
than 20 percent of the population dominate the country by military strength,
organization, and the policy of "apartheid" and as a result of the indifference
of the non-white masses. In the other areas a smaller percentage of whites
are similiarly attempting to maintain their privileged position. As a
result of normal evolution and outside agitation, the non-whites in these
areas are demanding a role in the government in proportion to their im-
portance in the population. The whites are determined to resist this
demand with force, and the non-whites are generally willing to respond with
force. The purpose of this section is to assess the present and future
strength of the opposing sides in this struggle.
B. The African Strength
There are organized groups attempting to unseat their white governors
non-white
in each area. Unfortunately for the success of the a4tionalist
aspirations, there are too many groups and much of their energy is wasted in
rivalry, sometimes quite bloody. The most effective opposition thus far has
occurred in Angola, where the rebels have been able to sustain a campaign
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which deserves the title of military action. Even with a garrison of more
than 40,000 men, the Portuguese have not been able to eliminate their
opponents and show no sign of being able to do so. The rebels in Angola
claim to have 5,000 men under arms. However, their force is ill-equipped,
poorly organized, and poorly led. In MOzaMbique, Southern Rhodesia, and
South Africa, the dissidents are even less well organized and have thus far
exhibited a capability for riots, sabotage, and terrorism but not military
action even of a guerilla nature.
C. The White Strength
In comparison with the non-white military strength in the area, white
forces appear formidable. White ground forces nuMber well over 70,000
fully armed, well-trained troops backed up by more than 17,000* police
and an immediately available trained reserve of better than 25,000 men.
These ground troops are supported by more than 4,000 Air Force personnel
with 450 coMbat and transport aircraft. Although these forces are in three
separate armies, initial moves have been made for the exchange of intelligence,
coordination, and mutual support for certain types of activity. It is likely
that this coordination will increase in the future.
* Not including Adnwhite
r---
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0
0-
-n
CT
0
0
M
IV
c)
c)
0
a
CA
al
"
0
5
i3
0
"0
w
--i
c)
Regular Military and Police Forces in Southeast Africa a/
Police
Military
Country Total
Angola
Congo
U.N. Congo
Rhodesia and Nyasaland
MozaMbique
South Africa
Total
White
African
Ground*
Air Naval
2,000*
NA
0
2,200
NA
13,500
17,700
NA
NA
0
8,800
NA
14,500
23,300
11.3,000
25,000
3.1,000 12/
5,200
17,000
12,0001,700
113,200
1,700 11.00o
300 0
0
600 0
NA NA
::9? 50430 2,100 .
47 100 44
25,300 1
11,000
16,800 ,
17,000
45,600
162,800
a:1
Lti
e57g
6440,
co
?0,
..,....v,
.
* Includes non-white troops. In the case of Angola, 12% of the Army is non-white; in other areas the division between white and
non-white is unknown.
a. Data rounded to nearest hundred.
b. As of May 1963, includes some Air Force personnel.
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rick k tvg.tm.,:tkd kiik-40.0.,..3q.
D. Military Prospects
In spite of the apparent disparity in the competing forces in the
present situation, factors in operation favor the ultimate victory of the
non-whiterebels. ;Mite mobilization is very near its peak, and further increases
in white strength can come only with considerable cost and sacrifice, which
are not likely to be made. Mon-white strength on the other hand is just
beginning to emerge. Rebel troops have the support of almost all of the
independent African states and are training cadres in many of them. EXperi-
ence and training will pay a greater return to the dissident troops in terms
of increased capability in this situation than they will to the already
trained white units. White forces are relatively unified in their present
organizations and goals and can gain only a little strength from increased
cooperation. The rebels, on the other hand, are weakened by factionalism.
If the rebel groups can get together, their strength will greatly incrase.
World opinion favors the rebels, and as the conflict becomes more open,
sanctions against the whites may occur at the same time that aid to the
rebels is increased. Because the white forces are dependent on external
sources for POL and much of their modern armament, they could be greatly
weakened by such sanctions. lipAlly, numbers alone almost assure the
ultimate victory of the non-whites. Of the more than 32 million people in
the area, far fewer than 20 percent are white. Although these factors seem
to make the eventual non-white : victory a mtainty, they do not provide a
,
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?
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time table for the conflict. Although insurgency and dissatisfaction are
and
Increasing,/the insurgent capabilities are increasing, large segments of
the non-white population do not support non-white nationalist movements.
Nevertheless, both help from other African states and disapproval of white
policies are increasing.
Angola!
A. Strength of Regular Forces
As of 1 January 1963, the strength of the Portuguese Army was
lcelowo men, more than 55 percent being employed in the defense of overseas
colonies. The strength of the Portuguese ground forces in Angola is about
43,000 men (about 40 percent of the total Portuguese Army). The largest tactical
unit is the battalion, and most of the troops in Angola are organized in
battalion or company-size units. Although detailed order of battle and numerical
designators of military units in Angola are not available, the organization of
the forces in operations units is approximately as follows:
Infantry: 33 Battalions, 5 Companies
Armored Cavalry: 2 Battalions
Artillery: 3 Battalions
Engineer: Possibly 2 Battalions
There are numerous service, administrative and engineering units of detachments
and 2,000 police. Two transport companies have been identified.
!Including Cabinda.
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In addition to the units listed above, over 500 paratroopers are under the
command of the Air Force.
To support the ground forces, elements of the Portuguese Air Force
are also deployed in Angola. A transport squadron is located at Toto
with the following aircraft:
16 Noratlas
60-147
4 0-54
An air-ground support squadron is located at Luanda with the following
aircraft:
12 F-84G
12 PV-2
18,T-6
16 DO-27
2 Skeeter
The total number of1Air?E2"Ai personnel is about 1,700,and ground support
equipment is believed to be adequate for normal operation and maintenance
of the aircraft.
The Angolan Naval Command of about 400 men operates a number of
patrol craft, including subdhasers, along the Angolan coast. Several
vessels have been observed operating as troopships and moving contin-
&Alta of troops numbering 1,500 men into and out of Angola. It is not
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known Whether these are naval vessels or merchantmen under Charter.
B. Local Forces
Supplementing the regular forces of Angola is a local civilian
volunteer corps which provides defenses for individual plantations in
the insurgent area. The strength and organization of these forces is
unknown. Although they could be counted on in the struggle against
the insurgents, they cannot be regarded as completely loyal to Portugal,
for they favor more autonomy for Angola. If Portugal appears to be
losingt& insurgents and if the regulAr military decide to support them,
local leaders might attempt to force Portugal to concede some form of
local governmett to the province.
C. Logistics:and Transportation
Total Portuguese strength in Angola is about 43,000 officers and
men. 1"rn. The main logistical fact
of life in the Portuguese campaign in Angola is the necessity for pro-
viding complete support from a home base? 5,000 miles distant by sea
and 2,500 tly air. All weapons and equipment, a substantial amount of
food, and most of the Men must be brought in from abroad. Tactically,
within Angola, logistics and transportation have not been a problem this
far. At this time rebel activity is confined to the northwest corner
of the province and has been in the form of squad or platoon-size actions.
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The rebels have not recently shown a capability for extensively inter-
dicting road traffic, which would constitute the main avenues of Movement
for the Portuguese troops. Although the TO&E of the Portuguese units in
Angola are not known, American Military Assistance Programs have provided
1,100 jeeps, more than 1,500 trucks, and 1,700 trailers, which the
Portuguese have admitted are employed in Angola. Air transport is
available as indicated in II, A, above. All of the railroads lie to the
south of the combat area and neither have proved vulnerable to attack
thus far nor have contributed tactically to the recent fighting in the
north. In summary, Portuguese transport requirements in recent months
have been relatively light and easily met.
D. Militaryarospedts
Portugal's greatest asset thus far in the Angolan campaign has
been the weakness and lack of cohesion and coordination among the rebels.
Recent reports of training, new arms, and increasing support from other
African nations promise a gradual increase in rebel capabilities. Rebels
have been recently threatfting a "second front" to the south, an operation
which appears more feasible since Katanga has been brought under the
control of Leopoldville. If this threat materializes, the Portuguese
problems will obviously increase, and the strategic Benguela Railroad
would be threatened. However,. the Congo would probably not be willing
to see the Benguela line cut until it has an alternative route open
for the movement of Katanga ores to market. The Congo can and probably
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will play a key role in the development of the Angolan situation. When
the so-called "national route" opens, the Congo may make a political
decision to divert some traffic from the Benguela railroad, as a gesture
of support for the rebels.
IV. Federation of Rhodesia and N asaland
A. Strength of Conventional Forces
Ground troops under the control of the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland number 5,171 men, organized into one all-white battalion
and four battalions with white officers and InqTAllittroops. This force,
the Royal Rhodesian Army, modeled along British lines, is probably
the second best-equipped, best-trained force in the area under con-
sideration. In addition to the military units, 10,945 police are under
the control of the provinces. These police are distributed as follows:
Northern Rhodesia: 4,609 (730 white)
Southern Rhodesia: 4,090 (1,275 white)
Nyeaaland: 2,246 (148 white)
non-White
Two .n-::ricuri battalions and a white armored car company of the Army are
normally deployed in Northern Rhodesia, one white and onericar.!'white
battalion is Southern Rhodesia, and the remaining battalion in Nyasaland.
In addition to these active forces, a trained military reserve of at least
6,000 men (whites) is available in Southern Rhodesia. A police reserve
of 5,000 men also located in Southern Rhodesia. The Royal Rhodesian
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Air Force, under. the control of the federal government, numbers 600 men
and has the following aircraft:
118 Vampire FB-9
15 Canberra B-2
2 Pembroke
4 Canadair c-4
8 Dakota c-47
3 Alouette III
15 Vampire T-11
3 Canberra T-MK-4
L. Provost T-1
10 Provost T-52
This force is organized into seven squadrons and has served at British
bases in Aden, Cyprus, and elsewhere.
Local Forces
No local organized paramilitary-type forces exist in the Federation.
C. Logistics and Transportation
Although well-equipped and completely mobile, the Federation force
has depended on the UK for military supplies and equipment and undoubtedly
will continue to do so in the future. Until now, this dependence on the
UK has proved to be an advantage. After the proposed break up of the
Federation, however, should radicalntiWwbeittel..;0:9Fscome to power and sever
their relations with the UK, this dependence could prove to be a serious
weakness. A fundamental weakness in the military posture of the Rhodesian
Federation and each of the component states is the fact that the country
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has no access to the sea. All of its external supplies must move over
land routes controlled by nations who may not always be friendly.
D. Military Prospects
The Federation is slated to break up into its component states in the
near future. When this break-up occurs, the forces will probably be
divided among the states (i.e. 2 battalions each to Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, white units to Southern Rhodesia). The future of the Air
Force is Of special concern to the UK) and its disposition has not yet
been decided. The result of this division will be to replace the second
most powerful military force on the southern portion of the continent with
three smaller and much weaker forces. These smaller forces will easily
be able to maintain internal order and put down any dissidence which may
occur in the foreseeable future. In Southern Rhodesia, however, efforts
of theridturhite to supplant the all-white government may eventually result
in a conflict which would tax the Army's ability.
V. Mozambique
A. Ets.tal of Regular Forces
Portuguese ground strength in Mozambique consists of a little more.
than 17,000 men, organized into 14 infantry battalions, 1 armored
battalion, 1 artillery battalion, 1 engineer battalion, 1 signal company,
and other miscellaneous units. An unidentified Air Force unit provides
some air transport capability and air-ground support with the following
aircraft:
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Number of Air Force personnel and their ground-support capabilities are
unknown.. Several naval vessels (all smaller than a destroyer) are
assigned to the area.
B. Local Forces
No local militia are known to exist in Mozambique. Howver, even
if such an organization did exist, the Portuguese would probably place
little trust in it because of the opposition to Salazar which has long
existed among Mozambique whites.
C. Logistics and Transportation
As in the case of Angola, the principal logistical factor affecting
operations in Mozambique is the extreme distance which supplies and men
must move from Portugal. Resistance to authority by Africans in Mozambique
has been more comparable to scattered tribal unrest than organized in-
surgency, and the Salazar regime thus far has probably been more concerned
with police control of white opponents to the regime that it has with
non-white
Atecarl dissidence. Nothing is known OC the TO&E of Portuguese troops in
? the area, but one source reported that they were equipped. With the new
NATO rifle. They also may be presumed to have same of the equipment that
Portugal has received under the American Military Assistande Program,
including motor vehicles (see fl 0, above).
