OFFICE OF (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100350001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 10, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INT"MIdG ;NOi! AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
APR 10 1951
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports ha been
prepared primarily for the internal ice of tI
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current,
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
"An - items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"Bit - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
communist intentions or capabilities
nqa other information indicating trends
and potential developments
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"A" USSR. SLecu1ation Regarding "TASS Denial" of Soviet Troops in Manchuria.
Emb Moscow comments that the categcri.cal.ature and circumstances of the
"TABS denial" of Soviet troops in Manchuria indicates that the USSR:
(1) attaches special significance to the subject; (2) will undoubtedly
utilize the statement now and in the future as "proof" that there are no
Soviet troops in the axca; and (3) by ignoring the presence of Soviet
troops in the Port Arthur-Dairen area authorized by the Sino-Soviet Agree-
went, is either announcing that such troops have boen withdrawn or is
suggesting that Port Arthur is a "special area", not included in Manchuria,
The Emb points out that if some new form of intervention is impending in
'Korea the USSR will utilize the denial to "establish" in advance that the
Soviets are not officially involved. On the otI r hand, it is barely
possible that it foreshadows a move for a negotiated settloment. (C Moscow
1775, 7 Apr 51). Ga? 1NT: Should the USSR consider the sending of an inter-
national "volunteer" force to Korea, as reports increasingly indicate,, the
TASS "denial" would serve to refute accusations of Soviet participation.
"B" EASTERN EUROPE. HUNG'1RY. Revolt of Soviet Troops Reported. According to
reports received by the Swedish newspaper, StockhoJms-Tidnene:en, Soviet
troops garrisoned in Szombathely (situated on the Austro-Hungarian frontier)
mutinied sometime in March. The unrest. reportedly spread to the Kossuth
Officers Academy located in the same city and was put down with ruthless
severity after the garrison had been surrounded by recently arrived Soviet
troops. Flying squads of the Hungarian political police reportedly silenced
the revolt to the Academy only after massacring 270 of the cadets. The
newspaper article concluded with the information that ten new Soviet
divisions had recently arrived in Hungary. (U Wash. Post,. 10 Apr 51).
CO NT The Headquarters of the Soviet 17th Guards Mechanized Division
is located in Szombathely. No evidence has been received to date to sub-
stantiate any of the items reported by the Swedish newspaper. The Stoc
h_,,2 s-Tidr.engn has been characterized in the past for its alarmist and
sensational reporting.
"C" POLAND "Exile Government" Doubts Official's Suicide. "The Polish Govern-
ment in Exl.J.e" in London maintains that the reported Washington suicide
on 6 April of their special representative Julius Lukasiewicz is highly
improbable. The "Exile Government" claims that it had just received a
communication from the representative discussing his plans for the latter
part of Apri.l.'In addition, Lukasiewicz is reported to have given no
indication in any recent communications pointing to suicide, (C London
5322, 9 Apr 51; U Wash. Post, 7 Apr 51). COQ According to a Wash-
ington press report,, a police investigation of Lukasiewicz's death
revealed that he had been in poor health for some time. He also had
recently received word from a co-worker that his work with the exile
government had been a complete failure.
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"C" RUM..ANSA. Economic Ministries Reorganized. In a splitting up of R unanian
economic ministries, the Ministry of Comm uuncttions had been divided into
a Ministry of Transport and a Ministry of Posts and Telecomuunicati.ons;
the Ministry of Forestry, Timber and Paper has been split into the Min-
istry of Forestry, Paper and Pulp and the Ministry of Forestry Adminis-
tration. (R FBIS56 Apr 51). OUT: The Rumanian changes are in accord
with the Satellite trend to narrow the functions of individual ministries:
and increasingly subordinate them to top level Communist control agencies.
The Ministry of Forestry has been in difficulty for some time. In Sep-
tember 1950 it was reorganized in an effort to improve the exploitation
of Rumania's timber..More recently the Communist press has accused both
management and labor of serious shortcomings,which appear to have led to
considerable production cutbacks, especially in the output of coal.
