CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100320001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 6, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
Date: APR (~ sr
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared -primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2.. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
3. Marginal. letter indications are defined as
follows:
"A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"P" - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet
Communist intentions or capabilities
"C" -- other information indicating trends
and potential developments
DIA AND DOS review(s) completed.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"A" USSR. Re-ported Soviet Svmuathv for Afghanistan's Claims on Pushtoonistan.
f
t
a
ary o
US Embassy Karachi was informed by the Pakistan Foreign Secre
conversation between the Saudi Arabian Minister and the Soviet Ambassador
in Kabul. The Saudi Arabian Minister, considered a responsible source
by the Foreign Secretary, reported that the Soviet Ambassador said the
USSR views sympathetically the Afghans' aspirations for Pushtoonistan on
the ground of racial affinity of the tribes. The Saudi Arabian Minister
then pointed out to the Soviet Ambassador that any attitude by the USSR
against Pakistan on such an issue would arouse strong resentment in every
Muslim country. The Pakistani Foreign Secretary added that the USSR ap-
parently had broadened it ?'s thinking to include all the area
west of the Indus River. COMMENT: There has
been no concrete evidence in the past o particular Soviet interest in the
Afghan-Pakistan dispute, although previous unconfirmed reports have been
received alleging USSR support of the Afghan demands, and Soviet complicity
in stirring up the tribes. It is not unlikely that the USSR, in view of
its current unfriendly propaganda policy towards Pakistan, its efforts to
woo the Indian Government, and its mild attitude towards the Afghans,
could have expressed its general support for the Afghan aspirations.
25X1
Such a move is characteristic of Soviet tactics, aimed at promoting friction
at a time when the dispute apparently has diminished, and designed as part
of its general policy towards weak border countries such as Afghanistan
of opening ways for possible future Soviet penetration. However, the re-
ported Soviet attitude is not believed to reflect any immediate Soviet
plans to increase activity in the area.
2 . , o In:Eluc nc in tanc1 J . 25X1
25X1
Soviet influence is especially noticeable in railways, where there has been
a considerable increase in the numbers of Soviet employees in all grades.
It is known that a Soviet director controls the Peiping-Mukden line, and
on various occasions countermanded orders of the Chinese co-director.
Soviet accounting methods are used on all railways and Soviet advisers
are in charge of bridge building and breakdown gangs. Soviet personnel
are privileged to buy railway tickets in advance while Chinese. must wait
in line at ticket windows. 25X1
the USSR is attempting, by nstituting sovie me o s and 5y facing
Soviet personnel in key positions on all levels, to make it difficult for
the Chinese to take over eventual control of the railroads, as provided
by present agreements. Industrially, Soviet "experts" appear to be
interested primarily in coal mining and in the iron and steel plants. Ac-
cording to a German engineer at Fushun, in Germany or in England, these
Soviet "engineers" would be considered merely as good mechanics. No
Chinese are employed in the Soviet consular offices or residences nor are
Chinese official cars permitted to enter the Soviet compound. Although
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there is some doubt regarding Soviet trade treaty commitments,, it is
believed that the USSR has substituted military equipment for industrial
machinery. Undoubtedly, some equipment has been furnished the Mukden
Arsena], which was working. day and night turning out automatic weapons
and perhaps light artillery. The USSR has also supplied motor cars, motor-
cycles for military use and agricultural equipment. A continued shortage
of rolling stock indicates that very little or none of the equi ment taken
by the USSR in 1946 has been returned. COMMENT:
It is known that the USSR exercises control over the principal arteries
of the Manchurian railnet, and other information substantiates source's
account of the Soviet position in the area.
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A
"C" USSR Transport Expenditures Boost Costs of Construction in Heavy Industry.
