DAILY DIGEST JUN 5 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000200320001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 5, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
Date JUN 5 1951
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments :represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
3? Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
"A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"B" - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
"C" - other information indicating trends
and potential de`tlopments
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DIA, DOS, USAF REVIEW COMPLETED
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 "C" USSR, PRAVDA Demands Expansion of USSR River Traffic, A PRAVDA editorial
RG HT
were told that the shortcomings are numerous and were reminded that the k-, r' Y
Ministry of the River Fleet underfulfilled the transportation plan last
year. As a further incentive for elimination of these shortcomings, the CPYRGHT
struction roe a for the a i l e' Readers
ble task of delivering an enormous quantity of freight for the great con-
on 3 June demanded prompt elimination of s
in-land waterways "are faced with the responsi-
article referred to workers' letters to Stalin "accepting the challenge...
to a and the Socialist competition for the early fulfillment of the 1951
plan." 25X1 CPYRGHT
"B" Moscow Comments on President Truman's Letter to Iran. Commenting on
President Truman's letter to Iranian Premier Mossadeq, Moscow radio quotes
the independent Tehran paper Tolu as stating that high circles in Tehran
regard the letter as a new example of US interference in Iran's internal
affairs. Moscow radio also quotes the Communist paper Besue Aiande as
stating that Truman had discarded the mask from the evil face of American
imperialism and officially confirms his collaboration with the British
plunderers, The paper adds that the letter is in contravention of the
principles of the national sovereignty, of Iran - emphasizes that the
nationalization decision must be fulfilled, and if Mossadeq evades his
duty he will be faced with-the rmined and acute struggle of the Iranian
25X1 people< COMMENT, The Moscow broadcast is
consistent with the Soviet's policy of refraining from editorializing on
the situation in Iran while commenting indirectly on the current cripis.by
quoting from press despatches from Iran favorable to the Soviet thesis
that the US and, UK are exploiting the Iranian people and their resources.
Similarly, Moscow has not utilized the traditional Soviet tool in Iran,
the outlawed Tudeh Party, to openly spearhead Communist aims in the present
crisis, but has worked instead through front groups such as the "Organi-
zation for the expropriation of AIOC," Moscow's indirect.-publicity to
Iranian press warnings prodding Mossadeq to move more quickly provides a
further indication of the Tudeh desire to force the Iranian Government's
hand, thus achieving the Communist goal of removing Western influence from
Iran without overtly participating in the issue,
"A" EASTERN EUROPE. YUGOSLAVIA, No Unusual Soviet Militarv Activity in the
Balms Noted by Yugoslavs. Yugoslav officials have informed Embassy
Belgrade that they are convinced there are no Soviet troop units in
Bulgaria. They also do not believe that a Soviet armored division has ar-
rived in Constanta, Rumanian Black Sea port. 2s X 1
w
activity in the Balkans. Recent reports of the arrival of Soviet troop units
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
M!ENTNT; The Yugoslav statement as well as recent information
rom western diplomats tends to refute reports of unusual Soviet military
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in northeastern Bul ria have also been largely refuted
25X1 C
2 5X1 C
I Constanta is known to be the headquarters for the esti-
mated 30,000 Soviet troops in Rumania, and is an important port of entry
for Soviet equipment destined for the Balkan Satellites. Recent reports of
the movement of Soviet troop units into and through Rumania may stem from
continued (possibly accelerated) shipments of Soviet material, accompanied
by Soviet guards and technicians,
25X1
YUGOSLAVIA. Allegations of Greek Maltreatment of Macedonian Minority
Revived. After several months of restraint the Yugoslav press has re-
vived its propaganda attacks regarding the treatment of Macedonians in
Greece. The press articles allege the continued terrorization and mal-
treatment of the Aegean Macedonian population and assert that the Greek
police agents are openly advising Macedonians to emigrate to North America
and Australia, depriving them of their property, and exercising every kind
of discrimination, US Embassy Belgrade believes, however, that these arti-
cles may be only isolated incidents and that their significance lies in the
Yugoslav Government's desire to give occasional publicity championing a
neighboring national minority. COMMENT: 25X1
The resurrection of Yugoslav al egations of ill treatment of the Macedonian
minority in Greece will do considerable damage to Yugoslav-Greek relations
which have markedly improved in recent months. It will also seriously
impede the promotion of any military collaboration in which both countries
have recently manifested some interest.