"C" YUGOSLIXIA. Yuposlavs Seek to Assi War Correspondent to Korea. US Amb
Allen reports that the editor of Po 'tika has requested US assistance in
obtaining permission for a Yugoslav newspaperman to be aeeredited as a
war correspondent in Korea. Amb Allen considers it decidcdiy in the US
interest for Yugoslavia to have its own correspondent in Korea, since
articles written by a Yugoslav correspondent would have a greater impact
on Yugoslavs than foreign news stories republished in Yugoslav papers.
Allen believes that the Yugoslav Government may desire to change its
position on Korea from neutrality to active support of the UN,and that
the Government wishes.to assign a Yugoslav correspondent to Korea in
order to develop an internal basis for a change of policy. (C Belgrade
1434, 6 Apr 51). C=I': Yugoslav coverage of the Korean war would
probably be advantageous not only within Yugoslavia but throughout Eas-
tern Europe in countering Soviet fabrications regarding the Korean war..
Since the Yugoslav Government has been gradually moving from its inde-
pendent position between East and West to one of closer alignment with
the West and is now seeking Western military, as well as economic
assistance, the Government is probably willing to give moral support
to UN action in Korea. However, it is not likely to support any UN
action which in its opinion might expand the war in the Far East and
thereby weaken Western Europe.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"C" IRAN. Iranian Press Indignant atUS-UK Talks on Iran. US Embassy in
Tehran reports that editorial reaction in local press of all shades of
political inclination to announcement of US-UK meetings currently being
held in Washington has been highly adverse. The Iranian press tends to
assume that the US and UK have the common intention of preventing imple-
mentation of Parliament's decision to nationalize Iran's oil industry.
A Tehran paper, KEHLAN, states: -'There is nothing more pernicious to the
Iranians than a situation in which two foreign governments get together
outside of Iran to determine the fate of Iran's resources." (C Tehran
2325, 9 Apr 51).
"B" ARAB LEAGUE. Arab Concern Over US Financial Aid to Israel. According
to US Ambassador Caffery in Cairo, Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the
Arab League, has protested a bill in Congress which would offer a 150
million dollar grant-in-aid to Israel. Azzam showed Caffery a telegram
from the King of Yemen in which the latter suggested immediate League
action on this issue. Azzam emphasized that passage of this bill would
undo any better feeling in the Arab States which the US has been able
to bring about and. would mean a setback of many years duration to US-
Arab relations. (R Cairo 1033, 9 Apr 51; R FEIS, News Ticker, 9 Apr 51).
COMPT,NT: The serious Israeli-Syrian border incidents have undoubtedly
intensified the long-term Arab alarm over American financial assistance
to Israel. Possible League action on this issue will be considerably
influenced by any improvement or deterioration in the tense relations
which now exist between Syria and. Israel.
"B" INDONESIA. Cabinet Discussions Fail. Premier-designate Sartono of the
Indonesian National Party (FNI) told the press on F# April that he had
failed to reach agreement with the Masjumi (Moslem) Party on the formation
of a cabinet. Points of disagreement were PNI,insistence on abrogation of
the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and reconsideration of comprehensive agree-
ments negotiated by the Dutch and. Indonesians in 1949 when sovereignty was
transferred. (U NYHT, 9 Apr 51). COMMENT: Sartono may now return his
mandate to President Sukarno or he may turn to leftist groups for support.
Should he return his mandate, it is reported that the'Masjumi will ask
Sukarno for a'presidential cabinet. Although this course would be uncon-,
stitutional, it would provide the most stable government possible under
present circumstances and might be excused on the grounds that Indonesia
is operating under a provisional constitution.
"C1' Chinese Communist Consulates Orened. Four Chinese Communist con-
sulates were opened 1 April at Djakarta in Java, Medan in Sumatra,
Macassar in Celebes, and Banjermasin in Borneo. (S Djakarta 1391, 7 Apr 51).
COMMENT: These consulates will give increased direction and encouragement
to Chinese Communist activities in the four largest islands in Indonesia.
