OFFICRE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

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CIA-RDP79T01146A000100490001-8
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RIPPUB
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T
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17
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November 16, 2016
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February 1, 2000
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1
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Publication Date: 
April 26, 1951
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SUMMARY
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Approved For Relse 2000/05~1 fDP79T016A0004g001-8 COPY NO 39 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE Date APR 2 6 1951 NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. 2. Comments represent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence. Marginal letter indications are defined as follows: "A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities "B" - important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/ Communist intentions or capabilities - other information indicating trends and potential developments Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 VAn , . Approved For Rel se 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO146A000100490001-8 TOP SORT 25X1X SECTION 1 (SOVIET, U$$R. Unconfirmed Re rtF on Soviet Plans for Invasion of, Northern Iran. reportedly heard that the Soviet army would invade the Northern Iranian provinces about the middle of May. This invasion was to be in conjunction with revolts in Xhuzistan and the oil areas. There has been, according to this source, a, movement of Soviet troops to reinforce divisions training in Georgia, having as their principal destination the Soviet-Iranian. border and the Western shores of the Caspian Sea. (US Officials Only). 00MME3To Rumors of Soviet plans for inciting the Kurds oz, actual overt invasion of Northern Iran appear every year at this time during the USSR's aftnual troop maneuvers near the Iranian border. While there have been recurrent reports noting a slight increase of Soviet border.guard,s, stepped up patrol activities, and stricter security measures, there is no evidence to date that the USSR is preparing for imminent hostile action against Iran. However, the USSR always maintains sufficient hoops in the vicinity of the border to overrun the Northern provinces at any time. _t, Vituperatiaxz,. A greatly increased Soviet Propaganda Reaches NewHigh tone of violence was noted in Soviet and controlled output during the past 48 hours. The Moscow audience heard another of a series of talks on US- inspired atrocities in 1918 when "they (US) organized a counter-revolutionary conspiracy in Siberia." The blood-thirsty tone appeared in Gromyko's vio- lent outburst at the Deputies0 parley Zn Paris, when he referred to Churchill as a "criminal" and described $ritish delegate Davies 'as one of Churchillos "cannibalistic advocates." He went on to threaten that "there will not be room enough in Korea for white crosses over the graves of interventionist troops if the fighting does not come to an end." Concurrently, Moscow's Par Eastern Service carried vitriolic attacks on Ridgeway, who was pictured as a "beast more frenized and brutal than Ma.cArthu.c," and on the "murderer," Van Fleet. Another unprecedented scare tactic was evidenced in Red China's broadcast to the Hong Kong audience of the trial of its own purge victims, which not only contained the regular accusations culminating in pronouncement of the death sentence, but also an interlude when the judge, ordering the defendants led through the packed courtroom, exhorted the audience to beat and kick the prisoners. (U NYTimes, 26 Apr 51; U S'BTS, 25 Apr 51). COMMENT: This over-all stepped-up hate-US campaign indicate:: further psychological preparation of Orbital peoples for a possible spread of hostilities, or possible Soviet retributive action, especially in the Far East. The scare themes beamed to Far East audiences appear aimed at herding the Chinese into line with the Communist regime. Gromyko's outbursts, together with the general emphasis on US aggression, sets the stage for a possible break- down of the Deputy CIF Conference. TOP SECRET 25X1A Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 Approved For Reldtwb 2000/05/1,,: - DP79T0114JA000100490001-8 25X1 C 25X1 C or as combat advisers with Chinese Communist and North Korean units,~lTwo to four officers, in uniforms of the appropriate army medical service, are assigned to each field hospital. In mid-February two such officers were at the Ngrth Korean Army field hospital at Namchou, 25X1A