DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000300430001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 20, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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2.0: August 1951
CIA Noo- 49309
Copy Noo
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been. prepared pr.imiarily
for the internal use. of the Office of Current Intelligences It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligenceo Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligenceo
State Department review completed
DIA and PACOM review(s) completed.
ARMY review(s),completed.
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SECTION 1. (SOVIET)
1, USSRe P?~?ixiin~ sets 3 September for celebration of victory ovex? Jamart8,
Ors l5 August ~ etia published a.dispateh.from Peiping reportix~ that
Chou L~lai has set 3 Se tember as the date to celebrate the victory over
25X1 Japan, .
Co ent: Peipingps annou.~sced reason for changing the-dete from 15 A~ .
is that Japan actually signed the sur~?end.er agreement on 2 September 1945
and thereforea ~ September is the correct date for celebrating g J may,
However the new date-almost coincides with the opening of the Japanese
Peace Treaty Confere~.ce and provides an excellent opportunity for a ma~'or
Communist demonstration against-the Treaty ,
On 1?7 August -the ~ Kremlin, in an announcement: tel7.~.n.g the H.ussian
people-for the first time of Soviet participation in the Corsference~
stated-its intentions of presenting proposals at-San Franciscop
2? EASTERt7'EUR~, TRTESTEa: Measures ~ontembla~ted to c~antrol Yugoslav refugee
tra~'fic: US Ambassador Allen ixj. Belgrade suggests a revision of the-
Trieste refugee entry permit system in order to strengthen-the C!S position
on this problem via?a vis ?the ~~.goslav Gaverrmsent and to bring about
some reduction in -the flaw of refugeesa ~'nder the proposed arrangement
the British Embassy in Belgrade and the British Consul in Zagreb would
authorize Trieste permits without reference to the Allied Military Goverta~
merltd A,M~Go~ hotaever~ is skeptical. about Yugoslav cooperatioue A17.en
notes that the Yugoslav Govertunent is forcing unwanted refugees, inelud~
ing the sick and aged into Trieste,,. At the same timeq Yugoslav police
controls are prevents he de axttire of thousands of genuine Yugoslav
2 5X1 political dissidentsa
~1~$ Trieste authorities have reported a large increase ins
refugee traffic from Yugoslavia dt~x^irsg the first two iaeeks of August which.
has beers taxing Trieste facilitiesa
3e. YUGOSLAV?A, Government alarmed at increasixs~ bander provocationsg Yugaa-
sla~ Assistant Foreign Mixsi.ster Barisic has infor~sed IIS Embassy Belgrade
that daily frontier incidents axe of growing concern to the Yug~slav-
Goverrm3ent, Incidents on the Bulgarian bander? are the worsts fol_7.owed
by the Hungarian' Rtu~sanian and Albaniano .Barisic stated that the purpose
of these attacks is to justify Cominform propaganda that disorders prey
veil within Yugaslavia9 a theme which has appeared in the Soviet pressa
With obvious purposes the Yugoslav official:.~?eferred to the Soviet claim
that Yugoslavia was to receive only small arms from the tTS since Washingtam
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ws,s :txuwilYing to pro~ride heavy equipment to Yugoslavia$ as a country o#
dr~u`ett'v~:1: ~tabilit~ and defense ea~abilitiess He did not beeveA ~ yeti.
thet tie Satellite` mi ` ary situation had substantially cha eds 25X1
25X1 25X1 -
' C :1..nt? Early in August9 Yugoslav notes to Hungary. and Romania pro-
'testing e,].leged 4iolativns on its borders-distil?sed that the number a#
incidents-had-greatly increased singe May, Although;Admiral Manolay
25X1 stated an 24 ~u7~y that border
c en, s ad remained an a small scales there has been recent evidence
. that the Cominform Gauntries have made bolder and more aggressive inctu~-
lions into Yugaslavia~ ~, a related developments the-Huxtgarian Goverr~-
ment on ,3 August sent a vehement note to Yugoslavia demanding that the
argani~ed-and systematic frontier provocations cease without delay,."'.'
Thus far there is no firm. evidence that the Satellites are planning any
immediate military action against Yugoslavia6
~s _Ti..ta tresses for US aids 2n an interview with US Senator Blair I~ody
at Brioni on 12 Augusts Marshal Tito emphasised the following paints to
substantiate his request far immediate US aids
a) Although the USSR is oat yet .ready for wary it wi11 not wait
until the West reaches its peak of preparedness in I951~o The c~tical
period will be 1952? The US should build up armament production centers
near danger points rather than in the US and other areas 'far removed
from the likely scene of eonflicte~
b) A primary Soviet aim is to 'bring-about the: internal collapse of
the Yugoslav regimes A secanda~- aim, is to maintain, tension between
Yugoslavia and the Satellites Satellite provoked border incidents to
accomplish these objectives have increased greatly during the past two
months, These incidents could get au$ of co]~trol~' at .axay time and.
develop into war, Prompt US m~;li?I;ary aid to Yugoslavia wou~. reduce
this possibilitys
c) Titois%n.will increase in the Satellites in propGrtign to the
deterioration in the Satellite standard of living as co~pai~ed``wii~ Yug~-
r~lavias Any weakening of Yugaslaviaas standard of liv~ -.will ad erse~y
affect the progress of Satellite Titoisms 2 5X1
C- $ Tita stressed, those pa3xlts which he feels-wl?P be effective
in aeci~ibg speedy aid far Yugoslavia without comm3.tting the Yugoslavs
to definite actions.
