OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100110001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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4S1 3
COPY NO 39
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC
MAR 13 1951
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared. for the internal use of the Office
of Current Intelligenceo It does not
Its"asarily represent a complete coverage of
all current traffic in CIA or in the Office
of Current Intelligenceo
2. Comment represents the preliminary views of
the responsible analysts and not necessarily
the final view of the Office of Current
Intelligenceo
3. Marginal letter ineiicatiens are defined, as
follows:
"At' v items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
csRes - important regional developments
not necessarily related. to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
~Cn other information indicating trends
and potential developments
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
25X1 C
'Acs USSR. REvidence of Stalin Letter to Italian Communist Party. A 25X1A
report states that a survey of Italian sources discloses no indication
of a letter from Stalin to Togliatti? con-
siders the receipt of such a letter unlikely in view of Togliatti's
recent return from the USSR. doubts that a letter would be 25X1C
used to communicate this type of information and states that Togliatti
would not in any cc-tee reveal its receipt to the entire PCT Politburo.
25X1C the letter to be a war of nerves move in pre-
paration for the prospective CFM. 25X1A
Only). COMMENT., See 0/01 Daily Summary of 10, 12 Mar 51 for infor-
ma,tion regarding reported Stalin letter to Trench and Italian Communist
Parties.
Ca_m i .p rx ;roue for Maximum Utilization of MaChzner and Materials.
The campaign for better utilization of machinery and materials which was
started last Dccc-mbe;r climaxed the budget addresses in the Supreme Soviet
as a dominant theie. The intensity of this campa:rgn has been unusual and
merits close attention. By making industry aYd Agriculture raise pro-
ductivity by more efficient use of existing facilities, new investments
in plant and machinery for the coming year could be devoted to building
up military industries. (S MA Moscow 1040, Week. 10, 11 Mar 51). COMMENT:
For several weeks PRAVDA has been devoting daily attention to this cam-
paign both editorially and by running reports from various enterprises
throughout the country on the local measures taken to realize maximum
productivity.
Politburo Member Opens Discussion on the Future Structure of
Consolidated Collective Farms. A speech by N. S. Khrushchev treating
various aspects of the newly consolidated collective villages in the
Moscow Oblast was delivered on 18 January but only published in PRAVDA
and other papers on 4 March. The discussion centered around three as-
pects of the problem of consolidation: (1) village planning and layout;
(2) local building material requirements-, (3) changes in organizational
structure to provide for permanent building brigades. A note in subse-
quent issues of the press stated that due to oversight, the 4 March papers
had failed to state that Khrushchev's remarks were open to discussion, a
highly irregular action. (C Emb Moscow 1623, 8 Mar 51). COMMENT : It is
probable that a period of "discussions" was thought necessary to ameliorate
the strong reaction among collective farmers which certain Khrushchev's
suggestions was certain to arouse, particularly those which tampered with
the location of peasant's private garden plot. While there appears to be
no reason to believe that similar censure is in. store for Khrushchev, the
last time an article on a related subject by a Politburo member appeared
in the Soviet press (Andreyev, 21 Dec 1949), it resulted in a public
rebuke to the author.
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BASTE EUROPE ALBANIA. Internal !erg ,io in Alban
Tirana reports that since 1950 the political climate of
Albania has cbanged rapidly as Albanian officials have progressively
yielded control to Soviet specialists whose nzmmbers increase daily,
regards the adoption of Seri?t6 inspired laws re-
organizing industry and agriculture as tacit admission of the partial
failure of the two ye:.r plan, which he believes is also responsible
for the recent dropping of two young militants from the cabinet. In-
creasing aerial violations and the discovery of a well-organized, well-
supplied underground have made Albanian leaders concerned for the in-
ternal solidarity of their regime. They have appealed to the police and
courts to intensify their prosecution of "enemies of the people" and
have enacted further repressive decrees Moreover, the Albanian press
and radio daily announce aggressive preparat'.ons on the part of Yugoslavia
and Greece, apparently in order to rally the people by appealing to-.their
patriotic sentiments and inflaming traditional hatreds, At the same time
the propaganda is probably intended to justify overt Soviet control over
Albania. (C Belgrade 1263, 10 Mar 51). COMMENT, The anxiety attributed
by to the Hoxha regime probably underlies the intensi-
fied anti-Tito and anti-Greek propaganda, as well ;as the recent cabinet
shakeup and repressive decrees. Evidence of a recent increase in Soviet
personnel has been reported from other sources. In regard to appeals to
nationalistic hatreds, it should be noted that Hungarian and Rumanian
Communists have also recently resorted to patriotic appeals.
