OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100200001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 23, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC
IVIHh o l jo I
MOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared for the internal use of the. Office
of Current Intelligence. It does not repre-
sent a complete coverage of all c 3.rrert
traffic in CIA or in the Office,. of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comment represents the preliminary views of
the responsible analysts and not necessarily
the final view of the Office of Current
Intelligence.
Marglnsi letter indications are defined as
f ollo rs:
"A" s, items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"B" -- important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
"C" - other in-formation indicating trends
and potential developments
State, JCS declassification & release instructions on, file
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DEPUTY F'Or'IEIGN MINISTERS' CONT s;R ;NC0
25X1 C lion
drench Popular Reaction. French public reaction to the Deputy Foreign
Ministers' Conference has been one of comparative apathy. Socialist
leaders have shown privately a strong hope that a Foreign Ministers'
Meeting will be held, permitting modification of the Brussels decisions
on German rearmament. Nearly all press comments reflect harmony among
the Western Powers, with the Communist press referring to US dictation
to France and the UK. If, however, present talks fail - without a break
in tripartite harmony - fear would become an important factor in public
opinion. Although there is not now any widespread fear of imminent war,
immediately after a break-up of the Deputies' meeting or of the Foreign
Ministers' meeting another wave of near-hysteria such as occurred in
June and December 1950, would probably break out. (C Paris 5578, 21 Mar
51; U Paris 5609, 21 Mar 51). COMMENT: Failure of present Big Four
efforts to relieve East-West tension would not result in sufficient popu-
lar reaction to force any important modification of French Government
policies supporting Western rearmament.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
USSR. goviet Ant-Epidemic Unit Arrives in Korea. Pyongyang radio
announced that a ten-man Soviet anti-epidemic unit arrived in Sinuiju
on 20 March and received an "enthusiastic welcome". (R FBID, 22 Mar 51).
COMMENT: Chinese Communist and North Korean troops opposing UN forces
in Korea are !.mown to have suffered from typhus anrl other diseases.
PRAVDA: Mao Presently in Peiping. On 21 March Pravda. reported.
that Mao Tse-tung Is now in Peiping. In this connection, Pravda also
cited a TASS dispatch from Shanghai which claimed that a Tibetan lama
had visited Mao on that day to convey the loyalty of the Tibetans.
(U i7 Her. Trib. 22 Mar 51). COMfLENT:_ Pravda, does not normally single
out for mention the routine activity of a foreign go,,ernmental official
in his own capital. If true, this report would identify Mao's presence
ii.Peiping'but may be an effort to spike rumors that Mao is being held.
prisoner in Moscow. 25X1C
EASTERN EUROPE. ALBANIA. Another Rumor of Bomb Incident.
cording to rumors concerning the "attempted as of Hoxha at
the Soviet Legation Tirana" 18 Soviets lost their lives in the ruin
of the building.
such an operation could have been engineered only by dissident Communists
as the Soviet Legation was probably the most closely guarded area in
those thoroughly
Tirana, and the persons responsible could only be among
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trusted by the Soviets. He feels that the rumors of a possible anti-
Comixform movement in Albania favorable to a rapprochement with Tito lend.
e poort to this theory. (13-6). COMMENT:
The above rumor should be treated with reserve until it is confirmed, al-
though it is probably another version of the original factual bombing at
the Soviet Legation on 19 Feb.
"Bit FINLAND. Lack of Concern Over Cabinet Crisis. The US Minister in Helsinki
reports that the Social Democratic Ministers in the Finnish coalition
Cabinet have presented their resignations. However, there has been no
indication of their acceptance and comments about the situation indicate
a lack of serious concern. The Minister's informants believe that a
solution to the problem may be found during the course of the Faster holi-
day. (S Helsinki 499, 21 Mar 51). COMJIE4J1T: The Minister, s report disproves
a report 21 "arch that the entire Cabinet had resigned. (see. O/CI Daily
Digests of 21 and 22 Mar 51),
"Bu H TGA ZY, Soviet ,fix.Activit-r _Incre ,sine. Reliable reports from Budapest
state that a~ dams airfield (in Eastern Hungary) is to be turned over
to the USSR. cork began in. 1949 to expand the field to include an 8,200
foot concrete runway is reportedly being rushed to completion. Increased
air activity over Budapest includin?_ Jet aircraft has been observed re-
cently. (S AA Budapest 284, 16 Mar 51).
"A" POLAND. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. EAST GERMANY. East Cermany Returns Railway Care 25X1C
oPoland and Czechoslovakia.
