OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

TP SECRET
Approved For Ruse 2001/09/(T4: CIA- DP79T01146AQ100010001-0
49094
COPY NO 39
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE `-
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC
Date: r?' ~"'
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared for the internal use of the Office
of Current Intelligence. It does not
necessarily represent a complete coverage of
all current traffic in CIA or in the Office
of Current Intelligence.
2. Comment represents the preliminary views of
the responsible analysts and not necessarily
the final view of the Office of Current
Intelligence.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
"A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"B" - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
"C" - other information indicating trends
and potential developments
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
4kcivvAi A'Cco
6; R
luff
y
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100010001-0
TOP SECRET
 Approved For4please 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0114Q900100010001-0
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
USSR. Embassy Moscow Comments on Possible Soviet Diplomatic Approach
to Turkish Government, Embassy Moscow "views seriously" the possibility
that the Soviet Union may soon present a diplomatic demarche to Turkey
suggesting a renewal of their non-aggression treaty and perhaps offering
proposals concerning the straits as well as a waiver of territorial
claims to the Kars and Ardahan districts. For some months, according to
the Embassy, a pattern of Soviet "sweet reasonableness" toward most Near
Eastern countries has become apparent- Since Turkey is the only Year
Eastern country possessing the capability of substantial resistance to the
USSR in case of war, the Embassy believes that "neutralization" of Turkey
is a major objective of Soviet policy. (S Moscow 1574, 27. Feb 51).
COMMENT: Present concern with Soviet-Turkish relations arises from a re-
port (Ankara 451, 25 Jan 51) that Israeli Minister Sassoon asked a high
Turkish official what his government8s attitude would be if the USSR
wished to renew their treaty of non-aggression, which was denounced by
the USSR in 1945 and permitted to lapse. There is no evidence, however,
that any conversations on such a subject have taken place between the USSR
and Turkey on an official level. The Montreux Convention on the straits
comes up again this year for possible amendment, and the Soviet Union may
be planning to offer a quid proquo to better its position in the straits.
In view of the fact that this report originated with the Turkish Foreign
Minister and also in view of the'Turkish desire for a firmer security
commitment from the West, Turkey might attempt to utilize a Soviet ap-
proach in order to improve its own security position. Nevertheless, it
is very unlikely that Turkey would permit itself to be "neutralized" by
the USSR.*
Soviet Price Reductions Announced, The Council of Ministers and the
Central Committee of the CP, USSR, announced the fourth postwar reduction
in the price of consumer goods. The announcement virtually displaced all
other topics in Moscow's transmissions on the evening of 28 February.
Commentaries reiterated Stalin0s statement that "no country can enlarge
its armed forces and expand a war industry and at the same time broaden
its civil industries, reduce prices, and improve the welfare of the
people." The new decree was said, to bear "vivid testimony to the peace-
ful policy of the USSR." (R FBID, 28 Feb 51). COMMENT: Initial comment
indicates that the price reduction decree will be widely used not only
to reinforce the. current Soviet "peace" line, but also to soften the
domestic audience for the expected announcement of a new Five-Year Plan.
USSR Seeking to Retain UN SeenritrY Council Post. The USSR has re-
portedly sought the reappointment of i9onstantin E. Zinchenko as Assistant
Secretary General in charge of Securi.ty.Council affairs, asserting that
the allocation of top Secretariat jobs agreed to in 1945 was still appli-
cable. Although the Security Council deals with such matters as the
Korean war and sanctions against Communist China, UN'members apparently
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100010001-0
 Approved For1lease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0114 900100010001-0
TOP SECRET
have not included Mr. Zinchenko in work on secret matters: (U NYTimes,
1 March p.5). 00MMENTs The USSR has been exerting pressure on the
Secretariat by threats of boycotting Secretary-General Lie and by propa-
ganda assertions that the US controls UN personnel. Although UN
Secretariat members are supposed to be international civil servants,
Soviet Nationals in particular maintain close contact with their dele-
gation. Zinchenko's reappointment is probably mainly a matter of pres-
tige for the USSR with concomitant intelligence value.
EASTERN EUROPE. BALHANS Siena of Immediate Hostilities Lacking. US
missions in Rumania,-Hungary and Yugoslavia do not attribute unusual
significance to reports of Soviet troop movements on the Yugoslav pe-
riphery. US Legation Bucharest reports that there is no evidence of any
unusual troop movements in Rumania, an observation which is supported by
most other non-orbit political and military representatives. The Legation
does have reliable reports of many tanks and considerable activity among
Soviet forces near the Yugoslav frontier, but attributes these to normal
operations of the one or possibly two Soviet divisions stationed in that
area. In regard to Bulgaria, the Bucharest Legation passes on the report
of the Israeli Minister that in Sofia air raid directives are being given
the civil population and anti-aircraft guns have been seen on buildings,
but there is no unusual evidence of troop movements. US Legation Budapest
reports that there are no signs of unusual activity in Budapest except
for unsubstantiated rumors that air raid sirens and shelters are being
readied. Prom Belgrade Ambassador Allen reports that the Yugoslav
Government is aware of a Soviet 1tanku division in Rumania, but does not
regard its activities as of particular significance. In assessing its
information, Legation Bucharest states its belief that unless the Soviets
wish to start a general war now, any plan for an anti-Yugoslav campaign
would probably consist of pushing the Satellites into the front of the
operation with the Soviets in the background, following the Korean pattern.