Saseno Island 9gestion Recurs. Admiral Manola, Deputy Commander of
the Yugoslav Navy, has expressed concern to the US Naval Attache that
Soviet development of a submarine base on Saseno Island is again con-
sidered a possibility. The Admiral. stated that the Yugoslavs have defi-
nite information as of 1 Fab that there is nothing in Valona Bay or on
Saseno Island that was not there in 194.3. He is of the opira?on that
construction activity extends no further than rehabilitating World War II
defenses which; actually, form the, only possible base fog sub .rines. tse
feels that reports of submarine training in Malone Bay are without foun-
dation.'-(S ALUSNA 6424 Belgrade, 10 Mar 51). COMMENT: Previous reports
that the USSR is constructing a submarine base on Saseno Island have been
discounted.
. Responsibilities As signed to PPeople s Counils: The Presidium of the
Albanian Peopleas Assembly has taken a number of measures to strengthen
local political power of the People ?s Councils. By a recent decree the
Presidium has established commissions for budget, agriculture, forestry,
public education, culture, public health, trade, local industry and com-
munaleconomy. The main task of the commissions is to rally the interest
of the whole population in participating in the practical. activity of the
People's Councils and in the advancement of local cultural and economic
enterprises. (R FBID, 12 Mar 51). COMBNTg The decree is in keeping with
the directions for paying special attention to local Communist Party
organizations, as laid down in the Cominform Journal of 15 Dec, 50. It
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is s?:nificant to note that, at the same time that local political
activity is hardening, a purge of dilatory, dissident Communist Party
officials is taking place.
#A" CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Arm * Intelli Bence Chief Declared. Guilty of .Conspiracy.
Minister of National Defense General Cepicka announced on 9 March that
his deputy, General Dedrich Reicin, and another high official in the
Ministry (the son-in-law of deviationist Svermova), were "guilty of
25X1C conspiring against the regime and of deviationism.fs In addition-
US Ambassador Briggs that General
Josef ve F Deputy minister or a oral Security and Chief of the
Security Police (SNB), Imrich Vesely, Chief of the Political Police (STB),
and Genera] Zdensk Novak, Commandant of the Military District of Moravia,
had all been removed from office,
stated on 8 March that Novak, Reicin, and Pavel had all been relieved and
possibly imprisoned. A reliable private contact of the US Mission in
Vienna also reported on 9 March that these same officials were allegedly
under arrest, A UP dispatch datelined Praha, 11 March, adds Arthur London,
Deputy Minister Foreign Affairs to this list of ppotent.al purgees.
(C Praha 566, 12 Mar 51; C Vienna 1973, 9 Mar 51; S US MA Praba 599, 8 Mar
51)., COMMENTg General Reicin has been considered one of the pro-Soviet
Communists in Czechoslovakia. He joined the Party well before World War
II, during which he served as Education Officer with General Svoboda's
Czechoslovak Legion in the Soviet Union. After the war, he reportedly
returned to Czechoslovakia as an Army Intelligence (OBZ) agent and by
1948 had become the Chief of the OBZ section of-the General Staff. In
March 1949 he was appointed, Deputy Minister of National Defense, but is
believed to have continued in his position as Chief of the OBZ. His
complicity in the recently uncovered conspiracy indicates that discontent
with increasing Soviet domination of Czechoslovak affairs has become dis-
tasteful to even those who had been exposed to the most pro-Soviet en-
vironment during and after the war. Pavel, London, and Vesely have also
been considered in the hard-core segment of the Communist Party.
RUMANIA. Drive for National Roman Catholic Church. The Rumanian secret
police have arrested Father Clemente Gatti, a Roman Catholic priest,
bearer of an Italian service passport and Rector of the Italian Church,
Bucharest. The arrest took place in the presence of the Italian Charge
DAAffaires, who has protested to the Foreign Office and asked for infor-
mation about Gatties present whereabouts. While the police may present
an individual case against Gatti, the move must be interpreted as part of
the final Government drive to break connections between Catholics in
Rumania and the Vatican. Gatti has been an important link between the
Vatican and the Church in Rumania. Meanwhile the organization of pro-
regime Catholics, called Status, assembled in Bucharest for a two-day
meeting presumably to discuss plans for an autonomous Catholic Church
in Rumania. (C Bucharest 633, 11 Mar 51; C Bucharest 634, 10 Mar 51).
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eB5 GJOS_S VI 4o Purge of Cominformmis s in Croatia Re-nnrted.
