OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100370001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 12, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGBST
Date: APR 12 1951
NOTE; 1. This summary of significant report, has been
prepared primarily for the internal ice of ti
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows;
"A" items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"R" - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
communist intentions or capabilities
"C" ? other information indicating trends
and potential developments
NAVY review(s) completed.
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
COPY NO. 01-)
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SECTION 1. (SOVIET)
"C" USSR. New Reg elation in Lithuania Bars Out Reports of Di af.fe_rt on. An.
January, forbids "arbitrary" posting of notices by organizations, enter-
prises, institutions and private citizens,, Violators of this decision are
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obligatory -decision.of -the City Soviet of Vilnius, Lithuania., passed last
subject to a fine of 100 rubles or up to 30 days corrective labor.Inc
for a two year period.
"law" will remain in effect within the city
ern i C011T EM: This regulation, would appear to bear our
unconrinmea p ,s -t anti-Soviet remarks are often seen either posted
or chalked on walls in cities and towns of the Baltic area. However., the
mild punishment and limited duration of the law suggests that the Soviets
are not overly alarmed at this "passive" activity.
"fl" Moscow Clalins MacAathur's Ouster Due to His Failure as the Inst5ni-
ment of g?ressive U5 Pola 'Radio Moscow said. that President Truman's
explanation of his order relieving Gen. MacArthur of his Far East Coz and
"sounded er tr. erely strange" since MacArthur's execution, of his co viands
.had been carried out "with Jashingtont s authorization," and "'Mac rthua
did nothing that disagreed with the aggressive policy of the ruling circles
in the US." Moscow added that Mac=rthur's ouster was due, therefore, to
his "failure as a Supreme Commander." His troops were "repeatedly defeated"
by the "heroic" Korean People's Any and the Chinese volunteers, and he
repeatedly revealed "the true plans of the US Government." "With, his dis-
missal," continued Moscow. ""the US ruling circles hope to: (1) blame the
failure of their disastrous policy on. MacArthur; (2) give courage to their
European allies, who have been frightened by the indignation of their
peoples against efforts to spread the war in Asia, {3d?otn the voice of
the Peace Partisans..." 1k,oscow then concluded that "the withdrawal of
one advent sr Cannot alter the adventurous character of US aggressive
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"B" EASTERN EUROPE. YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslav Employee in Praha Disappears, The
av Embassy in Praha has
$l
Y
ugo
Belgrade press has announced that.the. delivered two notes requesting competent Czech authorities to investigate
the disappearance of a Yugoslav radio om Embassy
in Praha in the early morning hours of 31 _
note: dated 11 April,, points out that
and responsibility of official
eumstances suggest the participate
Czech organs. The Yugoslav Charge in Praha has informed the US Embassy
that he considers it highly significant that the Yugoslav Embassy
employee was seized on Embassy property since the police had numerous
opportunities to pick him up outside the Embassy. The Yugoslav Charge
associated
believes that the radio operator's disappearance isent s.probably Ambassador
with a forthcoming trial, and probably that of
Briggs comments that the case tends to support the belief that the
trial of Clementis is scheduled for the near future.
lav Governments have :re ly
Y
ugos
n and
C N. EI_ The Bulgaria
s
the Hungarian and Yugo Govern-
il
e
wh
ousted one another's Charges,aneeousted the
ments have recalled their respective Charges. The disappeos radio operator from the Yugoslav Embassy in Praha will probably plthough
cipitate the recall or ousting of Czech and Yugoslav diplomats. g
no mention was made of collaboration with Tito in the einar cbar~es
made against Clementis and his co-conspirators,, in previous
deviationist trials the defendants have been accused of collusion with
Tito,
"C" CURBENT COMMUNISM AND 'R.OPAGAN-A. World Peace Council Delegation Fails
I
to Kee Date with UN Secretary General Lie. The recent World Peace
Council WPC meeting in Berlin resolved to send a delegation to the UN
to obtain a revision of UN policies in conformity with the goals of the
sident of the WPC, sent a message
President
i
Subsequently M. Joliot-Cur
e, to Lie asking for an appointment for the delegation. Lie replied and later
he would meet the delegation during his current European trip,
he fixed the meeting for,9 April in Paris. The delegation failed to appear.