Time and Life Admitted to Yugoslavia, Embassy Belgrade reports that
the Yugoslav Government has granted permission for the importation of
limited quantities of Time and Life for sale in Yugoslavia. Sales will be
limited initially to fifty copies of each edition of both magazines and
distributed in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana. The Embassy comments that
while the initial importations are admittedly small, the Yugoslavs have
established a most important precedent by agreeing to admit foreign peri-
odicals. Heretofore i or ions have been confined to technical journals.
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5X6
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"CO SAUDI ARABIA. King Dubious About Sending Prince Feisal to London.
According to US Ambassador Rare in Jidda, Crown Prince Saud recently:
stated that Prince Feisal has been invited by the UK to visit London
to review Anglo-Saudi Arabian differences. (See OCI Daily Digest,
6 Apr 51). Hare reports that King Ibn Saud, who subsequently refer-
red to this matter, was dubious about the advisability of accepting
the British invitation, apparently fearing that if the outstanding
differences were not previously settled, FeisalPs discussions in
London might result in a worsened situation. Hare suggested. to the
King that a solution to the Saudi Arabian dilemma might be found
(a) if Feisalts trip to England should be merely a "courtesy" visit
and (b) if Faisal used his London visit to discuss Saudi Arabian.
concern on broad general lines. If the London talks developed in a
favorable atmosphere, the subsequent negotiations might follow on a
lower level in regard to specific issues still in dispute. While the
King-reportedly welcomed Harets suggestion, the British Ambassador
subsequently indicated his reservations to the proposal. that Feisal"s
trip should merely be a uoourtesyO visit without an agenda. The
25X1 CO ENT8 King
Lon s concern over varied British activities in the Persian
Gulf sheikhdoms is closely related to his long term fear of a
general Hashemite aggrandizement whereby Iraq might join with Syria
and Jordan and also gain closer bonds with Kuwait and other of the
Persian Gulf sheikhdoms. These fears probably lead the Saudi Arabian
King to believe that,,, since the British exert considerable influence
with the rulers of prat and Jordan, British activities in the Persian
Gulf area might open the way for increased Hashemite influence in
the Gulf sheikhdoms, thereby threatening Saudi Arabia's security.
? Zs to be Sent to China in Return for Grain. The
Secretary of-the Indian Food Ministry has told a US Embassy official
that India must send China 800 tons of jute bags before the end of
July 1951 as replacement for Chinese bags used in shipping 10 percent
of the 400,000 tons of milo which China has agreed to send to India.
A weekly jute market report also states that India will probably
have to supply a considerable tonnage of Sato bags to China in connec-
tion with the foodgrain dealo 25X1
MCA NEPAL. Nepal Congress Party Su ests Establishment of Diplomatic
Relations with China. On 26 May, the Working Committee of the Nepal
Congress Party passed a resolution stating that Nepal would not be
allowed to become a pawn in the game of international politics and
suggesting that the Nepal Cabinet immediately seek to establish
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diplomatic relations with China,
COMMENT: The Government of India has apparently played a strong part
in Nepalese internal politics of late., thereby probably antagoniz-
ing certain ambitious elements of the Nepal Congress Party. Since
the Nepal Congress was suspected of using leftist and Communist
assistance in its fight to obtain control of the Nepalese Government
in late 1950 and 1951, the above resolution may represent a leftist-
inspired attempt on the part of the Congress to reassert its indepedence.
The Government of India is believed to be sufficiently aware of the
dangers of Communist infiltration into Tibet, Nepal, and India, how-
ever.. to prevent the opening of formal relations between Nepal and
Communist China.
PHILIPPINES. Retort of New Huk Policy Toward Americans Found Erroneous.
Investigation by US Embassy, Manila, of the reports on which Philippine
Defense Secretary Magsaysay based his recent statement that the Huks
had adopted a policy of attacking Americans (See 0/CI DD- I June 51,'
5 has revealed the reports to be erroneous. 25X1
I I
"C" BURL. Central Communist Command for Liberating Southeast Asia
Reported. THE NATION, a generally reliable Burmese-owned newspaper
in Rangoon, reported on 4 June that Chinese, Burmese and Indochinese
Communists have established an overall command for operations in
Southeast Asia. This command, known as the "Central Committee of
the Peoplees Liberation Armies of Southeast Asia" is alleged to be
headquartered in Kunming, Yunnan and to be directed by a Chinese
25X1 "advisory board."\ 90MENTs. Similar
reports have been received from numerous other sources, none of which
,1 '1- been confirmed.