If such an operation were now imminent, the Legation would expect to see
unusual activities on the part of Rumanian as well as of Soviet forces
and various measures inaugurated for air defense and control of the popu-
lace. To date no such activities have been discerned by any of the non-
orbit missions in Bucharest. (TS Bucharest 608, 23 Feb 51; TS Budapest
403, 22 Feb. 51; TS Belgrade 1173, 24 Feb 51).
ALBANIA. Qpen Hostility Toward Soviets in Tirana, The French Minister
in Tirana reports that two Albanian chauffeurs at the Soviet Legation
have been jailed following a bomb explosion on the premises on 19 Feb.
City shops are closed and 200-300 persons have been arrested as a result
of the incident. The Minister comments that the explosion is the first
manifestation of hostility toward the Soviets. (C Belgrade 1189, 27 Feb
51), COQ The ban on terrorist activity issued 26 Feb by the
Albanian Government (see 0/CI Daily 27 Feb) will cover this particular
incident. It is not yet known if the occurrence is connected with a
widespread resistance movement.
TOP SECRET
Approved For.Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100010001-0
 Approved For lease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0114WO0100010001-0
TOP SECRET
"B"
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. New Goals-Tie,Czechoslovak Economy More Closely to
Soviet Master Plan. According to the 1951 Plan submitted' to the
Government by Minister of State Planning Dolansk4y, increased emphasis
will be placed on developing heavy industry in Czechoslovakia. The rise
in production of heavy industry should be 18.2 percent in 1951 over 1950,
compared with an increase of 15,6 in that year over the preceding one.
By contrast, production goals for light industry will only be increased
by 6.3 percent over those for 1950. The 1951 Plan also provides that
the Soviet Orbit will absorb 59 percent of Czechoslovak exports, having
accounted for only 54 percent last year; *hile Czechoslovakia will ob-
tain 61 percent of its required imports from the Orbit during 1951, which
represents a substantial increase from the 11 percent figure during 1950.
In support of these figures, Dolansky stated that "in the present inter-
national situation we must more than ever strengthen our economy8s inde-
pendence of the capitalist West and so insure it against the consequences
of discriminatory policy." (R FBIS, 21 Feb 51; U NYT, 28 Feb 51) COMMENT:
The establishment of new industrial targets and the reorientation of
foreign trade commitments represents increased Czechoslovak subservience
to Soviet demands to integrate its economy into the over-all master plan
for the Orbit. The Soviet Union twice during 1950 stepped up its demands
for heavy industrial equipment and simultaneously refused to fulfill
Czechoslovak requests for sufficient raw materials to maintain its well-
developed light industry capacity. The reluctance of some influential
members of the Party to jeopardize the stable economy and the high standard-
of-living in Czechoslovakia through too rapid Sovietization probably ac-
counts in large measure for the current political crisis in Czechoslovakia.
The purging of the so-called bourgeoie nationalist deviationists will en-
able the Kremlin to exploit the Czechoslovak industrial potential more
effec,tively for its own benefit.
"B" FINLAND. Defense Minister Denies Soviet Demands for Radar Bases. Defense
Minister Skog has denied, on the occasion of an official call made by the
US Service Attaches, that the Soviet Union has made demands for radar bases
and the use of airfields in Finland. When asked what the Finnish reaction
to such a demand would be, Skog stated that Finland is a democratic sover-
eign state, free of entanglements in the altercations between major powers,
and intended to remain so. (S MA Helsinki 431, 27 Feb 51), COMMENT:
Skoges denial of Soviet demands accords with other reliable information
on this subject.
"A" POLAND. Movements of Polish and Czech Ambassadors., The following movements
of Polish and Czechoslovak Ambassadors have been noted. During the week
ending 21 Feb 51 the Polish Ambassador to the UK left for Warsaw. A note
dated ~6 Feb 51 (received 26 Feb-51) notified the US Embassy Moscow, that
the Polish Ambassador to the USSR was temporarily absent. During the week
ending 21.Feb 51 the Czechoslovak Ambassador, MA, and AirA to the UK
left for Prague. On 18 Feb 51 the Czechoslovak Ambassador to the US left
for Prague, having been preceeded by the Czechoslovak MA to the US who
TOP SECRET
3
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100010001-0
 "An
Approved For lease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T011464900100010001-0
TOP SFCRST
left for Prague on 16 Feb 51. The Czechoslovak Ambassador to the USSR
left for Pra e &D-proximately the middle of Feb 51. (R Moscow 1585, 28
Feb 51;
receive in-
structions possible that these individuals have ee
on further coordination of the Soviet-Satellite diplomatic
campaign concerning West German rearmament and an anticipated CFMO (See
0CI Dailies for 12 Feb 51, 15 Feb 51, 19 Feb 519 and 20 Feb 51 for recent
Polish-Czechoslovak actions in regard to West German rearmament and
possiUJ.e CFM). The Polish Ambassador and the MA to the US have not re-
turned to Warsaw.