Instead while waiting for the delegation, Lie received a letter from
Curie had received but ten days notice of the
Jabot-Curie claiming
impending meeting and that this was too short a period to assemble the
delegates from thirteen different nationse "However,," Curie advised,
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"the members of the delegation have been instructed to proceed to the UN
at the earliest date on which it will be possible to receive the WPC dele-
gation at the headquarters of the UN." Tie replied that his heavy travel-
ing schedule precluded the fixing of a date at this time for receiving the
delegation at UN headquarters. In a separate memorandum, Lie acknowledged
the o osals of the WPC and. t, restated the goals of the UN.
COMIENT: It had been obvious from
Tne g ran ng that the WFU delegation was unwilling to meet Lie anywhere
but in New York. From the viewpoint of the WPC, maximum propaganda exploi-
tation of their criticism of the UN requires the drama of a delegation
actually visiting UN headquarters.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"C" IRAN. Prime Minister Ala Improves Position. Embassy Tehran reports that
Prime Minister Ala's recent decision to suspend martial law in Tehran was
caused by: (1) a marked decline in public alarm; (2) criticism arising from
the arbitrary action by the security forces; and (3) the determined opposi-
tion of the National Front to the imposition of martial law. The last factor
is considered by the Embassy as the most important. Ala, who has been con-
ferring with National Front leaders in an effort to secure their cooperation,
is reported to have appointed four ministers in response to National Front
demands. The Embassy comments that elimination of National Front opposition
to martial law issue has strengthened Ala's position for the time being and
that his cabinet may well receive a vote of confidence.
25X1 COMMENT: While the strengthening of Ala's position as r me
s improved the situation in Iran in one respect, the magnitude
of the problems facing the government provide little cause for optimism
concerning any improvement in the over-all situation. Iran will have ade-
quate financial resources to carry out its economic development program if
it continues to receive income from its oil resources equal to that promised
under the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) supplemental agreement. However,
mismanagement of the country's finances has resulted in a stagnant industry
and trade. Many workers are unpaid and the currency shortage is such that
unless the note issue is increased there is danger that AIOC, the country's
largest industry, will not have enough rials to pay its workers. Moreover,
opposition to reform by the land-owning and merchant groups, National Front
intransigence, and the continuing deterioration in the economic, political
and social structure in Iran, as well as the impasse which has developed
over the Iranian oil industry, are all factors which presage continuing
trouble in Iran and which will probably prevent Ala or his successor from
carrying out the reforms which are so necessary if Iran is to achieve
governmental and economic stability.
"B" SYRIA-ISRAEL. New Incidents Aggravate Border Tension. Two additional
border incidents have been reported along the Syrian-Israeli frontier
since the El Hamma clash of a. week ago: (1) on 10 April a Syrian-Israeli
skirmish took place at the village of Nuqeib on the eastern shore of
Lake Tiberias, and (2) on 11 April a brief air engagement occurred be-
tween Israeli and Syrian planes in the Lake Hula region of the frontier.
Reports from the US Embassies in Damascus and Tel Aviv indicate that the
Syrian Army has partially mobilized and that Israeli troops have been
consolidated west of the Lake Tiberias and Hula regions but have been
reinforced by several tanks.' US Ambassador Davis in Tel Aviv states
that, while Israel press coverage of the US representations on the Syrian-
Israeli dispute are a favorable indication that US demarches have had some
effect on the course of events, Israeli government spokesmen have never-
theless carefully imposed certain conditions which, if accepted, would
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mean that Israel would hold all the advantages and yield nothing. Mean-
while US Ambassador Cannon in Damascus reports the views of two UN officials
returning from a preliminary investigation of'the El Hamma incident. These
officials, whose report Cannon indicates might need subsequent checking,
expressed (1) their great concern over the potentialities of the situation
in the Syrian-Israeli demilitarized zone, and (2) their belief that the
Israelis were almost wholly at fault in the recent incidents.