"B" BURMA. Buddhist Priests Oinose Government in Elections. In a sur-
prise move, the All Burma Sangha Party called upon the Burmese people
to vote against the Government in the coming elections. It decried
the Government's land nationalization policy as contrary to Buddhism,
deplored the Government's reluctance to declare Buddhism the state
eli ion and accused Prime Minister Thakin Nu of defending Communism.
25X1 COMMENTS The Sangha Party is an influen-
tial organization of Buddhist priests. Self-interest is apparent
in its declaration, but its direct attack on Thakin Nu, who is widely
respected as a devout Buddhist, was not expected. The Sangha declara-
tion probably reflects a deal with the conservative coalition which
is opposing the Government in the forthcoming elections and it will
adversely affect the Government's chances, especially in Rangoon and
some of the larger towns.
"B" IND. Viet Minh Presgure Continues. Elements of three divisions
of the rebel Democratic Republic of-VIetnam (DRV) continue to probe
French defenses along the southern leg of the Tonkin delta triangle..
The six native battalions, which constituted the sole defending fors,,,
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in this area at the outset of the rebel attack, have turned in a
very creditable performance and have since been reinforced by
three French regimental combat teams. French staff opinion is that
DRV action is, designed mainly for seizure of the current rice harvest
and the reinfiltration of areas recently cleared. The French hesitate
to reinforce their southern defenses further by withdrawals from the
north for fear of Chinese Communist intervention. Other operational
zones in Tonkin have been very quiet. Heavy action at the southern
extremity of the delta is expected within the next 72 hours. 25X1
25X1 COMMENT s The motes
pressing need of the defending forces continues to be trained military
manpower. The good performance of newly constituted Vietnamese units
against some of the fiercest rebel assaults yet launched may encourage
the French to put more reliance on the development of a native army,
wBw INOCHIN. Bao Dai Shwas New Opti . Emperor Bao Dai told Minister
Heath that he is experiencing new confidence that his government is
winning the battle against the rebel DRV and that General De Lattre
is sincere in his assertions that he is determined to do away with
remaining French restrictions on Vietnamus independence as rapidly
as possible. Bao Dai said that he is still receiving overtures from
would-be defectors from the rebel ranks, but he doubted that any mas-
sive defections would occur until large sectors were put under Vietnam
Army command, which De Lattre assured him would be done. Bao Dai
said that he is pushing plans to manufacture small arms in Vietnam.
25X1 COMMENT.- For several years Bao Dai
s a ern e y praised a sincerity and criticiz d the intransigence
of the French, Whatever the real feelings in t matter may beg it
appears to be Bao Daius most deep-seated conviction that the imdego ienee
of Vietnam will be realized mainly through the creation ef7aa.independeit
Vietnamese military establishment. Although he has shifted his ground
on many issues, Bao Dai has steadily pressed his aim to establish an
WC" 11D 0 Semi-official Viet Organ Prints Anti-US Innuendo. The
newspaper Phuc H states that the Tonkinese Dal Viet Part was
=qU formed with the aid of I"foreigners who also struggled against Com- C PYRG HT
CPYRGHT munism The article states t t e government of Premier Tran
Van Huu brought an end to this undesirable state of affairs and new
25X1 unity to Vietnam. COMMENTS Coming from a
newspaper which is widely known o to the mouthpiece of Premier ,Tran
Van Huu, this article constitutes a crude-admission of the Huu fac-
tions hostility to the Dai Viet Party and an equally crude charge
of US machinations on behalf of the Dai. Viet. Although the Dal Viet
had its erigins during World War 14,the faotthat the' Fr?nchuauthorities
have frequently expressed their suspicion of W?Dai Viet complicity
indicates that the "foreigners" in question are Americans and that Huu
is acting on French prompting. The only basis for such a change is
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that the Dai Viet,, by. establishing an administrative machine in
Tonkin which was markedly more efficient than that of Huugs in the
south,, won the admiration of US officials.