RUMANIA. Wi;ter Lull. Greeks recently repatriated from Rumania have
furnished up-to-date Information regarding military preparations in Rumania.
The conclusion reached by American interrogators is that there is a winter
lull in Soviet. and Rumanian Army activity and that neither Soviet nor
Rumanian units are preparing to attack in the immediate future. In regard
to the Soviet Army, the refugees reported normal troop movements and an
increase in troop strength at. Braila. Soviet families were still present
in Bucharest in Feb 519 but there have been no children since early 49.
In regard to the Rumanian Army9 the refugees reported that soldiers were
being released after two years" service; that troop strength had greatly
increased in Bucharest during the second half of 1950; no BW or OW
equipment had been issued soldiers or civilians up to Feb 51 in Bucharest
or Braila. No civil passive defense measures were being taken in
Constanta, Braila and Barlad, but in Lugo, (in the Banat) all civilians
had been ordered to clear their attics and have air raid equipment ready
by mid-Dec 50. In regard to transport, all rail traffic heading VW from
Lugo] increased duping the two months before Feb 51; shipping activity at
Constants had been normal or below for the same period; traffic on the
Danube had stopped since early Feb, when the river froze. (S MID Athens 54,
27 Feb 51).
YUGOSLAFIA. P99sible New Tack on Trieste,
Yugoslav Foreign Minister gardelj has stated that Yugoslavia has rev se
its position regarding Trieste and now favors an Italian-Yugoslav condo-
minium, whereby Italy and Yugoslavia would ""jointly administers the en-
tire Free Territory. Kardelj gave no indication that the proposal would
be brought to the attention of Italy, and did not expect a settlement in
the foreseeable future. Will COMMENT: If this un-
realistic proposal is ever made, it might represent a Yugoslav attempt to
gain some voice in the administration of the city and port of Trieste, to
salvage prestige for lost of outright control. More probably, it might
represent a bargaining position from which to retreat in bilateral negoti-
ations with the Italians, in which the Yugoslavs would settle for clear
title to Zone B.
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100010001-0
 Approved Forv&Iease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO114W00100010001-0
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"B"
ARAB LEAGUE. Rumored Arab L e a g u e Support for the Moroccan Issue i n t h e According to the Arab News Agency (ANA) in Cairo the Arab League Secretariat
has decided to submit the problem of Morocco and North Africa to the Securi-
ty Council. The ANA further reports the expectation that Egypt and Pakistan
will raise the issue shortly in the Security Council. (R FBIS Ticker,
27 Feb 51). COMMENT: Recent Arab League meetings in Cairo revealed the de-
finite concern felt by Arab countries over the Moroccan internal problems of
the past few months. The Sultan of Morocco's reported accession to French
demands in the last week will probably not diminish, and may even increase,
Arab or Moslem agitation for UN action on the issue, (OCI Daily Summary,
27 Feb 51). If the Arab League is planning to present the case of the
North African Moslems to the UN, it seems more likely that the League mem-
bers in the UN will submit this question to the next session of the General
Assembly in the fall rather than to the Security Council. Egypt and Pakistan
(the latter not a member of the Arab League) are so. concerned with their
own external problems--the Anglo-Egyptian treaty dispute and Kashmir--that
their raising of the North African question in the UN does not seem likely
at present.
ISRAEL. Speculation on Israeli Policy toward the USSR. US Embassy Moscow
suggests that Sassoon, the Israeli Minister to Turkey, may have been acting
under official Israeli. stimulus rather than on his own initiative when he
approached the Turkish Foreign Minister several weeks ago on the subject of
a Soviet-Turkish non-aggression treaty. (OCI Daily, 27 Jan 51). Since the
Israelis have been manifestly concerned over the problems of Near East de-
fense and over the deterioration of Soviet-Israeli relations, the Embassy
doubts that they "have so completely forsaken the 'neutralist' path that
they would refrain from exploring means of improving their security posi-
tion other than clear-cut identification with Western defense plans." The
trnbassy further comments that one alternative approach to Israel's security
problem could be the conclusion of non-aggression pacts betwE3n the USSR
and the NE countries including Turkey and Israel. (S Moscow 1578, 27 Feb 51).
COMMENT: It seems unlikely that Sassoon acted under Foreign Office instruc-
tions, but since evidence one way or the other is lacking, Embassy Moscow's
interpretation cannot be wholly discounted. Israel's constant fear of losing
her national identity in a general war might cause official reluctance to
abandon neutrality completely, and it might induce sporadic attempts by the
Foreign Office to re-explore the possibility of striking a "modus vivendi"
with the USSR. However, since Israel has already gone a long way toward
abandoning'neutrality in actual fact and toward identifying her foreign
policy with that of the West, and since the Israeli economy is dependent
upon US support, it is unlikely that the country will revert to its former
official neutrality despite its fears and doubts regarding national security.
TOP SECRET
5
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100010001-0
 ?
Approved ForJlease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146
TOP SECRET
00100010001-0
"A"
INDIA.
Boundaries of India, Tibet and Communist China.
