OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 2, 2006
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 14, 1951
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4.pdf1002.47 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 01 COPY NO 3j 03TICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC Date: MAR 14 1951 NOTE! 1. This summary of, eignifioant reports has been prepared for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does net necessarily represent a complete coverage of all current traffic in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. 2. Comment represents the preliminary views of the responsible analysts and net necessarily the final view of the Office of Current Intelligence. 3. Marginal letter indications are defined as follows. "A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities NEW - important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/ Communist intentions or capabilities - ether information indicating trends and potential d.evelepments OSD, DIA AND NAVY HAVE NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE NAVY, OSD, DIA and DOS review(s) completed. T)DRFCP P Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 TOP SECRET SECTION 1 (SOVIET) USSR, Su r~s eme Soviet assts ew n_W ~?__ ova nde At a joint evening session on 21 March 51, the Supreme Soviet decreed: (1) to consider that war propaganda, whatever its form, undermines the cause of peace, creates the danger of a new war and is consequently a most grave crime against humanity; (2) to prosecute persons guilty of war propaganda and try them PRAVDA and IZVESTIA carry numerous,, lengthy speeches and lead editorials on the new law, proclaiming its internationp? significances referring to the recent Stalin Interview and the Second W~?ry?.d Congress of Peace Partisans appeal to the TJN on war propaganda, nd citing the previous Soviet proposal on war propaganda. Also reference to American aggression as having committed a grave pen a.l offense. COMMENT-, This decree generally parallels those of the Eastern European Satellites, the GDR, CPR and the Mongolian People' Republic passed in conformance with a WPO resolution, and warmongering, German remilitarization, etc. population. ~Z--11 434 NuI fy... P.Pesed. Coneumer _Sav n Soviet Budget Increases Isame roz 1 March Price Cute. In connection with the 1 March prict cuts, the Soviet Government stated the resulting lose in revenue to the state would amount to 27.5 billion rubles. However, according to the 1951 budget, 9.6 billion more rubles will be taken from the population directly in the form of income tax and state loans than last year, In addition the state may also expect to gain at the population?s expense through increased in- come from the turnover tax (805 billion rubles),- industry profits tax (6,7), and from the use of new individual savings (3.5) Furthermore, the 7 billion decrease in Kolkhoz market prices portrayed by the government as a saving to consumers also represents an equal loss of income to the rural the Albanian Minister of Justice, has been relieved of his position "on the proposal of the Chief of the Council of Ministers." Manush Myftiu, Minister of State Control will assume the duties of the office in the interim. COMMENTs Konomi?s release appears EASTERN EUROPE. ALBANIA. Minister of Justice nReleasedaeo Dr. Manor. Konomi, to be part of a continuing reorganization of the .Albanian Cabinet, The future duties or fate of the three ministers released from their posts have not been announced so fare Embassy Belgrade reports that a round trip flight of a Soviet II,-12 to Tirana was made on 6-7 March. On its return flight when the plane made its usual custom check at the Belgrade airport, Soviet Embassy officials met the plane as if there were high ranking officials on board. Since the ninth plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee held in Tirana from 19 to 23 Feb, in addition to the governmental shakeup, local Communist Party officials have been dismissed and stricter control measures have been instituted, TOP SECRET 1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 TOP SECT ?PB" BULGARIA. New Civil Defense Mass Organization- Created. The newly created "Voluntary Organization for Defense Assistance"" is reported by Radio Sofia to be in the process of organizational activities throughout Bulgaria. The broadcast indicates that members are pledging themselves to attain greater proficiency in the arts "for the defense of peace" such as sharp- shooting, parachute jumping, glider piloting and to train "thousands"in similar activities. Courses will be held "to prepare all members in sharp- shooting and air defense,before the end of the year." Mine workers of Vulkan colliery have challenged Maritsa coal miners to a "competition for efficiency in the courses." COMMENT.