DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000300420001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 17, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For R? se 2001I09/06pSEER7, T01146A 300420001-3
17,August. 1951
CIA No. 49308
Copy No.
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views .of .the Office of Current Intelligence.
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. EASTERN EUROPE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA Upward revision of norms -planned to
increase productions "To raise the productivity of labor and to lower pro-
duction costs" is the aim of the norm revision for 1952,,according to a
statement by Czechoslovak Minister of Heavy Industry Kliment. He described
the current wage system as disjointed, and stated that, if the average wage
rates are being exceeded by 80 to 100 percent in virtually all heavy industri--
dal-enterprises, the present norms must be "soft,' Wages, he added, have been
allowed to rise, but productivity has lagged far behind. Kliment emphasized
that the upward revision of the norms must be accomplished' by the adoption
of Soviet Stakhanovite techniques, the operation of more than one machine at
a.time by the worker, and by the introduction of two or three work shifts
where necessary. (PBID, 13 Aug 51),
Comments The upward revision of norms will substantially reduce the
already low standard of living of the Czechoslovak worker and add to his dis-
content with decreased rations and increased regimentation.
2. POLAND. Possibility of further steps against US following USIS closing:
US. Embassy. Warsaw believes that further Polish Government action against the
US is possible as a follow-up to the closing of the USIS office. The Embassy
feels that, while the Polish Government's note protesting the closing. of the
Polish Research and Information Service office in New York may have been de-
signed primarily for propaganda use, it may also be used as the basis for
(1) the expulsion of the Embassy information officer, or (2) the prosecution
of USIS Polish personnel. The Embassy points out that the Polish note sper
cifically states that "only diplomatic immunity has protected the responsible
ones from the merited legal consequences" of USIS8 allegedly,-criminal activi-
ties, (S Warsaw 151, 15 Aug 51),
Comments US Embassy Warsaw originally believed that there would be.no
specific steps taken against US personnel working for the USIS office. Except
for the language of the latest Polish note there are no indications of possible
future steps against US personnel of USISO
YUGOSLAVIA, US Military Commander Trieste evaluates Yugoslav stabilitys The
US Military Commander in Trieste believes that the Yugoslav Army will remain
loyal while it is organized and carefully watched. If the Yugoslav forces
were confronted by overwhelming military power, they would retreat to already
prepared defenses in the mountains, since the Yugoslavs are probably counting .
on guerrilla tactics rather than front line action in the event of an in-
vasion. The source considers it likely that popular resentment toward the
Tito regime, Cominformist and royalist sympathies, and historic Serb-Croat
differences would weaken the Tito regime in the event that it became in-
volved in hostilities. (CGTRUST TRIESTE 8, 15 Aug. 51)
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. Commen : The Yugoslav Government has recently told US officials that,
as its military capabilities were increased by the arrival of modern e-
quipment, it would become less necessary to retreat into the mountains if
atresurg< oforegoing attack onuthelavia,
a resurgenca e of
country would. tend to counteract them.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: World Federation of Trade Unions will meet in
Berlini The Executive Committee of the World Federation of Trade Unions 25X1C
hold the next general WFTU con-
t
o
decided at their July meeting in ViAnn-
e in Berlin in mid-November,
Comments East Berlin is as far west as international Communist meetings
can still be held without running into visa difficulties, and it is easily
accessible from Soviet orbit ports. The WFTU conference would add to other.
evidence, such as major youth meetings and the World Peace Council meeting
held there this year, that Berlin is being built up into a center of inter-
national Communist activities.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. GREECE. Papaos, initial speech rouses little enthusiam: Marshal Papagos}
first electoral speech., delivered on 11 Augusta influenced few who were
not already persuaded. Dispassionate in both content and delivery, the
speech disappointed those who hoped for a fighting statement or an emotion-
ally inspiring declaration. Commenting that Papagos could have come closer
to the public mood with a "throw the rascals out" speech, the Embassy re-
ports that the Marshal is apparently sincere and firm in his determination
to avoid mud-slinging and recrimination. (C Athens 787, 14 Aug 51).
Comment: Papagos? opponents have not been inhibited by the Marshal's
restraint. Neither the King, who is currently the C-in-C of the Armed
Fer ces, nor the Liberal Prime Minister has hesitated to take advantage of,
his position to weaken Papagos. Despite the Marshal's determination to
conduct a fair campaign., he may eventually be persuaded to adopt the
tactics of his opponents.