The Second Secre-
tary of the Indian Embassy, Washington, states that Communist China has
assured India that it recognizes the present boundaries between India, Tibet
and China. The Chinese further state that, although India and Tibet had
independently agreed on their present borders, China has recognized the
action as valid in view of its suzerainty over Tibet. (C State to New
Delhi 1364, 27 Feb 51). COMMENT: Some maps had been brought forward re-
cently which showed the Chinese boundary within the Indian province of
Assam, but China has assured the Indian government that the maps are old
and not considered official by the Peiping government. Though this assu-
rance further emphasizes the present friendly relations between China and
India, it does not necessarily mean these will continue, or that Chinese-
Tibetan-Indian boundary matters will not be brought up again.
"C" Indian Troops Suppress Nepal Revolt. At the request of the new
Nepal Government, Indian troops have conducted a successful military opera-
tion in west N^pal which has resulted in the capture of K.I. Singh and
other Nepal Congress Party rebels who had refused to heed their Party's
earlier call for cessation of the revolt against the Nepalese Government.
US Embassy New Delhi comments that this effective intervention in support
of the new Indian-sponsored regime in Nepal is indicative of steps the
Indian Government could have taken last January (if it had so desired) to
suppress the revolt of the Nepal Congress Party at the time it first broke
.out. (C New Delhi, 2215, 23 Feb 51). COMMENT: This information supports
the previously-expressed belief that the GOI was informally interested in
the success of the earlier revolt in order to give it grounds for inter-
vention in Nepalese affairs.
"B" INDOCHINA. French Official Confirms De Lattre Meddling. A French official
in Hanoi has told the US Consul that C-inC De Lattre was to blame for
French meddling in Vietnamese internal politics, and that it was De Lattre
personally who gave orders to his civil aide to "occupy himself" with the
Vietnam cabinet and to oppose certain Vietnamese ministerial candidates.
The source believed that the "honeymoon" between De Lattre and the Vietnam
Government is over. (S Hanoi 463, 28 Feb 51). COMMENT: De Lattre himself,
although professing adherence to the principle of non-intervention in
Vietnamese politics, sought to justify a French voice in the selection of
the Vietnamese ministers of Defense and Economy on the strength of French
sacrifices in blood and treasure in Indochina.
"C" NEW ZEALAND. Sympathy Strikes Aggravate Dock Stoppage. Waterside workers
on 26 February rejected the Government's "return-to-overtime-work" ultima-
tum and troops are now unloading perishable cargoes under an emergency
TOP SECRET
6
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100010001-0
 Approved FoAQilease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146 100100010001-0
TOP SECRET
decree, Sympathy strikes have been declared by freezing workers, miners,
and hydro-construction employees. Seamen, railway men, and engine drivers,
although not officially on strike, refuse to help troops or to handle cargo
which they have unloaded. The moderate-led Federation of Labor has opposed
the Government?s emergency measures, but to date has not declared support
for either the Government or the wa tersiders. (U Wellington 276, 28 Feb 51).
COMMENT: The labor situation on the New Zealand waterfront has been chroni-
cally unstable, with increasing prospects of a showdown between the mili-
tant Waterside Workers' Union and the recently elected conservative Govern-
ment. Although, in the past, the Watersiderse influential Communist bloc
has felt that union leaders have precipitated strikes on weak issues and
agreed to premature settlements, the current strike - which involves both
overtime and wage issues - appears to be more solidly based and apparently
has caused a serious split throughout the ranks of New Zealand labor.
"A" CHINA. Re orted Nationalist Oil Shipment to Mainland.
25X1C the Panamanian freighter FLYING DRAGON,
which arrived in Hong Kong from eelung via Macao on 23 January, offloaded
2,500 tons of "ECA diesel oil", consigned to the Chinese Communists at
25X1A Macao. . COMMENT: If con-
firmed, this would be the largest known shipment of non-Soviet oil obtained
by the Chinese Communists since the start of the western oil embargo in
July 1950. Although the Chinese Nationalists would not openly permit the
export of oil from Taiwan, clandestine export is possible. It is known
that the FLYING DRAGON did proceed from Keelung via Macao to Hong Kong,
but whether a.large oil shipment was offloaded at Macao is unconfirmed.
"B" No Progress in UK Negotiations. T1S Embassy London
describing his farewell cal upon the inese
25X1X Communist Vice Foreign inls er. The latter displayed a "studious lack of
cordiality" and refused to express an opinion as to means of reactivating
UK-PRC negotiations for establishment of deplomatic relations. The Chinese
official reportedly would say only "I have no views to express." The
Charge concluded that the Chinese attitude "augurs ill" for an early UK-PRC
rapprochement. (C London 4647, 27 Feb 51). CON.ffy NT: UK-PRC negotiations
for establishment of diplomatic relations have made no significant progress
since their inception in the spring of 1950. UK Foreign Office sources
were reported as believing, four weeks ago, that Peiping had no desire to
regularize its relationship with the UK. Prospects for "rapprochement"
continue to be poor, although the new UK Charge, who will arrive in Peiping
in March is generally regarded as a very able man.
25X1 C "C"
a rugs were g 25X1A
very scarce, that the Communists were limiting hospital purchases of sulfa.
drugs to no more than 200 bottles, and that tetanus antitoxins were una-
vailable for civilian use either in Taihsien or Shanghai.
COMMENT: The scarcity of medicines or a vi Tan
use indicates that Peiping is tightly controlling its supply of drugs for
military use.