"AN NINA. 2aedish Ambassador Offers Views on Peiping Regime. The
Swedish Ambassador to Communist China,, in an interview with US
Consul General Ong.Kong, stated that (j ;chinaQs military and
25X6
inauswriau. potential has been Ogreatly overrated by Western observers;
(2) the Chinese Communists are in "critical need" of shipping and a
e w o e
prest ge of the, regime depends on acquisition of Taiwan; (4) Com-
munist materiel losses in Korea are "very important90' as the Soviets
will "affix conditions8" for resupply; (5) Peiping?s Vice Foreign
Minister d not reply to the Ambassadoras inquiry as to whether he
might.ass at in facilitating a truce in Korea; and (6) he believes
MAO T'se~t o in "reasonably good health'* and still firmly in
25X1 control., COjs In regard to the
abo ?poi; ekl) the m assador?s estimate of a low Chinese
military potential reflects the common Western emphasis on industrial
development rather than manpower resources; (2) shipping figures show
that most of the ships calling at China ports are Western flag vessels
25X1
1 0) e p ng no a ere s
comm ment to the eventual 'liberation' of Taiwan; (4) there are
indications of a possible Sino-Soviet dispute regarding the supply
of heavy equipment for Communist forces in Korea; ('5) Chinese Comm
munist officials thus far have ignored peaccr overtures from diplomats
in Peiping; and (6) the Ambassadorns opinion as to O's health and
status is supported by a 29 May cable from O to the Cominform
journal,, stating that neither he nor CHOU En-lai could write a re-
quested article as he (A??) was Ooccupied?0 and CHOU was "unwell."
"C" Communist Casualty Fires Compare with UN Estimates. Figures
on' Chinese Communist losses in Korea as of Aril-May, are 0 25X1 C
25X1 C by (1) approximately
340,,OOQ- roops of the Third and Fourth Field Armies had been killed
or worded; (2) estimates 238,000 25X1 C
as kill and 67,000 as wounded (but who also alleges that 1149000
were captured or missing); and (3) a Chinese newspaper in Kong Kong.,
which gives 312,000 combat troops and 50 000 non-combat personnel as
killed in action and 3500 as captured. 25X1
25X1A C?~s These figures are in su stantial agreement
with those of the UN command in Korea, which estimated, as of mid-
May, that Chinese Communist losses totalled. 336,000 killed or wounded,
60,000 non-battle ccasualties9 and 4000 PWs
"B" KOREA. New Communist Jet Aircran Reported in Korean Theatre. A
recent Air Force operational summary reports a 10 May sighting by a
X26 pilot of an enemy twin-jet fighter in the vicinity of Sinmak
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in north central Korea. The pilot "definitely identified" the enemy
fighter as very similar to, although "slightly more sleek" than, the
German MK-262, which, in turn, bears the same superficial characteristics
as the Soviet Type-S jet. The enemy pilot "fired avidly with no apparent
aim," which indicated that the enemy fighter may have been vectored
into the area, but that radar aids were not used during the pass. FEAF
comments that t}is incident is the third observation at close range
of twin-jet enemy aircraft believed to be a model of the-Type-8 fighter,
which FEAF speculates "may be present in Korea for combat testing,
possibly with a view to adaptation for use as an all-weather night
fighters' The same Air Force summary reports the sighting of two
possible Type-i5 jet fighters which were observed on 29 May in the
vicinity of Sinuiju in northwest Korea. FEAF comments that previous
observations of jet. aircraft reported similar to the Type-15 fighter,
were made in December, 1950, and that the May sighting, if true, may
indicate "the conducting by the enemy of operational training in new
into the Korean Air War."
lets reparatory to their introduction I I
"C" JAPAN. Police Law Revision Bill Passed by Diet. "Central News"
reports that the Diet's Upper House on 4 June approved the Police
Law Reviaion Bill (already passed by the Lower House). Enactment
of the bill will enable the Japanese Government to increase the
strength of the National Rural Police by 5000 moil and will remove
present limits on the numbers of the Local Autonomous Police. The
revised law also permits those comm itiee with-autonomous police
units to integrate them into the National Rural Police. E: _j 25X1
25X1 OIN s This is the first revision of the Occupation?
e fdreede decentralization of Japan's Police, system. The Japanese
have complained on several grounds of the decentralization, namely
that smaller communities in many cases could not afford to support
an autonomous police force and that the limitations on the responsi-
bilities of both national and local police left a "no man's land" of
responsibility in some areas. The present law is designed to cor-
rect these deficiencies. The National Rural Police will now be in-
creased from a 30,000 man limit to 35,000.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"C" AUSTRIA. Gruber Doubts Value of Deputies' Treat 'T
y alIGs. Austrian
Fore g Minister ru er was told this spring in Lon on by Soviet Ambassador
Zarubin that there would be no difficulties whatsoever in reaching full
agreement on an Austrian treaty as part of-a general settlement. Gruber
has told Reber, US representative'to the Austrian treaty talks, that in
these circumstances he feels it would be useless to continue the deputies'
discussions of the-Austrian treaty separately from a general Big Four
meeting.' (The Austrian treaty deputies last met-in March: 'of ths.year.)