a large?eca- e
oa
s
in
reportedly under way in
a '"a
February and early March. Mar _
~_
ny,go of
Cominformism have been arrested invZagrebtanditheaarea arounddTitoes
residence in that city has been cleared of occupants. Reliable Party
members have been moved into the houses vacated and concrete air raid
shelters are now under construction. 12 Mar 51,
B-3). C Ta In August and September 1950 three Serb officials in
the Croatian Government were removed from their government posts and
expelled from the Party because of alleged pro-Cominform activities
Although it was generally believed at the time that the .Xiair was
largely a manifestation of Serb-Croat animosities, the present purge,
if confirmed, may be the result of evidence uncovered by the arrest
of these men,
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"B" GENERAL. Further Moslem Reaction to Moroccan Situation. Developments in
Morocco continue to hold top attention in the press of the Arab States,
Pakistan, and India, even though excitement has subsided to some extent
over the peak of a week ago (OCI Daily, 6 and 8 Mar 51). Arab dissatis-
faction with the Moroccan situation is being highlighted by the current
meeting of the Arab League Political Committee, which assembled in Cairo
on 10 March. There now seems little prospect that the more extreme Arab
demands--such es severing diplomatic relations with France--will be seri-
ously considered. Primary Arab attention is now concerned with whether
the League should demand action on the Moroccan question i.n the UN Secu-
rity Council. (C Cairo 929, S Cairo 932, 10 Mar 51; S Baghdad, Karachi
and Cairo Weekas, 9-10 Mar 51). COMMENT: Arab and other Moslem leaders
are still seriously concerned over Morocco. The Arab governments, press,
and political groups have capitalized on the question in part to divert
public attention from problems closer to home. The most recent develop-
ments, however, indicate that many of the Arab leaders themselves feel
that the Moroccan campaign has gone far enough, and realize that UN con-
sideration of the Moroccan problem would give the USSR a chance to exploit
the situation. The Arab League, therefore, is likely to settle for sub-
mitting a protest to the UN and for sending a committee to investigate
the Moroccan situation at first hand.
"A" GREECE. Communists Continue to Charge Greece with Aggression Plans. The
Com:-unist Free Greek Radio in Bucharest states that the arrival of General
Eisenhower in Greece in March will'be coordinated with that of General
Montgomery and that these two will discuss the unleashing of a Greek attack
on the Balkans, Eisenhower will give the final instructions for the inva-
sion of Albanian (R FBIS, 9 Mar 51). COMMFr'T: The Cominform barrage of
propaganda asserting that Greece is about toy invade its northern neighbors
continues at a high level. This type of propaganda is always disturbing
because of the Soviet tendency to create excuses for initiating preventive
countermeasures. However, no evidence that the USSR is planning an invasion
of Greece Is available. The Cominform may be expected to keep up such pro-
paganda attacks as long as talk of Greek-Turkish participation in NATO,
naval maneuvers in the eastern Mediterranean, the impending visit of impor-
tant Western military officials, and improving Greek-Yugoslav relations
continues, since such events provide "proof" of the validity of the Soviet
accusations.
"C" IRAN. Majlis Confirms Ala as Premier. Embassy Tehran reports that Hussein
Ala's appointment as Premier was confirmed by the Majlis (Lower House) on
12 March by a vote of 69 to 20. The 8 members of the National Front walked
out of the session. (U Tehran 2044, 12 Mar 51). COMMENTS Alaes appoint-
ment as Premier was confirmed unanimously by the Senate on 11 March. Press
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repots state that he plans to present his Government to the Majlia on the
lh.th. However the low vote which Ala received from the Majlis both illus-,
trates the Shah's dilemma in finding a strong leader able to control and
lead the turbulent and frequently irresponsible Parliamentary deputies and
suggests that even if his government is accepted by the Majlis, Ala will
have difficulty in providing the firm direction and control needed in Iran
at this time.
"Acs PAKI$ A_N. Communist Corinect3ons with Plot to Over?throw tthe_Government.
Additional information has been received regarding the alleged military
plot to overthrow the Government of Pakistan, discovery of which was an-
nounced on 9 March (OCI Daily, 10 Mar 51). The name of Air Commodore
M.K. Jaa.njuaa, senior Pakistani officer in the Pakistani Air Force, ;now under
house arrest, has been added to those of other military officers connected
with the plot, Pakistani Government officials have informed US represen-
tatives that Major General Akbar Khan is a "hundred percent" Communist and
that Faiz Ahmad Faiz, editor of the PAKISTAN TIMES, was definitely the
argent nrovocaateur for the Communists in the approach to the irmy officers.
Official Pakistani opinion seems to be that unrest in the armed forces over
failure of the Government to solve the Kashmir affa? was responsible for
the conspiretors? susceptibility to the Communist overtures. (S Karachi
825, 10 Mar 51; S Karachi 830, 12 Mar 51; U New Delhi 2396, 12 Mar 51).
GOMM NTs Information from indicrtes that (1)
in the F* Army and may still
l
C
on-.
o
Faiz Ahinad Faiz was once a Lt.
have Army connections. He was also at'one time President-of tha Pakistani
Telegraph. Workers' Union. (2) Maj. Gen. Akbak'Khan may be the son-in-law
of Begum Shah Naawaz, a well=known Pakistani liberal with Communist connec-
tions. He may have a relative in the Pakistani Ministry of Communications.
(3) All military officers involved have personal or professional reasons
for being emotionally upset and dissatisfied with their present situations.
