OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 15, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved Forketease 20091/304S:Ea-RIP79T011461400100130001-7
4J
COPY NO 39
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC
Date:
MAR 15 1951
NOTE: l. This summary of 'significant reports has been
prepared for the internal use of the Office
of Current Intelligence. It does not
necessarily represent a complete coverage of
all current traffic in CIA or in the Office
of Current Intelligence.
2. Comment represents the preliminary views of
the responsible analysts ant net necessarily
the final view of the Office of Current
Intelligence.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
fellows:
"A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
"0" - ether information indicating trends
and. potential developments
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
TOP SECRET
40,i ?
Approved ForNi*lease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T011411e300100130001-7
TOP M`ClirET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"B" EASTERN EUROPE. ALBANIA. Rumors of Bomb_Tncident. Rumors are circulating
in Shkoder that an assassination attempt was made on members of the Hoxha
Government at ceremonies in Tirana in honor of Soviet Army Day 23 February?
Members of the Government for whom the bomb was destined are reported to
have escaped injury due to the delayed action of the bomb. However, a large
part of the building was destroyed. More than 500 persons are said to have
been arrested the same day, including high army officers, government
officials and technicians. It is alleged that 15 persons were shot immedi?
ately. liaatingtau Comment j This is the first eport of this incident and
should be treated with reserve. The above rumor could be a distorted ver?
sion of the bomb e,,Iplosion at the Soviet Embassy in Tirana on 19 February
If the report is true, the announcement on 5 March of the "release from
duty" of Spiro Pane, Deputy Premier, and Rita Narko? Ministry of Industry,
25X1A both of whom have been "entrusted with other impoir,ant duties," may be of
possible interest. ppMENTs It appears likely
that the rumors are a confused version or rie previously reported explosion
at the Soviet Embassy in Tirana. (See OCT Daily Summary, 1 Mar 51).
POLAND. Polish Industrialization to bft_gtappsc_Imap_222/Ing_2221. According
to statements by Minister of Foreign Trade Gede upon his return this week
from Moscow, where he has been since 1 Dec 1950, there will be a con?
siderable increase in the exchange of goods between Poland and the USSR.
Under the terms of the protocol for 1951 goods deliveries between the two
countries, Poland will receive iron and manganese ores, iron alloys, non?
ferrous metals, synthetic rubber, cotton, petroleum products, ball bear?
ings, machine tools, trucks, tractors, and agricultural machinery. In
return the USSR will receive locomotives, freight and passenger cars, coal,
coke, foundry goods, textiles, chemicals, glass, paper, sugar, and manu?
factured metalware. Gede stated that this protocol specifies and widens
appreciably the quantities envisaged by the long?term agreement signed
26 Jan 1948, and by the protocol dated 29 June 1950, which amended the
1948 agreement upward. He further stated that in the field of capital
goods deliveries, 1951 will be a year of great stepping?up of deliveries
of equipment and machinery from the USSR needed for the construction of
the large Nowa Huta steel factory in Krakow. (R FBIS, 14 Mar 51; U CSM,
14 Mar 51). CONMENTg These statements indicate that there will be an
additional increase in efforts to establish and improve Poland's basic
industries. The upward revised norms for 1951 in the Six Year Plan are
an additional indication of Poland's effort for and the USSR's interest
in, speeding the establishment of basic industries in Poland.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/043!, CIA-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
Approved FoNaolease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A.000100130001-7
? TOP &EGRET
"C" ANIA Ci Minister Ousted, Gheorghe Vasilichi, a veteran Communist
organizer, has been relieved of his post as EinIeter of Mines and Petroleum
by presidential decree, The new Minister is Constantin Mateescu, an Assis?
tnat Minister of Mines and Petroleum from April 1949?August 1950, who held
no official position in the interval, Vasilichils main qualification for
the position seems to have been his long experience as a Party agitator and
daring Communist fighter; his apparent dismissal at this point is the latest
of recent indications of dissatisfaction with production and labor dis?