COMMENT: This is one of the many capacitie in w is Soviet direction and guidance may be given. If true, it adds significance to the report"that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from N. Korea in Dec.148, Soviet medical." personnel remained "in every provincial, gun and city hospital" throughout the area. p8M June Announcement of New Five-Year Plan a Possibi.li . Enactment of the New Plan in June is a real possibility, Embassy Moscow feels, `because (1) the Soviet press refers to the Fourth Five-Year Plan as the "first" postwar plan thus implying another plan will follow; (2) the New York Times .correspondent heard from a "private source" that the Supreme Soviet will meet in June to enact the fifth Five Year Plan and this story passed the censor. However, the censor has permitted erroneous speculation on other occasions. . The Embassy also notes that Yashov, "head of the Executive Committee .of the Moscow Communist Party," wrote an article for 2yein Moscow, 23 Apr 51, in which he referred to the 1951 national economic plan as already enacted by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Contents of the nla.n or COMMENT: Inasmuch as presentation of t ve-ear an.to the Supreme Soviet is only for the purpose of rubber-stamp approval, it is certain that the top membership of the Council of Ministers would "enact" the Plan first. $31 Clue to the Missing 194-h Party Congress S pli?d by Trieste Parma Leader. At the close of the 3rd Congress-of the Trieste Party, ll Feb 51, the Secretary General Vidali,,in answer to a question, made some general observations on the frequency with which such Congresses are called. According to him, it is not practice."to go through all the trouble of preparing for a Congress very often. They are held only in exceptional cases, dictated by an international or local situation)"Evidently directing himself to his questioner, Vidali continued, "inasmuch as you are inter- ested in the matter you may as well know that the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Communist Party has criticized us for holding Congresses too frequently. On the same occasion, the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party also criticized us because the Italian Party limits it- self to a Congress every four or five years only. I consider this criti- cism justified, but pointed out to them that we work under special circum- stances in Trieste and in conse uenc was absolutely necessary to hold 25X1A this Congress." COMMENT., Vidalius statement clearly shows the mean nglessness of Party statutes. Whereas in the USSR, the Party is required to hold a Congress not less than once every three years, the eighteenth"and last Congress was in 1939. USSR. Soviet Military Advisers in N+._Korea Employ Medical Cover, 2 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100490001-8 25X1A 25X1A mpproveu ror Ru11fwde IuuuiV dP7 $ MAMMA- V 1 U-1 VMAUVV I VV4VVVV 1-s3 "B" PE. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Ads late, Press Corr ,spunden Di appears jn 1?rah . William N. 0atis, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau in Czechoslovakia, disappeared on 23 April in Praha while ostensibly en route to keep an appointment with a Ministry of Information official. The LIS Emb Praha has been informed by the Deputy. Chief of the Press Section of the 25X1A Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Oatis has been arrested and charged with activities hostile to the Czechoslovak state. These charges include the gathering and dissemination of information through illegal news organs. "Css HUNGARY. W'U YHeadnuarters Now ocatedm.ln B et. The official Hungarian news agency announced on 21 April that the headquarters of the World Federa- tion of Democratic Youth (WFDY) will henceforth be located in Budapest. (U NYT, 26 Apr 51). COMMENT: The WFDY is one of the Communist international organizations whose headquarters in Paris were closed in recent months by the French Government. 25X1A P014tMr Government Permits ,Amerian Scantie'Line to Continue operations. The representative in Poland of the American Scantic Line has been. informed that the Polish Government had unblocked the Line's accounts and had ordered the Gdynia Bank to permit all business transactions by the firm in order to permit its continued operation. A representative of the Polish Ministry of Finance made a special trip from Warsaw to Gdynia to deliver this decision. According to the shipping company's representative,the "situation looks better for the Company" and its operations are "practically normal." COMMENT: After prolonged negotiations, the Polish Government on 20 April levied a special tax of $31,100 against the American Scantic Line and blocked its accounts in Poland. This action, which