If the Communists can eventually be proven to have infiltrated the topmost
levels of both the Pakistani armed forces and the Communications Ministry,
US beliefs regerding the stability and security of the Government of Pakistan
will need thorough revision.
are holding maneuvers this
"B1e THAIIAN2. go11p_Eumor. The Thai Army and Navy
week. Government newspapers report that the police have been alerted and
are seeking Admiral Taharn Kambiran, former commander of the Thai Marines,
who allegedly planned to use the Navy in a cou attempt on Tuesday, 14
March. (C Bangkok 1364, 8 Mar 51). C ENTs The order for Admiral Taharn's
h 1951
M
arc
arrest was reported in the OCI Daily on 9
..,,., T'MT:)?RA unnm Trnnn mrivement Planned.
se Na
Ch
__--__
ine
US Embassy Bangkok that the
of Kengtung are planning to move into southern Yunnan in the next few days.
(C Bangkok 1382, 12 Mar,5l)a COMMENT-. This.force, the largest (2?3000)
and best=organized group of Chinese Nationalists in Burma, has loudly prom
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claimed, its intent of throwing the Chinese Communists out of Yunnan. The
Burmese Government would be relieved to see the troops depart. vowever,
these troops have been receiving material and financial aid from sources
in Thailand and it appears questionable whether their desire to liberate
Yunnan will outbalance the attractions of their border haven.
IA" MALAYA. Terrorism on the Increase. During the past week bandit activity
nose in Malaya to a total of 108 incidents, of which 98 were "significant"
and 49 "of major proportions". The largest number of these incidents oc-
curred in the southern state of Johore. This development is particularly
disappointing to the B' tish since it had been planned to clear Johore
completely and move the troops there northward by the and of January. The
terrorists have apparently received no reinforcements; in consequence, the
inability of the Security Forces to pacify Johore - after.& major military
and resettlement effort in that state - is baffling. (S Singapore #10,
9 Mar 51). COMIIENT: The latest estimates from Malaya indicate that the
deterioration in security noted during 1950 is continuing into 1951 and
that no solution to the problem of Communist-led terrorism is as yet
apparent.
"B" INDONESIA. Cabinet Crisis Continues. Although k'remier Natsir is not
expected to return his mandrte to resident Soekarno, his government
faces a critical test with the reconvening of-Parliament on 20 March.
Matters slated for immediate Parliamentary attention include controver-
sial issues regarding which Government support is very doubtful. Dis-
cussions with the Indonesian National Party (PNI) on Cabinet composition
are continuing. (C Djakarta 1227, 11 Mar 51). COMMENT: Unless the Govern-
ment and the leftist PNI (not now included in the Cabinet) reach an agree-
ment on Cabinet representation, that party undoubtedly will continue tactics
to embarrass the Government and eventually cause its fall. Should an agree-
ment be reached and the PNI taken into the Cabinet, the party's influence
may force a reorientation of Government policy towards the left.
"C" AUSTRALIA. Parliamentary Dissolution Possible. As a consequence of sus-
tained oprosition in the Labor-controlled Senate, Australia's Liberal-
Country Party coalition Government is powerless to take effective action
on its legislative program (including economic defense measures) and a
dissolution of both houses of Parliament seems likely. Political opinion
indicates that the Government would have strong popular backing at this
moment but failure to act very soon would cause a reversal of this view.
(R Canberra 246, 12 Mar 51). COMMENT: While a double dissolution and
general election are possible, both labor and the Liberal-Country coalition
will probably seek to avoid an election in the near future, for a variety
of reasons. A statement to be made by Prime Minister Menzies next week
may indicate what course of action the coalition Government intends to
pursue.
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nA" CHINA. Communist Mu lit.xy Pre oration on East Coast. Nationalist MND
reports state that Chinese Communist activities indicate Peiping's intent
to invade the guerrilla-held islands off the Chekiang coast. Considerable
troop concentration is reported in the Wenchou area (opposite the Ta-chen
Islands) and motor junks sufficient to lift 10,000 troops are currently
anchored in the Ningpo-Chou Shan area. A field hospital unit was recently
transferred to the Chou Shaans. (S ALUSNA Taipei, 1008272 Mar 51)e
gOMMIIENTs Action against these islands has been anticipated for. some time.
"A" Preparations Along South Coast. Nationalist MND also reports (1)
busy shipbuilding in the Amoy area, (2) registration of seamen in the Foochow
area, and (3) expansion of milit=pry recruiting in Fukien Province. In
addition to these signs that the Communists are mobilizing for an offensive,
presumably against Taiwan, the following defensive measures arc reporteds
(1) completion of repairs to all highways along the Cinton-Swatow coastal
area in three months, (2) increase in defense works along the Canton-
Kowloon railway and (3) construction o bomb-proof underground storage
facilities in the Canton-Swatow a^?ha. ( S ALUSNA Taipei, 100837 Mar 51).
