OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100040001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 5, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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49097
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC
Date: MAR a 195i
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared for the internal use of the Office
of Current Intelligence. It does not
necessarily represent a complete coverage of
all current traffic in CIA or in the Office
of Current Intelligence.
2. Comment represents the preliminary views of
the responsible analysts and not necessarily
the final view of the Office of Current
Intelligence.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
NAVY review(s) completed.
State Department review completed
items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet
Communist intentions or capabilities
other information indicating trends
and potential developments
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"B" USSR. Possibility of Js~.Taanese Questions Being Infected into the CFM. On
3 March 19519 Jacob Malik, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and UN delegate
issued a statement declaring that he is "not conducting any talks with
Mr. Dulles on a Japanese peace treaty and that the statement of Mr, Dulles
(28 Feb) regarding his message to me on this matter as well as m willing-
ness to resume negotiations - is absolutely groundless." 25X1
On 4 Mar 51 IZVTSTIA denounced US plans for a separate treaty and declared
that the "Soviet Govern.m nt, together with the Chinese Peoples? Republic,
insists upon the quickest conclusion of a universal peace treaty with
Japan." Declaring that the "peaceful solution of the Japanese question"
is"vital to the preservation of world peace,".IZVBSTIA quoted the following
World Peace Council declarations The World Peace Council condemns any
attempts at concluding a separate peace with Japan It believes the
peace treaty should be the subject of negotiations of the Chinese Peoples'
the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain, and must
th
e
the last CPM in May 1949, although Far Eastern questions were not on
agenda, the USSR proposed that a date be set for a Big Five meeting, in-
eluding China, to discuss a peace treaty for Japan.
"B" EASTERN EUROPE. RUMANIA. Axapsals to Patriotism Two new features have
recently appeared in Rumanian propaganda both of which seem intended to
rally the Rumanian people around the present Government. The first in-
novation is an historical approach to the hate campaign in an effort to
show that US-British exploitation of Rumania in the past was characterized
by dishonesty and violence-, the second, which may be a departure of some
significance, is frequent reference to Rumanian patriotism and national
interests, which had previously been played down Furthermore, the
Legation has been informed that early in February Rumanian school teachers
were directed to place greater stress on patriotism. 25X1
COMMENT-. The appeal to national traditions marks a new
point in the Communist regimeUS efforts to rally the population. In this
effort, the Communists have already utilized mass movements such as the
Peace Committees and have set up "national" churches for all faiths ex-
cept the Roman Catholic. The Rumanian line is similar to the Polish
Communists' recent enunciation of the theme of the national front, which
apparently seeks to exploit Polish national traditions for Communist ends,
the clearest example being the Government's call to Poles to be alert to
the prospect of new German aggression.
"C" Pressure on Frances The !?rench Charg4 has informed the US Legation
that theRumanian Government has threatened to apply further travel re-
strictions to the French Mission unless the French Government relaxed its
travel restrictions on the Rumanians in Paris. The Charg; anticipates that
new restrictions would include v resort area 15 to 25 miles from
Bucharest and now unrestricted. 25X1
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YUGOSLAVIA. ugoslav S.peechas Intended to Bolster Morales In public
speeches on L. March in Belgrade, two more Yugoslav leaders publicly ex-
pressed their views regarding a possible attack on Yugoslavia. Chief
of Staff Gen. Koca Popovic emphasized Yugoslaviags potentialities to
wage a successful defensive war explaining that no amount of modern arms
can substitute for the moral and political strength of a people fighting
for its independence and declaring that the USSR, because it has become
an aggressor state, is no longer invincible. Moss. Pijade, recently re-
turned from a visit to London to Paris, emphasized the concern which
Western nations viewed Yu.;oslaviags security and explained that it was
not necessary for Yugoslavia to join any pact or bloc today since the
people of the world will fight aggression, whether or not they are com-
mitted by a written or oral agreement. Pijade warned Yugoslaviaes
Cominform neighbors that their countries might suffer the same devasta-
tion as Korea, if they attack Yugoslaviae
COMMENT: Both speeches appear to reflect concern over the morale o the
Yugoslav people in the face of possible Soviet-sponsored attacks The
speeches are designed to bolster the morale of the poeple and to assure
them that Yugoslavia is not isolated but will be supported by the West
in the event of an attack.
"B" Yugoslav Foreknowledge in Event of Cominform Attack. A Yugoslav
official has told Embassy Belgrade that he would be able to advise it
on a 24 hour basis of any important border disturbances and probably a
week in advance of any major Cominform attack on Yugoslavia. The
Embasev comments that it has no real reason to disbelieve this assertion.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"B" TURKEY. Reaction of UN SC Members to US-UK Resolution on Kashmir. The
Turkish delegate to the UN has been given authority, at his discretion,
to support the US-UK resolution on Kashmir nor before the.UN Security
Council. Turkey feels that care should be taken not to push Nehru too
fnrbut it is generally sympathetic to the US-UK vier.