COMMENT: Numerous reports since mid-December 50 have indicated an un-
usually large eastward movement of empty freight cars from the Soviet Zone
of Germany. The movement appears to be continuing, although at a somewhat
reduced rate. Since late January 51 an estimated 3,000-3,500 such cars
have departed empty from the Soviet Zone. is the
first indication that primarily foreign cars held in the Soviet Zone of
Germany were involved.
Peasant Party Deputies on Trial. Public prosecutions are reported to
be proceeding against five former United Peasant Party (ZSL) members of
the Polish Sejm, according to Sejm Speaker Wladyslaw Kowalski. The nature
of the charges have not been disclosed, but are believed to have been
brought on because the five are unsympathetic toward the official policy
of liquidating kulaks. (U NYT, 23 Mar 51). COMAENT: Last fall it was
reported that fourteen members of the Sejm, all former members of the
non-Communist Polish Peasant Party were arrested, but released after
agreeing to resign from the Seam. In December 1950, at a meeting of the
Supreme Council of the ZSL, it was revealed that an extensive purge of
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members had been completed. This revelation was followed in January
and February 1951 by trials of various individuals allegedly working
against the agricultural collectivization program. These events and
the current trial of the former ZSL Sejm Deputies sugs?est that there
has been little ideological success so far in. convincing the peasant
population of the benefits to be derived from collectivization, and
possibly that the Communist Party is preparing for a new agricultural
collectivization drive.
YUGOSLAVIA. Amelioration of Htiuaan Bights. Commenting on the Yugoslav
Government's attitude toward human rights, Embassy Belgrade notes that,
while the regime continues to impose limitations, there is distinct
progress discernible in certain fields, specifically religion, judicial
practices, and police methods, Evidences of this progress are: (1) the
appearance of new shrines and crucifixes in the Catholic areas of
Vojvodina area in. the past few weeks; (2) the free and unrehearsed de-
bate in the recent session of the Yugoslav Parliament; (3) Yugoslav
requests for use in university libraries of American novels and cultural
books depicting American life; (4) a recent Borba editorial sharply
criticizin.FC local peoples' committees for arbitrary abuse of citizens'
rights. The editorial specifically pointed, to the recently enacted
Penal Code which provides for the punishment of officials who deny citi-
zens the right to appeal, to make objections, or to file requests.
Since local bureaucrats are among the chief violators of the Yugoslav
peoples' rights, the Embassy feels that the curbing of these officials
will facilitate an improvement in human rights. (C Belgrade 1333, 21 Mar
51). COMMENT: While some gestures have been made to improve human rights,
the Yugoslav regime still retains its basic totalitarians approach
toward this problem.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"C" GREECE. Prime Minister Venizelos ConsidersPcal.itscal Merger. Prime Minister
Venizelos informed US Ambassador Peurifoy that he is exploring the possibility
of merging his Liberal Party with the National Progressive Union (EPEK) of
Plaastires, and forming a new government based on this union. Venizelos hopes
to effect the Liberal-EPEK fusion on the basis of Plastiras as Prime Minister
and himself as Chairman of a United Party and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
According to this plan general elections would be held in August. (C Athens
3098, 21 Mar 51). COMMENT: Fusion of Venizelos' Liberals with Flastiras'
EPEK would be a healthy development in Greek politics because it would reduce
the multiplicity of political parties and at the same time provide a relatively
strong central party. Plastiras, however, is apparently confident of his
strength without outside support. Furthermore he would bt most unwilling to
agree to an arrangement which would deprive him of all political power, prior
to the municipal elections. Further development of the plan depends undoubtedly
upon the outcome of the municipal elections, scheduled for 15 April, which are
expected to clarify the relstive position o.L the various political parties.
"C" M. Turks Svai ch Marshall Plan M~nistr 6 The US Consul General in
Istanbul reports that the Turkish Foreign Minister has officially notified
him of a Cabinet decision to transfer Me.rehall Plan coordination functions
from the Ministry of State to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign
Minister stated that the Turkish Government was not satisfied with the fun.c-
tioning of the Ministry of State, and further observed that the question of
Turkish Marshall Plan administration was strictly an internal matter on
which ECA should not be expected to be consulted in advance. (U Istanbul
362, 19 Mar 51). COMMENT: The transfer of authority probably represents
a political maneuver aimed at strengthening the power of the top leaders
of the Democratic Party,. one of whom is the Foreign Minister. The US
Mission has considered the previous arrangement satisfactory. It may be
anticipated that the Foreign Ministry will realize eventually that it has
taken on more than it can carry.