2. INDIA. Food ration raised: The food ration, which was cut to 9 ounces
during India's critical period of shortages, has been restored to its orig-
inal amount of 12 ounces per day in over half the Indian states, according
to a Food Ministry statement on 8 August. The other states have been ad-
vised to restore the 12 ounce ration as soon as stocks become available.
.(R FBID Far East., 10 Aug 51),
Comment:. The moderate success of India's long struggle to obtain
food grains seems to have brought at least temporary relief.
25X1 C
URMA. Chinese Nationalist forces in Burma disintegratings
which were recently defeated by the Chinese Communists in Yunnan and
driven back into Burma, are now looting Burmese villages.
many Nationalists have deserted and that the morale of those remaining is
very low,
25X1A
Comment: Other reports have been received that Li Mi's army is dis-
integrating. Their looting activities, however, may cause Burma again to
raise on an international level the question of the Nationalists' viola-
tion of Burmese territory,
The Burmese have just dispatched 600 additional. troops to .Kengtung
State to control the Nationalists. Two battalions were committed.,to the
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same area several weeks ago. The diversion of these forces will further
weaken the government's efforts to contain the Burmese Communist insur-
rection.
25X1 C
Sino-Burmese Communist activity reported:
reports that, according to a Burmese who attended a conference at Paoshan
(Yunnan) in July:
(a) Naw Seng, the Burmese army renegade, is in Kunming
and his followers are being gained near Paoshan;
(b) there are an estimated 2,500 Chinese Communist troops
at Paoshan;
(c) Than Tun, the Burmese Communist leader, is highly re-
garded by the Chinese and is in radio contact with Paoshan and
Kunming;
(d) at the Paoshan conference it_ was decided to station
ChineseCommunist troops along the Sino-Burma border.
25X1A
Comment: Many sources are reporting increasing coordination of Chinese-
and Burmese Communist activities along the Sino-Burma border.
5. INDONESIA. Indonesian Government undertakes forceful anti-Communist action:
Military' police in the past few days have arrested several hundred people
including, some high officials of the Ministry of Labor, Communist Party
chieftains and leaders of several Communist unions. The police also
searched the offices of the Communist Party and the Communist labor unions
and the homes of several Parliament members. (R FBID Ticker Djakarta, 16
Aug 51).
Comment: Serious incidents of apparently coordinated violence-through-
out Indonesia from 4 to 6 August -- including an attack on'the Djkarta port
area by 200 to 300 men wearing Communist insignia '-- have alarmed the In-
donesian Government sufficiently to force it to take strong action for the
first time against the Communists.
These developments, in addition to reported Communist plans for nation-
wide demonstrations on 17 August, led the cabinet to order drastic action
"within the bounds of existing laws and regulations" against "anti-national
movements,"
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"Conservative" Indonesians have stated, however, that unless suf-
ficiently serious incidents continue, it is doubt?ul that the government
will persist in its forceful policy and that the Communists will be per-
mitted to develop their strength unopposed.
6, CHINA. Peiping denounces Japanese peace treaty conference: Chinese
Communist Premier Chou En-lai, in an official statement of 15 August,
made the following points regarding the Japanese peace treaty:
(a) Peiping regards the US-UK draft treaty as "basic-
ally unacceptable;"
(b) the treaty is "in reality...for preparing a new
war," is"hostile" to Communist China and a "menace" to other
Asian states;
(c) Peiping continues to endorse completely the USSR's
proposals regarding the peace treaty;
(d) Peiping, unless invited to participate in the prep-
aration and signing of a Japanese peace treaty, will consider
the treaty "illegal" and "null and void;" and -
(e) Peiping believes that a peace conference should be
attended by all states that engaged in armed conflict with
Japan during World War II, and Pei ing is prepared to "ex-
change views" on a "joint(Japanese) peace treaty" with all
such states,
(R FBID Flimsy, Peiping, 15 Aug 51).
Comment: This statement was issued after it was public knowledge
that the USSR had accepted its invitation to attend the San Francisco
conference. Chou's statement conceivably could become a source of em-
barrassment to both Peiping and the USSR, especially if the USSR should
choose to sign the draft treaty. However, Chou's last point suggests
that Moscow and Peiping may be contemplating the calling of a separate
peace treaty conference.