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D. Military Prospects
It is difficult. to comment on Portugal's military prospects in
Mozambique. Certainly no difficulty is presented in controlling indigenous
non-white
dissidence in its present form, for L:es.crA nationalists from Mozambique
have shown almost no capability for fomenting insurgency in the territory.
non-white
However, dissidence exists among the 'whites as well as the ? in
Mozambique, and neighboring countries are known to be training and aiding
various Mozambique nationalists movements. Although the situation at the
:present appears to be stable, the future seems to contain increasing
challenge to Portuguese rile in the province which Portugal may not have
the military capability to suppress.
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III. Congo,
A. Strength of Regular Purees
1. Indigenous
The Congolese National Army (ANC) consists of about
25,000 troops organized into 24 battalions. The Katangan Gendarmerie,
which totaled about 19,000 men in December 1962, has in a large part
dispersed as a result of conflicts with UN forces since that date.
However, Tshombe has been paying some troops, and part of the Gendarmerie
may still be loyal to him. Although units of the ANC and Gendarmerie
bear various designators ( commando, paracommando, Gendarmes, etc.),
they are all essentially infantry battalions, averaging about 600 men
each.
The Congolese Air Force has a strength of 300 Congolese and 16
Europeans. The Air Force has a total of 19 aircraft of various types,
but a lack of pilots and ground support renders it a very ineffectual
force.
2. UN
As of May 1963, UN Forces in the Congo totaled 11,000 nen.
Current UN plans call for the reduction of this force to less than 7,000
men by 1 Jay 1963, and complete removal of all UN forces by the end of
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B. Local Forces
No self-defense or paramilitary forces exist in the Congo in
the normal sense of these terms. However, tribal organizations remain
strong, and tribalwerriors constitute a force' whose effectiveness is
directly proportional to the quality of their weapons, leaders, and
motivation, which vary from time to time and place to place.
C.Er._....t_t_.csgL.ndTrao_znsrtation
The Congo does not have a munitions or an armament industry,
and consequently all equipment must be Imported. The only effective
surpoe supply routes are through the port of Matadi:-
Most
operations will be by or smaller units. As has been
demonstrated in the recent fighting, large units of troops cannot live
off the land in the Congo, and it is necessary to carry not only military
hardware needed for a campaign but all food and medical supplies as well.
Logistical considerations[ Its for a modern force
operating in the Congo are so critical as to be a limiting factor in
most campaigns. Little information is available concerning the equipment
inventory of the ANC, but, in general, organic transport, both surface
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and air, is at the present time inadequate for any but local operations.
A major weakness of the ANC is a lack of vehicles and communications
equipment.
D. Military Prospects
The ANC has very limited capabilities at the present time.
Most observers predict that if all UN forces are withdrawn as scheduled,
the ANC will have great difficulty in maintaining internal order and
security. Predictions range from the reemergence of secessionist move-
ments to bloody tribal warfare and massacres. The future prospects and
capabilities of the ANC are in the hands of six western nations committed
to training the ANC and developing it into a modern effective force.
These are Belgium, Israel, Italy, Norway, Canada,* and the US. Tae US
has already initiated a modest military assistance program. However,
this training will take time, and the prospects for a period of stability
in which the ANC would have time to train and reorganize are not good
without the UN or some other outside intervention.
VI. Republic of South Africa
A. Strength of Conventional Forces
The South African Army has a strength of 12,000 men, organized
into a mobile watch unit, a parachute battalion, and 10 training units
* Norway, Canada, and Italy have been reluctant to proceed with the
training of the AMC without UN supervision.
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equivalent to composite battalions. The police force consists of
be
28,000 men of which 14,500 are non-white and would of questionable
value in surpressing racial violence. Thew) regular units are supported
by a Citizens Force consisting of 14,700 men who have had 9 months of
basic training and who receive 2 weeks of active training each year.
The South African Air Force has a strength of 3,885 military personnel
and 303 civilians. In addition, the Air Force reserve has a strength of
10,000 members, more than 2,500 of whom are qualified pilots. Opera-
tional units of the Air Force include 2 fighter squadrons, 1 transport
squadron, 1 search and rescue squadron, and 1 maritime reconnaissance
squadron. The re3erve contains 6 training and 1 transport squadrons.
The Air Force has a total inventory of over 400 planes, including 70
jet fighters,* 250 training aircraft configured for air-ground support,**
41 transport aircraft, and 17 helicopters. South African Naval Forces
numbered. 1,746 men manning 3 destroyers and other smaller craft.
Sixteen Mirage III C aircraft have been ordered from France, and
negotiations are underway for the purchase of an undetermined number
of Mirage III B aircraft. Acquisition of these aircraft will signifi-
cantly increase the fighter strength of the South African Air Force.
** In this report all training type aircraft listed are configured for
air-ground. support.
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B. Local Forces
More than 50,000 men are enrolled in militia- type units
known as Commandos. Each Commando unit consists of 16 officers and
300 man. In addition to the formation of Commando units, the govern-
ment has eMbarked on a program of military training of every man and
has considered forming women into units.
C. Logistics and Transportation
South Africa has a munitions industry capable of producing
small arms, explosives, and aircraft and bazooka-type rockets. For
larger more sophisticated equipment, South Africa is dependent on
imports. Recently, negotiations have been underway for the purchase of
US KC-135 aircraft. Ostensibly for early warning purposes, the air-
craft are probably intended to insure rapid communication between South
Africa and Europe without the necessity of transiting areas controlled
by unfriendly African states. In addition to 800 armored cars, the
Army has 5:000 trucks (3/4 ton to 5 ton, of US manufacture), with 3,000
of these being in storage. More thou 300 tanks and 150 jeeps, sedans,
and other vehicles complete the motor park of the South African Army.
The Air Force maintains POL stocks at a level adequate for 30 days of
sustained operations. The country is attemptLng to become self-sufficient
for all armaments including aircraft, but it will be u ",le to achieve
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this goal. The internal transportation system is adequate for support
including
of any action ---I large-scale extended combat.
D. Military Prospects
The present regime in South Africa, loudly proclaiming a fear
of invasion, has announced intentions of improving its military posture
in every way possible. The Army and the police are already capable
of dealing with existing dissidence, which is sporadic, poorly, organized,
and generally ineffective. As South Africa's harsh racial policies
generate increasing tensions however, the Arwf may eventually prove
unable to cope with the situation either because of the scope of the
uprising or because of sanctions (such as embargo of POL shipments)
imposed as a result of international indignation.
There is reasonable doubt as to the UN's ability to enforce effec-
tive sanctions, for countries such as Portugal and the UK probably would
not support them. Moreover, the discovery of oil in Angola could provide
an alternative source for a limited amount of petroleum, which is the
only commodity that could be effectively embargoed to interfere with
South African military capabilities for providing,internal security
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/II. Logistics
A. US/UN Forces
The type and kind of forces which might be employed in operations
White Redoubt
in the;tr-Gi-s--. would vary widely frpm place to place depending on many factors.
It is probably worthwhile to consider requirements of US forces in various
types of situations, first to establish a yardstick against which the require-
ments of other forces might be measured.; second, because UN forces might
receive US logistic support similar to that required. by US forces. /n the
ease of US/UN forces, deployment as well as resupply oust be considered. A
17, 500-man US infantry division weighs approximately 27,000 tons. The new
type of airborne division has 11,500 men and weighs about 14,500 tons, with
its cotbat elements alone weighing about 5,000 tons. Immediate air deploy-
ment of this division from a US base would require 600 to 700 aircraft of
20 to 25 tons capacity.* The following tabulation gives the total require-
ments (including food, materiel, transport, medical supplies, etc.) for US
troops in given situations.
Pounds ? er man
Type of Action
Reserve
Inactive (ready)
Pursuit
Security force
Attack on fixed positions
Infantry**
13'
33
34
50
614.
Armor**
18
45
88
* Based on FM 101-100 Part I, October 1961.
** Assuming operations in division-size units in non-nuclear and non-gas war-
fare. Based on VW /I data modified to reflect the new TO 8. R.
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B. Portuguese Forces
Literature on the logistic requirements of the Portuguese
army is not availdble. Estimates of logistic requirements therefore are
subjective and subject to revision on the receipt of any more definitive
material. It would 'normally be assumed that the Portuguese colonial
forces would consume less than US forces. This assumption is reinforced
by complaints of Portuguese officers concerning lack of transport
capability and other supplies inthe field. Little or no artillery is
being used in Angola or Mozambique, and the nature of the fighting would
indicate no future requirement for artillery larger than mortars. Tacti-
has played
cal air support also p&yo a negligible role in the fighting thus far,
but the use of helicopters and air-ground support aircraft will probably
increase if the fighting increases. Armor also has played a negligible
role in the fighting thus far and will continue to be unimportant. The
Portuguese would require substantially less POI., ammunition, and ordinan.
support than would an American force of comparable size. The average
Portuguese soldier also requires less food., medical care, and gerera
support than do average American soldiers. The following tabulaticn
contains estimates of the requirements for the Portuguese forces operatiw4
in Angola and Mozambique. The tables presume the same level of combat
and essentially the same number of Portuguese troops as those presently
deployed.
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(Pounds per man per day)
line of Action Infantry
Reserve 7
Inactive (ready) 17
Pursuit 17
Security force 25
Attack on fixed positions 32
Portuguese forces in Angola today probably require from 7 to 25 pounds
per man per day depending on their location. Because the insurgents are
not judged capable of holding or establishing a fixed position at this
time or even of requiring the Army to function as a security force
throughout the entire country, the average daily level of requirement has
not been raised to 32 pounds per man. Even under conditions of maxims
mobilization, including maximum use of armor, artillery, and aircraft,
however, Portuguese requirements would never greatly exceed 32 pounds
per man per day.
C. British-Modeled Forces (SouthAFricaand Southern Rhodesia)
Unlike the Portuguese forces, who are already in a combat
situation, the forces of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia are garrision
and training troops except for occasional incidents. NO logistics
problem exists for these forces at this time, and it is impossible to
derive a meaningful estimate of their current requirements. Accordingly,
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the estimates in the following tabulation are for the forces of these
countries in a combat situation.
(Pounds per man per day)
Type of 40tion
Infantrz
Reserve
9
Inactive (ready)
22
Pursuit
22
Security force
33
Attack on fixed positions
42
These requirements assume a limited action of the type now in progress in
Angola', with little or no use of armor and artillery, but greater use of
aircraft. Little or no increased mobilization also is assumed. If
South Africa or Southern Rhodesia were forced into a maximum effort and
the entire population were involved in a fight to perserve their lives
and homes, the total daily requirement would increase, but the require-
ments per man could be decreased to the level of the Portuguese require-
ments or below.
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APPENDIX E
Sabotaoe Taxies
1. Vulnerability of the Transportation Systems of Southern Africa
The accompanying material discusses transport vulnerabilities in Southern
Africa as one aspect of a broader study of the significance of transportation in
the area. A general statement on physical and cultural conditions in which inter-
diction of transportation might be anticipated is followed by units that comment
an the vulnerability of transportation systems in six political entities of Southern .
Africa. Tables of major railroad bridges have been included with each unit.
Mridges appearing in these tables are shown on maps of each country. RailrOads,
highways, and vaterways discuased appear on the country maps and an the general map
of Southern Africa.
TT. Comments on Vulnerability
Transportation in Southern Africa is highly vulnerable to interdiction. Worth-
while targets in physical settings that favor dissident groups are not limited to
a few scattered locations but are found in a number of places in every country.
Railroads, key elements in the economy and early targets for interdiction, traverse
many miles of unprotected territory and cross many large bridges for which no
alternates are available. Aside from 'Urban areas and scattered concentrations of
rural population, most of the countryside is underpopulated, undeveloped, and diffi-
cult for seturity forces to control. SUmeroUs wooded landscapes, forested stream
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valleys, thickly grown marshes, and broad areas of tall brush or high grass afford
many opportunities for Concealment and present few obstacles to movement on foot.