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"C" PHILIPPINES. Fiulc Plans for Violence Toward Americans Questioned. :In
noting the contents of recently captured FIuk documents concerning the
murder of two Americans on 20 March, US rmba.s.ay Manila now comments that
the possibility of a neriluk policy of violence toward Americans "is not
so well suhstantiatec9 as p,reviotasly supposed" e (C Manila 3063, 6 Apr 51).
COMMENT: The American business community apparently continues to be
deeply concerned over the safety of lives and property.
"B" Arrests of Chinese Increase. Search of Chinese homes and arrests
of Chinese individuals have increased markedly during the past month.
25X1 C this campaign is largely
a racket with officials planting evidence of subversive activities and
later demanding a pay-off from alleged suspects. The Chinese community
is profoundly concerned but feels helpless to object through the Chinese
Embassy, since it is suspected that the Chinese Ambassador is also in-
volved in the racket. This situation is driving some local Chinese into
the Communist fold. (C Manila 3063, 6 Apr 51). COMMENT: A plan has
reportedly been presented to President Quirino for establishment of a
concentration camp for "undesirable&' Chinese pending their deportation.
Sustained persecution of the Chinese community is likely to add many
new recruits to local Pomtmtnist ranks,, particularly if Chinese lose con- 25X1 C
fidence in Chinese Embassy officials.
"A" INDOCHINA. Chinese Invaders Said to Number 2..000.
the group of Chinese
25X10 who entered Western Tonkin last week numbers 200-300 and may be engaged
simply in banditry or raids on the opium poppy harvest. On the other
hand, a special emissary of the Tonkin commanding general just returned
from Laichau has admitted that the invaders are "organized, if not
regular," and that their number is probably closer to 2,000. He adds 25X1C
that the bandit-opium theory is spurious. A marked reticence about this
invasion and about Viet Minh operations in the Tonkin delta on the part
25X10 of the French has been noted by US and British military observers.
confirms that the invading forces are Chinese but
that they are believed to be either (1) Chinese Nationalists or (2)
deserters from the regular Chinese Communist Army, possibly including
some Viet Minh defectees. The French expect to be able to disarm and
intern these forces without encountering resistance. (TS Hanoi 549,
8 Apr 51; USARMA Saigon MC 66-51, 9 Apr 51). COMMENT: In addition to
the bandit-opium theory, there has been speculation that this and earlier
incursions of Chinese forces into Indochina have been part of Chinese
Communist operations against Chinese anti-Communist guerrillas or against
anti-Communist mountain tribesmen of Indochina. There is also the much
more serious possibility that the current Viet Minh operations in the
delta may he designed to screen the entry of regular Chinese Communist
forces into Indochina via Gestern Tonkin or Laos. General De Lattre has
expressed fear of the possibility of such a "flanking movement". The latest
report, however, indicates that such a development is not yet in process.
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CHINA. Sino-Soviet Decisions on Korea. MAO
Tse-tung crnferr,d with Stalin in Moscow in late January and that the
following decisions were reached: (1) to expand the uorean conflict by
inciting riots in Japan, with the USSR releasing 35C,000 Jap POWs for this
purpose; (2) to supply Soviet equipment for 160 Chinese divisions by July
'51? (3) to train 30 000 000 Chinese ground troops in 1951; and (4) to
25X1 C
supply the Chinese with 000. Soviet aircraft, "250,000 tons of warships,"
25X1 C
and 30 submarines. . COMMENT: The
above appears to be simply another of a series o speculative reports on
Sino-Soviet decisions. The figures cited, are not credible.
"C" Further Arrests of US Nationals. A priest recently expelled from
China confirms a March report of the arrest of six US missionaries in
Kwangtung. (C Hong Kong 2930, 7 Arr 51). The Chinese Nationalist press
reports the arrest of all foreign personnel--including five US Catholic
missionaries--of the Maryknoll orphanage in Kwangtung. (R Reuters,
Hong Kong, 6 Apr 51). COMMENT: The arrest of US nationals in Communist
China was reported in the Daily Digest of 3, 4 and 6 April. US nationals
known to be under arrest now total 16; the number actually under arrest
is doubtless higher, as reports from many points are not yet in. The
Maryknoll arrests have not been confirmed, but Communist policy in the
takeover of other foreign-operated orphanages makes the report credible.