followed nn .official note of 18 April barring American Scantic activities in Poland (tee 0/CI Daily Digest, 21 Apr 51), would have forced liquidation of the Line's operations. The apparent reason for the Government's reversal of its position probably lies at least partially in the statement of a Ministry of Shipping official to the Line's representative in January that stoppage of American Scantic service to Poland would completely upset the Polish Six Year Plan for maritime activities. Poles I?emand Strategic Metals From French? US Embassy Paris reports that in the current French-Polish trade negotiations, the Poles have de- manded copper, scrap iron, and aluminum, all of which the French have re- fused to deliver. The Poles have also demanded 200 tons of ferro-molybdenum, and 15 tons. of ferro-nickel, The French negotiators feel that unless they agree to the Polish demands, France will lose one million tons of coal consti- tuting eighty percent of Poland's exports to France. The French anticipate having to agree to deliver about 100 tons of ferro-molybdenum and ten tons of ferro-nickel compared to last years agreement to deliver 200 tons and 20 tons respectively of these metals. COMMENT: This is another instance of the trade ackmai that Poland is using in its negotiations with Western countries, including Italy, Sweden and Austria, which are hard pressed for coal supplies. 25X1A 3 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100490001-8 Approved For RelWe 2000/0 15 RDP79TO1U6A000100490001-8 oelit Fessures in UN uAn YUGOSTAVTA Y02-7avs May _Raise This S r,_ Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler9 upon his return from Belgrade, has informed Ambassador Austin that increasing tension in the Balkans may force Yugoslavia in the next month or two to raise the question of satellite pressures on Yugoslavia in the UNo As a possible preliminary step to a full-fledged UN discussion, Belgrade has under consideration a memo for presentation to the UN citing the causes and nature of the tension provoked by the satellites. Bebler, however, refused to commit himself to a statement that Yugoslavia considers the situation urgent, insisting that 25X1A a request for UN action depends on the growth of satellite pressures. UN Secretary General Trygve e, Tito remarked that border incidents were becoming almost unbearable and that he was giving consideration to bringing The recent forthright Yugoslav accusations before the UN ti . on the situa that the marked increase in satellite provocations are Soviet-directed probably reflect increasing Yugoslav fear that these incidents may be in- tended to lay the basis for a satellite attack this spring. Another explana- tion undoubtedly is a Yugoslav desire to justify in the eyes of the Yugoslav people and the Party the Governmentes request for arms from the West. n~ u u oslpvia Favors Regional P~ac.a~'t~t ??.o-t?e~ Upon fine- structions from Tito and Kardelj, Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler has ex- plained to Ambassador Austin current Yugoslav thinking regarding a Peace Observation Committee (POO) for Yugoslavia. Bebleer declared that 'Yugo- slavia was resolutely opposed to any military observer group limited to Yugoslavia since it would appear provocative and might create panic in Yugoslavia. He added that Yugoslavia would accept a POO to observe Yugoslav-Satellite borders only if the Satellites agreed to admit such a team. He explained that Belgrade would be more interested in establishing a regional POO to cover a broader area including perhaps Morocco, Berlin, Greece, Turkey and the Arab-Israeli dispute, since such a regional. team would be less provocative to the Cominform than an. ad hoc POO limited to Yugoslavia. As a, third alternative Bebler said Belgrade is also consider-- ing having a POO or some other UN body send a diplomatic mission to Belgrade and satellite capitals with a view to examining the causes of tension and attempting conciliation. Bebler thought most highly of a regional POC but 25X1A 25X1A believed that a proposal for a team to observe both sides of the Yugoslav satellite borders would be advantageous propagandistically. COMMENT: Yugoslav aspirations for a regional POO appear to have little immediate prospects for success, Neither Turkey nor Greece can see any necessity for the introduction of such a team within their borders. The UK has expressed the opinioaa, that a regional team might tend to in- crease world tension. 