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December 9, 2016
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October 24, 2000
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March 23, 1951
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' SECRET Approved FoIease 200 / /04 : CIA-RDP79T0114SM00100200001-9 4 ~5; ~. .? COPY NO. 1 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC IVIHh o l jo I MOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been prepared for the internal use of the. Office of Current Intelligence. It does not repre- sent a complete coverage of all c 3.rrert traffic in CIA or in the Office,. of Current Intelligence. 2. Comment represents the preliminary views of the responsible analysts and not necessarily the final view of the Office of Current Intelligence. Marglnsi letter indications are defined as f ollo rs: "A" s, items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities "B" -- important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/ Communist intentions or capabilities "C" - other in-formation indicating trends and potential developments State, JCS declassification & release instructions on, file Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100200001-9 TOP SECRET Approved Foi elease 2001/0 DEPUTY F'Or'IEIGN MINISTERS' CONT s;R ;NC0 25X1 C lion drench Popular Reaction. French public reaction to the Deputy Foreign Ministers' Conference has been one of comparative apathy. Socialist leaders have shown privately a strong hope that a Foreign Ministers' Meeting will be held, permitting modification of the Brussels decisions on German rearmament. Nearly all press comments reflect harmony among the Western Powers, with the Communist press referring to US dictation to France and the UK. If, however, present talks fail - without a break in tripartite harmony - fear would become an important factor in public opinion. Although there is not now any widespread fear of imminent war, immediately after a break-up of the Deputies' meeting or of the Foreign Ministers' meeting another wave of near-hysteria such as occurred in June and December 1950, would probably break out. (C Paris 5578, 21 Mar 51; U Paris 5609, 21 Mar 51). COMMENT: Failure of present Big Four efforts to relieve East-West tension would not result in sufficient popu- lar reaction to force any important modification of French Government policies supporting Western rearmament. 4 :eW6MP79T01146 000100200001-9 SECTION 1 (SOVIET) USSR. goviet Ant-Epidemic Unit Arrives in Korea. Pyongyang radio announced that a ten-man Soviet anti-epidemic unit arrived in Sinuiju on 20 March and received an "enthusiastic welcome". (R FBID, 22 Mar 51). COMMENT: Chinese Communist and North Korean troops opposing UN forces in Korea are !.mown to have suffered from typhus anrl other diseases. PRAVDA: Mao Presently in Peiping. On 21 March Pravda. reported. that Mao Tse-tung Is now in Peiping. In this connection, Pravda also cited a TASS dispatch from Shanghai which claimed that a Tibetan lama had visited Mao on that day to convey the loyalty of the Tibetans. (U i7 Her. Trib. 22 Mar 51). COMfLENT:_ Pravda, does not normally single out for mention the routine activity of a foreign go,,ernmental official in his own capital. If true, this report would identify Mao's presence ii.Peiping'but may be an effort to spike rumors that Mao is being held. prisoner in Moscow. 25X1C EASTERN EUROPE. ALBANIA. Another Rumor of Bomb Incident. cording to rumors concerning the "attempted as of Hoxha at the Soviet Legation Tirana" 18 Soviets lost their lives in the ruin of the building. such an operation could have been engineered only by dissident Communists as the Soviet Legation was probably the most closely guarded area in those thoroughly Tirana, and the persons responsible could only be among Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100200001-9 TOP SECRET Approved For elease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0114WO0100200001-9 trusted by the Soviets. He feels that the rumors of a possible anti- Comixform movement in Albania favorable to a rapprochement with Tito lend. e poort to this theory. (13-6). COMMENT: The above rumor should be treated with reserve until it is confirmed, al- though it is probably another version of the original factual bombing at the Soviet Legation on 19 Feb. "Bit FINLAND. Lack of Concern Over Cabinet Crisis. The US Minister in Helsinki reports that the Social Democratic Ministers in the Finnish coalition Cabinet have presented their resignations. However, there has been no indication of their acceptance and comments about the situation indicate a lack of serious concern. The Minister's informants believe that a solution to the problem may be found during the course of the Faster holi- day. (S Helsinki 499, 21 Mar 51). COMJIE4J1T: The Minister, s report disproves a report 21 "arch that the entire Cabinet had resigned. (see. O/CI Daily Digests of 21 and 22 Mar 51), "Bu H TGA ZY, Soviet ,fix.Activit-r _Incre ,sine. Reliable reports from Budapest state that a~ dams airfield (in Eastern Hungary) is to be turned over to the USSR. cork began in. 1949 to expand the field to include an 8,200 foot concrete runway is reportedly being rushed to completion. Increased air activity over Budapest includin?_ Jet aircraft has been observed re- cently. (S AA Budapest 284, 16 Mar 51). "A" POLAND. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. EAST GERMANY. East Cermany Returns Railway Care 25X1C oPoland and Czechoslovakia. COMMENT: Numerous reports since mid-December 50 have indicated an un- usually large eastward movement of empty freight cars from the Soviet Zone of Germany. The movement appears to be continuing, although at a somewhat reduced rate. Since late January 51 an estimated 3,000-3,500 such cars have departed empty from the Soviet Zone. is the first indication that primarily foreign cars held in the Soviet Zone of Germany were involved. Peasant Party Deputies on Trial. Public prosecutions are reported to be proceeding against five former United Peasant Party (ZSL) members of the Polish Sejm, according to Sejm Speaker Wladyslaw Kowalski. The nature of the charges have not been disclosed, but are believed to have been brought on because the five are unsympathetic toward the official policy of liquidating kulaks. (U NYT, 23 Mar 51). COMAENT: Last fall it was reported that fourteen members of the Sejm, all former members of the non-Communist Polish Peasant Party were arrested, but released after agreeing to resign from the Seam. In December 1950, at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the ZSL, it was revealed that an extensive purge of Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100200001-9 Approved For-,&lease 2001/0946: 9P79T01146A000100200001-9 members had been completed. This revelation was followed in January and February 1951 by trials of various individuals allegedly working against the agricultural collectivization program. These events and the current trial of the former ZSL Sejm Deputies sugs?est that there has been little ideological success so far in. convincing the peasant population of the benefits to be derived from collectivization, and possibly that the Communist Party is preparing for a new agricultural collectivization drive. YUGOSLAVIA. Amelioration of Htiuaan Bights. Commenting on the Yugoslav Government's attitude toward human rights, Embassy Belgrade notes that, while the regime continues to impose limitations, there is distinct progress discernible in certain fields, specifically religion, judicial practices, and police methods, Evidences of this progress are: (1) the appearance of new shrines and crucifixes in the Catholic areas of Vojvodina area in. the past few weeks; (2) the free and unrehearsed de- bate in the recent session of the Yugoslav Parliament; (3) Yugoslav requests for use in university libraries of American novels and cultural books depicting American life; (4) a recent Borba editorial sharply criticizin.FC local peoples' committees for arbitrary abuse of citizens' rights. The editorial specifically pointed, to the recently enacted Penal Code which provides for the punishment of officials who deny citi- zens the right to appeal, to make objections, or to file requests. Since local bureaucrats are among the chief violators of the Yugoslav peoples' rights, the Embassy feels that the curbing of these officials will facilitate an improvement in human rights. (C Belgrade 1333, 21 Mar 51). COMMENT: While some gestures have been made to improve human rights, the Yugoslav regime still retains its basic totalitarians approach toward this problem. Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100200001-9 Approved ForQplease 2001/9&Pn IRDP79T01146AJ00100200001-9 SECTION 2 (EASTERN) "C" GREECE. Prime Minister Venizelos ConsidersPcal.itscal Merger. Prime Minister Venizelos informed US Ambassador Peurifoy that he is exploring the possibility of merging his Liberal Party with the National Progressive Union (EPEK) of Plaastires, and forming a new government based on this union. Venizelos hopes to effect the Liberal-EPEK fusion on the basis of Plastiras as Prime Minister and himself as Chairman of a United Party and Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to this plan general elections would be held in August. (C Athens 3098, 21 Mar 51). COMMENT: Fusion of Venizelos' Liberals with Flastiras' EPEK would be a healthy development in Greek politics because it would reduce the multiplicity of political parties and at the same time provide a relatively strong central party. Plastiras, however, is apparently confident of his strength without outside support. Furthermore he would bt most unwilling to agree to an arrangement which would deprive him of all political power, prior to the municipal elections. Further development of the plan depends undoubtedly upon the outcome of the municipal elections, scheduled for 15 April, which are expected to clarify the relstive position o.L the various political parties. "C" M. Turks Svai ch Marshall Plan M~nistr 6 The US Consul General in Istanbul reports that the Turkish Foreign Minister has officially notified him of a Cabinet decision to transfer Me.rehall Plan coordination functions from the Ministry of State to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Minister stated that the Turkish Government was not satisfied with the fun.c- tioning of the Ministry of State, and further observed that the question of Turkish Marshall Plan administration was strictly an internal matter on which ECA should not be expected to be consulted in advance. (U Istanbul 362, 19 Mar 51). COMMENT: The transfer of authority probably represents a political maneuver aimed at strengthening the power of the top leaders of the Democratic Party,. one of whom is the Foreign Minister. The US Mission has considered the previous arrangement satisfactory. It may be anticipated that the Foreign Ministry will realize eventually that it has taken on more than it can carry. "B" EGYPT. Increased Governmental Concern over Iranian Development s. According to US Ambassador Caffery ir}_,Caairo, there is an increasing concern in top circles in and out of they overnment over developments in bran. -tfta_~OCI Mar 51).