D saffection reportedly widesread among Chinese Communist Military:
A Chinese source reports widespread dissatisfaction among the Chinese
Communist military with the Peiping regime's Korean venture and with
C-in-C.Chu Teh's "lowered prestige." Another source corroborates the
latter point and adds that an estimated 70 per cent of the Communist
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military have "nationalist" sentiments as opposed to the 30 per cent
who are "internationalists," (C Hong Kong 661, 15 Aug 51).
Commen : It is unclear whether the sources are speaking of the
Peiping regime's top military leaders, or of the officer class as a
whole, or of the armed forces as a whole. Frequent reports of dis-
affection among the leaders have never been confirmed. bile there is
fragmentary evidence that Chu Teh has lost some part of his former
power, his prestige as one of the top four or five in the Peiping hier-
archy remains unimpaired.
Although it is doubtless true that the military has not been
thoroughly indoctrinated with the tenets of "proletarian internation-
alism," the political commissioner apparatus is an effective instrument
of Stalinist control and there is no evidence of the functioning of a
significant anti-Stalinist group at any level in the armed forces.
Chinese Nationalist agents receive favorable treatment by British:
The US Consulate General in Hong Kong was reliably informed that a
branch office of the Chinese Nationalist guerrilla liaison office was
recently raided, while the main office remained untouched and is still
functioning. Several persons arrested in the raid were allowed to de-
part to Formosa after necessary arrangements were made with the British
Consul in Formosa and fines paid.
The American Consul General notes that this is the first evidence
that the Chinese Nationalist Government is in a position to negotiate
with the British in these matters, and that all Chinese Nationalists
agents in Hong Kong will have considerably improved freedom of action
if.they can depend on being returned to Formosa when arrested.
Independent anti-Qhinese Communists, who are receiving increased
attention from the Hong Kong Government, are in a much less favorable
position, since they can expect only jail or deportation to the main-
land if apprehended. (S Hong Kong 595, 13 Aug 51).
Comment: This report, if true, represents a change in the British
position and indicates a softening of their attitude toward the Chinese
Nationalists. It assures the Nationalists of more control over the
guerrillas operating in China, and consequently weakens the "Third
Force" Movement.
9.
Chinese Nationalists accept proposal for supervision of US aid:
The Chinese Nationalists, in response to the US memoranda requesting
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effective supervision and control of US aid, have advised the US Charge
in Taipei that they have appointed a special committee headed by the
Premier to deal with reduction of the budget deficit and control of
expenditures. The Chinese Government states it will be grateful to have
the advice of US representatives on Formosa. (S Taipei 212, 13 Aug 51).
Comment: A report of 10 August stated that the cabinet was divided
on whether or not to accept the US memoranda. Furthermore, at that time
Premier Chsen Cheng admitted privately that the Nationalists had no plan
to propose, but desired practical suggestions from the US.
10. KOREA. Rhee seeks amendment to ROK constitution: President Rhee, in a
"Liberation Day" speech, discussed the subject of two constitutional
amendments that he urges the National Assembly to adopt. These amend-
ments provide for the election of the president by direct popular vote
and the setting up of a.bi-cameral legislature. Rhee further. declared
that he, personally, had no interest in these amendments and that his
sole concern "is to secure democracy for the sake of the future of the
25X1A Republic." (R FBID _ 15 Aug 51)
Comment: These constitutional amendments were suggested prior to
the June elections in 1950. While President Rhee has always tacitly
favored them, this is the first known occasion on which he has made
a public statement urging their adoption, Although his .motivations in
bringing-the matter up now are still obscure, it is likely that this
move is a further step in the President?s campaign to assure his as-
cendancy over the National Assembly.