Where adequate roads exist they may be patrolled in force but off-road areas are
relatively free from scrutiny. There are few target areas that do not provide con-
cealment potential fcor prOperly indoctrinated personnel -- even from observation
by low flying aircraft.
The rail lines that run west from Kolwezi in the Katanga across Angola to the
Tort at Lobito, sonth from the Oopperbelt to Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia, and
east from Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia to the port at Beira, Mozambique are repre-
sentative of routes that traverse relatively isolated, partially wooded country-
sides. Several long bridges on a aingle track railroad, widely separated passing
sidings, inadequate highways, good concealment and the proximity of international
borders are factors that favor attempts to interdict these lines. Very dry areas,
such as Tarts of SouthAest Africa or BeChuanaland, Offer fewer opportunities for
concealment, present better working conditions for repair crews, and are generally
less favorable in terms of unassisted aurvival. Dry areas offer more in terms of
conditions suitable for air support -- both for dissidents and security forces --
than do wooded areas.
Grasslands are between fOrests and deserts in terms of area of potentially un-
detected dissident operations. Grassland areas are traversed by rail lines in the
vicinity of Allawnyo, Southern Rhodesia, betWeen Ximina and Port Francqui and
between Leopoldville -and Matadi, loth it the Cow. In these areas movement during
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the day is subject to air observation but wooded stream valleys afford a safe haven.
Cross country travel at night under the open sky is practical and is difficult for
security forces to control.
Heavily populated areas are no less vulnerable to the actions of dissident
groups if the general population is unsympathetic to the mission of local security
forces. The semi-skilled industrial worker by day could very well be the man
security forces seek after dark. tndustralized areas of the Republic of South
Attica, the Copperbelt of Northern Hhodesia, and the Ketanga of the Congo) and most
ports are not snitable areas of operation for large bands of dissidents but these
areas do offer numerous opportunities for small groups that can mingle undetected
with the local population. Electric power transmission lines and substations,
centralized traffic control cables, switch control cables, and telegraph and tele-
phone lines are all industrial targets Whose systematic interdiction could cause
traffic delays of serious proportions.
III. The Vulnerability of Transportation in Specific Countries
A. Angola
Railroads are the most important means of long haul freight transport in
Angola. The highways act principally as feeders for the railroads. The roads are
in general in poor condition and, because of regulations restricting competition
'with the government-favored railroads, those paralleling the railroads are given
the least attention. The three main rail lines are all single track, 3'6" gauge,
and are =it itterlonsetted. The only internatimml rants is the Benguela Railway
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which provides a direct outlet on the Atlantic Ocean for the minerals of the Katanga
and the Copperbelt. (See Figure 30 map N. 37823)
The critical points on the BengUela Nailway are the principal bridges)
especially the 512-fOot bridge located about 55 miles east of Silva Porto; the major
repair shops at Nova Lisboa; and the terminal facilities at Lobito.
There are eight bridges Over 125 feet long On the Benguela Railway. Two
of these bridges are combined road and rail bridges and would therefore be excellent
targets. One of these is 2 miles north-east of the city of Benguela, and consists
of ten spans of 34 feet each for a total length of 340 feet. The other is the ex-
tremely critical 512-foot bridge over the Cuanza 'aver 55 miles east of Silva Porto.
This is a steel through.truOs type with fOur spans of 128 feet each. Destruction
of one or more spans of this bridge would effectively sever both rail and highway
service. A third major structure is the two-span 262 foot steel bridge over the
Rio Cuiba 25 miles east of the Cuanza River.
The Nova Lisboa workshops provide heavy repairs to all equipment and assemble
rolling stock. Buyer is provided by a 1250-kilowatt hydroelectric station located
12 miles south of Nova Lisboa.
A single track leads from the terminal facilities at Lobito to Benguela.
There are two bridges over 250 feet long within eight miles on the track between
Lobito and Benguela.
The two Shorter main lines also are Vulnerable to a vell-planned sabotage
effort. Critioalpoints on the Imanda Malanda line are the three principal
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bridges and the workshops and classification yards at Luanda. On the Dondo branch
of this line there are two bridges over 150 feet long. There are two major bridges
on the Mocamedes - Vila Serpa Pinto line, one 1,312 feet long two miles northeast
of Mocamedes, and the other 656 feet long ten miles northeast of Mocamedes. No
information is available on bridges east of Sm da Eandeira.
The only railroad tunnel in Angola on the Mocamedes - Vila Serpa Pinto line
Is 230 feet long and is approximately 20 miles north of Sm da Bandeira. Important
workshops and terminal facilities at Mocamedes are concentrated in a small area and
are reached by a single track.
Principal fuel is locally available wood, but some imported coal, fuel oil
and gasoline are used. Disruption of fuel supplies would seriously hamper railroad
operations. See Table 1 on railroad bridges of Angola.*
B. Congo SLeopoldville)
The railroads of the Congo carry more freight than any other means of trans-
port and during some seasons of the year are the only reliable means of land move-
ment. However, the chief port Matadi, is not connected directly by rail with the
Katanga, the area producing most of the export tonnage. Direct rail access to ports
is possible only through connections with rail systems of other countries: the
Benguela Aailway to Lobito, Angola on the Atlantic; the Rhodesia Railways to Beira
and Lourenc0 Maltues, Mozambique on the Indian Ocean; and South African Railways
to ports in South Africa and Bouth=Nest Africa. (See Figure 4, map No. 37824).
;ke.- Page 31?.0 below.
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Normally to reach Matadi cargoes are carried by rail from the Katanga to
Port Francqui by the Compagnie des Chemins de Per du Bas-Congo au Katanga (BCK),
transferred to bargeS of the Office dtEkploitation des Transports Coloniaux (OTRACO)
on the Congo.lasai river system to Leopoldville, transferred back to rail for trans-
port to Matadi by the OTRACO rail line. An alternate rail-water route is possible
by BaK rail to Kemine, Cotpagnie des Chemins de Per du Congo Superieur aux Grand
Lacs Africains (CPL) rail to Kindu, OTRACO barge to Ponthierville, CFL rail to
Stanleyville, OTRACO barge to Leopoid.ville, and OTRACO rail to Matadi.
OTRACO also operates a short line from Boma to Tshela. The Societe des Che-
mins de Fer Vicinaux du Congo (VICICONGO) operates an independent line in north-
eastern Congo that ties into the head of navigation on the Itimbiri River. The
track, totaling 522 miles, runs eastward from Aketi to Mungvere and branches to the
north at Komba to reach the Uele River at Rondd.
Locomotives in use in the Congo include steam, diesel and electric. Except
for electrified sections the Buic uses steam, the CFL uses steam, and diese_L equip-
ment -- backed up by steam -- is used by OTRACO and VICICONGO. Coal and wod are
burned on the BCK and CFL lines. Most of the coal is imported from Rhodesia, bui;
a low grade of Coal is mined near Luenal 115 miles north of Terike. Main workshops
are located at Matadi for 0TRAC00 at Elisabethville for MICK, at Albertville for
CFL, and at Aketi for VICICONGO.
The electric locomotives of the Mair operate an 25,000 volt, single phase,
50 cycle current that is obtained from power stations in the Katanga through 110 kv
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high lines supplying substations at Elisabethville, jadotville, Pungurume, Kisanfu,
and. Kolvezi. The sUbstation at Pungurume was destroyed in January 1963. Although
some pOwer is supplied to the Katanga from the Kariba complex in Rhodesia, four
hydroelectric planta produce most of Katangals power: The Le Marinel and Delcommune
plants on the LualaUm River north of Kolvezi and the Eta and Francqui units on the
Dufira River northeast of Jadotville.
* Rail traffic in the Congo is particularly subject to interruption because
all lines ard single track, and no alternate routes are available. All of the 38
bridges over 150 feet long on the rail systems are potential bottlenecks. Damage
to electric facilities in the Katanga could also cause considerable disruption of
rail traffic. The line from the Rhodesian border at Bakania to laisabethville has
no major structures but the electrified line from Slisalethville to Tenke has three
major bridges. These are key bridges in the Katanga and all three were partially
destroyed in January 1963 but have since been reopened to traffic. Blockage of
this line not only cuts off exports of minerals to the south but prevents industrial
supplies, including Rhodesian coal, from reaching Jadotville and. Kolvezi.
The track from Tenke to Dilolo Gare and the junction with the Benguela
Railway on the Angolan border crosses four bridges over 150 feet long and five more
between 30 and 150 feet long. Between Tenke and the end of the electrification at
Luena there are two large bridges and from Wena to the terminus of the line at
Port haucqui the line crosses four more major structures. The bridge over the
Lubilash River neer isamba that bas three spans of 138 feet each, was -partially
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destroyed in the 1962-63 fighting and has not been restored to service.
There are eight major bridges on the line leading north from Kamina to Kindu.
The 14-span, 1,628 foot bridge over the LUalaba River at Kongolo has been damaged
and is out of service. The CFL line between Rebel? and Albertville on Lake Albert
has a major bridge over the Liuzi River with One span of 164 feet and four of 43
feet each.
The OTRACO line between Leopoldville and Matadi crosses nine major bridges.
Four of these bridges that vary in length from 150 to 316 feet are situated within
three route miles near Matadi. On the eastern end of the line, centralized traffic
contra train Operation has been installed on 43 miles of the line between Leopold-
ville and Bona Meta. There is one major bridge On the OTRACO line between Boma and
Tshela and three an the VICICONGO tracks in the northeastern Congo. The CFL line
between Stanleyville and Ponthierville Crosses three large bridges. Two of these
have multiple spans of 43 feet each and one has a 95 foot span.
Inland waterways are well develOped in the Congo but are of primary impor-
tance only to internal transportation. The primary waterways, the Congo and Kwa-
Kaaai systems, do not serve ocean Torts nor do they reach the Katanga. Rail lines,
designed to supplement waterways, fill in unnavigable sections of rivers and reach
area's without navigable waterways. At the present time the Katanga is cut off
from river transpOrt because Of the damage to the labilash River bridge on the rail
connection to lorb lore:nevi and to the Lualaba River bridge on the Kinou line.
In the eastern Congo, lake services are provided on Lake Albert, Lake Kivu,
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1 Lake Tanganyika, and Lake MWeru. The most important of these services links the
CFL rail line at Albertville with the East African Railways at Kigoma, Tanganyika,
thus providing a route to Der es gala= On the Indian Ocean. The CFL and the East
African Railways operate services on Lake Tanganyika. Damage to boats, tugs, Larges,
or fuel oil storage areas could disrupt inland water transport.
The highways of the Congo were developed primarily as feeders for the rail
lines and inland waterways. The best roads are found in the area between Leopold-
ville and the sea, in the Katanga, and between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Kivu. The
road netmtat has not been maintained systematically since independence and is cur-
rently in poor condition. With the possible exception of the routes from Leopold-
ville to Matadi, and from Kolwezi to the Rhodesian 'herder, there are no cross coun-
try roads capable of sustained heavy truck traffic. There are five major bridges
and a ferry across the Congo River on the road between Leopoldville and the Port of
Matadi. Between Kolwezi and Elisabethville there are a number of large bridges
several of which can be bypassed without great difficulty. One that was blown out
in January 1963, and for which no bypass was found., is the 180 foot bridge over the
Lufira River at Ouba. Even with all bridges in service, the highways of the Congo
could not transport the tonnage normally carried by rail lines and inland water-
ways. See Table 2 on railroad bridges of Congo (Leopoldville) over 150 feet long.*
C. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
The railroads are the Moot important cross-country carriers in the Federation.
*. Page 34 below.
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Almost all imports and exports, including minerals, and agricultural and commercial
goods are moved by tail. There are two separate 316" gauge systems in the Federa-
tion. The two aystems? Rhodesia Railways and Nyasaland Railways, are tied together
in Mozambique by the Tiana-Zambesia and the. Beira railroads which also serves the
Port of Beira. The Rhodesia Railways tracks also join those of the Laurent? Marquee
Railway in Mozambique to reach the port of Laurent? Marques, those of the South
African Railways to the south, and those of the KStanga Railway to the north. (See
Figure 5, map No. 37820).