COMMENT: The series of border incidents in the as week along the yr an-
Israeli frontier have resulted in a potentially dangerous situation between
the two countries in spite of the forthright action of the US, UK, and France
in exerting their strong influence against the development of more serious
hostilities. Domestic factors within Israel apparently bar any Israeli
yielding upon the fundamental dispute: Israel's drainage of land in the
Lake Hule demilitarized area. Because of the Army's influence upon the
unstable Syrian government and because of the mounting hostility felt
by the Arab States generally toward Israel, Syrian restraint in the face
of recurrent border clashes is also more difficult.
"B" INDIA. Congress Party Demonstrates Awareness of Communist Intent-ions and
Propaganda Techniques. The US Embassy, New Delhi, states categorically,
without identifying the source of its information, that on 30 March,
Kala Venkata Rao, Secretary-General of the All-India Congress Committee
of the Indian Congress Party, addressed a confidential letter to all pro-
vincial Congress committees saying, "Some references have been received
by our office raising the question whether Congressmen can join Stockholm
peace committees and sign the (peace) appeal. It is not good for our
Congress organization that our members should join such committees or
sign appeals as they are designed for certain political purposes". The
Embassy does not know if the letter was issued with Prime Minister Nehru's
knowledge and approval. COMMENT-. The above
message obviously refers to the new international ommunist campaign to
obtain signatures advocating a Five Power Peace Pact and universal reduction
in armaments. It is believed to be the first official notice issued by the
Congress Party (as opposed to the Government of India) which indicates an
awareness of international Communist intentions and techniques of propaganda.
It remains to be seen, however, whether this letter represents an independent
move on the part of Congress rightists under President Tandon or whether it
has the blessing of Prime Minister Nehru and Congress leftists as well.
"B" INDIA. Fears of World War Allayed by General MacArthur's Dismissal,.
According to press reports, the Indians have learned of General MacArthur's
dismissal with whole-hearted relief. They had feared that under his
direction the United Nations might become embroiled in a third world war.
As recently as 28 March, Prime Minister Nehru had complained in Parliament
about military commanders who made statements on political affairs. Still
more recently, the Indian Government has sought confirmation in Washington
of a report that General MacArthur had been authorized to bomb Manchurian
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25X1 bases--a report which caused considerable uneasiness in India. As a
result of the General's dismissal, the Indians now hope A. fresh efforts
can be made to end the war in Korea.
"C" INDONESIA. Cabinet Crisis Remains Unsolved. US Ambassador Cochran reports
that the Indonesian government crisis continues unsolved, security condi-
tions have e political outlook has become more uncertain.
25X1
COMMENT: Efforts are still b
i
mode
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e
n
t
g
o
a
^- sue. p
vices its Indonesia--the
Masjumi (Moslem) Party and the Indonesian National Party. The government
fell on 20 March.
INDOCHINA. French and Vietnam Premier's Positions Strengthened. Military
successes in Tonkin during the last two weeks have generally strengthened
the prestige of the French and of Vietnamese Premier Huu's government.
Huu's opponents recognize that his dislodgment will be more difficult,
particularly since rumors that the French are planning to replace him with
an even less popular figure have increased the number of his supporters.
Indicative of this trend is a report that the country's foremost economist
has finally decided accept the post of Minister of Finance.
COMMENT: As the gravity of the milita y si ua on
in Indochina has lessened, the French have shown an inclination to become
correspondingly more intransigent in their dealings with the Vietnamese.
Premier Huu has cooperated with the French and it is not likely they are
contemplating his early removal. Despite a certain increase in the Huu
Government's prestige as a result of the Tonkin victories, it will continue
to be generally unpopular throughout Indochina.
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"C" Communists Ask GOI to Inaugurate Civil Air-Service to China. The
Chinese Communist regime has requested the Government of India to inaugu-
rate an airline route from Calcutta to China, with stops at Canton, Kunming,
Chungking, and other points, according to a report from the US Air Attache
in New Delhi. The Government of India hopes to organize this service
using only Indian'or Anglo-Indian pilots.
COMMENT: The inauguration of this air line wou.Ld provide the only air
access from a non-Soviet area to Communist China. At present, the Russians
(operating the Sino-Soviet Civil Air Transport Corporation jointly with the
Chinese) are the only foreigners permitted to fly aircraft into China. Under
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any air agreement with the Chinese Communists, the GOI will probably
recognize the reciprocal rights of the Chinese to fly civil aircraft
to India.