-. Caaffery reports that, while government officials are inclined to blame the British oil compnny they ?,nd opposition leaders are genuinely Fltrmed * the posF~ibility of aw e a of -the --- assa.sasinction-type of politics the Mosley! Br therhooda 8-n) s --,hat with the help of the Communists, wii-i-'be`~Irected against themselves. Caffery adds that the Egyptian political leaders are at a loss to know hoer to deal with this situation. (S Cairo 968, 22 Mar 51). COMMENT: While recent events in Iran will hardly lead to rublic violence in :`gypt, the growing activities of the Moslem Brotherhood during the past year and 44sar TOP SECRET 4 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100200001-9 TOP SECRET Approved For Wease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO11464 00100200001-9 1n}sincreased dissatisfaction with the government--as well as its long- term antipathy toward foreign influence in Egypt--furnish an adequate basis for the concern that the Brotherhood might use this opportunity to start its terrorist activities in Egypt again. "B" ISRAEL-SYRIA. Tense Israel yrian Border Dispute. Relations between Israel and Syria became severely strained during the past week as a result of Israel's recently initiated Lake Huleh drainage project in the t'emiliterized Syrian- Israeli border zone. Israel has so far ignored an order of the nixed Armistice Commission (MAC) to cease work and n'gotiate a settlement of the dispute with Syria. The Syrian Government insists that a work stoppage is the quid pro quo for a negotiated settlement .mnd has threatened army intervention unless Israel complies. A flare-up reportedly occurred on 15 March when Arabs on the Syrian side of the `~ordan River opened fire on Israelis who had crossed the river with a tractor. (S Jer-aselem 169, 15 Mar 51; S Tel Aviv 578, 22 Mar 51). COMMENT: The present border dispute between Syria and Israel is potentially more dangerous than the frequent Jordan-Israel border clashes where leaders in both countries ern genuinely interested in keeping friction at a minimum. Syria hs., thus *ar shown considerable restraint, but the unstable political situation in Syria cFupled with the Army's political dominonce suggest that if sufficiently aggravated, the Syrian authorities would have difficulty in checking precipitate military action. Israel may wish to achieve a fait accompli in regard to this particular project, but would compromise if the situation became sufficiently serious to threaten hostilities. "C" INDOCHINA. Bao Dai Resigns Himself to French Domination. In an interview with with Minister Heath, Bee Dai called General Do qtr e &2 essary evil": e military leedership is necessary, i,ut/I ho soJution of French-Vietnamese problems, -De-Lattre's authority. The Emperor be- lieves that it would be useless to press for Vietnamese control. over i rig armed forces =?ppet st French Amcursions on Vietnamese sovereignty at this time,, sue- that De Lsttre's ccrcertion of Baao Dai's "role is -tit of a "protectorship sovereign *-en the order of the Sultan of Morocco. o Dei indicated his belief that tentative arrangements for the defection of as many as 15,000 Viet Minh troops in a body will probably fail d e" t6 the liOklihood that De Lattre will insist that they surrender directly to French authorities rather than to Bao Dail a condition unacceptable to the potential defectors. The Emperor states that he must therefore "effecp; himself" and make no "compromising" public appearances at this time. -pejieath comments that, while Bao Dai is probably right in believing that he cannot successfully resist the tendency of De Lattre's advisors to maintain Vietnam as a closed preserve of the French;s_-that charges of French ineptitude and exc- s--montrol the Emperor's decision to withdraw to his hill-station headquarters at Delat is "too easily arrived aat". (BGNSaigon ItIZ, 20 Mar 51). "C" French Touchy re Pro-US Feeling. Friction has developed between French and Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi. Tonkin Commander Linares pro- tested to the Vietnamese that recent designation of Vietnamese names for Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100200001-9 TOP SECRET Approved For Qalease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO11464POO100200001-9 all the streets in Hanoi rac an "unfriendly gesture". US Consul Hanoi is worried how General Be Lsttre will take subsequent Vietnamese plans to name o ae of the streets Pho My-Quoc (America Street). (R Hanoi. 21 Mar. 51). COMP:.ENTs French sensitiveness toward US Presence in Inc ochinf and Vietnamese efforts to clay off the US against the French have been recurrent themes in the Indochilia situation. "A" Posible Vi~*t nh Attack in South Vietnam. 8s-o Dai states that chile it seems fairly ce:rtein that the mrir :i rt Minh military effort will be made in Tonkin, there are some indics tions at a Viet Minh attack involving 35-40,000 troops nsiEht be mfade in the-. ouch in order to take -advantage of the French tactic of drawing All pos