Centralized trend control train operation is used on portions of the main-
line of Rhodesia Railways. At the end of 1962 there were 83 miles to be completed
in Southern Rhodesia and 221 miles to be completed in Northern Rhodesia in the plan
to operate the entire line between "[Antall and Ildola by CTC. Panels of the CTC sys-
tem are in operation at Livingstone,. Salisbury, and Bulawayo and are planned for
UMtali, Owelo, Manzel Broken !ill, and Ndola.
Locomotive repair shops capable of complete overhaul are situated at Bula-
wayo, Umtali, Livingstone, and Broken Rill.. In Nyasaland locomotive repair shops
are located at Lidbe. Most of the locomotives in use are coal fired and supplied
with coal from the Federation's major source of coal at Wankie. Fuel oil is carried
by rail from the port at Laurent? Marques for diesel locomotives operating between
Malvetnia and Bamabula and from Beira for those on the Machipanda to Salisbury line.
'The line between Salisbury and Owela aIsa dperatet with diesel equipment. All of
ate locomOtives on the Nyasaland Rail:wave are toal fired, but some diesels are on
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order. Wahkie coal is supplemented by supplies from the Moatize coalfields near
Bengt& on the Zambesi River in Mozambique.
he 'anther Of bridges over large rivers, the lack of alternate routes, and
the easily isolated repair facilities and source of coal make the rail systems of
the Federation Susceptible to interdiction. There are more than 260 bridges on the
Rhodesia Railways system of which 32 are considel-ed major. On the Nyasaland Rail-
ways there are 120 bridges including three of more than 150 feet.
Disruption of railroad activity within the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia
could be effected by destruction of a series of three biidges within a distance Of
approximately 4o miles. One of these bridges is over the Kafue River and has 5
spans of 75 feet each, a second over the same river has 5 spans varying from 30 to
75 feet each, and a third over the MWambashi River has 3 spans of 50 feet each.
The flow of minerals south from the 0opperbelt could be disrupted by
destruction of one or more Of a total of nine bridges between tusdka and BOlawayo.
The longest bridge in this series crosses the Dem River at Kelm and has 13 spans
of 100 feet each. The most difficult bridge to replace, however, is the Victoria
Falls rail and road bridge which has spans of 62, 500, and 87 feet and is more than
400 feet above the voters of the Zadbesi River.
The major source of coal for the Federation is situated at Wenkie, about
67 route miles Southeast of Victoria Fells. Destruction of large bridges on either
side of *wide would temporarily prevent coal from reaching the railroads and the
industry of both Northern ihOderais and Aouthern Rhodesia. The only tusael on the
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Rhodesia Railways is on the Wankie bypass; its destruction would slow traffic but
would tot block the line.
...he line leading to the port of Beira has two major bridges between Salis-
bury and UMtali. Deatruction of either of these structures would also isolate the
major repair facility of UMtali. The line to Lourenco Marques has three large bridges
in Southern Rhodesia. The line between Saliihury and BulaWayo is one of the most
heavily travelled in the Federation and crosses six major bridges, all of which have
spans of 90 feet er longer.
In Nyasaland, destruction of either of the bridges over the Shire River at
Chiremo, two spans of 161 feet each and one span of 258 feet, and at Shire North
Station, two spans' of 110 feet each and six spans of 50 feet each, would block the
rail traffic. The repair shops are at Lidbe which is situated between these major
bridges.
Highways in the Federation have been designed as feeders for the rail system
and with some exception could not be used successfully to take over heavy traffic
in the event of railroad stoppages. Most of the through roads parallel the general
routes of rail lines and must croes the same major rivers. A notfable exception
is the all-weather road that links Lusaka and Salisbury directly rather than by the
rail route throughyictoria Falls and Bulawayo.
Interruption of highway traffic is best accomplished by destruction of bridges
over large rivers'. Many 'stream that generally carry little water but flood sea-
sonally are cross On "low bridges" that are little More than long culverts. During
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high water they may be impassable for four or five days at a time. This type of
crosaing is found on the major highways: and during low water some Of these may be
bypassed without great difficulty. These bridges are gradually being replaced by
"high bridges' that are open ta traffic at all times.
Along the major highways there are more than 50 high bridges over 150 feet
long. Some of these could be bypassed at low water or adjacent rail bridges might
be used for road traffic. In some places, such as at Victoria Falls, highway and
rail traffic normally cross on the same structures. Bypasses around bridges on
major rivers such as the Limpopo, Zambeti, Kafue, or Sabi are not practical. Some
of the key highway bridges in Northern and Southern Rhodesia are: The Beitbridge-
Bulawayo bridge over the Limpopo River with- 14 spans of 111 feet each, the Victoria
Falls rail-highway bridge with a main span of 500 feet, the Kafue River bridge south
of Lusaka with three spans of 140 feet each, the Otto Veit bridge over the Zambesi
River on the route between Lusaka and Salisbury with a main span of 1,050 feet, and
the Matetsi River bridge between Wankie and Victoria Falls with four spans of 106
feet each. rit Nyasaland the main highway outlet to the Indian Ocean crosses the
Ruo and Tachila Rivers over bridges that each have spans of 100 feet. The highway
network of the Federation, like the railroads-, offers little opportunity for alter-
nate routing. Major internal routes as well as those leading to ports serving the
rederation dould be interdicted by destruction of highway bridges. The following
list of railroad bridges in the Yederetion that are 150 feet or Imager ere shown
in TAU 3.;*
Page324, below.
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D. MozaMbique
Transportation routes across Mozambique provide access to the sea for the
north-eastern part of the Republic of South Africa, the landlocked Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Katanga Province in the Republic of the Congo. Rail-
roads are the most important method of transport because of the nature of traffic
hauled, the inadequacy of the highway system, and the little use that is made of
the extensive inland waterways. Highways are increasing in importance but except
for a few roads in the vicinity of the ports they are unsurfaced and could not handle
? sustained heavy traffic. (See rigure 6, map No. 37819).
Five railroad companies operate service an widely separated rail systems
in Mozambique. In the south the Lourenco Marques Railroad (Caminho de Ferro de Lau-
renco Marques) syotems has two international railroad connections, one with the
Republic of South Africa and the other with Southern Rhodesia. tn the north the
Mozambique Railroad (Caminho de Ferro de Mocambique) operates an isolated line run-
ning inland from Lumbo and Nacala. The third system serves the port of Beira with
three inter-connected lines: the Beira Railroad (Caminho de Ferro de Beira) that
has an international connection with Southern Rhodesia; the Tete Railroad (Caminho
de Ferro de Tete) leading from the Moatize coalfields; and the only privately awned
railroad in Mozambique the Trans-Zambesiallailway Co., Ltd., which joins the Cen-
tral African Railway en 'route to NyasninnA.,
/be main lines are all 3'6" gauge And are single track except for six miles
Of double track leading soUth from tourenco Mortices. 'Mere is a total of 280 bridges
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over 12 feet long, of which 26 are over 150 feet long. The longest is the 12,064
foot long Zambezi River Bridge north of Sena, the longest bridge on the African
continent.
lorOm Lourenco Marques, capital and Main port of Mozambique, rail lines ex-
tend in three directions -- southwest through Goba to the Swaziland border, west
to Ressano Garcia, and north to Milvernia. Lourencd Marques' facilities include
railroad workshops, an enginehouse, classification yard, loading equipment, and Oil
tanks. There are at least 13 oil tanks in Lourenco Marques proper, and 21 more at
Matola Petroleum Pier six miles to the west.
The line leading southwest to Goba has one principal bridge on it, the
11181-foot long steel structure Over the Rio UMbeluzi, 15 miles north of Gobs. At
Goba the Mazadbique highway service connects the line with the South African high-
way service.
The important line from Laurelled Marques to Ressano Garcia, *here there is
a connectidn with the South African Railways, provides Pretoria and Johannesburg
with their closest outlet to the sea. There are 14 bridges in the 55 route miles
in Mozambique one a principal structure of 305 feet situated 15 miles northwest
of Moamba. The tie to the Lourenco Marque S -Milvernia line extends northeast from
the junction at Mallamba.
Southern Rhodesia and Laurence Marques are linked by the line that has its
international connection at Malvernia. There are three bridges over 150 feet an
this line with the principal target the 1,380-foot long President Carmona Bridge
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over the Rio Incomati. This is a combined rail and road bridge and would therefore
disrUpt truck transport as well as rail. The other two bridges on this important
route are 689 feet long and 2,010 feet long. Lourenco Marques and Reim are con-
nected by rail only via the Federation of Rhodesia And Nyasaland.
Reira is the second major port Of Mozamb1qze and is served by two rail lines
' with international connections: one to Southern RhOdesia and one to Nyasaland.
it is also the major east coast port for ratanga Province of the RepUblic of the
Congo. In the pert complex there are 4 classification yard, a railroad workshop,
an engineheuse and loading and 'unloading equipment. A single track rail line leads
from the port and in One place there are 34 oil storage tanks within 1,200 feet of
this track.
The Reira4lachipanda line leading to Southern Rhodesia has 53 bridges on
its 196 route miles -- and average of over one bridge every four route miles.
Seventeen of these are principal Structures and nine, totaling 8,460 feet in length,
are in one 11-mile stretch across 416e Rid Pungue mud flats. There are four more
bridges over 150 feet long within 40 miles of the Rhodesian border. The main re-
pair shops are at Machipanda.
The rail line to the Nyasaland border branches off the Reira-Machipanda
line at Donde 18 miles northvest of Beira. The Zambezi 'liver railroad bridge, nori4
of Sena, is the Only reliable manner of dressing the Zambezi River in this region.
The bridge also carries =Or vehicles across the river on railroad flat cars. This
line it important obi 0414 for the interhational traffic from Nyasaland but also
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for the coal it carries from the Moatize coalfields. There are three other prin-
cipal bridges between Moatize and the junction at Donana: the most important is
the 263-foot bridge over the Rio Goma 31.7 miles northwest of Donna. Other criti-
cal points an this line are the shops at /hhaminga and Sena, and the junction and
shop at Donana.
In northern Mozambique a railroad serves the agricultural region with ports
at Nacala and Lumbo-MocaMbique. The line has now been extended as far west as Con-
gerenga and has three principal bridges: 315-feet over Rio Luria, 20 miles east
of Cumnbal 345-feet over Rio Nalume, 45 miles east of Cuamba; and 490-feet over Rio
Monapo near MonaTo Station. Other important targets would be the railroad shops
at Nampula and the terminal yard at Nacala. (See Table :4 of railroad bridges in
Mozambique over 150 feet in length*).
E. Sauth Africa
The rail net operated by the South African Railways -- that serves the
Republic of South Africa, South-West Africa and Bechuanaland -- is a sophisticated
system that presents numerous vulnerable targets. The fairly dense network in the
Republic provides alternate routes in the event of damage to individual lines.
Because of the heavy traffic carried by these lines, however, service could be dis-
rupted by damage to power sources, transformer stations, or transmission lines
that feed energy to electrified itctions or by destruction of centralized traffic
control (CTC) and other signaling systems that are required to maintain the cus-
tomary density of traffic. DisrUption of fuel supplies for diesel and coal burning
* Pigi 3300 beldrec
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locomotives could also reduce the capacity of the system but in an emergency both
steam and diesel equipment could replace electric locomotives in critical areas.
(See Figure 7, map NO. 37821).
In South-Vest Africa the network is largely single track and no alternate
routes are available. tocomOtivet presently in use are all diesel on this line
because of the shortage of water and the long distance from sources of coal. The
line that crosses Bechuanaland to reach Billawayo in Southern Rhodesia is also
single track in a very dry area.
Damage to coal mines, petroleum storage facilities, port facilities, loco-
motive repair facilities, and freight yards could possibly curtail rail traffic
to some extent, but systematic destruction of bridges and tunnels in addition to
damage tJ supporting facilities could seridusly hamper the utility of the rail sys-
tem. Damage to a aeries of bridges on a single line creates bottlenecks and mate-
rially slows repair wOrk. Destruction of mainline structures such as the 1,430
foot bridge over the Orange River near Norvalsport or the 1,580 foot bridge over
the Vaal River near Vereeniging would seriously congest rail traffic. If properly
executed, destructioa of a aeries of bridges could halt through movement of rail
traffic for a time.