"B" KOREA. Enemy Activities in Northeastern Korea. A US naval interrogation
of two fishermen intercepted off the northeastern Korean post of Songjin
on 10 April revealed that only small military detachments armed with
infantry weapons were deployed in the villages in the Songjin area and
that no coastal artillery pieces were in evidence. The fishermen further
stated that although there were no Chinese Communist troops in the area,
a "recent" UN air raid knocked out eight railway cars carrying Chinese
Communist troops with "heavy" casualties. Further confirmation was given
to the cutting of the coastal supply route by UN naval and air attacks.
25X1 COMMENT: The deployment of small lightly
armed coax a e n ':his area is a more logical move than the
deployment of major North Korean units 25X1
The "recent" presence of Chinese Communist troops in the area sugges s
either the movement of replacements into Korea or the movement of casual-
ties back into Manchuria. No major CCF units are believed stationed in
this area.
"C" JAPAN. French Views on Japanese Rearmament. The Director of Far Eastern
Affairs, French Foreign Office, has expressed to US Embassy personnel in
Paris his opinion that the French will be generally in agreement with the
provisional US draft of the Japanese Peace Treaty. However, he stated
that France holds the view that while Japan might be permitted to create
-round forces, it should not have a navy or air forced 25X1
25X1 COMMENT: The creation of a Japanese Navy or it Force is
largely academic for at least several years, and Japan will be under
severe economic strain in maintaining even minimum ground forces.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"C" WESTERN EUROPE. Considerable Disagreement Indicated in Final
Schuman Plan Talks, The situation w1 1 e ui ' o ay a e
start o e con erence in Paris. of the Foreign Ministers of the
Schuman Plan countries, which is to clear away the remaining problems
before signature of the draft treaty. While Monnet, the real author
of the Plan, is "still guardedly optimistic" that serious difficulties
will not arise, his uncertainty is obvious, .and his advisers claim
to expect trouble. The aermans are eased with a com romise tentatively
reached on the Saar issue but sharp
disagreement is now evident among all the participating coup ries on
the composition of the High Authority, national voting strength in the
(advisory) Council of Ministers, and location of tie coal-steel poolts
capital, In talks with Monnet, Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland.
has intimated he would raise at least two questions not on the agenda,
over one of which--later re=examination and perhaps renegotiation
of the Treaty-Monnet fears that "serious difficulties" may arise.
25X1 COMMENT: Disagreement to this extent
in this final conference was -o a anticipated inasmuch as basic
decisions determining the relative weight of each participant were
deferred in mid-March in order to gain the publicity advantage of
having the Treaty at least initialed, Van Zeeland's critical attitude
is probably sincerely based, on the Belgians' misgivings,that their
high-cost coal industry will suffer disproportionately under the Plan.
25X1
"B" FRANCE.. Vote of Confidence on Queuilleis Policies Due Next Week,
the question of confidence on his budgetary policy and desire for
elections on 10 June, with emphasis on the:,latter, and it appears
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"not unlikely" that he mill have the necessary support when the vote
is taken early. next week. Socialist President Auriol, who is known
to favor early elections, can be expected to promote establishment
of a united coalition front. The Socialists in general appear to
have become convinced that -a ministerial crisis would not benefit
them, and are therefore more conciliatory in their demands for "long-
range anti-inflationary measuresna On the other hand, it is question-
able whether the Radicals will vote tax increases although they are
anxious for early elections, and many Popular Republicans (MRP) are
reluctant to vote for 10 June elections because-they know they will
not be returned to the next Assembly. F__ I
COMMh'ENT: The Coalition party discipline
in e anticipated vote is likely o ee poor, and the result close,
Even if the opposition fails to muster the absolute majority needed
to block Queuillets policies, the Assembly may still find it impossible
to clear its heavy calendar in the coming weeks so that elections could
be scheduled for June. Furthermore, the aggravated dissension evident
within the coalition in recent weeks makes it unlikely that even a
stop-gap anti-inflationary program can be rapidly implemented,
SPAIN. Lead Sales to Soviet Orbit Continue, US Embassy Madrid reports
that 200 me Eric Eons of lead bars, shipped on 29 March from Cartagena
to Antwerp on'the SS HELIOS, were consigned to the Societe Financiere
Econciinique' Euro eerie., Liechtenstein., and hence woulpresumably ee
transshipped o zec oslovakia. The Embassy comments.that this ?is
believed to be part ot" an order of 'about 1,000 tons placed by the
Liechtenstein firm through various local dealers.. Filling of some
orders from legitimate Western European purchasers has been deliberately
held up by the Spanish Government pending shipment of lead to the
Liechtenstein customer at 23 cents a pound (f.o.b. Spanish port).