cipline in the oil industry. In other Government shifts, Petre Bele was
named Director General of Affairs in the Council of Ministers, a newly
established post, and Emanoil Vihea named Assistant Director, (R Bucharest
642, 14 Mer 51), COMTIENT8 Vasilichi's career erdicates that he may be a
nationalist Communist. He is described as a self?taught Marxist, idealistic,
intelligent, and daring, sympathetic toward the Rumanian peasant, and dis?
satisfied with Sovjet domination of his country. He thus qualifies well for
the role of scapegoat for the oil industry, which has been subjected to a
drumfire of criticism by the Communist Party and press since early Februaryp
the most notable example being a decision passed y the CP Central Committee
and the Cabinet on 3 Feb calling for the increase of labor discipline, and
the elimination of absenteeism and mechanical breakdowns in the oilfields,
If Vasilichi is in fact something of a nationalist, he must have suffered
serious misgivings as Petroleum Minister, since Soviet exploitation of
Rumania's oil through the Sovrompetrol Co, has been especially thorough,
Little is known of the new Minister, who will probably serve as a front
for Soviet control of this key segment of the economy,
"C" YUGOSLAVIA, British View of Yu oslav Economic Situation, The British Foreign
Office now estimates Yugoslavia's 1951 deficit at 30,000,000 pounds which
represents an approximate 25% reduction of the figure submitted by the
Yugoslays, The reduction is due to the inclusion in the original program
of items of a military nature, increased raw material imports based upon
expanded capacity which British representatives do not believe realistic,
and other less important factors. The British estimate that the Yugoslav
deficit for 1951 through 1953 will ?be between 70,000,000 and 90,000,000
pounds. British Economic Mission to Belgrade believes that the recent
Yugoslav request for $20,000,000 and 4,000,000 pounds from the US and UK
? respectively (OCI Daily Summary, 8 Mar 51) will cover at best only a
period until the end of June, The British Foreign Office is confident
that it will be able to extend the Yugoslav Government its 4,000,000
pounds before Easter, (S London 4848, 9 Per 51),
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/0+: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
B
If
Approved FoNitelease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01141591600100130001-7
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
A" INDOCHINA. Chinese Communist Border Violations. Chinese Communist forces
are reliably reported to have violated the Indochina border twice in the
pas'- week. The violations occurred on 9 March, in the course of a Chinese
Communist attempt to capture a Nationalist guerrilla band which retreated
across the border. During this action, the Chinese raided a French border
post and took one prisoner. On 11 March, a larger Chinese Communist group
forced the withdrawal of the garrison of the same post and took 23 pri-
soners, including one French officer. The French authorities in Indochina
apparently do not plan to protest these incidents to Peiping. (C Saigon
1621, 14 Mar 51). COMMENT: Continuing border incidents of this nature
are to be expected, since anti-Communist guerrillas in South China often
seek sanctuary in Indochina and in Burma as well.
TOP SECRET
3
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
25X1A
. Approved For %pee 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T01146AQ010100130001-7
TOP SECRET
French Obstruct ECA Program. The concluaion of bilateral economic
aid agreements between the US and Vietnam (as well as the other Associated
States) has been delayed by Economic Counselor Penavaire, a member of
General De Lattre's High Commissariat. After more than a month, Penavaire,
an old-line "colonialist" who is generally considered to entertain a narrow
conception of Vietnamese independence and a suspicious attitude toward the
US role in Indochina, has submitted his comments on the bilateral text
agreed upon by US and Viet representatives. Penavaire has proposed various
amendments which are in almost every case identical with proposals previ-
ously advanced by the French or by the Associated States and subsequently
deleted as a result of negotiation or turned dawn flatly by the US repre-
sentatives. ECA chief Blum observes that the French, in taking this
action, are within their rights as established by the 8 March agreements
with Vietnam, but that this situation impinges on a "supremely important
political issue": the fact that French intransigeance on points under issue
can only reinforce the general belief in Vietnam and Southeast Asia that,
in spite of all accords and conventions, the Associated States are very
far indeed from being independent of France. (S Saigon TOECA 243, 8 Mar Si).