The ports of South Africa and SOuth4Teat Africa and Lourenco Marques in
Mozambique are relatively isolated frotsthe main network Of the South African Rail-
way system. Destruction of spans of seven bridges selected from a total of 40
would effectively cut of these ports from the heart of the rail system.
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Durban, the principal port: , is eerved by a single rail line that crosses
four major bridges and passes through nine tunnels that cannot be by-passed. Cape
Town, another principal port, may be approached by two lines one of which has twO
bridges and a tunnel and the second four 'major bridges and four tunnels. Both
Walvis Bay and Luderitz, secondary ports in South-West Africa, could be isolated
from the Republic by destruction of portions of a single bridge 3,514 feet long.
There is one tunnel an the Walvis Bay line. The port of Port Elizabeth Could be
Isolated by destruction of two of three bridges, and East London by a single bridge
near the port, by two or three bridges on approaches to the port or by two of
three tunnels. Destruction of two of four bridges or two of five tunnels could
cut off the minor port of Mosselbaai.
The secondary port Of Simonstown and the minor port at Saldandha are
served by the same approach routes that serve Cape Town. Port Shepstone a minor
port, is approached. through Durban and Could be isolated from Marban by damage
to one or more of nine bridges. Traffic from the Republic to Lourenco Marques or
to Southern Rhodesia could be cut off in the Republic by destruction of one 750
foot bridge near the border or by two of a possible five bridges some distance
from the border. The line linking Southern Ahodezia and the Republic that passes
through Bechuanaland crosses four major bridges each of which has at least two
spans 100 feet in length.
The highway networks of the Republic, gcluth=West Africa, and Bechuanaland
serve an important role sort haul traffic but do not carry a significant
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percentage of heavy, long haul traffic. Many of the bridges are narrow or have
limited load capacities and Some are Under water after heavy rainfall. Additional
bridges, ferries, or fords are available as alternates for most bridges but some
key structures do not have by-passes readily available. Such structures are the
1,369 foot Vaal River Bridge 18 miles South Of Vereeniging or the 150 foot Kaffer-
rivier Bridge 17 miles north of Heddersbruy. These two bridges are on routes that
parallel rail lines. There are an additional 54 major road bridges that parallel
rail bridges.
There are an estimated 10,000 rail bridges of significant size in the South
African RailWays system. Seventy-one of these structures are over 150 feet in
length. (See Table 5*).
F. Tanoanyika
Railroads operated by the East African Railways are the most important
means of long-haul transport in Tanganyika. Highways and waterways provide feeder
and transhipment service between rail stations and outlying areas. The two impor-
tant rail lines are the Central line (Dar es Salaam - Kigoma) and the Tanga line
(Tanga - Arusha). The gauge of all the railroads in Tanganyika is 3' 3 3/8" which
is different frOm the standard African gauge of 3'6". (See Figure 8, map No.
37822).
/here is not at present a connection between the two main rail lines in
Tanganyika. A connectidn it planned however', from Mnyusi on the Tanga line and
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RuVu on the Central line. The Tanga line in the north is connected with the rail-
road system in Kenya and thence to the port of Mombasa. There are few good high-
in the country, especially in the south-central and western areas. Transport
of large quantities of freight via the highways would be restricted by numerous
fords, low-capacity ferries, narrow and low-capacity bridges, narrow stretches of
road, Sharp curves, and steep grades'. Weather factors such as floods during the
rainy season, dust during the dry season, and the intense heat also afflict high-
way transport.
Inland waterway transport is important but is confined to lakes which are
not connected; however, by utilizing railroad-waterway routes, transshipment can
be made to the Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Kenya.
The Tanga line extends north-westward 272 route miles from the port of
Tangs to Arusha. At Kahe, 206 miles northwest of Tonga, a branch extends to the
Kenya main line. There are six bridges over 100-feet long on the line, two of them
between Italie and Tanga. These are clOst to Korogwe, about 4.5 miles vest of Tanga.
Because of the alternate route through Kenya leading to the sea at Mombasa it also
would be necessary to damage the bridge eight Miles northeast of Kele or one of
the four in Kenya in order to block traffic with the port.
The Central line extends east-west for 779 route miles and is part of an
international route frOm Tanganyika to the .Congo via take Tanganyika. Because of
the difference in gauge between the railrOadS Of Tanganyika and the Congo there is
no rail ferry- betveeniCigaaa, Tinganrika and Albertville, Congo. There are 11E,
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bridges over 10-feet long on the Central line, 11 of these are 100 feet or longer.
Critical points On the line are the two 100-foot long bridges near Kilosa and
MorogOro, the terminal facilities and major repair shop at Dar as Salaam) and the
transshipment facilities at Kigoma. Destruction of selected bridges could sever
tranaportatiOn of this rail line for a lengthy period.
The import port of Dar es Salaam has the following facilities: two classi
fication yards, a freight yard) major and minor repair shops, 14-stall roundhouae,
passenger car sheds, freight sheds, scales, oil, Coal, water, and sidings to wharf.
There are at least 25 oil tanks at Dar es Salaam and large stocks are usually main-
tained. At Kigoma there is a minor repair Shop, roundhOuse? freight sheds, oil,
and water besides the transshipment facilities.
A branch line extends from Tbora an the Central line to the lake port of
Wanza on Lake Victoria. There are facilities at Wanza for transshipment of
freight to 'Uganda and Kenya. Within a distance Of 40 miles in the vicinity of
Shinyanga there are three bridges over 100 feet long.
Another branch extends south-weatward from Kallua servicing the lead mines
at Mpanda. There are no bridges of any great length on this branch but there are
16 bridges of 10 feet or longer spread along the 131 route miles.
One other potential target on the Tanganyika railroads is the many oil
tank cars that use the lines because of the heed for disbursing the imported oil
from the pOrts for Use as fuel oil for the locoMOtives. Similarly water is hauled
in tank cars to Combat severe seasonal drOUghtt. (Bee Table 6*, bridges of 991).
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or
1 c
...?1?044Laii
Table 1
-
Mbilroad Bridges - Angola
Structure
Number
(See rig.
1
3)
Location Mile-
age Approx.
Total Syens
Length
Ft. Material Type
45 miles If of 198 reinforced n.a.
concrete
Vila Salazar
2 30 miles 1,1" of est.
Vila Salazar 194
3 22 miles K of 33a
Vila Salazar
15 miles R of 180
Dondo
3 Niles N of 165
Dondo
6 T idles S of 276
Lobito
2 alien NE of 340
Benguela
8 10 miles SE of 380
Benguela
steel
n?a?
steel
steel
steel
steel
n.a.
steel
through truss
deck arch
haIf-through
truss
n.a.
plate girder
through truss
deck girder
deck truss
Tracks
Number
Length
Ft.
n.a.
n.a.
1
1
164
1
1
est.
30
3
100
1
n.a.
n.a.
1
5
33
1
1
276
1
10
311-
1
5
76
1
Remarks
aver stream
over Rio Luinhs
over Rio Lucala
over Rio Lucala
over stream. Combined rail and
road bridge
over Rio Catumbela
over Rio Cavaco. Combined
rail and road bridge
over Rio Lengue. Bridge on
curve
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r-4 r-4 ?-I
141 eA t?
Crl
)-4
tot
14
(NI (:) Lr
Crl
LIN
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SEMI: !7
2
Al r411,1
Railroad Bridges - Congo (Leopoldville)
Structure
Total
Number
Location Mile-
Length
(See Fig. li)
age Approx.
Ft.
Material
1
10 miles I of
169
n.a.
JadctvilIe
2
20 miles NW of
156
n.a.
Jadotville
3
27 miles NW of
172
n.4.
jadotville-
4
80 miles W of
jadctviLle
342
steel
3
160 miles N of
171
steel
Dilelo Gare
6
140 miles E of
171
steel
Dilolo Gare
IT
35 miles X of
171
steel
Dilolo Gore
8
60 miles S of
169
n..a?
Damn
9
35 miles S of
169
n.a.
lkikama
SP82213
Length
l'YPe Number It. Tracks Remarks
through truss
through truss
deck girder
through truss
through truss
through truss
through truss
through truss
through truss
through truss
1
169
1
1
86
1
2
35
2
86
1
2
171
1
1
171
1
1
171
1
1
171
I
1
169
1
1
169
1
triter Lufira River
IVer Mulungorishi River
over Dikuluwe River
over Lualaba River
over Lubluli River
over Makulveshi River
over Lulua River
over Lubudi River
over ralule-Nord River
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Table 2 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges - Congo (Leopoldville)
>
TS
TS
n
0
<
CD
0-
-n
Structure Total Spans o
n
!lumber Location Mile- Length Length X
(See Fig. 4) age Approx. Ft. Material Tyre number Yt. Tracks Remarks' m
c7
m
10 at Eukams. 828 n.a. through bow- 4 203 1 over Lualsba River en
m
string n.)
0
deck girder I 16 o
0
(both on masonry o
al
piers and abut-
FIrc
ments) "
0
steel through truss 3 138 1 over Lubils.shi River. Restora- F.
Imams deck type 2 16 tion anticipated by fall of X
?approach spans 1963. 0
-o
(IKAAIon masonry -4
to
piers and. abut- -i
o
ments ) al
4:.
c.0
3.5ct miles NW of 276 n.a. through truss 2 138 1 over Lunn River >
o
, irgmfmc, o
no
13
oo
o
ICC miles SE of 236 n.a. through truss 1 236 1 over Mushimale River o
o
Luluabourg al
0
0
steel through truss 2 217 1 rail/road bridge over Lualaba _.
c'n
deck girder 2 131 River
deck girder 8 217
(on masonry piers
and abutment)
15 43 miles E of 336 steel through truss 1 164 1 over Luizi River
Kabala girder
deck plate 4 43
girder
(an masonry or
concrete piers and
abutments)
122 miles EW of
14 7 miles S of 2439
Kabala
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StIAdifais D:SSEI
Table 2 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges - Congo (Leopoldville)
Structure
Total
Number
Location Mile-
length
(See Fig. 4)
age Approx.
Ft.
Material
16
24.5 miles N of
158
n?a?
Kabala
17
25 miles H of
529
steel
Kabalo
33 miles N of
232
steel
Kabala
19
52 miles N of
labaJ-o at Iongolc
1628
reinforced
concrete
20
20 miles W of
338
steel
Kasongo
gPana
Type Number
deck plate
girder
through truss
suspension
(on concrete piers
and abutments)
through truss
lattice deck
girder
(an concrete piers
and. abutments)
deck type
through truss
plate deck
girder
(on masonry abut-
ments and masonry
and metal piers)
Length
Pt.
Tracks
Remarks
39
1
over ignkuga River
2
149
1
?Ye; 110kaga River
1
230
1
131
1
over linfuhuta River
1
96
1
52
1
road/rail bridge over Lualaba
8
112
River. Restoration not
1
230
anticipated for at least
1
101
2 years.
1
171
1
124
1
164
1
over Lufubu River
4
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ikv
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Table 2 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges Congo (Leopoldville)
Structure
Number
(See Fig- 4-)
Total
Location Mile-. Length
age fimmom. Ft.
25 5 miles of 24-1
Stanleyville
26
27
28
29
30
80. miles of 250
Bata
26 miles X of 250
.Aketi
20 miles S of 230
Bonds
1/ miles NR of 328
Thrsville
26 miles W of 158
ThywriLle
31 38 miles W of
Thysville
&Pans
Material
T7Pe Number
n.a. /slate girder
deck
(on masonry abut-
ments and masonry-
piers topped by
steel pylons)
steel through truss
girder
steel through truss
girder
steel through truss
girder
steel through truss
steel deck girder
reinforced arch
concrete
steel half-through
truss
Length
Ft.
Tracks
5
43
1
3
82
1
3
82
2
82
1
1
66
2
164
1
2
66
1
1
26
1
164
1
Remarks
crier Xongamba River
Zobia Mridge over Zobia Elver
Gums Bridge over Likati River
road/rail bridge
road/rail bridge over Libogo
River
over Inkisi River
aver stream
over vater course
322
*
Laddi
4 t.ot4
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Table 2 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges - Congo (Leo-poldville)
S-tructure
Number
(See Fig. /4-)
Total
Location Mile- Length
age Approx. Ft.