A number of the foreign nationals thus far arrested and to be arrested
in future--especially those charged with espionage--are expected to be
executed or to receive long prison sentences. 25X1C
"B" 25X1C Ex-Japanese Officers Training Nationalists on Taiwan.
25X1 C
the former Lt, Gen. NBMUl'U riirosni is now neau w. a
group of ex-Japanese army officers who are serving as instructors in the
Chinese Nationalist army near Taipei. A reported 30 to 40 other Japanese
are in Taiwan as technicians, (R Tokyo, PANA, 5 Apr 51). COMMENT:
(1) The presence of Japanese advisers on Taiwan has been reported over a
long period of time. (2) Reports of a Japanese advisory group, consisting
of OKAMURA Reiji, former Japanese commander in China, Admiral HASEGAWA,
former Governor of Taiwan, and NISHIMURA Kokei, having arrived in Taiwan
to advise on defense and peace treaty matters were forwarded by US Charge
25X1C Strong from Taipei in July 1950. (3) The Chinese Communist press and
various - reports have indicated that NEMOTO, former C-in-C of
Japanese forces in North China, arrived in Taiwan in July 1948 to make
25X10 preparations for an organization of Japanese airmen.
"A" KOREA. Possibility of Bacteriological Warfare.
25X1C a Chinese Communist bacteriologist left Hong Kong in mid-Marc ).
under orders for Peiping. Prior to departure he asserted that the Chinese
Communists ossibl will start bacteriological warfare in Korea in June or
July. COMMENT: This report supports
25X1 D
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recent statements attributed to the Chinese Communists of their intention
to employ bacteriological weapons in the Korean theatre. The Communists,
with Soviet material assistance and. methods of dissemination, could im-
plement this threat. It is felt, however, that the Communists will not
use overt bacteriological warfare instruments,hut that this could be a
build-up for a psychological attack on the South Koreans. There is no
evidence indicating actual preparations in this field.
"C" Continuing Enemy Air Activity in Northwest Korea. A 6 April
operational summary reporting on clashes between UN and Communist jet
aircraft in the Sinuiju area of the Sino-Korean border, observed that
enemy pilots were more aggressive than u.sual,although still taking re-
fuge across the Yalu when outmaneuvered. Furthermore, the enemy jets
were observed. to be shiny and appeared new. Other reports of early
April state that although the jets appeared new their gun fire was for
the most part inaccurate,with the exception of one or two planes out of
each group which were evaluated by friendly pilots as highly accurate.
(S AX 5919, 6 Apr 51; S AX 5952, 7 Apr 51; S AX 5967, 7 Apr 51).
COMMENT: From these and other reports of early April, it appears that
although the Communists are being successfully supplied with aircraft,
there is no observable improvement in the performance of the pilots..
The notable exceptions to this may indicate the participation of Soviet
personnel.
"C" JAPAN-KOREA. South Koreans Seize Japanese Fishing Vessels. The South
Korean Navy has announced the capture of 30 Japanese fishing vessels
during 1951, including 16 "captured" on 5 April. This action was taken
for the alleged. reason that the Japanese illegally crossed the "MacArthur
Line" limiting Japanese fishing grounds and were found trespassing on
Korean fishing grounds. (U NYHT, 9 Apr 51). COM'MMENT: In negotiations
in early 1950 with the South Korean Government over seizures of fishing
boats, SCAP made it clear that violations of the MacArthur Line were
matters between him and the vessels concerned and that seizures on the
high seas are in effect piracy. The Japanese are becoming increasingly
disturbed over the seizures. In view of the large number of vessels
involved, it is likely that SOAP will take prompt action to have the boats
returned. For the future, continued seizure of Japanese vessels will not
be conducive to good relations between Japan and the ROK.