Approved For Release 2001/09/04 r7CIA-RDP79T01146A000100010001-0
 Approved For*elease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146M00100010001-0
TOP SECRET
"C" Nationalist Briefing of Admiral Strubleo In an official briefing of
US Vice Admiral Struble, the Chinese Nationalist MND emphasized the strong
capabilities of the Chinese Communist ground, sea, and air forces, while
the Nationalists military potential was protrayed in a less optimistic
fashion. Admiral Struble was informed that the Communists have 454,000
tons of shipping available, adequate to transport 6 armies and 1 division
one way to Taiwan but that Nationalist intelligence would probably be able
to spot an invasion one month in advance. (S USARMA, Taipei, AT 74,
28 Feb 51)a COMMENT: In the portrayal of the relative potentials of the
Communists and Nationalists, Nationalist capabilities were apparently un-
derestimated for the purpose of attracting US aid. Six armies would be
roughly equivalent to 200,000 men, the figure generally accepted regarding
the number of troops the Chinese Communists could transport in a single
water-lift operation against Taiwan. Concentration of the necessary troops
and invasion craft could. not be accomplished without giving considerable
forewarning of the intended operation.
"B" KOREA. ROK Fiscal Problems. ECA officials have urged that the present
ROK currency conversion rate of 4,000 won to US $1 be revised upwards to
6,000 to 1, in order to more nearly reflect the falling purchasing power
of ROK currency. Ambassador Muccio, concurring in the economic aspects of
the ECA report, notes that such a move would discourage ROK financial offi-
cials who are presently making a sincere attempt to collect revenue and
curb inflation. Muccio suggests that revision of the currency rate be
postponed until 31 March, the and of the Korean fiscal year, (S Pusan 771,
28 Feb 51). COMMENT: Ambassador Muccio's suggested postponement of the
exchange rate revision is desirable, since February and March are tradi-
tionally the ROK's best revenue-collecting periods.
"A" New NK Internal Securi Proclamation. Radio Pyongyang broadcast
on 24 February an internal security edict, in KIM Ilsung's name, ostensi-
bly designed to "expose and crush" enemy agents (disguised as People's
Troops) who have been dispatched in an "effort to depreciate the prestige
of the People's Armed Forces". All citizens are called on to deny accomo-
dations to individuals with whom they are not acquainted, to prohibit the
transportation of material and food without proper authorization, and to
turn in loitering military personnel who lack identification or travel
certificates. (R FBIS, 28 Feb 51). COMMENT: While there may actually be
some reason to tighten security due to the presence of ROK agents, these
same measures could equally well be designed to regain controls lost in
the NK retreat, to halt blackmarketing and evasion of food controls, and
to capture NK military deserters.
"C" JAPAN. British Mission Upset by SOAP. Action. State Department has advised
Polad Tokyo that.an officer of the British Embassy in Washington has pointed
out that transfer of certain diplomatic functions by SOAP to the Japanese
Government (see OCI Daily, 20 Feb 51)had.been announced in Tokyo with no
8
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100010001-0
 Approved For (ease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146,p 00100010001-0
TOP SECRET
prior notification to the British Mission there. The officer stated that
the transfer required staff changes, and that it would be helpful if prior
notification could be given on such matters to the British. (C State to
POLAD A-353, 27 Feb 51). OUNT: This is further evidence of strained
relations between SOAP and UK Mission in Tokyo, which appears frustrated
by SCAP's unilateral decisions. The protest reflects the domestic pressure
on the UK Government to assert its position more vigorously in its rela-
tions with General MacArthur.
"B" Dulles Predicts Early Treaty. Ambassador Dulles predicted yesterday
that a Japanese peace treaty probably would be completed by the middle of
the year. He also disclosed (1) the USSR Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Malik,
had agreed to further talks on the treaty, and(2) that the US does not con-
sider the Soviet-occupied Habomai Islands as pert of the Kuriles chain.
(U NYTimes, 1 Mar 51). COM14ENT: The Japanese have long contended that the
USSR occupation of the Habomais is illegal, and they will welcome the US
position. It is unlikely, however, that the USSR will relinquish control
of these islands, and the stage may now be set for increased disputes in
this area. While this decision will be a sop to Japanese territorial as-
pirations, they will continue to press for eventual return of the entire
Kuriles chain, which they claim (1) was not subject to the Cairo Declara-
tion since the islands were not seized by aggression and (2) was granted
to the USSR under the secret Yalta Agreement of which they had no knowledge
at the time of the surrender.