32 42 miles W of 262
Tbysville
33 7.5 miles Z f 263
Matadi
6.4 nrils of 150
?Matadi
35 6 miles of
Nata.di
36 4.5 miles E of
Matadi
316
3T 3.5 miles E of 2914
Matadi
38 38 miles N of
Bona
197
spans
Material
steel
steel
steel
reinforced
'concrete
n.a.
reinforced
concrete
steel
steel
steel
Length
Type Number Ft.
half-through
truss
half -through
truss
Taate girder
ecpproach
hal f-through
truss
arch
deck girder-
deck arch
through truss
(on masonry
abutments)
truss deck
through truss
Tracks
1
262
1
1
131
2
66
1
98
1
2
26
66
1
2
26
1
262
1
6
1.9
1
1
197
1
Remarks
aver twill' River
over Lieu River
-aver stream
over Ravine du. Diable
over Faze River
over -water course
road/rail bridge over Lukula
River
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Table 3
Railroad Bridges - Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Structure
Total
Number
Location Mile-
Length
(See Fig. 5)
age Approx.
Ft.
Material
1
at Salina
350
a.a.
2
1/25 miles N of
420
n.a.
Paantyre
3
50 miles S of
580
n.a.
BLentyre
20 miles If of
315
steel
Umtali
5
60 miles NW of
180
steel
Vitali
6
5 miles W of
1/5
n.a.
Sheave,
40 miles NW of
200
n.a.
Salisbury
sYsnig
Length
Type Number Ft.
through truss
girder
through truss
girder
through truss
larder
(on concrete piers
and abutments)
deck type girder
(on concrete
piers and. abut-
ments)
deck type girder
(on concrete
piers and abut-
ments)
5
50
100
2
110
1.
50
2
161
1
258
1
66
3
83
3
60
through truss 1
girder 1
through truss 2
girder
(on concrete piers
and abutments)
75
100
100
-
Tracks
Remarks
CD
a.
-n
0
1 over Lintipe River. Nyasaland
1 over Shire River. Nyasaland
1 aver Shire River. Nyasaland.
tri
0
-o
?-?1
0
cs,
0
0
03
0
0
0
0
0
1 over Odzi River
aver Lesapi River
1 over Poorte River
1 over Gwebi River
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Table 3 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges - Federation of Rhodesia and Nyas and
Structure
Number
(See 74. 5)
8
9
Total
Location Mile- Length
Ft.
age Approx.
8 miles S of
laldonan
160
20 miles SE of 400
zawi
10 20 miles W of
Salisbury
II 60 miles W of
Salisbury
12 8 miles SW of
Gatooma
13 22 miles 11 of
Que Que
360
300
200
429
Material
n.a.
11.a.
steel
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Length
Type Number Ft,
deck type girder
(on concrete
piers and abut-
ments)
through truss
girder
(on- concrete piers
and abutments)
deck type girder
send-through
Warren truss
girder
(on concrete and
masonry piers and
abutments)
through truss
girder
(on concrete and
masonry piers and
abutments)
both through-type
and deck-type,
(on concrete piers
and abutments)
Tracks
Remarks
2
50
1
aver Mukwadzi River
1
6o
4
100
over Hunzrani River
4
90
1
aver Runyani. River
100
1
over Vmfuli
2
100
1
over Unmet:we River
4
100
1
over Muniati River
1
29
0
a.
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Table 3 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges - Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Structure
Number
(See Fig. 5)
Total
Location Mile- Length
age Approx. Ft.
14 4 Idles N of
Que Que
10 miles S of
Que Que
3E4
300
spans
Material
n.a.
11,,?ass
16
5 miles N of
180
Tort Victoria
17
25 miles SK of
150
n.a.
Shabani
18
10 miles SE of
360
n.a.
Shabani
19
30 miles EN of
140
11.8.
Shabani
Type
Length
Number rt.
through truss
girder
(on concrete piers
and atutments)
deck-type truss
girder
(on concrete Tiers
and abutments)
through truss
girder and
dedk type
girder
(both an concrete
Tiers and abut-
ments)
deck-type girder
deck-type girder
(on concrete piers
and abutments)
deck-type girder
(on concrete piers
and abutments)
Tracks
Remarks
3
91
1
ever Sebakwe River
3
100
1
aver Que Que River
1
100
aver 11ashagashe River
4
20
3
50
1
over Singwesi River
4
90
1
over Ngezi River
2
40
1
aver Ka.shambi River
60
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t
Table 3 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges -Federation of Rhodesia and. Nyasaland.
Structure
Number
(See Fig. 5)
Total
Location Mile- Length
age Approx. Ft.
20 35 miles SR of 150
Onlawayo
30 miles SE of 210
Rulatrayo
22 20 miles SE of 150
Nulawayo
23 65 -miles NW of 150
Iialawego
24 88 miles NW of 300
Bulawayo
Spans
Material
n.a.
n.a.
11.a.
n.a.
n?a?
Length
TYPe Number Ft.
semi-through
trust girder
(on masonry piers
and abutments.)
deck-type girder
(on concrete piers
and abutments)
semi-through
truss girder
(on masonry piers
and abutments)
through truss
girder
deck-type girder
(both-on concrete
Tiers and abut-
ments)
trough truss
girder
(on concrete piers
and abutments)
'fracks
Remarks
2
75
1
Over Serie River
3
70
1
over Ummingwane River
2
75
1
over Rnyeme River
1
l
1
over ilmgaza River
1
50
3
100
1
over Gwaai River
=327-
a.
0
0
0
th
th
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SECRET/111 rciTE1 1_11SZEM
Table 3 - (Continued.)
Railroad Bridges - Federation of Rhodesia and. Nyasaland.
>
-a
13
Total iftructure Spans
n
0 Number
< Location Mile- Length Length
Material Remarks
a (See Fig. 5) age Approx. lirt. Type Number Pt. Tracks
0
25 10 miles SX of 208 n.a. through truss
Wamkie girder
deck-type girder
(both on concrete
piers and abut-
ca meats)
ca
ca
ca 26 5 miles V of 11.00 n.a.
Wankie
0
2T 35 miles IT of 169 n.a.
-a Vankie
?-?1
CD
0
28 25 miles SX of 440 n.a.
co Livingstone
ca
ca
co
ca
ca
ca
ca 29 5 miles S crf 670
0
Livingstone
c'o
through truss
girder
2
75
2
29
li?
100
1 over Lukosi River
1 over Data River
(on masonry piers
and abutments)
deck type girder 1 42 1 Xasiba Bridge over Doomba
1 40 River
3 29
through truss 4 100 1 over Metete River
girder
deck type girder 2 20
(both on concrete
piers and abut-
ments)
steel deck type truss 1 62 1 'Victoria Falls rail/road bridge
arch, anchored into 1 soo over Zaibezi River Gorge
face gorge 1 87
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.???weiihm if
Table 3 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges - Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Structure Total
Number Locsalon Mile- Length
(See Fig. 5) age Approx. Ft.
Spans
Material
Type
Length
Number Ft.
30 80 miles NE of 200 n.a- through truss 2 100
Livingstone
at/Cable
n?a?
32
20 miTp NV of
373
rt?a.
Ndola
33
20 miles SE of
150
noa
Chingola
34
15 miles SE of
265
n.a.
Cbingola
35
5 miles N of
235
n.a.
Chingola
'larder
(on masonry
abutments)
through truss 13
. girder
(on concrete piers
and abutments)
deck type girder
(on concrete
piers and abut-
ments)
deck type girder 3 50
(on concrete Tiers
and abutments)
deck type girder 3 75 1 over Kafue River
(on concrete piers 1 40
and abutments)
Tracks Remarks
1 Kale= River
1 over ICafue River
aver Kafue River
1 -over Mwanbashi River
deck type girder 1 75 1 over Kefue River
(on concrete piers 2 50
and abutments) 2 30
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SEP7
Table 4
UtO
Railroad Mridges - Mozambique
> Structure
-o
-o Number
O ? (Ree Pig.
o.
-n 1
2
to
c.n
0
C.0 5
0
6
0
0
oo
0
0
3
Total
Location Mile- Length
6) age A-pprox. Ft.
15 miles Vit of 305
ltoamba
50 miles NE of 1380
Mamba
12 miles 8 of
Canicado
15 miles W Of
Oanicado
689
2010
15 miles N of 1181
Gobs
13 miles NW of 426
Dondo
13.8 miles NW of 1702
Dondo
Spans
Material
steel
YP e
reinforced deck arch
concrete
steel
half-through
truss
steel deck n.a.
and timber
construction
steel through truss
reinforced
concrete
reinforced
concrete
deck girder
deck girder
Length
Number
n.a. n.a.
14 98.5
3
67
6
23
92
n.a.
Tracks
1
1
1
Remarks
over stream
over Rio incomatic. President
earmona Mridge largest.ron-
arete bridge in Africa,
serves rail and road
over Rio Mozimchopes
over Limpopo River
196 1 over Rio- Umbeluz_.
18.5 1 over swampy ground
18.5 1 over swampy ground
-330-
0.0 .1 001 QC
0
CD
0-
0
to
c.n
Fs;
0
0
???1
C.0
0
C.0
0
0
oo
8
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
SECRET!
Talile "(Continued)
S
Railroad Bridges - Mozadbique
Structure
lumber
(See Fig. 6)
Total
Location Mile- Length
age Approx. Ft.
8 426
800
10 20.1 miles NW of 851
pond?
11 21,3 miles 1W of 851
Bond?
9
15.1 miles 16/ of
-Dondo
IT.9" miles NW of
ondo
12 2.11- miles RW of
Donla
25 miles NW of
DOnda
26 miles WIT of
Dondo
15 40 miles E of
tfmtali
851
851
1702
250
spans
Material
trioe
reinforced deck girder
concrete
steel
reinforced
concrete
reinforced
concrete
reinforced
concrete
reinforced
concrete
through truss
deck girder
deck girder
deck girder
deck girder
reinforced deck girder
concrete
steel
deck girder
deck girder
continuous deck
truss
Length
Number Ft. Tracks
23
18.5
1
5
160
1
46
18.5
1
46
18.5
1
46
18.5
1
46
18.5
1
92
18.5
1
1
30
1
2
6o
1
2
50
1
Remarks
over swampy ground
over River Fungue
over swampy ground
over swampy ground
over swampy ground
over swampy ground
over swampy ground
over stream
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6-1?0001?0008ZOOV61701.016/dCIU-VI3 : 91./90/000Z eseeleu Jod peAwddv
SECkVLio
Table 4 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges - Mozambique
Structure
Number
(See pig. 6)
Total
Location Mile- Length
age Approx. Ft.
16 34.9 miles NE of 265
17 20.1 miles NE of 200
Umtali
18 20 miles NE of 196
19
20
21
22
thatali
Material
steel
steel
steel
spans
Length
TEM Number Ft. Tracks
deck girder
deck girder
deck girder
deck girder
deck girder
half-through
truss
half-through
truss
half-through
truss
1
30
1
over stream
1
60
1
1
75
1
1
6o
1
1
40
1
2
100
1
over stream
2
48
1
over stream
1
100
1
4 miles S of
450
n.a?
U.S.
5
90
1
tilsFontes
0.6 miles NE of
Sena
12,064
steel
bowstring
through truss
U.S.
33
n.a.a.
263
remarks
1
U.S.
n.a.
7
6
165
67
31.7 miles NW of
263
n.a.
n.a
n.a.
n.a.
1
Donana
85 miles NW of
197
n.a
U.S.
n.a.
n.a.
1
Donana
aver Rio Zengue
over Zambezi Elver. Longest
bridge in Africa. Steel spans
of unknown number and length
total 1828 ft.
over Rio Goma
over Rio Malice.
- 332 -
rl
? la ea, .;11-.J1.111[113
6-1.0001.0008Z00V61701.016/dCIU-VI3 : 91./90/000Z eseeleu Jod peAwddv
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
Table 4 --(Continued)
? - '1".1
Railroad Bridges - Mozambique
Structure
Number
(See TU. 6)
total
Location Mile- Length
age Approx. Ft.