11 Communist Air Fcr ce night interceptor uses "rocket":. Communist
aircraft over North Korea made four attacks on UN aircraft during the
nights of 11 and 13 August--two by jet-type and two by high-performance
conventional-type aircraft. Of particular interest is the 12 August
determined night attack on a US reconnaissance bomber north of Pyong-
yang, The enemy aircraft, identified as a twin-jet "believed to be a
Type-8.." fired a rocket which missed the,US plane and burned out 1,000
yards away. Neither aircraft was daiw.ged in this encounter. (S AX
.2686 FEAF, 14 Aug 51; S,AX 2685 FEAT, 14 Aug 51; S AX 2660 FEAF, 13 Aug
51; S AX 2700 FEAF, 14 Aug 51)a
Corot: While certain types of German rockets are known to have
a burning period that would extend up to 750 yards, an additional pos-
,sibilty exists that the observed missile might have.beena large cali-
ber air-borne artillery tracer shell. This is the first reported in-
stance of a Communist airborne attack employing anything larger than
machine guns and small caliber cannons.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
la GERMANY. West Germans are indignant over Allied economic moves: The West
Germans; sensing the approac o vi u in ependence in eir internal
affairs, react sharply these days to any restraints or direction from the
Western Occupation Powers, Indignation has been intense over the decisions
of the Ruhr Authority on German coal export quotas and the insistence of
the Allies upon the full payment of German occupation costs. The Germans
appreciate that the Ruhr Authority will soon be superseded by the Schuman
Plan; meanwhile, they resent its decisions having the effect of curbing
West Germany's robust industry, Finance Minister Schaeffer has demanded
a German Allied treaty on defense costs, declaring that the occupation costs
must not be set unilaterally by the Allies. Newspapers report that the
coalition parties and the opposition Social Democrats are united in a common
front against the Allies on both issues. The press speaks_of "high political
tension" in Bonn, and foresees not only a crisis in German-Allied relations,
but also in German internal politics and economics,
FRANCEO Assembl Committee resolution on Japanese Peace Treaty worries
oore gn Minister: A Foreign Of is offi a has revealed, ore `"
Minis er Schuman is somewhat upset over the Assembly Foreign Affairs Com-
mitteets adoption of a Gaullist-sponsored resolution decrying the govern-
ment's stand on the Japanese Peace Treaty, The resolution was especially
critical of Francets omission from the group of "inviting powers" for
negotiation of the-Treaty, and of the failure to.invite the Indochinese
states., Schuman plans to present the Foreign Office position to this com-
mittee in an off-the-record talk next week.
Government concern over Gaullist efforts to make political capital
of the Japanese Peace Treaty has induced the Foreign Office again to
request that the Associated States of Indochina be invited to the peace
treaty conference. (C Paris 998, 13 Aug 51)
Comriern: Gaullist efforts to embarrass the government in its foreign
policy -are aided by. the widespread popular suspicion'that the US tends to
ignore French wishes, In the present instance, there is considerable
sentiment within the Cabinet itself that France should have been given a
major role in the handling of the Japanese Treaty,
3, French backing hinted for Chinese Communist UN bid: French UN
Deputy Permanent Representative Francis Lacoste has expressed the "personal
view" that France would be strongly tempted to vote for admission of the
Chinese Communists to the UN if they held out the prospect of a "Kaesong
in Indochina". He inquired whether the US would modify its position on
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admitting the Chinese in the event of a Korean armistice, (S I( 233,
15 Aug 51)
Comment: While the French have been extremely desirous of obtaining
some Thin o non-intervention guarantee for Indochina, this is the first
intimation that France would consider bargaining with Communist. China on
its admission to the UN. This "personal view" may be a feeler, but there
is little likelihood that France would act against US wishes on this point?
AUSTRIA. Exclusion from Austria of WFTU Secret General. considered:
Info anon at t Austrian cap a indica es that Louis Sail ate , TIT
Secretary General now in,France, may return by air to his Vienna post. about
20 August, The US Legation opposes harassment as such, but suggests that
effective action preventing S ailiant's return would seriously embarrass
WFTU activities in Vienna. Austrian-authorities have previously asserted
that the WFTU is, considered an illegal organization and-that residence
permits for its employees will be denied. However, expulsion of WFTU
personnel has been believed impossible so long as the Soviet occupation
authorities provide protection, (S Vienna 597, 14 Aug 51)
Comments, If M, Saillant approaches Vienna by air and avoids rail or
road ransi of the Western zones, Allied occupation authorities cannot
prevent his return? The Austrian Government is not likely to undertake
additional provocative measures on its o
i
it
wn
n
iative withut st
orong Allied
support, This means that any action would have to be taken by the French,
who have not.,-however,, indicated an intention of preventing lis.return to
Austria.