COMMENT. Similar 'offensive and defensive preparations have been reported
from this area for several months. There are as yet no precise indications
of the timing of the anticipated invasion of Taiwan.
25X1X in g?ng 25X1C
"C" HIANG ? oses Third Party Movement.
e KMT
Kong 25X1 C
Central Executive Committee recently dec e to e lmz rd party"
activities in Chinese communities throughout the world. This decision
was based on CHIANG Kai-shek's belief that the growth of a "third party"
movement constitutes a greater threat to KMT power monopoly than does
the Communist Party, which CHIANG believes will be destroyed by the West.
25X1A Chiang also believes that the "third -party" movement is growing because 25X1A
of US support. ( COMMEND The
"third party" movement, which crumbled before the KMT was eliminated
from the Chinese mainland, revived after US entry into the Korean war, which
was regarded by anti-Communist Chinese as a certain indication that full
US power would eventually be thrown against international Communism and
that the Chinese-Communist regime would, therefore, eventually be destroyed.
Anti-CHIANG elements among the anti-Communist Chinese considered the US
as essentially hostile toward CHIANG and, therefore, considered the current
situation as propitious for the revival of a third party movement. The
movement, however, still lacks leadership adequate to contend with the KMT
and it is quite probable that the Generalissimo has initiated action to
eliminate the movement before it can become a competitor for future domina-
tion in China. 25X1X
firm wrote in January 1951 that 80% of China's 5 million textile spin
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were operating 11 shifts a week. At this nearly maximum rate the source
stated, the industry will run out of cotton three months before the local
cotton harvest in the fall of 1951. Cotton dealers in Shanghai estimate'
that China's 1950 harvest - in terms of ginned cotton - was about 2,400,000
bales, of which 1,700,000 bales will be availabl& for mill consumption,.the
25X1A remaining 700,000 bales being locally spun or used as cotton padding. (C
8 Mar 51). COMMENTS US Consulate Hong Kong offers
a similar estimate of cotton output, although the Communists have claimed
that 3,123,000 bales were harvested in 1950? Continued Communist insistence
at full-sca'l'e operation of"mills, in the face of a probable large deficit
later in 1951,-may indicate the urgency of current military orders for
textile products.
"A" KOREA. Urg^nt Need for Medical Personnel in North. Radio Pyongyang on
10 March carried the announcement that the tra-aning of nurses was being
undertaken bi '-*-ie Ministry of Health and the North Korean Red Cross. The
Health Ministry is training "senior workers for health administration".
On 1 February, a two-months' training course for 400 trainees was begun;
a three-week schedule for 900 is expected to staaart on 1 April, and a further
six-months' program envisaging the training of 600 individuals - will
start on 1 July, The Red Cross is running "many training_schQols.for.Red
Cross nurses". (R FBIS, 12 Mar 51). COMMENT: The brevity of the periods
of instruction indicated in this announcement or ears to confirm North
Korea's desperate need for medical personnel. The timing of the periods
is also of possible interest since it coincides with the timing of the
"4th phase" offensive.
"C" ROK Technicians Abroad Balk at Return to Homeland. Ambassador
Muccio in Korea reports that the refusal of US- and Japanese-trained
Koreans to return to Korea unless offered "aprropriate" positions is
simply an attempt to avoid leaving a pleasant life abroad. Muccio opines
that only US refusal to further extend immigration permits will pry these
trainees loose. (R Pusan 794, 10 Mar 51). COMMENT: Although Ambassador
Muccio is undoubtedly correct in his assessment of the motive underlying
t''-.e reluctance of ROK t-ohnical trainees at, present, it should be noted
that ROK technician, who returned from abroad in the pre-hostilities
period were frequently kept from suitable employment by the ROK govern-
ment, which favored local political appointees.
"A" JAPAN. Attorney-General Outlines JCP Flans for Arms Purchase. Attorney
General OHASHI Takeo declared before the Cabinet on 9 March that the Japan
Communist Party is working out a fund-raising campaign to purchase weapons.
He also stated that the Party is using ciphers in their communications.
(R FBIS, 12 Mar 51). COMMENTS While the JCP may well be working out such
a campaign and also using ciphers, OHASHI has made similar pronouncements
in the past without convincing evidence. Satisfactory confirmation re-
garding JCP collection of arms has been lacking to date.
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IAINICHI Warns ag inst Overoptimism. MAINICHI, in an 8 March
2 not overe the
editorial, warned ceJand neconom.ic benefitsuof the proposedmeconomic
political significan
to think that a great
link between Japan and the US. It is dangerous a er said,
boom will visit Japan when American creditJis~ granted, he on p capacity
for although the US requested a survey of ap producti
on some 60 items, this does not mean that there is a huge demand forth-
coming from the US. (R FBIS, 12 Mar 51). COMMENTS Japanese newspapers
have been giving top play for the past week to a rumored US-Japan economic
alliance which envisions a u2 sbrial illion
capacity fornthe USpdefenseneffort,and
the use of Japan's idle ind These rumors appear to be based ar?d concerned nver1theirnrawsmfterialskposition,
Japan's industrialists who and an unfortunate let-down seems inevitable.