23 105 miles NW of 197
Donana
24 22.5 miles g of 315
Cuamba (Nova Freixo)
25 45 miles I of est.
Caamba (Nova Freixo) 345
26
1 mile NW of
Wear*
est.
490
Material
n.a.
ri?ae
reinforced beam
concrete
aliens
Length
Type Number Ft.
reinforced beam arch
concrete
Tracks
1
1
1
1
Remarks
over Neconbeze River
over Rio Lurio'
over ver Nalume
over River Mona.
_V
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6-1?0001?0008ZOOV61701.016/dCIU-VI3 91./90/000Z eseeleu Jod peAwddv
ULIALLIIN
Table 5
...04.40 Lir
Railroad Bridges - South Africa
Structure
lumber
(See Fig.
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
7)
Total
Location Length
age Approx. Ft.
95 miles E of est.
Worcester 500
170 miles X of est.
Worcester 840
50 miles I Of est.
Kimberly 1580
20 miles NW of 900
Kimberly
10 miles N of 450
Port Elizabeth
25 miles N of 616
Port Elizabeth
75 miles N of 480
Port Elizabeth
130 miles N of 360
Port Elizabeth
130 miles N of 360
Port Elizabeth
sPanz
MaterialType
reinforced deck arch
concrete
steel
steel
steel
steel
through truss
through truss
n.a.
reinforced n.a.
concrete
reinforced
concrete
reinforced
concrete
reinforced
open spandrel
arches
apen spandrel
arches
open spandrel
arches
Tracks
Remarks
Number
Length
Ft.
est.
est.
1
Mnffelsrivier
lo
50
7
est.
1
Leeu (stream)
120
10
est.
1
Vaal River
158
6
150
2
Veal River
3
150
n.s.
Ostartkops (stream)
11
56
n.a.
Sundays River
8
60
1
Klein-Vis (stream)
6
60
n.a.
Great Fish River
6
60
n.a.
Great Fish River
-334-
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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
S11".1
Table 5 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges - South Africa
0
CD
0-
11
0
Structure
!lumber
(See Fig. 7)
Total
Location Mile- Length
Ft.
age Approx.
10 330 miles N of 280
port Elizabeth
12
13
15
16
11
18
130miles N of
Fort Rlizabeth
80
130 ailed I of 300
Port Elizabeth
30 miles SW of 1430
SiEringfontein
15 miles of 300
Tabemfontein
20miles RR of 400
lamemfontein
55 miles Dix of 525
Bloemfontein
40 miles SW of
Kroonstad
300
0.5 miles E of 705
Vereeniging
Material
reinforced
concrete
reinforce&
concrete
reinforcei
concrete
steel
steel
steel
reinforced
concrete
reinforced
concrete
steel
reinforced
concrete
Spans
c7
Length
TYPe
Number
Ft.
tracks
CD
Remarks
0
0
deck span
5
56
Great Fish River 0
0
thth
deck span
56
114L.
Great Fish River "
0
arch
5
60
n.a.
Great Fish River
-o
?-?1
CD
truss
1.30
1
Orange River 0
CD
100-
2
Renosterpruit River 0
0
co
100
2
Modderrivier
deck
75
1
Vet River
deck girder
14.
75
2
sand
deck truss
3
150
2
Vaal River, Twin Bridges on
deck arch
6
30
common Tiers and abutments
-335-
6-1?0001?0008ZOOV61701.016/dCIU-VI3 91./90/000Z eseeleu Jod peAwddv
Structure
Mutter
(See Trig.
19
20
21
22
211-
25
26
27
7)
Total
Location Mile- Length
air Approx. Ft.
125 miles W of 350
Port Paizabeth
30 miles V of est.
Potchefstroom 675
15 miles NW Of est.
Durban 252
30 miles Mi of eat.
Durban 252
30 miles NW of 300.
Pietermaritzburg
35 miles of 30o
-
Ladysmith
15 niiles S of 375
Ladysmith
360
5 miles SE of 567
Pietermaritzburg
100 miles SE of
Johannesburg
SEC17: F?
"-r?-" `1"n1"01
Table 5 - (Continued)
WailrOad Iridges - South Africa
Material
steel
steel
reinforced
concrete
reinforced
concrete
reinforced.
ccttcrete
reinforced
concrete
reinforced
concrete
sTens
Type
through truss
through truss
through truss
deck arch
deck arch
deck arch
deck arch
deck
reinforced open spandrel
concrete arch
steel
deck truss
Tracks
Remarks
/limber
Length
1
150
1
Great Irish River. Combined
2
100
1
rail and road bridge
5
est.
1
Milner Ifildge, Vaal River
135
7
eat.
2
iffidatuzaxia (stream)
36
7
est.
2
stream
36
5
60
2
Mooirivier
n?a.
n.a.
2
Little Bushmans (stream)
5
T5
2
Tugela River
6
60
2
7
81
1
Inchange Viaduct, over stream
- 336 -
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6-1?0001?0008ZOOV61701.016/dCIU-VI3 91./90/000Z eseeletliod peAwddv
(rnrTji
;
01!?Uli
yLit.,h;
Table 5 - (Continued.)
Railroad Bridges - South Africa
od peAoiddv
Structure
Umber
(See Pig. 7)
Yotal
Location Mile- Length
age Approx. Ft.
28 30 miles I of est.
Pretoria 271
29 90 miles E of est.
Preto;ria 273
30 145 miles Eof est.
Pretoria 250
11 IO0:milesW of est.
Nomati-poort 250
32
33
at romatipoort est.
750
60 miles NW of est.
NcomatiToort 1080
6o miles E of est.
Pietersburg 390
Spans
Material
steel
steel
reinforced
-concrete
'ITY/je
deck girder
deck girder
deck arch
steel deck truss
reinforced deck arch
cOrEarete
steel
steel
steel
steel
steel
? deck girder
deck girder
through truss
through truss
through truss
Length
Number Ft.
3 est. 60
1 est. 35
4 est. 14
3 eat.
75
5 eat.
50
5 est.
50:
5 est.
150
9 est.
120
3 est.
130
Tracks
Remarks
1 idelge (stream)
1
1
1
1
-Olifants River
Iaandsrivier
llandsrivier
twat' Raver
Sable (stream)
stream
6-1?0001.0008Z00V61701.016/dCIU-VI3 91./90/000Z eseelet1
6-1?0001?0008ZOOV61701.016/dCltl-VI3 91./90/000Z eseeleu Jod peAwddv
Sift*" 1400 '
Table 5 -*(dOlitiiiixed)'
Railroad Bridges - South Africa
Structure
Number
(See Fig. 7)
35
36
37
Total
Spans
Location Mile-
Length
age Approx.
Ft.
Material
Type
Number
? I mile E of
3514
steel
n.a.
n.a.
UPington
20 miles SE of
600
n?a?
n.a.
n.a.
Rehoboth
60 miles W of
est.
steel
11.a.
Mosseibaai 300
38 30 miles W of 770
Mosseibaai
39 8 miles NE of 550
Mosselbaai
ko 8 miles NE of 336
Mosselbaal
40 miles NW of 550
Part Alfred
42 at East London 975
k3 55 miles SE of est.
Queenstown 350
steel
deck truss
reinforced through truss
concrete
reinforced
concrete
steel
steel
steel
steel
reinforced
concrete
through truss
hinged arch
deck truss
through truss
deck girder
deck arch
2
11
6
Length
Ft.
n?a?
n?a?
est.
60
est. 180
eii.) 200
50
56
230
4
80
160
55
3
9
10
est.
35
Tracks
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Remarks
Orange River
(longest bridge on BAR)
USib River
Kafferkuils (stream)
Gouritis (stream)
ilein-Brek (stream)
Groat-Brat (stream)
BleaUkrantz Bridge, over
stream
Buffelsrivier (only double
deck bridge on the BAR)
'Iroise (stream)
- 338 -
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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
Structure
Number
(See 71g. T)
Location Mile-
age Approx.
Total
Length
Ft.
44
45
50 isibas SE of
Qu.eenstown
30 ran2s sE of
Springfontein
est.
350
1088
146
50 miles N of
1287
East London
11.7
TO miles SK of
est.
Springfontein
360
48
70 miles SE of
est.
:Bloemfontein
900
49
35 miles SE of
est.
Kimberly
' 300
50
miles S of
318
Durban
51
9 miles S of
450
Durban
52
14 miles S of
est.
Durban
250
53
18 miles S of
est.
Durban
750
54
25 miles S of
729
Durban
ri:i 6,.%01t-
SECRET 'i7i riiSSE1
Table 5 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges - South Africa
0
Spans
MaterialType
Length
Number Ft. Tracks
Remarks
reinforced deck arch 10 est. 1 Thames (stream)
concrete 35
reinforced deck 16 68 1 Orange-River
concrete
steel n.a.
steel through truss
steel through bow-
string truss
steel through truss
steel n.a.
steel n.a.
steel deck girder
steel deck girder
reinforced deck girder
,7nnzrete
9
143
1
6
est.
1
60
6
est.
1
150
3
est.
1
100
2
159
2
3
150
n.a.
10
eat.
1
25
est.
est.
1
30
25
9
81
2
Nei River
Orange River
Oaledon River
Wdderrivier
Canal
Umbogintwiai River
Amanzimtoti River
Illovo River
6-1?0001?0009ZOOV61701.016/dCltl-VIO 91./90/000Z eseketl -10d
Umkomaas River. Combined rail
and road bridge
- 339 -
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
SI':.-ztran4
Thble 5 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges - South Africa
Structure Total
lumber Location Mile- Length
(See Fig. 7) age Approx. Ft. Material
55 26 miles N of est. reinforced
port Shepatone 300 concrete
56 22 miles N of n.a. n.a.
Port Shepst one
57 10 miles N of 660 reinforced
Port Shepstone concrete
58 4 miles N of n.a. n.a.
Port Shepstone
59 0.5 miles N of est. n.a.
PcatShepstone 1320
60 15 mile NE of est. steel
Durban 1170
61 30 miles NE of 440 steel
Durban
62 55 miles NE of est. steel
Durban 875
63 65 miles NE of est. steel
Spans
Length
TY-Ze
Number
Ft.
Tracks
Remarks
n.a.
est.
est.
n.a.
Sezela River
5
60
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a
rfafa River
n.a.
11
60
n,a.
Ummumbe River
n.a.
n.a
n.a.
n.a.
Umhlangskula River
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n?s?
V*7311)EursBlver. Combined rail
and road bridge
through truss
9
est.
2
gpmen Bridge. Umgeni River
120
truss
11
40
1
Great UMhlanga River
deck truss
15
1
1
n.a.
est. 75
est. 50
1
Tugela River
deck girder
9
est.
1
Amtikula. River
Durban 270 30
- 340 -
6-1?0001?0009ZOOV61701.016/dCltl-VIO 91./90/000Z eseeletl JOd PeA0AdV
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
Structure
Number
(See Fig. 7)
Ica miles NE of
Durban
Total
Location Mile- Length
age Approx. Ft.
aho
65 135 miles NE of
Durban
66 20 miles S of
Messina
67 2 miles N of
Messina
135 tiles S of
Francistown
69 30 miles S of
Francistown
70 ?
18 miles S of
Franc istown
at Francistown
est.
900
est.
250
1554
350
200
500
400
4,, LOLA
Table 5 - (Continued)
Railroad Bridges - South Africa
Material
reinforced
concrete
steel
n.a.
steel
Spans
Tracks
TYPe
Length
Ft.
bowstring
7
12a
1
arch
through
est.
100
1
9
deck girder
5
est-
50
deck truss
14
111
1
half-through
2
75
1
truss
2
100
half-through
2
100
1
truss
half-through
5
100
1
truss
half-through
4
100
1
truss
Remarks
Mhlatuze River
th
0
Did`olozi (stream). Combined F.
rail and road. bridge
-o
Sandrivier
Alfred Reit Memorial Bridge
over Limpopo River, combined
rail and road bridge
emer Mhalapshwe River
over Macloutsi River
over Shasi River
over Tati River
0
Co
0
0
0
0
0
0
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
11
4
0 0
0
- r-1
1-4
4111
to
eH
qa 0
A
03 A 10 WI V
VA cd
O.\ 0
Fti
V:1 ? CO
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
^ p
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0
r4
0)
4-4
0
II
LIN
ii
11)
rtia)
Cf:)
r^ -I
4-)
n:11
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A00280004004-9
?
r4
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 1
( NIGERIA C CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICS 'U D A N \I *?????. ,.