25X1 COMMENT: Turkey is one of the first SC members to indicate
its stand regarding the resolutiop. Previously? political observers in
Jakarta had stated that Indonesia would abstain if the matter came to a
vote.
25X1
"C" KOREA. ROK refugee problem. J. Donald Kingsley, UN Agent General for
Korean Reconstruction, predicted on 3 March in Geneva that there will be
a famine in South Korea next year unless about 3,000,000 refugees,
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jammed into the lower portion of the peninsula, can be put back on their
25X1 farms in the near future. COMMENT: Kingsley's
estimate of the number of Korean refugees is a Fallr" In
addition to the problem of feeding these refugees, however, there are the
more immediate problems of screening them for Communist infiltrators,
diverting them from military areas and highways, and the prevention of
disease. In the latter category, typhus has already been reported among
the refugees and the cholera season will open in about three months.
110" JAPAN. Poll on rearmament. A public opinion poll conducted by the
'1Mainichi" (an important national middle-of-the-road daily) shows 63%
of the people approved rearmament for self-defense, while 89.2% of this
group favored the continued stationing of US troops in Japan. Amon
those o osing rearmament, 69% wanted US forces to remain. 25X1
25X1 COMMENT: While Japanese public opinion favoring rearmamen
had crystallized several months ago, this is the first poll overwhelmingly
favoring the presence of US troops in the post-treaty period. This is
probably a reflection of the Japanese tendency to accept decisions made
by their leaders - in this case, during the course of the Dulles visit.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"A" FRANCE. French Communist Appeal to Neutralists by Emphasis on German
Neu ralization, An eventual Sov:i_e proposal. for German neutralization
was heavily stressed by Pierre Cot, representing the Communist-front
Progressive Union, in his speech at a neutralist mass meeting in Paris
on 1 March4 This point in Cot's speech received favorable comment from
some orthodox neutralists, The Progressive Union has not had much
success in winning their support for the Soviet peace policy, and Cot's
group during the next few months will increase its efforts to exploit
neutralism. At the same time, the French Communist Party (PCF) is
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struggling ainst the spread of neutralism as well as national
doviationism ';within its own ranks. C MUM, NT
This is the first report of a mass meeting sponsore ~y of 'o x"
and Comm unist-front neutralists, and is the first clear indication
that the PCF is failing in its efforts to convert the original
neutralists. By shifting the emphasis to German neutralization, the
PCF probably hopes both to convert the neutralists to support of the
Soviet peace offensive and avert defections from the party.
FRANCE. Proposed General Solution of Political Crisis. Socialist
Guy T:tollet announce( on -t March that He-
e is found a so cation for the
Cabinet crisis whereby electoral reform would be loft up to Parliament
chile a short-teem Government would concentrate on other critical
matters. The Mollet Plan envisages elections before summer after
action has been taken on inflation, the budget, arms production, and
modification of the Constitution in order to eliminate the Communists
from any pre?-election care-baker Government. The next Government will
probably include only the middle-of-the-road parties, since some
Popular Republicans and Radicals can be expected to support the
Socialists in opposition to the Gaullists' suggestion for a "national
union government" including; them (but excluding the Communists).
Representatives of all parties are calling for "elections as soon
as possible", and there is. increasing support for a popular referendum
on the electoral reform question.
COLSIENT: even resigned because he was
unable -to fulfill his commitment 9 obtain electoral reform. Mollet's
proposal will therefore receive serious consideration both as a means
of leaving the next Government free to support France's major role in
Western European affairs and allowing the shaky middle-of-the-road
coalition to survive until elections.
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"Bu UNITED KINGDOM. British 14ilitary Plannin ; Alternative for Suez Base.
n :rr riti h hie f6 of Sta f pan for the u ur'a e ense o the Suez
Canal Zone is reported by the t; i Embassy Cairo to include the follow-
ins feature:,, (1)- / phasod evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone, begin-
n~nrr i-m.r, dl.ahely,to be completed by 1956) vd..th "'civilian" technicians
rc:y lacing; the rii.i litary spec:i.alis l,s. (2) The leasing by the. UK of the
S ez base v ith administrative control in British hands but
with. Egyptian "participations" and. S' .th the 1gyptians responsible for
policing the base. (3) The nosssib-)1e creation of a ""temporary" base
in Israel which z?rould coot .0 million and take 8 years to construct.
The British 1,,:"~o ssy in r,c..ir.o has s`Aar;-)7y criticized certain details
in this plan axid has also c C1iroesc d. 'v" 1E: view th?i; i11 tale British ;n.sh
to sell the %,yptianc on any such "joint defense'l? arrangement for the-
area, the UK must first clc rionstrate faith in Egypt! military caoa--
b:IAUIe by 1 ?;.:cumin