A letter to the editors of Pravda charges that excessive transport expendi-
tures are responsible for 16 percent of the costs of construction undertaken
by the Ministry of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises during the
first half of 1950. Unproductive use was made of automotive transport,
which exceeded the planned cost by 40 percent during the first quarter of
last year. Also in the first half of 1950 many main administrations and
trusts of the Ministry are alleged to have uneconomically utilized railroad
transport, paying fines for demurrage of freight cars.. These fines were
said in some cases to have reached hundreds of thousands of rubles. In
July of last year the Ministry ordered a sharp cut in transport expendi-
tures, but the order was apparently not implemented, and during 1950 the
Ministry paid out about 8 million rubles in fines for demur rage of freight
25X1 cars. COMMENT: Transport is Down to 'he one of
the most serious w a. ne of the Soviet economy, and perir-Aic efforts are
made by the Government to obtain maximum use of railroad anL_ ouie:c? uia.ns-
porta.tion., even to the point of sentencing allegedly incompetent or irre-
sponsible officials to jail terms for infractions connected with transport.
One of the basic difficulties, however, stems from the Government's own
policy of overloading the transport system,with the result that proper
maintenance of equipment is often impossible.
"C" PASTERN ELOPE. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Month of Peace Inaugurated. The US Embassy
Praha Is of the opinion that the April "Month of Peace" demonstration in
Czechoslovakia, which is concentrated on preventing the rearmament of
Western Germany, is a more effective propaganda issue for Czechoslovakia
than previous ones such as the atomic bomb or Korea. The Embassy notes
that the Communist propagandists can probably reach a comparatively wide
segment of the Czechoslovak people on the German issue, with the memories
of the German occupation still vivid. A secondary objective of the "Peace
Month", according to the Embassy, may be to impress the West with the
strength of th's movement during the Deputy Ministers' conferences in
Paris The "Month of Peace" was inaugurated throughout the country on
2 Aril with a Sokol (physical culture organization) parade in Praha.
This was preceded by speeches of the Communist hierarchy condemning
American imperialism and the aggressive remilitarization of Western Germany.
25X1 COMrt NT: The propaganda to the Czechoslovak
people directed against Germany is not without its drawbacks for the
Communists, since it is doubtful that the average Czechoslovak has learned
to distinguish between the "democratic" Germans of the Soviet Zone and
the "reactionaries" in Western Germany.
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"B" YUGOSLAVIA. Rumored Cominformism in YugoslavArmq. Embassy Belgrade
reports that in recent weeks there have been recurrent rumors of arrests
of dissident Yugoslav Army officers with pro-Cominform sympathies. Al-
though these reports have been generally vague in character, the per-
sistence of the reports and Tito's recent outspoken references to dissi-
dent elements in the Army appear to indicate that there have been some
arrests. The Embassy has learned that
Tito's references to dissidence in the Army in s 17 Febru-
ary speech related to a "small group of five or six high-ranking Army
officers who had been arrested almost six weeks ago" and that these
arrests had been the subject of much discussion within the Army. Simi-
25X1
25X1
larly, the US Consul in Zagreb in late February was told 25X1
The Embassy, however, is of the firm opinion that the
dissident elements in Yugoslavia favoring the Cominform is small and
thoroughly under control by the Government.
they may have been identical with those admitted 25X1
that in early February the Yugoslav Government had rustrate a
plot among army-officers in Zagreb and Sarajevo to overthrow the
Governments of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with Hungarian assistance.
The Embassy reports that no confirmation of this report is available but
the timing of the alleged arrests in Zagreb and Sara evo suggests that
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SECTIO7 2 (EASTERN)
"B" SYRIA-ISRAEL. Border Incidents tjor> > l . According to an Israeli communique
from Tel Aviv, Israeli Air Forceplan::s on 5 April. bombed fortified positions
of the Syrian Army and of armed Arabs .,he the Israelis cla.i !ed had penetrated
into the southern demilitarized zone (SE of Lake Tiberias) which lies within
Israel. This action was allegedly token in retaliation for the killing of
several Israeli policemen the previous day. A Damascus press account reported
that eight Israeli planes had attacked Ll Hamma, a village near the Syrian
frontier wiViin the demilitarized zone. Tel Aviv press dispatches had claimed
that the Israeli policemen rare killed within the demilitarized Israeli terri-
tory, but UTN Deputy Chief of Staff Ridd-er in Jerusalem said that the Israeli
l i ha..d apparently been shot just inside Syrian territory. 25X1
25X1 COMI!IENT: This later inci-
dent around 71 Hamma in the. southern demilitarized zone widens the already
serious border dispute between Israel and Syria. During the last few weeks
both sides have disagreed to the right of the Israelis to drain land in
the central demilitarized zone just south of Lake Hule. 25X1
25X1 Doubt exists as to 1-here the Israeli police were killed.