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FRANCE. PCF Politburo Initiates Campaign for Peace Pact in Asia,
steadily heig ene war of nerves is expected by the US Embassy
in Paris, following the publication 7 April in Humanite of a
declaration by the French Communist Party (PCF) Po itburo calling
for a popular campaign in. line with the World Peace Council's appeal
to the Big Five "to impose the conclusion of a peace pact";in Asia.
US policy is depicted as bringing on World War III by authorizing
General MacArthur to bombard at will the China mainland. Communist
journalist Courtade further develops the theme by asserting that.,
with a proposal to seize Vladivostok, for the first time US imperialist
demands bear openly on the USSR itself. (C Paris 6011, 7 Apr.51).
COM!1ENT: Since the USSR has failed during the Deputy Foreign Ministers'
o erence to force an open split in Western solidarity, the Soviets
may now try to rupture Western relations by means of this PCF
propaganda campaign, Criticism of General MacArthur, already prevalent
in the UK, Benelux and France, has to some extent already?molded
public opinion toward a readier acceptance of the PCF thesis.
ITALY. Increasing Popular Apprehension over the Defense of Western
its the insistence. of General MacArthur on taking responsibility
.for decisions'on political matters., as well as to rumors that he may
be replaced. It has also stated that the,. controversy in the US over
the number of divisions to be sent to Europe, recently evidenced by
the Senate debate, will seriously retard the formation of an effective
defense force in Western Europe. (R FBIS, 9 Apr 51; R FBIS, 7 Apr 51).
COMIC'ENT: The'.prominence given by the press to the situation in Korea
and the slowness of US rearmament indicates growing apprehension
in many sectors of the.Italian public that the defense of Western
Europe is being gravely jeopardized.
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w+11.x" d ~c t.4rn
"B" UNITED KINGDOM. ew efense ro-osals to Eg tiaris:
The Cabinet has n; w approved the su mission,'o e following defense proposals to Egypt: (1) evacuation by stages of British
t'N6 troops from the Suez Canal Zone (presumably to Cyprus, Malta, and
Libya) by 1956; (2) nominal Anglo Egyptian control of the Suez Canal
Rp+` s7 bases under lease arrangements but with the actual management of
the bases remaining in the hands of British civilians; (3) anair
defense pact permitting the retention of RAF squadrons and ground
defense organizations in Egypt after 1956; (4) an Egyptian guarantee
of the right of se- the UK and its alliesJin event of~-war;
and (5) British assistance in helping build up Egyptian armed forces.
-`TS` endon 5307, 6-Apr. 51). COMMENT: There has-not been time. yet .
-the Egyptians to make a formal reply to this offer; hawever,-
ither the UK Foreign Office nor the War Office are very sanguine
that the proposals will be acceptable to Egypt.
"B" FRENCH NORTH AFRICA. Nationalists Seek Support to Oust French.
According to neta, the semi-official Dutch news agency, two North
African nationalist leaders have arrived in Djakarta in an effort
to obtain arms from the Indonesians. Habib Bourghiba, head of the
Tunisian Neo-Destour Party, allegedly stated that his ultimate aim.
is to drive the French from North Africa and that preparations are
now underway for a war of liberation. Bourghiba and Taieb Slim,
influential member of the Tunisian Old Destour Party, also plan to
visit the UK and US, and desire the moralsupport of "all the world"
for their efforts. (U Djakarta 132, 9 Apr 51). COMI'UNENT: This
visit to Indonesia probably is part of a propaganda HE=ur undertaken
by Bourghiba and Slim to keep alive the sympathies aroused in Moslem
nations by the grossly exaggerated press accounts.of the, recent
difficulties between the French Resident General and the Sultan of
Morocco. Bourghiba, fiery and unstable leader of the principal
Tunisian nationalist party, may be taking a radical position to impress
Middle and Far Eastern Moslems, but no one is more aware than he that
an uprising against the French would be extremely foolhardy since the
nationalists lack the necessary following, arms, and financial and
moral backing. Bourghiba's action, moreover, is not in line with
the policy of his party, which is cooperating with the French in
executing administrative reforms in Tunisia. While Slim's party
has opposed these reforms as inadequate, it has not yet advocated
violence to obtain North African independence.