4 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 Approved For Rel vase 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T0144tA000100490001-8. TOP SECRET SECTION 2 (EASTERN) "B? TURKEY. Turkish Ambassadors Mceti.n in Ankara. Foreign Minister Koprulu Informed US bassador Wadsworth that current discussions with the Turkish Ambassadors from London, Paris, and Rome were being held with a view to crystalizing Turkish foreign policy. The Turkish Ambassador to the US is being instructed to join then in Ankara. Koprulu stated that French Foreign Minister Schuman had assured the Turkish Ambassador in Paris that while in 25V A Washington he has-almost reached agreement with the US Government on sup- port of a Mediterranean pact which would include the US, TJK, France' Turkey, COM1tENTm Undoubtedly the meeting and Greece. INEWENE of the Ambassadors is concerned mainly A h Turkey's major preoccupations some type of 'firm security arrangement with the West which would include the US. Turkish preoccupation with its own security and that of the non- Communist world has been further heightened by recent international develop- mentsi such as the disorders in Iran, and the recall of General MacArthur. Currently Turkey may be more hopeful of realizing some security arrangement in view of its firm stand in Korea, and its growing reputation as a non- Communist bastion in the Middle East. "AI ISRAELRorted Leftist Gains in the MAPAM Party. According to a press 0190h o?"" 2 2 April from Tel Avivo an extremist group advocating stricter compliance with the Cominform line has gained control of MAPAM, a left-wing socialist party which was second only to MAPAI (Prime Minister Ben Gurionls party) in the 194.9 general elections, In a countrywide election this week of delegates to next month ' s MAPAM party conf erence, the extremist group gained about 60% of the delegates. Until this week the extremist group, which maintains that there is no ideological difference between Communist and MAPAM party aims other than Cone uni.st opposition to Zionism, had a 50% voice in the party's rule. MAPAMgs moderate groups, which have reportedly elected but 40% of the party delegates, have stressed the importance of Zionism and of ideological independence (U New York Times, Tel Avviv, 26 Apr 5i). COMMENT: If the press report is true that MAPAMss forthcoming party conference ai.ll be controlled by the extreme left-wing group, the long--rumored split between the extreme left and the moderates of MADAM may actually develop into an open break, This eventuality could have a startling effect on the general election which Prime Minister Benrc-Gurion has scheduled for this summer. A new coalition might well result between the left-wing faction of MA.PAM and the Israeli Communist Party (lCP). Such a development could present Israel with a more serious Communist problem than the present political, set-up provides. BennGurion's moderate socialist party MAPAI,, on the other hand, sight win sufficient assistance from the moderate factions of MAPAM to give MAPAI a near majority of the Knesset (parliament) seats. If Ben -Gurion then formed a coalition with the rightist General Zionists, who made impressive gains in last November', municipal elections, the generally pro=West groups In Israel would ha a stronger political control of Israel than they now have. 5 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 Approved For Releae 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01143A000100490001-8 25X1A Propaganda anda Techniques* It has been preir cat sly repo: ted e- QCI Da - - - Digests 12 Apr 5 1 T on 30 March the members of the Indian Congress Party were officially advised by letter to have nothing to do with the current (C(armnunist-inspired) campaign to collect signatures to an appeal advocating a Five Power Peace Pact. At the time of the first reports it was not knnovm whether ,the letter was issued with the knowledge and approval of Prime Minister Nehru or whether it was independently dissemi- nated by the rightist Congress faction under party President Tandon. It has now been reliably reported that Prime Minister Nehru. was present at the committee meeting where the matter was discussed and that he approved the distribution of the advice. US Embasr New Delhi believes it had become so clear that the earlier Stockholm Peace Appeal was a Communist maneuver that even Nehru could no longer ignore the fast., COMENTs It therefore appears that. for - e first time, the Congress Party seas ,a whole has taken official, cogni- zance of international Conmut- ,st intentions and propaganda techniques and has expressed itself as being opposed to theca.. #An Visit of Indian Scientists to the USSR. On 9 April, a Reuters n e w s release stated, that 2 prominent nn- i`a ai9 including Dr. Homi J. Bhabhas Chief of the Atomic Energy Comnissions had been invited to .visit the USSR during the coming summer. (See OCI Daily Digest, 9 Apr Si). On 21 April, according to Reutersg the Indian Goverment announced that Dr. S.S. Bhatnagar?s Secretary of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Researchs would be unable to accept the invitation because of the pressure of his work. On 22 April: the Delhi radio denied eua recent press report" that Prime Minister Nehru had refused permission for the Indian scientists to visit the USSR$ and a press note :issued by the Minis- try of Natural Resources said that the?