Minister,Suances is reported to have said he was not concerned with
the ultimate destination of. Spanish lead so long as the metal is
first to Western European nations,
"B" MOROCCO; Nationalist Parties Plan Cooperation. The four Moroccan
na ion is. pa ies, representing all ree zones, reportedly have
met in the. International Zone of Tangier under the chairmanship of
a visiting Egyptian Senator-journalist to sign a'pact of unity and
cooperation, requiring the parties to (1) present a common front,
.(2) refrain from negotiating independently with the French, and (3)
refuse cooperation with the Communists: A French declaration favoring
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at least the principle of..Moroccan independence is deemed a pre-
requisite for any negotiations with France. Istiqlal, the most
important and largest of the parties, is to act as coordinator in
formulating a common policy, Announcement of the "national unity"
pact was followed by order demonstrations in Tangier streets.
25X1 COMMENT: Other attempts by the Moroccan
nationalists to achieve unity of . action have been fruitless. It is
not likely that they will agree-in the near future upon a program of
action for the independence of Morocco since there is, considerable
mutual distrust, and at least one party has a notable record of.
willingness to accede to French demands. The French, however, wil:L
not look kindly upon Egyptian "interference", in presiding over the
,signing of this pact. The arrival of six Egyptian journalists to
"investigate the Moroccan situation", and the formal note calling
on Franoe to grant liberty to. Morocco have not received a cordial
reception. While no serious French-Egyptian discord is likely,
relations will continue to be cool for some time,
"C" UNITED KINGDOM. Cabinet Nearly Split' over, 'Eudget, Issue, US Embassy
onion reports that one.m nor em In-Ug new u ge e imposition
of partial charges for some hitherto free medical: services-brought
forth strong opposition from Cabinet Ministers Aneurin Bevan and
Harold Wilson, who both threatened to resign. The Embassy attributes
? the withdrawal of their resignations to the Labor Party's desire to
remain in power despite serious internal differences, and adds that,,
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gaitskell's position has been enhanced
as.a result of the test of strength with Bevan.
25X1 COMMENT: Apparently Bevan.and Wilson were eager to put
themselves on, recd as opposing any cut in the social services. As
two of the youngest men in the Cabinet, their threat of resignation
was probably primarily intended as a political gesture to reaffirm
their Socialist convictions anac to increase their prestige with the
rank:-and-file of the Labor Party,
"C" Consulates to be Closed Following Chinese Communist
Order,. 'The UK Consulate at unman re y -scheduled to be close-21
25X1 in may will probably be closed
immediately., following an order delivered presumably by focal Com-
munist authorities to surrender Consulate property within ten days.
The UK representative in Peiping was told at.,the Foreign Office that
the People's Government had no knowledge of the order. The UK Foreign
Office hasdecided..to close the Consulate at Hangkow in May in addition
25X1 COMMENT: The forced closure of the Kunming
Consulate :o ows that of T19 and Urumchi consulates, which
resulted in the UK decision to close a number of other consular offices.
British-Consulates will remain open at Tientsin, Shanghai, and Canton,
in addition to the Embassy at,peiping.
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group if it were not made to lose face In the eyes o
VENEZUELA. Government Im oses Petroleum Contract over Labor Ob-
ecions. T ei Venezue an'Miis er o Labor se e by decree on
he tiro-month-old petroleum labor contract dispute. Workers
.11 will get a wage increase of approximately 10% and a few of the "fringe
benefits" demanded in the 1246-clause proposal submitted to the companies
by the.all union bargaining committee. The contract, is binding for
30 months. The Minister's action was taken in spite of protests by
the workers' committee. .US Embassy Caracas feels that the terms are
about what the companies were prepared to grant. The oil fields are
ouiet with no evidence of strike preparations..