Gruber even. questioned the desirability of the deputies' meetings i'f-,a
Foreign Ministers' Conference were re ected.by the USSR, or were long
25X1 delayed. C0MIv NT: The Austrians, wbo
used to urge the g 11our to continue ei efforts . to - arrive at Bement
on a treaty, have come to appreciate that the USSR does not-want a treaty,
and that diplomacy on the subject only produces new Soviet stalling tactics
resulting in a stalemate,
C" Substitutions Likely Among People I Party Cabinet Ministers,
Austrian Interior Minister Helmer, a Socialist, commenting on possible
changes within the coalition People's Party, has told US Legation Vienna
that he doubts whether Chancellor Figl will retain his post when the
Government's reformed after the inauguration of President Koerner later
this month. 'According to Helmer, Foreign Minister Gruber is "pressing
forward" and might become Chancellor; the Socialists, however, consider
Figi preferable to any other People's,-Party leader because of,his diligence
and abilities as a conciliator. Helmer also expressed the opinion that
the Ministers of Education and of Trade and Reconstruction are certain -
to resign, and that the Minters of Finance.and Agriculture- will probably
25X1 do likewise. COMMENT : -The People's Party,
smarting after its defeat in a presidential e ection, feels that it must
.make some changes. Its differing factions will have difficulty agreeing
on -a successor to Figl, although some Cabinet Ministers are likely to be
replaced.
A" MOROCCO. Communists to Sabotage Defens n ^ c y .
se Construction. According to the
US Army Attache in Tangier, Communist agents are attempting to foment
labor difficulties among the natives in order to hinder the forthcoming
air base construction in Morocco, The Attache_comments'that no mass
adherence to Communist policy is considered possible because the local
Arabs have fond memories of the US wartime occupation forces, and also
because the dominant nationalist party is opposed to Communism, The
Moroccan Communist organization is also reported-to-be distributing anti-
JJS leaflets, particularly in the Casablanca area, but the Attache points
out that the majority of the Arab population is'illiterate and hence little
influenced by such propaganda, 25X1
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COMMENT: Communist efforts in Morocco have heretofore been confined to
a few industries in limited areas, and Communism is largely unknown to
the Moroccan people generally. Any attempts at sabotage will probably
have little effect on defense copsttion. Efforts to propagandize' the
native population will probably not be very successful, if as'has been
reported, the Communist Party in,yorocco has gone underground,.
"C" NETHERLANDS, Closer Atlantic` Communit Favored. According to Dutch
Foreign airs Minister er in talks with the US permanent delegate
to NATO, the hope is growing that Europe can be integrated inlan Atlantic
Community on a practical basis, following the US and UK lead, rather than
in a "tight continental bloc". This point of view is shared'by UK Labor
and Conservative-leaders as well as some French and West German leaders,
5X1 COMMENT: In recent months,: sentiment,
except in . ely, has grown for a long range development of NATO for
political and economic objectives as well as military. UK unwillingness
to participate wholeheartedly in prop.opals for a'federated Europe and
Francels failure to live, up to earlier expectations of forceful leadership
on the-Continent have also contributed to this attitude.
".$" ITALY. Communists Show Gains, Neo-Fascists Win Balance in-Sicilian"Regional
ME -, ionsReturns from3, of .is s 3,627 voting districts in e
Regional elections held on the week-end of-2 June give"the Christian Demo-
crats 564,203 votes, the Communist-Socialist bloc 559,030, and the neo-
Fascist Italian Social Movement,(USI) 2329609.. Because neither the
Christian Democrats nor the Communist bloc obtained an absolute majority
of the ninety seats in the semi-autonomous Regional Parliament; the PSI
now appears to hold the. balance of power. Both Christian Democrats and
Communists show gains over the 1 ?47 regional elections. The Christian
Democrats have "clearly lost strength in Sicily since the 194t8 national
:elections, when they polled 1,635,000 votes as compared to 465,000 for the
Communist bloc. Political observers in Rome explain this change by pointing
to the fact that although the majority of Sicilians-are anti-Communist,
they are. nevertheless dissatisfied with the policy of the Christian Demo-
cratic 2 5X1
Government in Rome. COM ENT: Sicilians
are traditionally hostile to the Rome overnmen excep en pelle"d
through terror of Communism, as was the case in 19)48, to support it.