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SECTION 3 (?ESTERN)
A Ny rraan r ounte ro osal for organization of European
e
Tune 11 I,ULLLLL Luraa vi +-L, "?^^^'" ^"^
national unit, and proposes instead a "combat group" which would be,
in effect, a small division. The Germans believe that all elements
of each operating unit (including artillery and tactical aviation)
should be of the same nationality and under the same national com-
mand. In rebuttal, the French military advisor, elaborating the view
that a mixed division is not only militarily sound but also
politically essential, has stressed French opposition to the creation
of national divisions. The Germans, however, in order to surmount
the political difficulties involved, are ready to renounce all
armament production except small arms for police. Pressed by the
Italians, the French have reluctantly agreed to study the German
proposal, whereby units of different nationality would be combined
at the army corps level, rather than in the smaller divisional
contingents. (S Paris 5387, 9 Mar 51). C01UL-,.SENT: French fear of
the formation of a German general staff will cause them to resist
strongly all such German proposals. The German offer to accept
a drastically curtailed armament program can hardly appeal to the
French w'rio, far from intending to facilitate Germany's return to
predominance in civilian markets, will insist on an equitable
distribution of defense production burdens.
FIANCE-C=E "TA x
on erence rejects
T11`~Gerlnan c ega ion o e European Army
ITALY. Nationalists Step up Agitation over Trieste. Small bombs,
allegedly t rovrn y neo-fascist yout h e ements in protest against the
non-return of Trieste to Italy, caused minor damage to a US Embassy
building in Rome on 1_3 March. In Trieste pro-Italian nationalists
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have recently declared the occupation by Western troops of Yugoslav-
held Zone B of the Free Territory a prerequisite for Italian partici-
pation in a Mediterranean pact or acceptance of military agreements
with Yugoslavia. (C Trieste 515, 5 Mar 51; C Rome 3997, 12 Mar 51).
COMMENT: The Trieste question, on which the great mass of Italians
feel more strongly than on any other issue deriving from Italy's
losses under the peace treaty, is now being accentuated in the public
mind by the current De Gasperi-Sforza conversations with Attlee and
Morrison in London. Further bomb-throwing incidents and even large-
scale demonstrations may be expected on the part of extreme rightist
nationalists as part of their caTraign calling for the return of Trieste.
ITALY. Italians Weigh Violation of Peace Treaty. Defense Minister
Paciardi has infoy?me US Embassy o f1cials ta a a contract for the
manufacture of munitions in Italy for the Indonesian Government has
been referred to the Defense Ministry by the Foreign Affairs and
Foreign Trade Ministries. At the same time Pacciardi stated that he
was not asking permission to enter into the contract which was the
responsibility of the Italian Government. He also omphasized that
he was aware that no one could give authority to alter the peace treaty,
rl COT" T'T? Under rising nationalist demands for an en o
)
.
9 Har
the peace trey y limitations, the Italians may possibly attempt piece-
meal violations of the military limitations of the peace treaty until
it becomes a dead letter. By this means the Italians would be able
to utilize their military manufacturing potential with a minimum of
legal complications. At the same time the Italians Will continue to
urge all signatories, including Tito to support Italian rearmament
beyond the Peace Treaty, in order to justify the de facto abrogation
of the Treaty.
SPAIN. Barcelona General Strike Evidence of Popular Dissatisfaction.
On' March a wor ers in farce ona, except ose in pu is u i 1 les,
went on strike in protest against the high cost of living. The protest
was directed specifically against the Falange-controlled Government
food distribution agency. There were instances of violence, but by
afternoon the police forces were reported to have restored order, and
the workers are expected to return to work today under threats of heavy
penalties by the Civil Governor. The strike stemmed from the successful
popular strike of 1-6 March against increased streetcar fares. (See
OCI Daily, 7 March, p. 11). (U, New York Times, 13 Mar 51; AP Ticker
13 Mar 51). COT. ENT: This is the second general strike to occur under
the Franco regime. (The first took place in Bilbao in 19)7.) Although
the Government has attributed the strike to Communist agitation, it is
highly doubtful that the Spanish Communist Party could organize such
a demonstration involving various political elements. The strike is
chiefly significant as a manifestation of the growing desperation of
the Spanish worker as a result of his ever-increasing economic hardship.
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"C" UNITED KINGDOM. Second Round of Wage Demands Seems Trminent. With
groups of workers in heavy industry and in tYie 3hi yards of the
Liverpool area currently staging minor strikes and slowdowns to
obtain higher piece rates, US Embassy London estimates that a second
round of wage demands is imminent. Workers in heavy industry and
shipbuilding were among the first to receive wage increases last year
when the Government assented to an all-round pay raise of about 5N?