-' were free to accept the invitation if their duties did not prohibit it. (R FBfs Far East, 25 Apr 51). COMMENT: In recent months, the Gover er t of India has been increasingly d snne fined to ? mote the exchange of visitors between India, and European Communist countries. In, spite of the GovPr nment rs apparent disinterested- ness in the matter of the scientists it is believed that most of the 25 who received the Soviet invitation will find themselves heavily overburdened with work when the time for the visit arrives. 25X1 C "A" BURLi4m Large Ch5_nese Communist Forg Reported at Burnes Border. into the Mengmao area along northeautern Burmese border from Kunming prior to 13 April. The same report : tatps that on 12 April. 2/4,00 rnwell-armed Kuomintang troops, under Gen. LI ni 9 were preparing to reenter Yunnan from Kengtung State in northeastern Burma some 200 miles southeast of the Mengmao area. C tWIENT a 25X1 A Although there have been several reports of Chinese Communist troop 6 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 TOP SEG.FtET Approved For ReWose 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO146A000100490001-8 deployment on the Burmese border, with the intention of aiding Burmese Reds, and/or containing and eventually destroying Nationalist forces in Burria, this is the first L-idication of a large-scale concentration. Many conflicting reports on the movements and intentions of Nationalist troops in the Sino-Burma-Thailand border regions have been received over the past several weeks. Those forces in the Kengtung area are estimated to total less than 5000. They are not believed to be capable of a deep or sustained penetration, but the initiation of {uerrilla-type forays, incorporating return to Burmese sanctuary, is considered possible. "C" INDOCHINA. Premier Huu C'aims Good Relation wi? hlorth. Vietnam Catholics. Premier Huu states that, during his recent visit to the Catholic-dominated provinces of south Tonkin, he received an enthusiastic welcome and that the Catholic prelate-administrators of that region, who had resisted ex- 25X1A 25X1A Governor Tries efforts to assert his authority over th m,, ha%e now cc e CO Th ENT: The strong-willed Catholic bisho s who r p o some time have been the de facto rulers of a large section of south Tonkin have been wooed by various Vietnamese politicians. During Nguyen Huu Tries tenure as Governor there was almost constant friction with the Catholics, who sought at the same time to maintain the-autonomy of their sector and to cut in on government subsidies. Although Huues statement that the Catholics resisted Tries attempts to assert control and although Huu has made the magnanimous gesture of raising a Catholic diocese to the status of province it is very doubtful that the Catholics will support Huu "unequivocally". The bishop of the diocese in question has expressed contempt for Huu-a sentiment which is general in Vietnam--and has compared him unfavorably with ex-Governor Tri. "Bet French Reinforcements Arrive inor^t Vietnam. The first battalion of the reinforcements which the French Government in March promised that it would send to General De Latt ailed through the streets of Hanoi 25X1A last night. CQMMENT: Other units are expected to follow shoe y. "C" French and Viets Clashh Over Minor sue An incident which reveals General De Lattrees attitude toward Vietnamese independence is his insistence that he preside over ceremonies inaugurating the new rector of the; Univer- sity at Hanoi. De Lattre dismissed Vietnamese arguments that the Univer- sity had been turned over to them in accordance with the S March Agreements. He stated that.Vietnamese independence was still in a "transitional stage" COMMENT: Although this issue is of"little significance Jr, itself it i s worth noting that General De Lattre feels strongly that in just such a minor affair it is important that France assert its "presence" in Vietnam despite the great demands made on De Lattre by his,military responsibilities. TOP SECRET 7 Approved For Release 2000/05/1.5: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 25X1A Approved For Relae 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T014A000100490001-8 TOP SECRET "A" CHINA. CCAF Buildup_in South Chin, A Hang Kong newspaper item of 22 April states 1) the Communists are developing all airfields in Kwangtung province, (2) 160 planes have arrived in Kwangtung, and (3) it is rumored