COMMENT: Hostility to Vietnamese nationalist demands and suspicion of US
intentions on the part of various officials who belong to the old French
"colonial bureaucracy" has frequently been reported in the past. However,
the fact that General De Lattre, himself, has recently expressed his sus-
picions of ECA to top US officials in Saigon suggests that Penavaire's
stand does not result merely from one isolated official's own narrow views.
THAILAND. Correction. On the basis of Phibun's public denial and personal
assurances to US officials, Embassy Bangkok has corrected its earlier re-
port that the Prime Minister voted against the appointment of the new
Regent. (0 Bangkok 1395, 14 Mar 51).
MALAYA. "Progress" Claimed in Terroriappression. Malcolm MacDonald,
UK Commissioner for Southeast Asia, has left London following talks with
the Colonial Office in which he indicated that progress is being made in
Malaya for the first time since the EmergencY began and expressed his
belief that the resettlement program would be completed by I May in Johore,
and by 1 July in Negri Sembilan, thereby permitting the release of some
UK armed forces for service elsewhere by that date. (S London 4931,
14 Mar 51). COMMENT: There is little evidence in the current Malayan
terrorist situation to justify MacDonald's present optimism. Terrorist
activity in Johore, where the UK's greatest effort has been concentreted,
is now higher than any other state in the Federation.
"A" INDONESIA. p_pening of Chinese Communist Consulates Approved. The Indonesian
Foreign Ministry has agreed to the establishment of four Chinese Communist
conculetes (at Djakarta in Java, Makassar in Celebes, Medan in Sumatra, and
Bandjarmasin in Borneo). The consulates reportedly will be opened in April.
25X1A (U FBISIIIIIIIIII 14 Mar 51). COMMENT: It can be anticipated that these
consulates, located in four serarate Indonesian islands, will lend further
direction and encouragement to Chinese Communist activity in the archipelago.
The Indonesian Government has previously refused a Chinese Communist request
to open nine consulates.
Approved For Release 2001+9/0g.&q*RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
ii
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T011
%goy/
TOP SECRET
00100130001-7
"B" AUSTRALIA. Parliament to be Dissolved. Prime Minister Robert Menzies,
leader of Australia's Liberal-Country coalition Government, has requested
the Governor General to dissolve both houses of Parliament, thereby setting
in motion the machinery for a general election. (AP Canberra, 14 Mar 51).
COMMENT: The coalition Government has apparently decided that only a new
election will resolve the political stalemate caused by Labor's current
blocking tactics in the Senate, where the "outs" maintain control. Another
factor in the dissolution is probably the Government's hope that popular
dissatisfaction with the High Courts recent invalidation of anti-Communist
legislation will serve to increase the coalition's Parliamentary majority.
One report states the general election will probably be held on 5 May 1951.
a Soviet tanker, theSO-FU-NIEI G-
CHINA. Soviet Tanker Shi Gasoline to Tsin tao.
arrived in nuery from the Soviet Far East with a load
of gasoline. . COMMENT: This is the
first reported tan er s.ipmen s Soviet Far East to a port
in China proper, although such shipments have been anticipated. The
vessel's reported name is probably the Chinese transliteration of the
SOVETSKAYA NEFT, a Soviet tanker with a cargo capacity of some 10,000
tons which has been operating in Far Eastern waters.
JAPAN. Dynamite Confiscated from Korean Red. Police confiscated 160
sticks of dynamite and 98 percussion caps from the home of a 21-year-old
Korean Red. (R FBIS, 14 Mar 51). COMMENT: There have been unconfirmed
reports that the Japanese Communists are shoring an increased interest in
the purchase of weapons. Although small quantities of dynamite (a common
item for black market sale) and a few pistols have been found in Communist
homes, there is still no evidence that a successful widescale Communist
effort to cache arms and ammunition is underway.