Despite their,traditi.onal conservatism, the recent vote suggests that they
consider the Communist Party the only hope for economic improvement. The
Communists also advocated greater Sicilian autonomy, which apparently has
had a strong appeal,
"C" SWITZERLAND. Swiss to Participate Reluctantly in European Agricultural.
Pool Conference. The Swiss Government has accepted an invitation to take
part in the conference concerning a European pool for agricultural products. 25X1
Although the Swiss are not optimistic over the proposal they feel that
non participation would be disadvantageous to them.
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COMMENT: The Swiss will,strongly resist all efforts to pool European
agricultural production. The agricultural sector in Switzerland is the
least liberalized in terms of i.nternatjonal trade, because the landlocked
Swiss have sought to maintain present levels of agricultural-production,
the least competitive sector of their economy, as a measure.of-national
security, The wisdom of this policy was proven during-the last war when
the Swiss were greatly dependent upon domestic food production,
25X6
5X1
BOLNIA. US. to Recognize Bolivian Junta 7 June. The De art nt of State
Tas instructed ass es in Lain erica o inform.the various Foreign
Offices'-that-the M. feels that the Bolivian junta has. established effective
governpnent authority over Bolivian territoryhas'given satisfactory
indication of its intent to honor its international obligations, and
accordingly Embassy La Paz has been directed to resume US relations with
Bolivia on 7 June.. F
CORD NT: The UK,
France, and .Italy have in is a e that-they o ow.. here ad in
recognition. Six Latin Amer~ican countries and Spain already have
recognized the Junta,
_
"B" URUGUAY. Communist Party Purge. Continues, During a secret meeting of
e a ion Committee of the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU) on 27 Ma,51,
Hector Rodriguez and Antonio. Richero were officially removed-from- all }Party
positions. This purge is.also being extended to lower-level leaders in tine
Montevideo Department. Richero has been active in 25X1 C
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forming an autonomous. textile syndicate which, if succespful~?would
further :weaken Comm mist control of Uruguayan labor- 25X1 A
25X1 A COMMENT:. The removal - of Hector Rodrigues
follows his demotion from important party positions three-months ago for
insisting that the PCU should concentrate on domestic problems rather than
fore the party to take a stand on interna-tional-affairs._ (;fee OCt Daily
Digest, 7 Mar' 51_.1 This latest step was probably occasioned by his fai re
to state his intention to abandon his deviationist tactics.- The removal
of Richero, one of the two PCU deputies in the present Uruguayan Congress
and Secretary of Party Finances, comes as a surprise, however. .'here has
been nopreyi.ous indication of his being out of.favor with the party 'as
recently as January.the-Secretary General of the PCU des__cribed`Richero as
"one of Jiis' most faithful men".. Although Rodriguez has for a long .:time
been one_of t h e leaders of the Textile Workers' Union, there_has.been no
other reporting of Richero!s connections with labor in that industry.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
JUN 5 1951
492ii
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
5 June 1951.
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
25X1
AFGHANISTAN, Evidence of Communist- Pro New2anda US. Embassy Kabul .has re-
ceiYed from a a copy of an article in English 'en-
by the Soviet Embassy in Kabul to the Islamic Missions there. The.Embassy
feels it is more than probable that the same article in Persian translation
is being given surreptitious distribution among the Afghans.- The Embassy
points out that if the USSR could break down Afghan distrust of Soviet
religious policy, Soviet penetration of this fanatically Moslem country
would ba greatly facilitated. However, it believes it unlike that the
Soviets have had much success to dated
COMMENT: This is the second recently noted piece of documentary a ence
of Soviet propaganda in Afghanistan, The first was a mimeographed paper
praising Communism, which was Ifound in. the bazaars in 25X1 C
Jalalabad a few months; ago?
25X6
SECRET
12
Approved For Release 2002/08/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000200320001-5
25X1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000200320001-5
Approved For Release 2002/08/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000200320001-5