Doubt also exists as to whether actual Syrian Army troops have yet crossed
the frontier as alleged by the Israelis, and it may be that armed Arab
civilians, rather than Syrian regulars, seized control of El Hamma. While
actual hostilities bctvleen Israel and Syria do not seem likely at the present,
there is no doubt that this latest breach of the peace has established a
potentially explosive situation. Domestic considerations within Israel and
Syria, which is politically unstable, might force either side to aggravate
the already serious border situation.
"A" INDIA. Communist Orbit Offers of Food .Relic' to India. The Secretary of
the Indian Food and. Agriculture Ministry reports that China has offered to
India 500,000 tons of rice at prices below those of Burma and Thailand as
well as 500,000 tons of wheat and milo at prices well below the US market
price. India is preparing to-send a representative to. Peiping to discus.,
the offer. In addition, Indian Ambassador Panikksr in Peiping has informed
the British Charge that he has negotiated a long-term contract for the
purchase from China of 500,000 to 1,000,000 tons of grain for a six-month
period beginning 1 May 1951. Panikkar inquired whether British shipping
would be available to move the grain, and US Embassy London reports that
the British have no objection from,a political point of view. US Embassy
New Delhi also states that Soviet official's are telling the Government of
India that "any amount" of Soviet wheat is available for delivery to India
if arrangements can be made for a barter deal. F_ I 25X1
25X1 CONT19'INT: T? reports indicate that the Commu-
nist orbit is about to wrest the initiative from the US in providing special
food supplies to India and thus nullify the value to the US of its projected
$190,000,000 gift of wheat. China and the USSR have the capability to
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furnish and ship 2,000,000 tons of grain to India within they next year if
they feol the ::effort is justified, and Communist governments in the past
have demonstro:ted their willingness to ignore the physical welfare of their
people in the pursuit of important political n7.bj:,ctivus. Favorable publi-
city accorded in India to recent arrivals of Chinese rice suggests that,
even if China. and the TJSSR fail to deliver more than token shipments of
their newly-offered grain, the Indian press will draw criticel comparisons
between the desiresof the. V'estern world and the Communist bloc to prevent
starvation in India.
PMLJ?YA. Malaya to License Rubber x .,off its . The Malayan Government announced
on~5 April that rubber exports to all countries except those of the Common-
wealth and the US would be subj-rct to license after 9 April. It was stated
that the measure was aimed at "preventing unduly large quantities being sent
to any country so that insufficient supplies would be available for the UK
:
and other friendly countries". COMMENT
British authorities have hitherto been unwilling to agree to an allocation
system designed. to reduce the heavily increased rubber exports to Communist
countries, particularly Communist China, which have oecurr~d since the
start of the Korean war. The licensing order appears to be a step toward
that objective.
INDOCHINA. Current Viet Minh Military Obl~ctJ.v s Apgar Limited. The French
Commanding General in Tonkin expressed his belief to the US Consul in Hanoi
that the enemy's principal current objective appears to be luring the French
off base and destroying troops. This officer,, although concerned with the
continuing heavy weather, otherwise radiated optimism and anticipated no
imminent major move by the Chinese Communists. Meanwhile possible lack of
confidence was indicated by a Vietnamese Communist release to its general
staff, rhich stptedthat if the present military
action was unsuccessful, the movement must return to intensified camp erns
of Propaganda, sabotage and destruction of French fortified works.
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"C" KOREA. South Korean Popular Discontent Increases with ImprovedMilitary
Situation. Ambassador Muccio reports that, as the military situation has
i.m.proved, porular discontent with the extraordinary martial law which has
been in effect throughout South Korea since 7 December has increased. The
ROK Government has been forced gradually, and apparently reluctantly, to
lift martial law on Cheju Island and. in the five southernmost provinces where
immediate danger obviously no longer exists. Excepted areas are certain
guerrilla-infested sections, and also Pusan and Taegu. As logistical mili-
tary bases the Government claims that these two cities require special
protection against fifth. column activity. 25X1
COiMM T: While this is Muccio's first cab a in some time relative to popular
dissatisfaction with the South Korean Government, 25X1
the Government's arbitra-?v and dictatorial ways have aroused opposition among
the people and in the I'ational Assembly. The volume of criticism of such
unpopular measures as the Government's martial law has and will continue to
reflect UN military successes and failures.