(London, V?EEKA #10, 9 March 51; S London, 4819, 8 March 51; London,
Desp. 331 , 16 January 51) COIT-,2,NT: Although not expected to
materialize in large scale strikes at the present time, these labor
troubles are (1) immediate obstacles to the rearmament and export
programs, and (2) omens of a difficult year for the Labor Govern-
ment in its relations with the trade unions. Since rising living
costs have just about cancelled out earlier wage increases, the
labor rank-and-file will increase their efforts for a corresponding
raise in wages and the recently concluded agreement for a 7 ro wage
increase for railway workers is likely to be regarded as further
justification for wage claims. The Government will feel compelled
to resist these demands as inflationary pressures. There is little
doubt that the Communists will use every opportunity to exploit the
situation.
"Cn Conservatives Adopt More Aggressive Parliament
Tactics. The C o n s e e opposition has now a opte harassing
par iamentary tactics, involving unexpected calls for votes on minor
policy or procedural matters, in an effort to wear down the Labor
members. The Conservatives hope to hasten their advent to power by
this form of parliamentary warfare (in addition to frontal attacks
on major Government policies) despite the resultant strain on their
own MP's and the possible public revulsion against such political
methods. (C London ).1.861, 9 Mar 51). C0M E NT: Adoption of this
strategy testifies not only to the impatience of Winston Churchill
to return to 10 Downing Street but also to the growing conviction
of the Conservatives that they will win a general election if they
can precipitate one soon.
"C" UK Cabinet Concerned over Troop Drain in Malay..
The UK Cabinet, disturbed by t7e Malayan situation's eivy drain on
limited UK troop resources, has siumnoned Commissioner-General
MacDonald to London to confer, but has not fully accepted his
optimistic report of the progress being made toward the restoration
of order. Despite MacDonald's qualified prediction that some troops
may be released for duty elsewhere in about six months, various
technical suggestions and criticisms were made by London officials,
and further discussions were scheduled. (S London 14857, 9 Mar 51).
COT,IEN,F : This Cabinet scepticism probably will not result in any
majo'rianges of policy in Malaya, at this time, but the incident
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reflects the g:ro-wing concern Which has been expressed both in Parlia-
ment and in the press. It is likely that this kind of pressure on
MacDonald will continue.
"C" DENMAR.IK. Danish Foreign Office Perturbed over US Activity in Greenland.
Me- arriva of O US airmen rom Ne-vFT"ouncl.an -a-t B uie West Son e
Str$mfjord), Greenland , to establish a radio station without prior
approval by the Danish Government in Copenhagen has greatly alarmed
the Foreign Office, which fears adverse parliamentary and public
reaction if the US action becomes known before contemplated negotiations
for an expansion of US activity in Greenland are completed. (TS Copen-
hagen,75L , 9 Isar 51 and State 17 to Amer Consulate, Godthaab, 9 Mar 51).
COMMNT: The Danish Government, which is very sensitive about US bases
an ac-ivities in Greenland., desires to avoid anything which might be
interpreted by the Danish public and/or the USSR. ..as indicating a sur-
render of Danish sovereignty. The Danes apparently fear that, if the
facade of Danish authority in Greenland is in any way impaired: the
USSR might develop an unhealthy interest in the Danish island of
Bornholm, strategically located in the south Baltic.
"C" NORWAY. Participation in European CommandAn roved. The Storting
(Parliament) approved on 12 March Norwegian partt-icipation in the joint
European command. The Government is authorized to decide what
Norwegian forces will be under the Supreme Commander in the event of
war and what forces Norway will contribute to the integrated peacetime
forces. It is also left to the Government to determine further
Norwegian participation in German occupation as well as possible
inclusion of the Norwegian occupation brigade in the integrated forces.
(See OCI Daily, 28 Feb 51). (U Oslo 910, 12 Mar 51).
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MAR 1 i Ira i
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
Not for dissemination outside the
Current Intelligence.
431 `J
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(S/S Cable Supplement not for dissemination outside 0/CI and O/IE)
OFFTCE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY SJMr1ARY OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLE TRAFFIC
13 March 1951
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE
UK and French Delegations Pushing for Foreign Ministers'
Conference. a ripa i e meeting among the , UK and French dele-
ga i ons to the Deputy Foreign Ministers' Conference in Paris, the Chief
of the UK delegation, with French support,, appealed stron~ly "for
doing everything possible excluding appeasement or acceptance of the
Soviet agenda" to insure that a Foreign Ministers' Conference would be
held in an effort to buy time and avert war. British public opinion,
he said, favors such a conference "if only for the sake of meeting".