9
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100010001-0
 Approved For'4 lease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146, 00100010001-0
TOP SECRET
"C" Gh,RMANY. Communists Attem
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
Public Service Unions, Leaders of the ublic ervice lira e Unions have
informe the West Berlin city administration that a public service strike,
affecting surface transportation, mail delivery, garbage removal and gas
and-water supplies, will be called 4 March unless union wage demands are
met, On 27 February the West Berlin Senate rejected the unions' demands
on grounds that the city treasury could not grant the wage increases with-
out cutting pensions and other relief funds. Meanwhile, the Communist East
Berlin newspaper Neues Deutschland has urged Communist Party members to
"make common cause with West Berlin workers in protesting the rising cost
of living and to demand a new East-West conference on reunification of the
city. (U NYT, 1 Mar 51). COMMENT- Although the strike is not Communist
inspired, and the strongly an ommunist West Berlin workers are unlikely
to be deluded by Communist appeals for unity of'action, a widespread stop-
page of public services will have serious consequences for the Western
Power position in the city. A compromise solution of the dispute is there-
fore probable,
"C" Soviets claim Ownershipoof~ Berlin's Teltow Canal, In recent talks
with their coup erpar s in -FU 77H. Soviet transport officers endeavored
to prove that the east German Government (GDR) has the right of control
and operation of the Teltow canal, which runs through west Berlin. On this
theory the Soviet authorities demanded the release of the east German water-
ways inspector who was sentenced on 6 February in a west Berlin court for
offenses committed on the Teltow canal. The Soviets are apparently willing
to have German experts discuss a possible solution to operational and main-
tenance problems on the canal after (1) release of the waterways inspector
and (2) conclusion of a basic occupation power agreement on ownership of
the canal. ( S Berlin 1088, 27 Feb 51). COMMENTi Control of the waterways
is a constant source of friction and troub e, w1iic enable Soviet authorities
to make occupancy of Berlin as difficult as possible for the Western powers.
"B"" Break in Bruederschaft Over Pro-Soviet Polio. A significant break
within the Sr-ueaerschaftl, semi-clandestine right-wing nationalist organiza-
tion in West Germany, occurred with the resignation of one of its principal
leaders, Helmut Bech-Broichsitter, on 12 February. Bech-Broichsitter charged
the existence within the organization of a pro-Soviet group led by ex-8S
officer Alfred Franke-Grieksch and by Otto Strasser adherents. He further
claimed, in a recent press release, that the "great majority" of Bruederschaft
members in Hamburg had also resigned and joined Bruederschaft Deutschland,
apparently a new organization. (C Bonn Unnumbere , e an e 51).
COMMENT; Franke-Grieksch was, according to an unconfirmed report (S HICOG
is~ tch 976, 22 Sept 50), conducting clandestine negotiations with East
German representatives, and had reportedly received financial support from
Approved For Release 2001/09/40: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100010001-0
 Approved Foc Iease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146000100010001-0
TOP SECRET
unknown sources. The recent propaganda of the Bruederschaft has become
increasingly anti-Western, to a point where it Men pare els the Commu-
nist line. The Bruederschaft does not, however, currently wield signifi-
cant influence in wes Ge many. Although a year ago its prospects for
amalgamating considerable right-wing nationalist strength were considered
good, the organization has been unable to overcome the internal squabbling
which is prevalent in west German rightist circles.
"C" FRANCE. US and Gaullist Views Now Closer. Embassy Paris, in an analysis
of enera e Ga e's Curren campaign for political power in France, ob-
serves that his over-all position on national and international issues is
closer than that of the middle-of-the-road majority ("Third Force) to US
views. The Embassy finds that De Gaulle, from "genuine conviction", has
repeatedly: (1) insisted that the present defense plans are far from ade-
quate; (2) condemned the Pleven Plan for a European Army; (3) advocated a
German national army to be joined with other NATO forces; and (4) wanted
Spain to contribute to an integrated Western defense. It is clear, accord-
ing to the Embassy, that these views are beamed, at the US as well as the
French audience and that De Gaulle 's major purpose in sending trusted ad-
visers to the US is to create a favorable climate of opinion here, which
could be "of particular importance" in the prospective electoral campaign
of his Rally of the French People'(RPF). Pending the outcome of the pre-
sent debate over electoral reform, the Embassy conjectures that the RPF
will become "an important party" in the next Assembly, with somewhere be-
tween 17% and 25% of the seats. (C Paris Despatch 2057, 29 Jan 51).
COMMENT. De Gaulle's position has not been presented in such favorable
ugh since the fall of 194, when France was weakened by serious strikes
and repeated Cabinet crises. On the other hand, the Embassy's spot re-
porting has frequently emphasized his chauvinistic statements aid implied
that, once in power, he would work to make France less cooperative in
matters of Western defense and European integration.
"B" Government Orders Strom Anti-Communist Measures. The Minister of
the In error -reportedly has issue instructions to the departmental pre-
fects to break all relations with Communists and pro-Communist organiza-
tions, Representatives of the Communist led'General Labor Confederation
(CGT), especially, may no longer be received. A listing of all local
Communists was also ordered, and membership in the French Communist Party
will be grounds for dismissal from the police services, 25X1A
25X1A r1n,,fr. nrma otixir
aggressive anti-Communist campaign, and would indicate a determination to
TOP SECRET
it
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100010001-0
 ferret out subversives from even the lowest governmen4l levels. Because
the CGT is the strongest as well as the largest of the French labor unions,,
compliance with this order may be difficult in so far as Government-labor
relations are affected,
"C" Bidault's Attitude on Spain's Role in Western Defense. Ex-Premier
Bidaul ., rest en of the largely a ho is Popular Republican Party (MRP),
is strongly opposed to the inclusion of Spain as afull-fledged partner
in NATO. However, he has stated he would accept Spain in a sort of co-
belligerent status. In addition, Bidault is not opposed to strengthening
Spain's military machinery, but suggests that it be done with a minimum
of publicity and not through NATO. (C Paris Despatch 2031, 25 Jan 51).