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8Cn JAPAN. Communist Rift Intensified by Local Elections. The rift between the
principal "centrist" and minority "internationalist" factions of the Japan
Communist Party is being brought into the open as a result of the local
election campsign. Communist gubernatorial candidates in Tokyo, Osaka, and
several other prefectures who s.re identified with the internationalist faction
are among those who have been denied official Party backing and are running as
inderendents. The JCF, whose headquarters is centrist controlled, is backing
several Socialist candidates in an attempt to develop popular-front strategy
v~'.ich succeeded in electing a Socialist governor and mayor in Kyoto last year.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"B" FRANCE Electoral Reform. Vote Reduces. Chances of June Elections
Although the narrow margin (263 to 251) by which the Assembly has
tentatively approved the Government-sponsored electoral reform bill
gives little ground for optimism that it will pass on the second
reading, the larger majority which may be needed on that occasion
is "still quite possible". The support in the Assembly on the first
vote was 49 short of the absolute majority which will probably be
required later inasmuch as the strongly Rightist Council is expected
to reject the bill. However., 318 deputies previously approved the
controversial single ballot provision on a separate motion., and should
the present bill. be voted down, the existing system of proportional
representation - which all but the Communists oppose - would prevail
in the approaching elections. F_ I COP ENNT;
Inasmuch as no other electoral reform bill could be prepared and
passed in time for elections to be held before sumner, the fate
of this bill will probably be decided on the basis of the individual
preferences of the middle-of-the-road deputies for elections in June
or October. Hence an added. problem for the bill's supporters will
be to overcome the fears of the increasing riupber uncertain of their
chances of reelection,
"Bit Government Plans Anti-inflationary Tariff Reductions.
Premier Queuille., In an effort to develop an anti-inflationary foreign
trade policy# has assumed the chairmanship of a high-level Cabinet
committee which is expected to overcome the protectionist sentiment
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of the representatives of agriculture and industry. The Government
has just released a new list of tariff suspensions which had been
decided on before the recent wage crisis, but,.since few consumer
items are included, more effective action is imperative to counter-
balance the upward pressures on the price level resulting from wage
25X1 revisionsP COMMENT- The trade
liberalization policy proposed by Government leaders has met with
consistent low level official opposition. It is now possible, how-
ever, that the threat of recurrent' labor unrest may push the Govern
ment into a forceful attempt to implement a more extensive relaxation
of its restrictive import policy.
"Br" BELGIUM. Communists Sabotage Postal Communications with Belgian:
Korean Volunteers, According to the head of the committee urging
civilian support for the Belgian contingent to Korea, the Belgian
Communists have thus far effectively sabotaged communications between
the volunteers in Korea and their families. The Communists have in-
filtrated the Ministry of Communications so that letters have been
burned by Communist-influenced postmen and packages to the troops
in Korea have been pilfered off the ships. The Belgian public and
press have remained silent due to the reluctance of the Minister of
Communications and currently Acting Prime Minister Seegers to admit
this state of affairs in his Ministry. I-- I
COMMENT; This is the first indication of the present extent
Communist infiltration in the Ministry of Communications. Communist
influence in the Government's Ministries is believed to have become
negligible following the immediate postwar period. If Communist
sabotage activities have been as successful as indicated for the
more than four months that Belgian troops have been in Korea, it
seems highly unlikely that the situation has not been leaked to the
press. Furthermore, Seeger's reluctance to take action does not,
seem plausible in view of the Government's aggressive anti-Communist
campaign, which includes the dismissal of Government employees actively
combining Communist activities with their Government positions.