- Organization 25X1 of this new group follows close on the heels of the merger of the two mass pars,-military organizations for civilian survoaillance and control, 25X1 The USSR is overlooking no bets in strengthening its Bulgarian outpose for all contingencies. HBO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Catholic Bishops Succumb to Communist Pressure, On. 12 March, four Roman Catholic Bishops and two other church administrators swore loyalty to Czechoslovakia"s Communist regime before Vice-Premier Fierlinger, Director of the Office for Church Affairs. COMMENT: 25X1 The 12 Bishops of Czechoslovakia until now have presented an united front against increasing pressure from the regime to accede to the Le.w of 1 November 1949 which required all clergymen to take a prescribed loyalty oath. Two of the Bishops were sentenced to long prison terms last January on charges of treason and espionage. The banishment of Archbishop Beran from Praha and the investiture of a pro-regime priest as Archbishop pro teml 25X1 probably paved the way for the fealty ceremct"y. As a result of this new rapprochement, the Government is considerably closer to the creation of an autonomous Roman Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, ex- empt from the influence,ef the Holy See. , ""B"" HUNGARY Permission to Set Up New Cooperatives Temporarily Suspended. A decree issued 27 February prohibits the' establishment of new agricultural producer cooperative groups from 10 March until further noticed Hungarian officials explained that the order has a two-fold aim: (1) working peasants must devote all their energy to agriculture now that spring is here; and (2) efforts must be made to strengthen those cooperatives already set upb COMMENT: An intensive campaign during the last few months to increase the number of cooperatives resulted in the formation of 1,800, bringing the total to 3,480 at the end of February. A shortage of skilled agriculturalists and tractors, as well as other weaknesses pro- hibit further numerical development of the cooperative movement at this time. Efforts to increase the membership of the existing cooperatives, however, are continuing. Meanwhile, the anti?kulak campaign is being in- tensified. According to Hungarian officials 70% of the arable land is still in individual holdings. Production of Children Promoted, A decr?e issued 8 March creates the Order of Merit for Motherhood "to honor the mothers of many children who have greatly contributed to the strengthening of the homeland." COMMENT, The Bulgarian Government recently awarded medals to 39 mothers who had reared many children. The Russian Communists and German Nazis used the same method to increase their populations, Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 R174ANIAa Possibility of Soviet-Satellite Meting Near Bucharest. The fact that during the past week-end diplomatic cars on the way to Snagov were turned back about 10 kms from Bucharest has led Western diplomats in Rumania to believe that a high level conference is being held at the 25X1 25X1 3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 YUGOSUVIA. !tractors for Yu oslaviao Embassy Belgrade strongly supports the Yugoslav proposal to obtain 5-7,000 tractors from Western Buropean estimate that the additional tractors would enable a 15% increase i. grain production, particularly over a period of 2-3 years. The Embassy points out that tractors on farms will not only improve Yugoslavia's export and foreign exchange position but will also relieve the stringent manpower situation in the Yugoslav mining, forestry and other essential industries. The Embassy states that the essential weakness of Yugoslav ve-ear Plan of economic development lies in the imbalance of agriculture, es- pecially the syphoning off of manpower from the farms,This has resulted in a manpower shortage on the farms without provision for replacement, and has contributed to the failure of agriculture to recover its prr status The Embassy does not consider unrealistic the Yugoslav countries. through BOB on easy credit terms. The Embassy cautions, however, that unless the tractors are utilized to the best advantage on private farms as well as collectivized farms (which represent only 20% of agricultural land), the recent tendency toward decline in over-all farm production may continue, thereby negating COMMENT.- Yugoslavia's ability to use an additional 5-7,000 tractors is limited by its lack of trained operators and maintenance facilities, Previous reports indicate that manpower difficulties in industry, mining, etc., arose, at least in part, from the fact that manpower would not stay, but returned to farms. While mechanization would release labor from farms, it is not believed that there is now an agricultural labor shortage. the expected advantages in respect to exports. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 SECTION 2 (EASTERN) "B" THAILAND. Phibun 0pposes New Relent, The King has appointed Prince Dhani Niwat to succeed the late Prince Rangsit as Regent of the Realm. The appointment was approved by Parliament with only Prime Minister Phibun and a "maverick MP" voting in opposition. Ambassador Stanton comments that Phibun?s vote was a surprising lapse of his usual political astuteness and will probably cast a shadow over his relations with the new regent, d i h n an who is popular in Thailand and is expected to take a stronger COMDAENTS If Prince Dhani restricts his activities to management o the regency, no serious upheavals in the Thai Government or change in its administration is likely to develop as a result of personal animosity between himself and the Prime Minister. "C" INDONESIA. Communist party supports Moroccan independence The Parliamentary ':gas voiced su ort of faction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) Pp Moroccan independence, stating that the PKI. will not take a neutral stand on the issue and calling upon the entire Indonesian people to dema .1 F_ before the predominantly Moslem population of Indonesia, can point to the government?s indecisive stand on the issue. "BU INDOCHINA. De Lattre leaves fear Paris. De Lattre departed from Saigon today for. Paris where he will press demands for military reinforcements. In this connection he hopes to meet General Eisenhower on 16 March. "B" A11e0*ed suicide of GeneralGiaape A Saigon Vietnamese newspaper, has published further details on the circumstances surrounding the rumored suicide of the Viet Minh C-in-C Vo Nguyen Giapo Giap is reported to have taken his life as a result of accusations by a subordinate general that Giap was responsible for Viet Minh military reverses in Jaanuary~ COMMENTS A member of the Bao Dal Government confirmed hat he was the author of a whispering campaign which produce the above story, which,, to the best of his knowledge, has no basis in fact "A" I eminent CChinese Invasion Held Possible. US Army Attache Saigon calls attention to a combination of factors which may herald a Chinese invasion of Indochina earlier than General De Laattreus estimate of August., Septembers 1) Viet Minh work on supply routes has been expedited, 2) the CCF is still in a position to attack without warning, 3) past experience with Chinese indicates that the period immediately preceding the rainy season is the most likely period for a CCF i-1ir?ture in Indochina, 4) Franco-Vietnamese forces could barely withstand an attack 5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 by the Viet Minh alone, and this attack, which is expected soon, would so seriously tax the Fren h that the CCF "could not resist the temptation" to move ins C0MMENT: The Chinese Communists continue to possess the capabilities ior invasion, but indica- tions are lacking of their intent to do so in the immediate futures "B" CHINA. Communists ma. acquire l OOO ton tanker. A Chinese Communist crew, manning the 15,000 ton tanker YUNG HAO in Hong Kong, endeavored to make an unauthorized departure for the mainland on 11 Marche The vessel was intercepted by harbor police, and the crew was placed under arrest, charged with attempted transfer of anchorage without authoriza- how- d emeanor, tion of harbor authorities. This charge is m:;rely a mis ever, and Hong Kong authorities have indicated that they have no legal Nationalists in Hong Kong before possession was taken by the Chinese Communists. United States officials have repeatedly declared their concern to Hong Kong authorities that the vessel would depart for the mainland, where it would be invaluable to the Chinese Communists, the petroleum-carrying capacity of their fleet. Interception doublin g by the Chinese Nationalist navy may be the only way to prevent the tanker from reaching the mainland. US naval vessels in the harbor are prepared to signal immediately if the tanker departs. "C" KOREA. Yon of Powfer Pler_t Badly Damaged.,,. A preliminary ECA inspection of the Yongwol Thermo Power Plant indicates that -b e plant has been badly r?amaged by the fighting. The plant has a rated capacity of ,00.0 kilowatts although it has been producing only 60-70,000 kilowatts 100 during the past six years. It is estimated that in six to eight weeks by cannibalizing part of the slant sufficient repairs could be made to produce at l ' y supp 25,000 kilowatts. Coal on hand is estimated at one months 25,000 kw. The coal mine, however, that normally supplies the plant is the Yongwol Plant produced about 80$ Q South ores Si IMENT OI nce s V C electric power prior to the Korean War, the plant's importance to the ROK's industry is obvious. tic" Com unitt vulnerabilities. A mid-February summary of POW interro- gations indicates that the major causes for low morale among enemy troops continue to be hunger, frostbite and fear of air attack. Almost two-thirds of the POWs claimed that food was obtained entirely through foraging and that food had become increasingly scarce south of the 38th Parallel. Two-thirds of the POWs, both Chinese and North Korean, mentioned frostbite and estimated that 10 to 97% of the men in their units had been affected. Shortages of medicines and medical facilities were a more serious factor among North Koreans than among Chinese. No North Koreans reported receiv- ing innoculations or vaccinations although some of the Chinese had received TOP SECRET 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 immunization injections. A large number of reports were received indicat- ing intense fear and helplessness in the face of air attacks, at times & mounting to virtual demoralization, A higher desertion rate reflects. the more serious morale factor among the North Koreans. Socialist Party. Strong right wing minorities in both the Party-and the Federation favor soft-pedaling or even discarding the Socialists three- point policy which they feel is unrealistic and not reflecting present public opinion. COMMENT. Sohyo does not present a solid front at this time. Within its ranks the Federation reflects the growing difference of opinion in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. 