METH ,LANDS, Revision of Dutch-Indonesian reements forecasts A special
Indonesian -Autbassa or is on his way to the Netherland s or talks with the
Dutch Government on replacement of the Union Statute by an ordinary inter-
national treaty, Other agreements on Dutch-Indonesian cooperation, made
at'the December 1949 round table conference, will also have to be studied,
according to the Ambassador. (R FBIS.-Hilversum, 1. Aug 51)
Comments; Defense and int
l
erna
economicobl h
premsave lately over-
shadowed" onsideration of the Dutch-Indonesian relationship by the Dutch
Government and press, The Union Statute, which provides that the Netherlands
sovereign be head of the Dutch-Indonesian Union, is essentially a matter
of prestige for the Dutch and has never been implemented, Abrogation of
the Statute, either because the Dutch accede to Indonesian threats of uni-
lateral action or because the Dutch seek to prevent additional loss of their
economic interests under other portions of the 1949 agreements, would
probably further weaken the Dutch Government,
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6. ITALY. Italian Communists -- end b t
ommunis,ts out of top-level positions, it is
probable that the Communists have succeeded in maintaining agents in posts
- -- -
where they have acc eee +.n 4m ---4---4-
V
p sa o age Program*- IWO members of the
Cunis Par yls cen. r commi ee recen ra'efed.the directing of the Milan federation on the partyr gotup
s program for improving its sabotage
potential, This potential in the metallurgical-mechanical industry was
described as "already well organized" and is expected to be
" utilized
toward the end of the year". It was stated that the Italian Communists
had trained 27 expert saboteurs and hoped to have 50 by the end of the year
in line with the organization of sabotage squads on an international level
and their operations "for the past eight months" in Western Europe
was said Yugoslavia, Greece, Africa, Asia and America, They also had succeeded;, it
, in planting at least one agent "in every military headquarters".
It was emphasized that Communist party members possessing "war material"
must hide or destroy it, not only for security reasons,,; but also. because
at the suitable moment, "the most modern equipment" will be available- With, 25X1 A
reference to the Milan municipal election,. it was asserted that the extreme
left was the real victor because the election results showed complete s i_
darity between the C
the pro-Communist Socialists*
Comment: There have been no other reports that internationally organ-
ized sa o age squads have been operating in any of the areas mentioned ex-
cept Yugoslavia. It is known that considerable numbers of Soviet satellite
agents have been penetrating Yugoslavia in a continuous stream,, but there
have been no reports of.sabotage0 Although the Italian military authorities
maintain they have weeded C
e
Brit sh ecTlegat on w is is current s , grain contract vrith USSRt The
Z,o is ing or a coarse grain
contract with Soviet representatives feels confident that the USSR will
agree to supply by mid-1952 nearly all of the 1,000,000 tons requested by
the UK. (750;,000 tons were delivered during the past year.) Though the
discussions are being carried on by commodity level representatives, it
is believed that the Soviet delegation has the requisite authority to sign
a binding agreement at London" The British hope that a bilateral agreement
will be practically completed when the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
meeting on East-West trade convenes at Geneva on 20 Augusts (S London-853,
13 Aug 51; NY T 9 15 Aug 51
UNITED KINGDOM, British foresee favorabl
Comment: The UK remains convinced that substantial quantities of timber
and coarse grain must be obtained from Eastern European countries rather
than from the dollar area because of Britain's critical dollar shortage.
If the current negotiations are completed before the ECE East-West trade
talks begin, the UK's opposition to .a total economic blockade of the Soviet
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Union will then be quite clear. (A timber contract was signed last month
between the UK and the USSR.) The speed with which the grain negotiations
are commencing contrasts sharply with .the Soviet delaying tactics in
former years and suggests that the USSR also feels it advantageous to secure
the commercial contract, If an agreement is reached before the Geneva
meeting, the USSR can use it for propaganda for closer economic relations
with Western European countries,
$, SWEDEN, T gye Lie reports neutrality firmly entnched: The Secretary
ner off' t he UN has informed the A assador to Norway that his conver-
sations with the Swedish Prime Minister indicate that neutrality sentiment
is currently stronger in Sweden than ever before. (S Stockholm 171, ]1 Aug 51)
Comment: This assertion of the continuing firmness of Sweden's "no
alliance1' foreign policy is supported by other evidence. Stronger-confidence
in this policy is probably due in part to Sweden's success in obtaining
vitally-needed radar equipment from the US (see OCI Daily Digest, 21i. May 51),
which has largely removed such doubts as the Swedish Government may have
inwardly harbored that its non-adherence to NATO was isolating Sweden from
the West and adversely affecting its defense capabilities. At. the same time,
Sweden has been evincing an increased willingness to cooperate with the West
in such matters as the limitation of strategic exports to the Soviet orbit
and the informal communication of military information to NATO nations,
provided that Sweden's "freedom of action" is not impaired by any legal
treaty obligations?