"C" ARGENTINA. Chamber of Deputies Favors Ex pro riation of La Prensa.
on 9 p1171 t eronista majors y bloc in the Chamber of Deputies
voted to expropriate the opposition newspaper, La Prensa,, after
having heard the report of the joint Congressional c ttee that
has been investigating the paper during the past month. The com-
mittee recommended that La Prensa's name be expropriated along with
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its tangible property and that the Government float a special bond
issue to cover the cost of expropriation. The all-Peronista Senate
is scheduled to meet on 10 April, and then it is expected that both
Houses will meet jointly on 11 April to decide finally the La Prensa
case. (U NY Times , 10 Apr 51). COMMENT : It. is probable t a ie
Senate action will parallel that of Ch anber of Deputies.
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3J
491500
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
APR101951
Not for dissemination outside 0/Si and 0/NE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES
10 April 1951
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"A" USSR. Embassy Moscow Sees Possibility of Indirect Soviet Intervention
in Korean War. Embassy Moscow believes that the USSR may attempt to
bolster the Chinese Communists and still avoid direct Soviet involve-
ment in the Korean war through the device of providing "volunteer"
assistance from the Mongolian People's Republic to the North Korean
and Chinese Communist forces. Such an intervention would merely be
the mechanism cloaking actual Soviet participation in the Korean war,
since the ostensibly Mongolian units could in fact consist of Soviet
arny or air force units containing nations of various yellow races in
the Soviet Far East and Central Asia. This intervention would be
welcomed by the Chinese and could alleviate criticism which has un-
doubtedly developed within the Chinese Communist Party and among the
Chinese people in view of heavy losses in Korea, caused by the failure
of the USSR to provide sufficient planes and equipment. (TS Emb, Moscow
1768, 6 Apr 51). COMM: ID estimates that the Mongolian People's
Republic has an army of some 30,000. This force, which has some 'token
mechanized elements, and an air arm of sorts, could be reinforced by
Outer Mongolians and other Mongolian personnel to a strength of 100,000
effective in a relatively short time. The USSR formed some homogene-
ous national units up to division size during the first half of World
War II, but their combat record was generally poor and none were of
Mongoloid races. Such national units were completely eliminated
shortly after the war, and present Soviet policy is to scatter men of
minority nationalities throughout the armed forces. Few of the
Mongoloid nationalities would be trained in technical skills (which
the Chinese Communists also lack) and any Mongolian units would be
understaffed in good officers and specialists, These units would have
to be specially formed, and it is doubtful that more than five we:11-
trained divisions of Soviet Mongolians could be formed at this time.
As noted in the 0/0I Daily Digest of 31 Mar 51, in view of Co==1st
China's abundance of military manpower, it would appear that, aside from
such technical and specialist assistance as a force of this kind could
provide, the main value of an "international army" would be to demonstrate
the same kind of support for Communist China as was evidenced by token
contributions from various UN members in support of US action in Korea.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"B" FRANCE-GERMANY. Proposed Solution for Saar Problem Facilitates
Schuman Plan Sip-nature. West German Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Halistein thinks most of the outstanding problems involved in the
Schuman Plan can now be settled, although the relationship-of the
Saar to the coal-steel pool may yet prevent German ratification of the
Plan. Halllstein hopes, however, to avoid mention of the Saar in the
protocol of signature and will meet Schuman today in Paris to propose
a separate Franco-German protocol specifying that the Schuman Plan
will not prejudice the legal status to be assigned the Saar by the
eventual peace treaty. In the meantime, US High Commissioner McCloy,
in an effort to eliminate German hostility and offset Socialist leader
Schumacher's opposition to the Plan, held a six hour talk on 7 April
with trade union representatives. (S S/S Bonn 708, 7 Apr 51).
COMMENT: Although the French would ordinarily be inclined to en-
courage an international status for the Saar which would weaken its
ties with Germany, Schuman's anxiety to implement the coal-steel pool
will probably incline him toward compromise, perhaps along the lines
suggested by Hallstein.
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