"B" EGYPT. Increased Governmental Concern over Iranian Development s. According
to US Ambassador Caffery ir}_,Caairo, there is an increasing concern in top
circles in and out of they overnment over developments in bran. -tfta_~OCI
Mar 51).-. Caaffery reports that, while government officials
are inclined to blame the British oil compnny they ?,nd opposition
leaders are genuinely Fltrmed * the posF~ibility of aw e a of -the ---
assa.sasinction-type of politics the Mosley! Br therhooda 8-n) s --,hat
with the help of the Communists, wii-i-'be`~Irected against themselves.
Caffery adds that the Egyptian political leaders are at a loss to know hoer
to deal with this situation. (S Cairo 968, 22 Mar 51). COMMENT: While
recent events in Iran will hardly lead to rublic violence in :`gypt, the
growing activities of the Moslem Brotherhood during the past year and 44sar
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1n}sincreased dissatisfaction with the government--as well as its long-
term antipathy toward foreign influence in Egypt--furnish an adequate basis
for the concern that the Brotherhood might use this opportunity to start its
terrorist activities in Egypt again.
"B" ISRAEL-SYRIA. Tense Israel yrian Border Dispute. Relations between Israel
and Syria became severely strained during the past week as a result of Israel's
recently initiated Lake Huleh drainage project in the t'emiliterized Syrian-
Israeli border zone. Israel has so far ignored an order of the nixed Armistice
Commission (MAC) to cease work and n'gotiate a settlement of the dispute with
Syria. The Syrian Government insists that a work stoppage is the quid pro quo
for a negotiated settlement .mnd has threatened army intervention unless Israel
complies. A flare-up reportedly occurred on 15 March when Arabs on the Syrian
side of the `~ordan River opened fire on Israelis who had crossed the river
with a tractor. (S Jer-aselem 169, 15 Mar 51; S Tel Aviv 578, 22 Mar 51).
COMMENT: The present border dispute between Syria and Israel is potentially
more dangerous than the frequent Jordan-Israel border clashes where leaders
in both countries ern genuinely interested in keeping friction at a minimum.
Syria hs., thus *ar shown considerable restraint, but the unstable political
situation in Syria cFupled with the Army's political dominonce suggest that
if sufficiently aggravated, the Syrian authorities would have difficulty in
checking precipitate military action. Israel may wish to achieve a fait
accompli in regard to this particular project, but would compromise if the
situation became sufficiently serious to threaten hostilities.
"C" INDOCHINA. Bao Dai Resigns Himself to French Domination. In an interview
with with Minister Heath, Bee Dai called General Do qtr e &2 essary evil":
e military leedership is necessary, i,ut/I ho soJution of
French-Vietnamese problems, -De-Lattre's authority. The Emperor be-
lieves that it would be useless to press for Vietnamese control. over i rig
armed forces =?ppet st French Amcursions on Vietnamese sovereignty
at this time,, sue- that De Lsttre's ccrcertion of Baao Dai's "role is
-tit of a "protectorship sovereign *-en the order of the Sultan of Morocco.
o Dei indicated his belief that tentative arrangements for the defection
of as many as 15,000 Viet Minh troops in a body will probably fail d e" t6
the liOklihood that De Lattre will insist that they surrender directly to
French authorities rather than to Bao Dail a condition unacceptable to the
potential defectors. The Emperor states that he must therefore "effecp;
himself" and make no "compromising" public appearances at this time. -pejieath
comments that, while Bao Dai is probably right in believing that he cannot
successfully resist the tendency of De Lattre's advisors to maintain Vietnam
as a closed preserve of the French;s_-that charges of French ineptitude and
exc- s--montrol the Emperor's decision to withdraw to his hill-station
headquarters at Delat is "too easily arrived aat". (BGNSaigon ItIZ, 20 Mar 51).
"C" French Touchy re Pro-US Feeling. Friction has developed between
French and Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi. Tonkin Commander Linares pro-
tested to the Vietnamese that recent designation of Vietnamese names for
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all the streets in Hanoi rac an "unfriendly gesture". US Consul Hanoi is
worried how General Be Lsttre will take subsequent Vietnamese plans to
name o ae of the streets Pho My-Quoc (America Street). (R Hanoi. 21 Mar. 51).
COMP:.ENTs French sensitiveness toward US Presence in Inc ochinf and Vietnamese
efforts to clay off the US against the French have been recurrent themes in
the Indochilia situation.
"A" Posible Vi~*t nh Attack in South Vietnam. 8s-o Dai states that chile
it seems fairly ce:rtein that the mrir :i rt Minh military effort will be made
in Tonkin, there are some indics tions at a Viet Minh attack involving
35-40,000 troops nsiEht be mfade in the-. ouch in order to take -advantage of the
French tactic of drawing All pos