??--i... ETHIOPIA
SANTA CAMEROON ts. BANGUI r?-" ..., ........1"--,.... \
..(- .....
......... j
ISABEL ,Bd
?YAOUNDE on o .?
FERNANDO PO ? tTltule 1. /
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BATA Go .MRi7,-r. .?.--??----..,s ,
. Mungbere ?..
:
...UNI:
i.. `.? i
(AP. 2.1 UGANDA ?, ?
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IBREVILLE .1
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j KAMPALA f
GABON : 0 ) Ponthierville
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) C., ,..' REP. OF THE CONGO VANDA??? ....... isNAIROBI
k. Co i
BRAllAVILLE I
SOMALI
REP.
KENYA
(U.K.)
Pointe-Noire
,./Tshela
Matad
a.
LUANDA
LEOPOLDVILLE
?? -,,
. ??
CiKIALI
Mwan.za
/- r
Arusha. __....--...k
Kindu Kamanyola _
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Uvira i*USUY.A.BURA
,
:. / N.ombasa
Po Francqui IBURUNDL
._Kigoma ) --...
M
.4,Tabora . -*Tanga
ZANZIBAR uK .)
ZANZIBAR
DAR ES
SALAAM
1.Dondl"---?Malanle
Porto Amboim?
?Gabela
Kamina
ondprx
1
Kabalo 1 .i-
Albertville il ,,Eructioni
??\ Mpanda
. 4Mikumi
--N. TANGANYIKA
Tenke ( lin \
. i ) Z ?,
.........nElls*ethville ( .:5 ??\?'. ----??--"'
Lobito LNi sobvoaa
I ja 1c
,..?. Chingola r
e ..i..
ANGOLA Luanshya
????Ni ) : ,Vila Cabral
(Port') Vila
INORTHERN RHODESIA /salmi,
Mogamedes.?
FED. 'N.,under construction
Serpa Pinto OF HODESIA ? ???">.'.,.,..,, \ Nacala.
.: Conjerenje
1 Lusaka ../
hiange ........
). ETIZa?ntmyrbea-Limbe Lurnbo
........ IN, Mulobezi ) / Zawi Kildonan .;
AND NY LAND '''.... Benga
...... `????? ...., ..(0
4.,.) Mocuba
? Sena
Shamva
????????
SALISBURY Quelimane
SOUT Marromeu
Tsumeb
ESIA )1 AC??
Grootfontein :
SOUTH- ST AFRICA I
(Man te?Rep. of S. M.)
WALVIS BAY
(Rep. of S. AC)
Walvis Bay
Liaderitz
Gobabis r..
WINDHOEK
Saldanha
CAPE TOWN
BOUNDARY REPREBENTANON IS
NOTNECESSARILYAUTNORITATWE
Fort s Beira
Victoria
BECHUANALAND
(U.K.)
(Administered from Mafekin
PRETORIA
0
?
Inhambane
t? Inharrime
?
Vila de Joao Belo
I Mafeking
LO RENO MARQUES
.Goba
?
Hotazel
........? )ntel?".\.
MASERU
#0 . BASUTO/LAND
.../. ? *(U.K.) Durban
?
.48
East London Port Shepstone
Port Alfred
, . likmtata
SOUTH
Port Elizabeth
REPUBLI
Bitterfontein
;?a?
SWAZI AND
(U.K.)
Bases da
India (Fr.)
lie Earapa
RAILROADS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
Railroad-3'6" gauge
Other railroad
(gauge indicated)
-??- International boundary
? National or colonial capital
O 190 290 300 40,0Miles
0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers
CONFIDENTIAL
37850 6-63
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 2
\
(NIGERIA ) CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
i .i. A .t..t.".....\SUDAN ?....
ETHIOPIA
ANTh CAMEROON
ISABEL --N BANGUI te.??
? N............/.""'e A*
FERNANDO PO ..,,?.. ./ NAL. N.?????? :" .,
,....N .s.
* 491.819
,,,,,,YAOUNDE ??
: (
?-, UGANDA .1
somu
Ri0 * ?1 /-------..,i .
....1
(. * / l :??????:.)
ff. KAMPALA
LIBREVILLE / REP.
MUNI BATA ;
t.. 0 f I (.`.
,
GABON
REP. OF THE CONGO
ar?-?? 1/4.RWANDA ??*%,....
m?l\??*1.1:0 . ( , ziK1 'ALI
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go
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ese
LUANDA0Coffee---Coteo,
M alanje
Porto AmbolAidree
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Arusha
?- ? Tanga
ZANZIBAR
(U.K.)
V-9ZANZIBAR
DAR ES
SALAAM
TANGANYIKA
KENYA
(U.K.)
NAIROBI
`) N
El sabethville ..1 1
JO 1 ???
Lobito 1 Z . ????".
iso.
5 -. i ....5 .a.....,..--...---?
cfee
ANGOLANdola 41-'
(Port.) NORTHERN RHODESIA .,_>:
...": i
I FED. OF ( Salima ??
Conjerenje
*Vila Serpa Pinta u..
Mocamedessivaisomim..E--- Iron
I RHODESIA cz4; r.....????
?..??. WM a ? , .
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???
. \ 0... NYASALAND') ''
.-1 '?
t
e :
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA ??????????????...--
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..1..... ".......
? "SOUTHERN
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.....^....
(Mandate?Rep. of S. Af.) ___???---- ?N.,"
!-- (U.K.) SALISBURY.
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ton_cadyew--..- Lumbo
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i
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v
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WALVIS BAY tq Q
0
(R'P' of S. AL) Walvis Bay
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/
k
i): r.-,..
.o araesbumang.n..4- .
,./ .Flotazel
I N.V1ArINE j.....
1:
c SWAZILAND
".. 0,:il.?......
.....,-0 r_
REPUBLIC
,,,,se ' ? ??. ' 1 - . . . .
.i \,,?.. ?
OF \.B.A3T0LAND
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-0
SOUTH AFRICA c ?:
'b % (U.K.) ..2\
o o
,--
(Th -0 0
o .
0
....--Cor "
? -?? East London
---"
pOL.
oPPer ?
Beira
,???
LOUREKO MARQUES
CAPE TOWN
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY A UTHOR IT A TIVE
?
Port Elizabeth
Bassas da India
(Fr.)
Be Europa
(Fr.)
RAILROADS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
FLOW OF
MAJOR COMMODITIES
Commodities shown are in
addition to general freight.
? ? ?? International boundary
0
National or colonial capital
O 190 290 390 490 m
I
O 100 200 300 400 Kilometers
CONFIDENTIAL
37851 6-63
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 3
?
CONGO
BRAllAVI LL
er'?
Noire./ *
?? CAINDA
Cabinda I
Matadi
LUANDA
LEO PO LD VII LI
Vila Marecha
Carmona
20
Kikwit
REPUBLIC OF TH CO
Dprid
ge/
Porto Amboim/0" A
Gabela
Novo Redondo,
SO( T711
TLA NTIC
orp,,i1A7 Lobito
6
Benguela c
( 8
12 ,
, .
Mogar,iedes
Chiange
7
SA da
Bande_i_ra
vii
;
Nova Lisboa
Cltima
()
S 0 U
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
9 :
Silva Porto
cC
Port
Francui
NGO
RAILROADS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
ANGOLA
Single track
a Locomotive repair shop
6. Bridge 150' or longer
(Numbers keyed
to text)
Road
All rail lines shown are 3'6" gauge,
except where otherwise indicated.
50 190 Miles
0 50 100 Kilometers
CONFIDENTIAL
a.
Vila Henrique
de Carvalho
? _
Vila Teixeira de S
.4% Ca551-1i
Vila Luso
Vila Serpa P'into
Dilolo
Gare
IFED?. OF
RHODESIA
'
\ .
AND
i 1
Y`
NYASALAND
\
i (UK,)
:
\ (
\
----------;-,
........ .....N...........-...."..r
\'-.?..-
, .............??? sTR1 P
....4../...S...A.A.............c A pftiV'..
BE6 FlUANALAND
(U.K.)
___-- Okovanggo
Swamp
TI{-WES?T\ AFRICA
(Mandnte ?Rep. of
Tsumeb
/7
37823 6-63 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 4
CAMEROON - 1'6' 24 32
RAILROADS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
Single track
BANGU
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP UBL C
? SUDAN
-

... J
Q?1
Centralized traffic control
Electric traction
ili Locomotive repair shop
15 Bridge ' or longer
\ id 150 l
(Numbers keyed to text)
Commercial navigation
.7`
i Powerplant Transformer
station
I
--..?.
.
0
Coquilhatville
\ Bondo N.
,,,,____-_,.._ _ ? ??
28 , Uele
/------. Titule
1,1- Komba, Buta illh.. 26 11113/4" gauge
Aketi -._..-
isa L.
Lla . . ,. ' Mungbere
0,,,,fi I., ..,"___??fi,
- -`,._/111.7 ??
Lake
Albert
It. Rutshuru. ,I 'UGANDA
4 -2 -Stanleyville '''3,/33/411 gauge
o sp 190 290 Miles
23
Ir (7)2,--
i .. .
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
CONFIDENTIAL
P
,
nt1 erville r: Lake
(I Edward .
,
Lake :
All rail lines shown are 3'6" gauge,
except where otherwise Indicated.
j ...1- \ GABO..N . ).
N....-... \s;
CONGO
).i
4, "--i Luc
i 's ('- Leopold II
\.-7i: ,
- ?I..,
? Victoria ;
)"."-`/V:.X
, 4,-:, i
\-.--..- Lac .; RWANDA
Kivu ),/). ?KIGALI
Kinduoa Kamanyola
1
,...\ee
ZZAVILLE
BRA?
___J 's_?.
'Port Francqui
?' (
i, ?
4.8. n9a ./.4T. .. 45,1W
'I,' 38 Ts'hela42- ' iSo2
ysvil
gaup _a ? m O.
1 ? ..--\
W.,
opvILLE
Bata
Lus.mbo
\ .
Kikwit.
)
LulUabOir.:
c
-Kasongo
fa -. \ . Kigoma
...? ,
\ 19
4,kuga K?ngolo 18 . 1. ??11.3%/ gauge
16? "--- ' ''' ?'?
k........ Et' )
'TANGANYIK
6,
34-3
2
\...,,..----i 3
,Aatow 0 Albertville ,. ( I
. ,
15 \ \ Luke
14. ,
, \?,,Tannan Wk.)
Kisamba
Kabongo( .-? '\ 1\
',1'
\
?LUANDA -
'- ie ?
,..,,0 C:uanza
A
Ail , A .% 17( ' '
( 'I.; 1. A.
( ) ." /
Benguela
K,... z"."-? ,,
,C" 1
,
2 --I'Lr.
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,
N\ G 0 ' \ L A ,_ -.G a e ?..)
7
"N(Port)"N(Port)R -;ai i
io 0?. ___1,..! s
I . -
N'" ,
...?.. 1
N'\
IDE
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS I
16 NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE 1 24
_,?
\c" '
r. ..,.., .?
Kamina
/ 10
L ,Buka a ?'Ncilttiveru
el, n -
9 e
A
'''ee'''''
2 Lake
Ltd, ywouhr _

'-'
......\....--,_,
"---** Elisabethville
Sali-3"A?ral
Ndola
Luanshya "J
ATION OF RHODESIA D NYASALAND
(U.K.), /
UE
1,11-15-rIp
(i..--0 i01
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002800010001-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 5
EPUBLI
? Dilolo-Garp,..
12 ii
ANGeOLA
(port.)
1
\ I
\
16-1
Grmlue
'x82 ?Fultis
Katima
m
? s. .;" 29
24
Kamin'a
N.Mongu
Maiono.
THE C NGO
6
Te ke
Kolwezi
Jadotville
r
Lake `,\\
Tanganyika '\,\ Lake
k NRuktua
'. ...1
?
, ) ?)/..,/i.-