COMAPO T: Negotiations between
the companies and the argaining i ee were suspended by the
Government several weeks ago when it appeared that a deadlock had
been reached. Several company officials have felt that the Minister
intended from the beginning to settle the contract matter himself;,
and that an impasse would allow him to do so. Certain of the officials
believed further that he would like to intervene in the guise of
"winning the days" for labor while actually granting only enough
to reduce the motive power of the committee. The committee has
apparently been-strongly influenced by the outlawed Acci5n Democr~ t ica
party and could have become an important weapon of t -zs revo_ u tio:nary
f th workers
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49.
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
APR 12 1951
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
12 April 1951
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
YUGOSLAVIA. Requests for Arms Aid from West Revealed to Yugoslav
People. Goaded on by public disclosures in the Western press, the
Yugoslav Government has informed the Yugoslav people that it is re-
questing through normal commercial channels "certain quantities of de-
fensive weapons" to strengthen its arms industry. In a Borba article,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Veljko Vlahovic explained that the
decision to obtain arms from the West would not involve any change in
YugoslaviaTs present policy of independence of any bloc. However,
Yugoslav leaders have been on record to the effect that they would seek
arms when they believed the time had come to strengthen the army against
possible aggression. The Deputy Minister said the decision to seek arms
from the West was taken because of the intensive rearmament of Hungary,
Rumania, and Bulgaria in violation of their peace treaties, and the in-
creased number of border incidents provoked by Yugoslavia's Satellite
neighbors. COMMENT: Yugoslav leaders
have been carefully preparing the people for this announcement in recent
months. In speeches during February and March Tito publicly admitted
th? tthe Government was taking certain measures for the procurement of
machines and raw materials for the development of its war industry,,. but
added that, for the present, Yugoslavia could not receive or purchase
armaments or weapons without increasing tension with the Cominform states.
The release of the Yugoslav White Paper on 9 March probably was partially
intended to prepare the Yugoslav people and Party for the admission that
Yugoslavia is seeking arms from the West. The Yugoslavs have been
negotiating for arms with the French since late 1950 , and in February
1951 presented a list of military requirements to the UK. The Yugoslav.-
French negotiations will probably be concluded this week according to a
French Foreign Office spokesman.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"B" JAPAN. Yoshida "Shaken" at MacArthur's Dismissal. US Political Adviser
Sebald in Tokyo cables that he called on Premier Yoshida on 11 April and
advised him of MacArthur's dismissal. The Premier was "visibly shaken"
and stated that the General's departure would come as a "tremendous shock
to the Japanese people". Yoshida added that he feels personally indebted
to MacArthur's guidance for his ova, political success and he attributed
the retention of the Emperor institution to the General's influence. In
reply to Sebald's personal expression of hope that the Cabinet would not
follow the rule of traditional "responsibility" (by resigning) and would
carry on during the initial period of Ri.dgway's take-over, Yoshida gave
assurances that his Government would carry on. With an "absolute major-
ity in the Diet" and the probability that the Liberal Party will be
successful. in the forthcoming local elections, there appeared to 'be no
reason why the Government should not feel secure, The Premier stated
that he would convey the gist of the conversation to the Emperor and to
the Cabinet and he felt that they would be greatly heartened to learn
that the US cooperative policy towards Japan and towards of a peace treaty remains unchanged. 25X1
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
U .1, Germans Propose Defense Ministr and Tactical Air Force., At
the eighth Allied-German defense conference, the German representative,
Theodor Blank, proposed that the Federal Republic create a Ministry of
Defense responsible to the parliament. Under the Defense Minister would
be an Inspector General, supreme commander of all German troops. The
French representative commented that these proposals were rather far from
the Brussels agreement and expressed the view that the Western Foreign
Ministers wished to avoid the reestablishment of a defense department in
G
ermany. The Allied representative, however, agreed to take note of the
German proposals. At this same meeting, the Germans also outlined pro-
posals for a German tactical air force of about 2,000 planes, to be
organized on US lines, emphasizing fighters, but also including fighter
bombers light bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. 25X1
ccupation Troops, which could be expanded into a Ministr
of Def
n
y
e
se.
Despite its name, this office's main function has been the conduct of
negotiations on a German defense contribution.
TOP SECRET
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