COMMENT.- There have been no indications that the MRP has adopted Bidault's
'Tiews as its official position. Such a position would, however, have con-
siderable influence upon t'rance's attitude toward closer military coopera-
4ion with Spain.
"B" ITALY. Italian Attitude toward Defense Requirements Unrealistic. Italian
v ingress o make the necessary sacrifices o meet the dangers inherent
in the international situation still leaves much to be desired. Military
and Foreign Office officials want Italy to meet the danger, but are un-
willing to assume aggressive leadership in convincing the population of the
importance of defense preparations. In the armed forces there exists anxiety
over Italy's chances in a new war. Other governmental ministries, and busi-
ness, industrial, and labor leaders are unwilling tof~ce the implications
of the present danger and take a "business: as usual" and "depend upon
American aid" attitude. There is complete apathy on the part of the rest
of the population. (C Rome Despatch 210E, 16 Jan 51; AA: IR-l9-51, 12 Jan 51,
C) COIM EN Tq Despite present attitudes, there is a slow but steady improve-
ment inhe Italian will to resist. However, the achievement of a defense
effort (psychological and material) fully commensurate with Italian capa-
bilities is at best a long-term proposition.
Approved Forttelease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0114WO0100010001-0
TOP SECRET
UNITED KINGDOM. Controversial Labor Arbitration Order Reported Being
Amen e ._I ough the later flare-up of the dock strike was on a much r. e-
duced tale, the Government and the Trades Union Council have now reported-
ly decided that modifications must be made quickly in the controversial
Order 1305, which is the issue that has been exploited by the Communist-
dominated Fort Workers' Defense in the these sporadic dock strikes. It
is not yet clear exactly how the regulation will be amended,, but it is in-
dicated that legal sanctions against wildcat strikes will still be possible.
(C London 4652) 28'Feb 51). COIR4EN T- Order 1305, which prohibits unofficial
strikes and makes arbitration compu sort', has for some time past not only
been attacked by the unofficial "workers' Defense Committees", but has also
TOP SECRET
12
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100010001-0
 Approved For.Iease 2001/09A04 : CIA-RDP79T0114WO0100010001-0
TOP SECRE T
been criticized by responsible leaders trhoughout the trade union move-
ment as prejudicing the unions' collective bargaining powers. It appears
that the Government and the TUC have now been convinced that there is a
legitimate grievance here which must be removed if the Communists are to
be deprived of one of their best opportunities for exploiting labor dis-
satisfaction,
"B" SWEDEN DENMARK. Soviet Claim to 12 Miles' Territorial Waters in Baltic
Sea. The Swe ish and ania overnments have decidecto propose to the
UM that the dispute concerning the Soviet claim of a 12 mile limit to
Soviet territorial waters in the Baltic Sea be submitted to the Hague
International Court of Justice for adjudication. (S Copenhagen Despatch
686, 30 Jan 51). C?nDMT-, In August 1950 the USSR rejected a Danish-
Swedish note concerning-he seizure of fishing vessels by Soviet authori-
ties and laid claim to a 12 mile limitation of territorial waters in the
Baltic Sea. The Danes have been disposed to let the issue lie dormant,
since the Russians have so far stopped only one Danish fishing vessel
during 1951; but the Swedes, although probably not sanguine over the pro-
spects for USSR acquiescence to the proposal for adjudication, fear Soviet
plans to make the Baltic a Soviet "Mare nostrum" and wish to indicate
clearly the Scandinavian position. The Swedes are not prepared, however,
to undertake any drastic action to assert their rights and because of Danish
desires and the "good behaviour'' of the Russians, and the note undoubtedly
will not be delivered to the USSR until the close of the current fishing
season in April..
"B'f ICELAND. Defense Negotiations Progressing. US-Iceland negotiations on
an an agreemen or peacetim e defense of islards although progressing
slowly, have already established a wide area of agreement. Foreign Minister
Benediktsson is prepared to accept an initial peacetime force of 3,900
men with such additional increases as NATO deems necessary subject to
Iceland's authorization. He does not desire that Icelanders initially com-
pose part of such a force or receive training, but wishes to leave room
for later participation if desired. Benediktsson would like the first con-
tingent to be sufficiently large to impress the public that adequate de-
fense is being provided. Iceland refuses to sign an agreement for so in-
definite a period. as the duration of NAT., and. US negotiators are attempting
to find a workable solution which will preclude unilateral short notice
termination by Iceland. The form of the public agreement to be submitted
for Althing (parliament) approval is still to be decided; internal political
considerations preclude publication of many provisions with which the Gov-
ernment leaders will concur. Althing action on an agreement giving the
Government general over-all authority so that there can be detailed informal
understandings on operations is envisaged. (1S Reykjavik 144, 21 Feb and
TOP SECRET
13
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100010001-0
 Approved For ?lease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0114W0100010001-0
TOP SECRET
146, 23 Feb 51). COMMENT: (See OCT Daily Summaries of 5 Jan 51 and 16
Jan 51). Icelandic acceptance of foreign troops in peacetime would be
the greatest departure from its traditional zenophobia since it signed
the NAT. Even if the Government carefully provides that the fa?eign
force is for the security of the Keflavik Airport such an agreement is
likely to be hotly debated in tl,.e Althing in view of the present govern-
ment's repeated assurances that no foreign troops would be permitted to
be stationed in the country in peacetime. The Foreign Minister'desires
a sufficiently large initial contingent to show the public that, in re-
turn for its concessions. Iceland is getting real protection.