that 300 rare planes will be shipped, (U Navy Hong Kong CTG 50.69 22 Apr 51.) COMMENT: No reliable count of CCAF planes in South China has been received. The reported figures may be excessive; since no large flights of CCAF air- craft have been reported from that area an the past few months, and 160 aircraft is the current US Air Force estimate of aircraft available to the CCAF in all of China proper, Recent press reports, however, have persistently describ d th i e e cont nuing arrival of jets, bombers and other aircraft at Canton, and in February the British est:,:.mated that CCAF strength in the Canton area may have reached 120 planes. "C" Alle?ed Disaffection. FU Tso?yi and TUNE Chei-wu, as a resul of ear "rebellious attitude." have been 25X10 sent to the USSR for "special indoctrination " while CHU Teh due to , , his "strong nationalistic feelings." is losing power and is "only- a figure- 2w-1 r" heaA Of COMMMFNT: FU and TUNG are One-time Nationalist s who have been associated with the Peiping regime as "oemorratic personages"; CHU is C-in-C of Chinese Communist armies; and YEH is Governor of Kwangtung. All have been rumored to be disaffected and as fallen or about to fall from favor. While FU and TUNG probably have no power in the regime, and CHU and YEH may have less than other leaders, there is no evidence of recent changes in their status. KOREA. ROK National Assembly Charges M ITII eaf Finds irk Draftee _Trainin The National Assembly's Investigation Committee charged on 25 April that officers of the National Reserve Armyb, which is somewhat akin to a National Guard, have lined their pockets with 1,5 billion won of army funds, The Committee Chairman charged thats (1) 700,000 soldiers In training camps had been. exploited; and (2) malnutrition and sickness in camps, which forced the Government to consider nearly 80% of the draftees as unfit for duty, could have been prevented by a proper, use of Government funds. The Committee further charged that maltreatment of ,trainees "had caused many of the younger generation to plan to betray the Republic," (U UP Ticker labelled "not for report or wire use", 26 Apr 51). 1OMI'1 Nr: While corruption in the South Korean regime is not a recent innovation, it will prove unfortunate in terms of world opinion regarding the ROK If publicity is given to this scandal.. The Assemblyfls charges combined with the probable resignation of Defense Minister SHIN will probably cause a crisis in the ROK Defense Ministry, JAPAN. Sebald Comments on Local Elections, In reporting on last Monday's local elections, US Polad Se'7ald states; that while next wkeekes gubernatorial elections will indicate more clearly the extent of conservative strength, 25X1 C 25X1 C Approved For Release 2000/05/'$5: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100490001-8 Approved For Relae 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01 A000100490001-8 it is his belief that the Socialist defeat was based primarily on the public's rejection of the Socialist peace principles (favoring over- all peace, neutrality, no foreign bases) rather than being a blanket endorsement of the Conservative parties, Sebald adds that Dullest presence in Japan and his press conference of 19 April probably had a dama in ff t g g e ec on the Socialist campaign, and his speech of 23 Anri COMMENT: Socialist Party leaders, as well as most of them panese press agree that Ambassador Dulles? return arid subsequent remarks were a major factor in the Socialist defeat, It is probable, however, that with the long-desired peace treat now immit- th th y . nen, e Japanese people were ready to reject any platform which would have pro- longed the. Occupation. TOP SECRET 9 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 25X1A Approved For Relae 2000/05/15.: CIA-RDP79T01 A000100490 0?j TOP SECRET SECTION 3 (WESTERN) "A" FRANCE, Communists Infiltrate French Comm 25X1 C French Communist Party (PCF) has liberally infiltrated with militant Communist agents all posts of.the nationalized postal9 telephone and telegraph services (PTT) where information can be gathered concerning international..communications. Cells of the PCF Pyrenees network have recently rechecked the list of their members and ordered careful examination of all trans-Pyrenees com- munications, . COI\afENT: Com- 25X1A munist infiltra on in~French communication facilities as probably not changed appreciably in the past year, although PCF influence in this field was reported recently in connection with alleged PCF control of the. management of the French Broadcasting System, PCF reassessment of its capabilities along the Spanish border may be the result of recent indications of a decided drop in Communist strength in that area. According to a recent report, Belgian