The Chiefs of both the UK and French delegations admitted that they
wanted "to make it easier" for Gromyko to seek ? --?ised inptructigps and
for Moscow to accept the Western delegations' a er.da proposal, az . in-
sisted on agreeing to "demilitamiZation of Germany" as an item iii the
revised agenda proposal. The Chief of the US delegation "re*lewsd the
ABC of negotiating with the Soviets", pointing out that partial con-
cessions to the USSR do not induce them to reciprocate. (S S/S Paris
529 1, 10 Mar 51) ? COMMENT: In both the UK and France, there is i de-
spread public expec a ion that a Foreign Ministers' Conference W~l1 be
held, and both Governments are under considerable pressure, to explore
every avenue to this end, regardless of the chances for reaching a
modus vivendi in such a conference. These Governments are not inclined
o elzeve at concessions regarding the agenda, would necessarily pre-
judice the Western position in the final conference.
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
25X1A
25X1A
"A" USSR. Rumored Soviet Approach to NE Countries for Neutrality Assurance,
+V1, =___ `- - reporting a conversation said to
f
8 J
rom
am
.
1
have taken place between the Pakistan Prime Minister and ire Syrian
Prime Minister. The latter said that theSoviets had officially approach-
ed the Egyptian Government for assurance of Egyptian neutrality iz} event
of war, aid had made similar approaches to other NE governments, notably
Turkey. He said the Syrian Government had not yet been officially approach-
ed by the USSR in this regard. (S S/S Moscow 1611, 10 Mar 5l)? COMMENT
There have been recurring rumors ever since the fall session of the
General Assembly about alleged Soviet approaches to NE govern ents on the
15
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subject of neutrality pacts. (The Arabian UN delegation in December
1950 reported that the USSR had made moves towards some NE goverr rents,
.but that those Arab governments had rejected the Soviet overtures. Anoth-
er rumor to that effect was reported by the Israelis in r?spect to the
January meeting of the Arab League.) While a major objecj.ive of Soviet
NE policy is to secure the neutrality of the area, and while certain
"neutrality" circles in Arab countries undoubtedly encourage the USSR
in their efforts to influence NE opinion, there has been no specific
evidence of any such approach being made by the USSR to ' a Middle East
country. It may be that Qudsi picked up the rumor of an pproach to
Turkey, in view of a report (See 0/CT Daily of 1 Mar 51) that the USSR
might be seeking to effect a pact with Turkey, However, there ie no
evidence that any conversations have taken place between the USSR and
Turkey, and it is highly unlikely that Turkey would he susceptible to
any overtures,
"B" Deputy Fore. Ministers' Conference. Soviet Pro a anda o CFM Lauds
sa sand .cruses West of 'Sti in Tactics". tensive
=Proposals'
propaganda support of dviet agenda proposals is offered along th as-
sertions that the US with French and- Bi?itish support is attempting to
foist an agenda on the CFM which "would disregard main problems of peace
and security"n TASS said that the USSR considers any agenda unsatisfac-
tory if it does not include the question of "demilitarization of Germany
and inadmissibility of her remil i tarization" Gromyko g s challenge to the
West position that reduction of armed forces of the Big Four doeg not
merit a place on the agenda as an independent item was reported in such
a way as to leave the impression that consideration of this propdoal, as
expressed by the USSR, is the only way in which the alleged "fray Tic arms
race" can be discussed (R S/S Moscow 1631, 8 Mar 5i; S S/S Mosco' 1637,
9 Mar 51; TJ-FBIS 9-12 Mar 51). CC VENT: Soviet reports and commo:rrts and
the Soviet attitude at the deputaes eating at this time show primary
interest in exploiting the talks for propaganda against the Westt$ rearma-
ment,and have given no indication of making the concessions necee~ary to
achieve an actual meeting of the Foreign Ministers,
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
Eastern Asia
"A4" INDOCHINA. French foresee Viet Minh offensive. General De Lattre,
Cowman- that French intelligence
has established the Viet Minh intent to launch a large-soale offensive
in Tonkin between 15 and 20 March. De Lattre estimates, however, that
as a result of delays in the despatch of military equipment from China -
the Viet Minh will not attack before 25 March. De Lattre thus feels he
has enough time to proceed to Parise press his demands for reinforcements,
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and return to Indochina before battle is joined. Even without th lse
reinforcements (approval of which has been delayed by the French
cabinet crisis). the General "hopes" to repulse the attack, since his
own military preparations are well-advanced and his troops are it4
good spirits. De Lattre does not think the Chinese Comm lists will
participate in this March attack. He believes they may do so in
august or September, however, at the end of the rainy season, It he
gets the desired reinforcements, some US jet aircraft and two aircraft
carriers from Franck De Lattre "gives himself a very good chancel" off'
holdLng such a Chinese invasion. providing it does. not take place until
later in the year. (TS SJS Saigon 1603, 11 Mar 51).
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