25X1 the USSR and Communist China), perpetual neutrality and no lease of military bases. Sohyo also voted against joining the anti-dommunist "C" JAPAN. JaDanese Agency in Washington Proposed. Noting that the establish- ment of a Japanese Government Overseas Agency in Washington would serve to familiarize Japanese Foreign Office officials with the Washington scene during the interval prior to conclusion of the peace treaty, the Depart- ment of State has requested that the Mission in Tokyo discuss with SCAP the desirability of such a step. The Department also suggests that SCAP consider granting authority for the agencies in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle and Honolulu to perform passport and other travel documentation services. COMMENT: Japan?s 25X1 overseas agencies have been established iii the US and in several other countries primarily for trade promotion and market research, although they have performed quasi-consular functions in some cases. These proposals would be further steps in restoring Japans international status prior to a treaty. "C" Larsaest Labor Federation Favors Socialist Stand. Sohyo, credited with 3,200,000 members and Japan's largest labor organization, went on record during its three day national convention in Tokyo as supporting the Socialist Partyus three-point policy of over-all peace (including TOP SECRET 7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 SECTION 3 (WESTERN) "B" ITALY. Projected Socialist Unification :1al;.es Cabinet Reshuffle Increasin Lf1 ely. Cabinet res u e In Apra or immedia e y a- er - ie l4lay elec ions is probable now that the Socialist Party of Italian Workers (PSLI) and the Unitary Socialist Party (PSU) executive committees have signed a definitive agreement for unification, based on PSLI withdrawal from the Government (and PSU support for the Atlantic Pact). US Ambassador Dunn believes it likely that the PSLI convention (beginning 31 March) will accept the unification agreement and that the PSLI may leave the Cabinet during early April. The Ambassador adds that "no one even hazards a guess" as to what the new Cabinet would be like. He points out that the agreement :makes no mention of trade union policy. C OI.UMT1;NT Because of intensified pressure from the right and _e - wings of Premier De Gasperi s s Christian Democratic Party, a new Cabinet will probably involve increased concessions to these two groups. The ISLIes decision to leave the Government is probably precipitated by (1) possibility that a strong Italian socialist movement may develop as the result of the projected alliance between the PSU and the follow?rin of Communist defectors M.Tagnani and Cucchi F_ -1 and (2) the increasing ineffectiveness of the PSLI in the Christian Democratic-dominated Cabinet. 25X1 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 YT F L1 a i Coalition Cabinet Formed. Dr, Romme, Parliamentary Tea er of -the M,a1C)"Y1C Party, has reported success as informateu in ending the seven-;week-old Cabinet crisis with a four-par y agree- Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 meat to join a coalition.. The program calls for an increase in defense expenditures and a restriction of consumption and investment to ease the balance of payments disequilibrium. The now Cabinet has the same political complexion as the last, with participation by the two major parties (Catholic and Labor) and two of the minor parties (Christian Historical Union and Freedom and Democracy). Furthermore, there will be few shifts in Cabinet personnel, as Drees, Stikker and Lieftinck retain the posts of Premier Foreign Affairs, and Finance, respectively. COIll NT: The retention of almost all the members or the former a inet' p- ably will give continuity to Dul,ch domestic and international policy. The inclusion of Stikker, despite repudiation by his party (Freedom and Democracy) is indicative of the national and international eminence he has at- tained.. The immediate need for measures to carry out the defense, social, and economic programs indicates that the New Guinea issue, which was the direct cause of the last C abinet t s downfall, will be pushed into the background. "C" IRELAND. Cabinet Shuffle of Little Significance. In a triangular rea oration of Cabinet positions, t e Mnis erg of Defense, Industry and Commerce, and Justice have exchanged responsibilities. COTSEMINIT: The move was effected in order to give the ailing 11intis cr c ustry and Commerce the less burdensome Justice portfolio. The coalition Governmentts balance remains un- altered as all three men are members of the same party; no significant policy change is involved. The facility with which the Ministry of Defense was reassigned suggests the slight importance the Government still attaches to military :matters. TOP