ARGENTINA. Meat exports to Britain temporarily suspended: On 15 August the
government ordered that meat shipments to Britain be suspended for. 10 days,
or until the critical supply situation in Argentina is relieved Shortly
before the suspension order, it warned cattle producers'that if they did
not ship their cattle to market, "they would regret it", (U La Prensa.(NY),
16 Aug 51) . --
Comment: A moderate meat shortage has been created in Buenos Aires
by the -cattlemen's refusal to accept prices offered by the government's
packing plants. The order suspending exports is probably designed to..as-
sure a plentiful supply of meat for the thousands of workers which the
government will bring into Buenos Aires to attend the 22 August Peronista
political rally. At this meeting,, by the p y government-dominated
Confederation of Labor Unions, Peron is expected to accept the workers'
"demand" for his re-election,
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17 August 1951
CIA No. 49308
Copy No.
51/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence, Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligenc e,
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SECTION I (SOVIET)
1. USSR. USSR not expected to demand reparations At., J
- am
conference. The Department of State does not?,share..Ph
i pp ne.concern .
that Soviet maneuvers at San Francisco will revolve around the reparations
issue. The Department points out that Soviet proposals, which.Gromyko has
indicated will be renewed at San Francisco, so far have been wholly geared
to winning favor in Japan? In particular there have ,been no suggestions
in prior Soviet notes that Japan should pay reparations. The Department fur-
ther observes that since India also opposes reparations, efforts of Indonesia
and Burma to form a coymion front with India in this respect have not succeed-
ed, (C, S/S State to Manila 560, 15 Aug 51),
Comments The USSR may be hesitant to raise the reparations question
because Soviet postwar removals from Manchuria have presumably created a
delicate issue between the USSR and Communist China,
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
2. Il3r CHINA. US?Minister in Saigon urges-presence of Indochinese states at
San Francisco conference: In view of the Soviet .decision to take partin
the Japanese peace treaty conference, Minister Heath believes that-the-issue
of the Associated States' participation has been intensified, and that fail-
ure to invite them is "less than ever defensible." Heath believes that in
addition to wedge-driving on larger issues, the Rum sians may defend the
legitimacy of the Ho Chi Minh government., recall Vichy!s and Bari Dai's war-
time collaboration with the Japanese, and challenge the Western nations to
submit the Vietnam problem to elections or international investigation.
Moreover, the Russians may bid for French support of their overall position
at'the conference, by dangling before the French the prospects of a guaran-
tee for the Tonkin frontier. Heath believes that under these circumstances
to withhold an invitation to the Associated States would take on the character
of appeasement, and that by a forthright defense of our own position we may
even enhance the solidarity of the Western and Western oriented Asian nations.
S, S/S Saigon 383, 15 Aug 51).
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
P , Newly appointed US Ambassador in Panama suggests further delay on
shi pin decree: On 14 August, Ambassador Wiley informed Panamats Foreign.
2 nister that.,. if the Panama Administration should want legislative authority
in. order to issue a strong decree banning ships from calling at Communist China,
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postponement of action on the decree until the National.Assembly convenes
on 1 October would not be an excessive delay, The Ambassador believes that
the decree as now drafted might actually serve as a blueprint for the.
evasion of controls and might offer new life to unethical and illicit trade,
In answer to the Foreign Minister's expression of concern over the possi-
bility that a postponement of promulgation would cause publicity adverse
to Panama in the tai press, the Ambassador replied that the US press would
closely analyse the text of any published decree and that to promulgate
an inadequate decree also might have unfavorable repercussions, (5, s/S
Panama 137: 34 Aug 5l)6
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