25X1C
cIi
25X1C
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/04 :5CIA-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
25X1C
25X1A
nail
Approved ForVielease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01140A+000100130001-7
TOP SECRET'
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
Emu& MpAPj)elayaella%y Hmper_Eyensh. Defense PrqgLaat French Defense
Minister Mach has stated that it would-6 ndifficult".to activate
the 17 divisional "slices n (total nomber of men available divided by
the number of dIvisions) planned for 1952, if MDAP equipment tentatively
provided under the 1952 fiscal-year program is delayed until 1953. He
has requested indications of delivery schedules; since NDAP equipment
programmed for 1950 and 1952 is running about a year behind schedule.
(S Paris 5301; 10 Mar 51). COMMEEL This is the first indication
of serious French concern that the1952 program may not be fulfilled
on schedule. The situation may possibly be alleviated, however, by
assigning to France Canadian equipment which is now available for
another European division. French equipment shortages in Europe
may have influenced Inspector General Juin to favor sending to
Indochina -- where ample equipment is available -- troop reinforcements
which are desperately needed in France.
=Lac Communist qLKalg14 inepelise F,orce.ilevealtplA Prompted by
the Communist showing inrecel:? police union elections, an investi-
gation by US and British official0 of Communiet strength in the
Austrian police force has revealed that the problem is larger than
Austrian officials have generally indicated. The Interior Minister's
policy of gradually weeding out Communists (originally appointed under
Austria's provisional government in 3945) has been much less effective
than responsible police officials have suggested. (C Vienna 1999,
13 Mar 51), COMMENU According to an unofficial press report,
the Communist vote in the Vienna police union elections was 50% of
the administration police; 33% of the secret police, and 20% of
the regular police. The unexpected strength of the Communist vote
can only be due in part to discontent with economic conditions and
the Government parties. Although the investigation may prove salutary,
Austrian steps to remove or block Communist influence in the police,
will continue to be hampered by civil service laws and the fear of
Soviet retaliation.
"An ITALY Italian Communiets_Acti,pzet2Recev,er Lost GI:ounqA 25X1C
25X1C Togliatti has given the Communist Party
(PCI) Central Committee a general outline of the party's future activities.
Togliatti wants to unite elements capable of embarrassing the Italian
Government and pro-Atlantic Pact groups. He plans to exploit existing
dissension within De Gasperi's Christian Democratic Party, to refrain
from anti-clerical activities and to appeal to reformist "leftist"
Catholics in the labor field. With regard to defections, Togliatti
TOP SECRET
6
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
- -
0
0,1110010,00ff
Approved For ForRelease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T011460091)100130001-7
Itaw.
TOP SECRET
opposes reurging on a large scale, preferring that itbe done "silently"
through the revolutionary vigilance Committees. Dissident Commtnist
groups will be penetrated by loyal Communists. (See OCI Daily 13 Mar 51)
Meanwhile, a New York Times report from Bologna states that, as of 26 -
February, Communist efforts to stop loca.1 defections had been mlocessful,
because many Commnists who would like to leave the party have been
held back by fear of physical reprisals or loss of jobs, and ,others
25X1A fear that large-scale defection would create confusion among Communist
workers. UFk Times, 14 Mar 51).
COMI,TLITL Althoughl og a i may r ee.L Lnat he can make use of elements
within the increasingly divided Christian Democratic Party who believe
that Italy could serve as a bridge between. East and West or who
criticize the Government ? failure to achieve socio-economic refoiml
he will not be successful. Neutralism within the party is changing
to a pro-Atlantic Pact stand. Important defections from the PCI
will depend mainly on whether potential defectors eon find a group
which they feel will represent the workerls interests.
UNITED KINGDOM Forei n, Office favors Western. Germanz's full Membershi
in Council of_ELEan2a. The Foreign Office now feels that the CounciJeof.
Europels Committee of Ministers ought to discuss the application of the
German Federal Republic for full membership et its 16 March meeting.
The Foreign Office also wants favorable action on the application,
but will not press for a vote in case of French objections or the
injection of the Saar issue. (S London 4932, 14 Mar 51). mum
These views reflect the two main objectives of Britaints German a
policy: to reorient Western Germaznrfully toward the West but to remain
in step with France on this issue.