SECRET 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100120001-4 DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT MAR 14 1951 Not for dissemination outside the Office of Current Intelligence 4 LL 4 33 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 TOP SECRET OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY SUMMARY 25X1 14 March 19;1 DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE CcMMENTm Soviet delegate Gromyco has state a e co er- ence no agenda which did not specifically include the subject of the demilitarization of Germany and the prohibition of the remilitariza- tion of Germany would be satisfactory to the USSR". SECTION 2 (EASTERN) "A" Remarks of Jessup Regarding Soviet Actions in Deputy Foreign Ministers' Uoh-f eren ce. e e ega o e Depu y Foreign finis ,ers 4 Conference s aT s that the Soviet delegation has made the usual propaganda attack on the West and has not revealed any new positions. The admission of the Austrian Treaty and German unity issue to the Soviet agenda consti- tutes no concession. The Austrian Treaty is still linked with Trieste and the addition of "German unity" apparently represents Soviet recogni- tion of a disadvantageous propaganda position4 The US delegate believes that the Soviet delegation is waiting for "some break" in the Western position and that the conference will, therefore, continue for some time. He also believes that the modified Western agenda contains all important concessions that can be made without moving toward the slanted Soviet agenda. sentiment in Burma, INDOCHINA, Cambodian Appointee to Burma. The Cambodian Government intends To ssig,~i a p e,n is mine To E Tench Legation in Burma. US Embassy Rangoon considers that the assignment of a Cambodian representative on this basis(rather than as chief of mission) would be a grave mistake since it would be interpreted by the Burmese as evidence of continuing French control over Indochina and might contribute to pro-Ho Chi Minh TOP SECRET 3-1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 ,..e TOP SECRET SECTION 3 (WESTERN "B" GERMANY. Allies Review West Berlin Canal Restrictions. At a spe dal me me tee ng on l2 March, the Allied High Coi.ssioners in western Germany planned to review imposition of counter measures against the Soviets on the west Berlin waterways. t a meeting 25X1 the dasy before, the three Allied Berlin commandants agree to urge the High Commissioners not to discontinue these counter measures, which have so far resulted in considerable stalling of east German barge traffic in west Berlin canals- This view, presented through theBritish commandant, stressed the need to force a cessation of Soviet east German harassing Ca LENT -. No further reports have been received on the outcome o e 12 arch meeting of the High Commissioners, who are presumably reconsider- ing these counter measures in view of east German halting of train ship- s l V -_- Lm ent s V .L coa VV "e "B" FRANCE -INDOCHINA. De Lattre Seeks Eisenhower Interview. General de a re de assignyA ren High Commissioner in In ochina, who will arrive in Paris 15 March to ask personally for reinforcements, has re- quested a private meeting with General Eisenhower to seek support for his mission. The US Minister in Saigon reports that these reinforce- ments are vital toFrench plans and operations in Indochina, and de Lattre is gambling that he can complete the Paris trip before the ex- pected Viet Minh offensive opens in late March. Inasmuch as Minister for the Associ ated States Letour?nean has indicated that the decision to transfer metropolitan, troops to Indochina depends on General. Eisenhower's attitude, de Lattre believes he must see Eisenhower personally. CC MENTo General JUng supreme ren military comman e?, favors n&l in gate ?. tional troops to Indochina, but the French Government new seems willing to be guided by NATO 'leadership on the size of such reinforce- ments. By deferring to NATO headquarters in this instance, the French may t sh to pave the way for a possible future decision to request international participation in the Indochina struggle -a step which France has carefulay avoided to dated TOP SECRET 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23 : CIA-RDP 79T01 146A000100120001-4 UNCLASSIFIED when blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document-Automatically downgraded or declassi- fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document. CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY SOURCE CIA CONTRO NO. DOC. NO. DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED DOC. DATE COPY NO. LOGGED BY NUMBER OF PAGES NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns. REFERRED TO RECEIVED RELEASED SEEN BY OFFICE SIGNATURE DATE TIME DATE TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE/DIV. DATE NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record. DOWNGRADED DESTROYED DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO BY (Signature) TO BY (Signature) WITNESSED BY (Signature) BY (Signature) OFFICE DATE OFFICE DATE OFFICE DATE TAD eG(DCT 8073 26 08E PREV1OU Approved For Release 2007/10/23 CIA-RDP79T01146A000100120001-4 (40)