Communists have seriously interfered with postal deliveries between Belgian soldiers in Korea and the homelands' n$" UNITED KINGDOM* Labor Rank-and-File Reaction to Bevan Resignation SMI Unc_ ear U Em asst' Lon on 4:p1-10 s ha a k e 5 Apra meeting owe Labor Party?s National Executive Committee at which only three members out of a total membership of 2i supported foixner Labor Minister Bevanas position on the budget and defense expenditures, 3.0 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100490001-8 Approved For Rele a 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T011W0001 00490001-8 TOP SECRET Bevan himself was much more moderate in presenting his case than in his previous statements to the House of Commons and the Parliamentary Labor Party, The Embassy attributes this to Bevants awareness that very few Labor. Party members approve of his tactics? Concurrently, British trade union leadership, by a large majority vote of the General Counci r- v-_ o f th e T o U UMETimes 26Ar 51). CO A1- - j____e,, e,, p 2ENT: Althoff n it is now evident that Bevan can at present command little support either among Labor MPs or in the top leadership of the trade uni ons, it is to be noted that (1) no clear evidence has yet appeared as to the reactions of Laborts rank-and-file, (2) Bevan's elections in years past to the National Executive Committee have been by very heavy votes, and (3) there is abundant other evidence of rank-and-file concern over civilian living standardst being sacrificed. to rearmament. If Bevan can avoid being labeled by. the rank-and-file as a traitor to the party as a whole, he will be in a position to raise this potent issue again later on. 25X1A "C" GUATEMALA. Rail Strike Tests Labor Sympathies of New Administration. The US th asst' in ua em a I s a , actor ng o omas r siaw '(president of the US-owned International Railways of Central America), 25X1A 25X1A no progress is being made tow d ar a settlement of the railway workers' strike. Which has 1arn1 roe.?i +L.. COIENT s The underlying purpose of the strike. which hPxran n? is n,,,, -r___-?, of forcing the new Arbenz administrationdtocommitjitself Lonpitsat labor policy. Although Arbenz relied heavily on the aggressive, militant, railway workers, union durin his el ti g ec on campaign, he has also given the impression that he will follow a less antagonistic course toward US business interests than did his predecessor, Arev alo. In view of the serious disruption caused by the strike, the Government may be forced to intervene pending a settlement. The political considerations involved, however, suggest that a final settlement may be delayed for some time. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/05/1%: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100490001-8 Approved For RPIase 2000/05/15 :A"tDP79T046A000100490001-83,9 APR 2 6 1951 Not for d.i.o; ,om n, tion outci&e 0/("i nrci o/NF. 49166 Q.. (/ C_ Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 25X6 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 Approved For Ra epse 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO 6A000100490001-8 SECRET Shah. President Truman has offered the services of his personal physician, Major General Graham to the Shah who has been suffering from appendicitis. C .- The .Shah has been reluctant to leave Iran for medical treatment ent during the current unsettled situation in Iran. President Tr os offer, if accepted, should. provide an added opportwiity for improving US-Iranian relations. The Shah, however, may be considering employing European physicians. SECTION 2 (EASTERN ) IRAN. President Truman Offers the Services of his phhysician to th _ 25X1 A 25X611 SECTION 3 (WF TEPN) SECRET 25X1X Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 25X6 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000100490001-8 ~r ~K~g~j TOP SECRET UNCLASSIFIEc ~JtA-fta ojjj~grlf d1 bL'Jni 1 ? &1! r)M?TBl .W6b& dt44dd6q!gmsi- fied when fil ed"I or Is ta``~c a ~F r e 8 CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY SOURCE CIA CO? N,7.1. NO DOC. NO. DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED DOC. DATE COPY NO. LOGGED BY NUMBER OF PAGES NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns. REFERRED TO RECEIVED RELEASED SEEN BY OFFICE SIGNATURE DATE TIME DATE TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE/DIV. DATE - 1 L NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record. DOWNGRADED DESTROYED DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO BY (Signature) TO BY (Signature) WITNESSED BY (Signature) BY (Signature) OFFICE DATE Approv d For Rele OFFICE se 2000/05/15: CI DATE -RDP79T OFFICE 1146A0001004900 DATE 1-8 FO 84" 26 uaE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. TOP SECRET (40)