New ChaLre_lnikk,ing_aldly_ReceivegA. The new UK Charge in
Peiping, Leo N. Larib? has described his initial interview with a -
- Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs as courteous but cold. He,
like his predecessor, 15 still treated strictly as a representative
to arrange for diplomatic relational the Chinese brushed aside all his
efforts to mention specific problome. (8 London 4908, 13 Mar 52).
mupla The UK decision to present a. stiffer attitude toward Peiping
by pressing for satisfaction of British. grievances (See OCI Daily,
8 Mar 51) has thus been frustrated in its initial effort.
SWEDEN. RadaliDifficu'ltiee hipitteq.,? Defense Minister Vougt
has pUbliciy announced -that the US.has refused export licenses for radar
shipments to Sweden. The Conservative and Liberal opposition press
blames the Social Democratic Governmentve "isolationist" policy for the
situation, but hope is expressed. that the US will, in view of the UKIs
more liberal policylreconsider its position. (R Stockholm 1085, 24 Mar 51).
TOP sEcna
7
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
? e,
Approved For*aelpase 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T011415111e000100130001-7
TOP SEM_ T
CO NT; This is the first time a Goverment official has publicly
revealed in an address that Sweden's foreign policy of no alliances
has a distinct disadvantage for Sweden's defense plans. While many
Swedes will be disturbed, they will persist in believing that Western
strategic interests require that Sweden's defense be maintained and
strengthened, Irrespective of non?adherence to NATO. No change in
foreign policy is to be anticipated, and the Government's action
undoubtedly is designed to make the public aware of the need for a
concerted national effort to keep Sweden strong and to unite the
country and political parties behind the Government.
TOP SECRET
8
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
41tii
Approved Foriterease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146,60100130001-7
SECRET
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
MAR 1 5 1951
Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.
SECRET
431
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
3:3
Approved ForNlIgiease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0114616100100130001-7
SECRET
(S/S Cable Supplement not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE)
41
Onel.CE OF CUTRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY SUMMARY OF SIGNIFiCANT S/S CABLE TRAFFIC
15 March 1951
DEPUTY FORUGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE
"A" US Dele ation Seeks Instructions on Soviet German Demilitarization
I em., e-Thlr-d-elegaTifoi= acceded-to a a request for tripartite
-3-7-g7gement 15 Mar0 en how to handle the Soviet pisoposal. that an item
. on German demilitarization be included in the agenda for a Foreign
Ministers' Conference. Urgently requesting a decieion on an accept-
able formula for countering this Soviet proposal, the US delegation
suggests as a tripartite agenda item the "problem of German rearma-
ment", with an outright Western admission that this is the issue in
the dispute over the Soviet proposal. The US delegation believes
that it will have difficulty in trying to handle the Soviet "demili-
tarization" item until the US is prepared to discuss in the present
Meeting the substance et' the US position on Germany's military con-
tribution to Western defense and on the status of the Potsdam
Agreement. (S S/S Paris 5377, 1)4 Mar 51).
Btt .
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
EASTERN EUROPE. Netherlands to Reduce Soviet 0/212:21.2122:21sa_LA__?
167-s-63:7/767-7cooranirco?tre?tra eiliTaTaas-litia-iber to Budapest and
Bucharest, at a recent conference of Dutch Iron Curtain Ministers
it -was decided to gradually reduce the staffs of the missions in
the Soviet orbit2 eventually heading them by Charge d"Affaireso
The Netherlands Minister to Poland will not return and the Nether-
lands Minister to Prague will leave his post shortly. The consensus
of the conference was that an offensive war in the Balkans is improb-
able this year. The Netherlands Minister to Hungary stated that he
had seen no signs of offensive Russian equipment in Hungary. (S S/S
The Hague 12602 8 Mar 51).
SECTION 2 (EASiERN)
"B" INDIA. Prime Minister Nehru Takes a Personal Interest in Moroocan
Situati7F-c ;11111111111111111111111111111111111111111
25X1X read to US .Ambassador Henderson
portions of a private message sent byPrime Minister Nehru to the
Approved For Release 2001/0g/Re41A-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
9.