"B" CHILE. Possible Communist Demonstration Against Assistant Secretar
Mier. has been reported t at the ommunist Party of~ lli__i I attempt
to foment a demonstration against US Assistant Secretary Miller upon his
arrival in Santiago, where he will visit the UN ECOSOC meeting now it
session. CCIWENT: Assistant Secretary Miller
is scheduled to be in Santiago March 5 ommunists can be expected to
use the Miller visit as a springboard for propaganda and activity which
may be directed against the coming Inter-American meeting of Foreign
Ministers. Such activity would support any Communist propaganda con-
demning "US exploitation of Latin America Pt at the current UN ECOSOC meeting.
Continued labor unrest in Chile favors Communist agitation at this time
(see OCI DAILY SUfSURY, 26 Feb 51), but the Chilean authorities are con-
sidered capable of preventing the reported demonstration from reaching seri-
ous proportions.
"C" MEXICO. Communist Efforts to Propagandize Braceros in Mexicali. In
connection wi recent press reports that Communes is are active among to
braceros (contract laborers) entering the US from Mexicali, the US Consul
in Mexicali states that he believes that "through some means Communist
literature is being disseminated among the braceros of "Mexicali" but that
he has "no idea as to what extent nor how receptive the' braceros are to it".
C Mexicali 2, 27 Feb 51)e COMMENT-, The Inspector General of Police for
Baja California has recently s a ed that he "is watching closely" a number
of persons whom he lists as "dangerous suspected Communists". Communist
literature being circulated in Mexicali reputedly includes Cultura Sovietica
and Manifestos Communistas. It is possible that it also inc u es a exTcan
Communist newspaper Voz e Mexico and the pro-Communist El Popular (organ
of Lombardo Toledanc;s Partid opular .
TOP SECRET
14
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100010001-0
 Approved For lease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146..Ap00100010001-0
(S/S Cable Supplement not for dissemination outside 0/CI)
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY SUGARY OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLE TRAFFIC
1 March 1951
SECTION l(SOVIET)
"A" EASTERN EUROPE. YUGOSLAVIA. Allen Doubts Imminent Attack on
Yugoslavia. While admitting that he has few solid facts on which to
base an estimate, Ambassador Allen in Belgrade is inclined to doubt,
from a purely political point of view, that there will be open ag-
gression against Yugoslavia in the near future. Allen notes that Tito
has kept his status as a Communist and a neutral sufficiently clear to
make an attack on him appear as a flagrant aggression in the eyes of
the world, including even those who, like Nehru and the extreme left
of the British Labor Party, are still unable to perceive a clear.-cut
case of aggression in Korea. The Ambassador believes that the reason
the Yugoslav party line has recently been somewhat less confident in
tone than the opinions expressed privately by Tito and Kardelj, is
probably the desire of Yugoslav leaders to avoid over-confidence or
relaxation among the people. Allen thinks that Western Germany is
more likely than Yugoslavia to be the next target of Cominform ag-
gression in Europe. (S S/S Belgrade 1175, 2!. Feb 51).
SECTION 3. (WESTERN)
"B" BRAZIL. Foreign Minister Promises Full Cooperation. with US. Foreign
Minister Neves da Fontoura told US Assistant Secretary of State Miller
that Brazil had accepted fully US point of view and promised that there
would be no differences between Brazil and the US at the Meeting of
Inter American Foreign Ministers to be held in Washington this month.
Meanwhile, other Brazilian officials applied "terrific pressure" on Mr.
Miller to make a public statement that US $500 million would be forth-
coming to Brazil. Neves also indicated his desire for Brazil to send
one division to Korea, but emphasized the need to prepare public opinion
for such a move, (TS S/S Rio de Janeiro 317, 27 Feb 51). COMMENT: The
statements of the Foreign Minister are more optimistic than. reports from
other sources indicate. The pressure for loans of up to US $500 million
strengthens other reports that Braziles cooperation will be on a quid pro
quo basis. This is the first information on Brazilis desire to send a
division to Korea. Only a few months ago Brazilian military officials
and former Foreign Minister Fernandesreported that Brazil. could not meet
the requirements of the Unified command for sending troops to Korea,
Approved For Release 2001//04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100010001-0
 TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED when ApEo a kR 1dmeaglg g0p$PpdtAERDP7@Tr0tf4 jWp46003Md?d or declassi-
fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOURCE
CIA C NTROL N0q
DOC. NO.
DAT D CUMENT REC IVED
DOC. DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
BY (Signature)
TO
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
OFFICE A
proved For ~
6016'61se 2001/09/04 : C
A' KhP79T01
4bibt0100010001-0
DATE
RM 26 ust PREVIOUS EclTIeNS. TOP SECRET (40)
F8O73