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DENMARK. Polish Coal Deliveries Retarded.. Polish deliveries of coal
and coke to Denmark for March and the preliminary schedule of deliveries
for April fall short of the Polish commitment to supply 200,000 tons
nnonthly from January through October. The Danes conjecture that Poland
is withholding coal and coke because of Danish failure to proceed with
deliveries of 8.5 million kroner worth of automotive spare parts under
the October 1950 trade agreement. Denmark has been withholding export
licenses pending US opinion on the question, since the parts are of US
and TJK origin,' Technically the Poles have no right to withhold coal
exports, since the agreement makes these specifically contingent on
the sale to Poland of two Danish ships, both of which have now been
contracted for. The Poles, however, have reportedly indicated irri-
tation over non-delivery of authomotive parts, pressed for definite
delivery schedules and hinted that coal shipments might be curtailed,
and the Danes believe that if these deliveries are longer delayed
the Poles will find reasons for holding up coal deliveries without
specifically attributing the action to Danish failure to deliver
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spare parts. COMMENT': Denmark
has experienced great difficulty in finding non-strategic items
which the Poles will accept in exchange for coal. It is in a
particularly vulnerable position since it depends almost entirely
on Poland for its coal supplies and has a very limited stockpile.
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49141&-
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
APR 6 1951
Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/0.
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25X1 DAILY DIGEST
6 April 1951
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"A" YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslav Demarche to Greece. Greek Prime Minister
Venizelos has informed US Ambassador Peurifoy that the Yugoslav Govern-
ment made a formal demarche on 3 April to the Greek Government seeking
to learn the course of action Greece planned to take in the event that
Yugoslavia were attacked. The Greek Prime Minister replied that Greece
would presumably mobilize and assist Yugoslavia economically, but that
he would have to consider the matter carefully before giving any further
or definfi.te assurances. In relating the conversation to Ambassador
Peurifoy, the Greek Prime Minister implied that he wished the US to advise
him regarding his reply to Yugoslavia. 25X1
COMMENT: The reported Yugoslav demarche contrasts with its previous
attitude, since it opens the way for military talks between the two
countries. During the negotiations for the exchange of military attaches
between Yugoslavia and Greece in early March, the Yugoslav Minister ex-
plained that, although the community of interests of the two countries
was clear, there was no necessity to coordinate their military preps-
rations since this could be accomplished in a short time when the occasion
25X1 arose The Yugoslavs have, therefore, been
extremely care o.avo1 any actiqn which would appear to justify Comin-
form charges that the Tito regime and the Greek "Monarcho Fascists" were
coordinating their military plans. The demarche may, therefore, represent
increased Yugoslav apprehension regarding the possibility of a Soviet/
Satellite attack. The Greek Premier probably hopes that the reported
Yugoslav approach will further Greek attempts for military collaboration
with Yugoslavia.
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25X1
"B" "Liberation" of Tibet. Peiping radio on 31 March broadcast a message
from the "Chinese Army in Tibet," quoted as informing Peiping of their
preparations to "liberate the whole of Tibet..." 25X1
CORNT: The above broadcast--possibly timed to coincide with the arrival
of the Tibetan delegation Peiping--clarifies the reported statement of
Premier CHOU En lai that the 25X1
Tibetan question has already been "settled." The broadcast is additional
evidence that what has been "settled" is that Chinese Communist forces are
to occupy Tibet, either by agreement with the Tibetan delegation or through
a resumption of the military operation launched last October.
"B" KOREA. ROK Interest in Extending Administration North of the 38th.
Ambassador Austin has learned from UN sources of a recent call paid by the
ROK Prime Minister to the Turkish chairman of UNCURK (United Nations
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea). The Prime
Minister inquired relative to UNCURK's position on the question of admini-
stering North Korean territory which may be liberated in the future, and he
expressed the wish that UNCURK would agree that the RON has the right to
appoint local administrators and to insure public order through the use of
ROK police. The Chairman was non-committal but took the position that the
liberated areas should be under military administration. 25X1
The Prime Minister's inquiry is a further indication of the ROK Government's
determination to eradicate the 38th Parallel as a political boundary and to
extend its authority to the Yalu River.
COOS!IENT: A similar problem arose when UN Forces advanced
into North Korea last October. This is the first notice this year, however,
of renewed ROK interest in administering liberated North Korean territory.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN) 25X6
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8.73