25X1X
11Bil
Approved For htPrease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146*60100130001-7
SECET
French Government, in which the Indian leader expressed the hope
that France would take appropriate stepe to :r re the eventual
independence of Morocco. stated that the Syrian Minister - 25X1X
and the In an Charge in Baghdad, Iraq., had suggested the move and
that the governments of the Arab countries had been confidentially
informed of Nehru 's action. According to Ambassador Henderson, Nehru
Wrote in most friendly terms although be displayed sympathy for the
Moroccans and other North African nationals. The Ambassador believes
that Nehruls new interest in North Africa has been stimulated by a
desire to strengthen his influence in Arab countries of the Middle
East. (C S/S New Delhi 2427r 13 Mar 51). C0MENT2 Prime Minister'
Nehru once again appears in his familiar rOT.; as champion. of oppress-
ed and colonial peoples. It is doubtful that his message will have
much effect on the French in view of (1) French sensitivity to ex-
ternal interference? (2) the antagonism raised by Nehru ,s earlier
outspoken criticisms of colonialism. in Indochina, and (3) Nehru,s
. behavior when he visited Paris after the close of the Commonwealth
Prime Ministers' Conference in. London in January. On the other hand,
the message may improve India's position in the eyes of those Arab
nations which opposed Indian recognition of the etate of Israeg last
September.
SECTION 3 :(INESTERM)
BELGIUM. Bel iana Unsympathetic toward Proposed Schuman Plan
Organization. n a converse ion with U b.,nbassTRITFrils? Belgian
oreign Minister Van- Zeeland stated that he felt the Paris coal-steel
pool negotiations mere developing a too complex organization, beyond
the original objective, and that the implications of a controlled
ecohomy in the proposed structure almost defeat it purpose. His.
remarks- also reflect a lack of sympathy with Articles 60 and 61 (on
prohibited and regulated industrial canbinations). (S S/S Brussels
1481, 13 Mar 51). COMMENT? This is the first official indication
from any of the parMITEing powers that the:Troposed organization
is too osmPlex. Belgian acceptance Of the Schuman Plan principle has
not been enthusiastic.
ITALY. Public Fet1i2g2ver Trieste Remains High. as Italo-UK
nirvirsaaras 157-aw... to. a Zirar, "The concern of Italians over the
Trieste issue continues to moillat as the Prime Ministers and Foreign
Ministers.offItaly and the UK confer in London. Public opinion of
all shades except the extreme left has emphasized the utter inaccept-
ability of any solution of this .thorny problem other than the return
to Italy of the entire Free Territory. Although the UK has reaffirmed
its support of the tripartite declaration of March 1948, advocating the
SECRET
10
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
Approved For F*Prease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146M50100130001-7
SECRET
the return of Trieste to Italy, the present Soviet attempt to include
Trieste on the agenda for a Big Four conference has aroused Italian
apprehension that the Western powers might use this issue as a pawn
to obtain Soviet concessions on German rearffiament. (R SiS State -
Rome 4768, 13 Mar 51; U Rome 3996, 12 Mar Si; R FBID, 13 Mar Si;
U New York Times, 14 Mar Si). CaTMEET2 The UK affirm= of adherence
to the tripartite declaration wi-TrEr far toward mollifying Italian
nationalist ferment over Trieste and strengthening De Gasperits posi-
tion at home. The Italians., who have also feared a Western power deal
with Tito over Trieste at their eocpense, derive a certain feeling of
security psychologically from the retention of the small Anglo-American
forces in Zone A of the Free Territory4,
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/041CIA-RDP79T01146A000100130001-7
25X1A
. _.
UNCLAW NED when leipidreVilfd SBURekbasedeostowattp eigkemprzoroilpresteteilechnoon* or declassi-
Ved when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOURCE
CIA CONT, OL NO. ....-
'
DOC. NO.
DATE 'DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
OFF ICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
OFF I CE/D IV.
DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
By (Signature)
TO
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
OFFICE
A
DATE FFICE
proved For ReiOease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0114ii6
?ATI
0100130001-7 ek
W
DATE
FORM 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
8-73
TOP SECRET
(40)
0