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]., CiR Greek ~,x~r morale appears to be declining; The Greek High Military
25X1
General Frederick rho attended a ~^ecent t~unoil meeting on personnel matters,
9
reoe~.ved the impression that promotions ~rere considered on mer$g and tat some
of the retired and transferred officers had indulged in political activities on
behal.# of Marshal Papagosa He repo~?ts that there was consider8ble sentiment at
the meeting #or deny.ng opting pri~rJ.leges to military personnel in future (riot
the coming) elections,, ~
.~ceording to confidential reports reaching the IIS Militax~'.~ttache in Athens
t1aI1. younger Greek officers are awaiting ?the out~me of-the electirins, They be-
until app~7.~- has retired fivee and .transferred fQUr Ma~or~G~neralsg US '
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2a
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lieve th.a.t if Papagos becomes Px?me I~Ainister9 Ball will be all right;r~ many are...
consider^r~g resigning if the present tension continues
Count: MaY?shal Papagmss who ie a candidate in the 9 September electionsy
has ~.xsstisice repeatedly that pola.tical pressures were being need in the array subs
seciu.ent to his resignatono ,~,~.,though General ~'s?ederickns repo~?t ie some~ehat reA
ae~ring~ the pre-election removal and reassigt5ment o# top officers even for
cause9 will iYatensify the friction between P'apagos and the King ~ ,any restrictions
vn 'the voting priv3.l~sges of military personnel ~rould law~r morale and increase
the dissatisfactions which seem tQ be appearing
IRAP~'Sov3.et planes which combated locusts lease. Ix?axlm .pll Soviet air and ground
pment .ar~3..personnel .vahich .has .been .en aged .in .an~i~lacust activity ~ north>
eaistern Iran has returned to the T3SSRn 25X1
Comments There was eoffie s~a,spiciox~ over the ~aillirsgness o.f the USSR to co-
opera~combating the locusts; apparently the units ms,de available attex~d.~d
strictly to the^r task and have returned home vaithout incident, .
Tc~ s~C~r
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IN1~3NESI~,p ~ nment cont~:nues ~ia~m a nst Chinese Gnrr~r.?~3s-~ pretests: The
In nan Government,continues-to-stand f~.rm.against APR p~?r~testatinns over the
former c s refusal.. c+f entry ~ta 7.6 ~h~.nese ~or~nnur~.st diplomatic and oonsul.ax? of-
ficials at ~,~akartam ~, Peip3.ng news despatch of 11 ~ugu,st quotes the CI~3.rlese
Ministry of Foreig~z affairs as cnnsidering Tndnnesia~s conduct span unprecedented
v3.n].ation of diplomatic practice and v~.z?t~zal7.y a sera.nus manifestation of un-
friendl.~ess? r~ The Indonesian Gnvex?nment replied ihraugh its- Consul General. in
.Hang Rang on 13 ~:,agu.st 1ha,t the affaix? of the lEi officials represented the thfird
necasion nn ?~vhich the ~h%nese ~mmun3.st Government had ~'confx?onted the Indonesian
Goverx~nent w3.th a fait a~com. li, in v3.nlation n~ usages of diplo~na.tic eourtc;sy. ~~
. Comtnen~g ~ similar e~echange tank place late in ~u1..ym ~, spokesman of the
Indonesaan reign. Office explained tkjat the Chinese Gommux~ist Goverr:ment dad not
give adequate notice of -the arx 1.val of the 16 persons nor did ~.t supply the3.s?
names and off~.cial designations until ~n.s?t befo~?e theaz? sh3:p docked at D~akarta~
~,t that time,. Indax~sa~ a9 atti?tude nn the matter appeared to be -based mare upon
t~rl~at it considered ~ diplomat3.c insul,?I;' than upon ~,ts conce~?n aver ~hat.nese Com~-
murii..st subvers~.ve asxt$~aties? Hc~~rever, a general resu~^gence of la'~3.essness early
in ~,ugusty. ?pchich the government believes to hs.ve been Co~tun3.st~.rlspiz?ed, may
have caused Indonesian officials to reconsider ev~:dence available to them that
the Chinese IInbassy 3xi Djakarta is v~orking ~ri.th the Indonesian Comrmznist Partya
IN,DO S~,a ~xao ur es abrn Lion of Netherlands~Indc~nes3.an Union: President
o .s 1.7 . ugus epee secs ay speec urge a raga ion o e .Netherlands-~
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Indonesian Ux~.an~~the s?oner tb.+e better, ~? S+a.lsrno aeked how I'ndones~a could
remain vd:thin the Uns.on as a friendly partner ~:th. the Ihz?Io~h when tle' latter
in a.dministeac^~:?rig VYest New Guinea9 ~rere ae~tua,lly oc~.pying part of Indonesia g s
r~.tional territory's
Referring. to domestic affax?sq ~akarno warned against the ~acsreat~.on~+ of
~.binet ~x?isde and romised drastic measures to put an end to la~r~:essness~
Coz~unent~ Sul~a.rno s s etra~ag recor~aenda~~.on for abrogation of tYxe Netherlands--
I?ndgnen3~on merely x'~a~+ the o~rent politics;I. ter~pe~~ Soh actioh has
been almost inevaetable since Decexnbex? 19~Q~ when a specially convened oonference
failed to solve the two rations o d~.f~ereaxees cover T~'est New Guinea .~ Indonesian
mLssioss recently departed for the Hag~xe t;o conduct preliminary eliscusaions on the
sa~bstitution of `a bilateral treaty .for the Union statute -and other a~eements
negotiated in 19~.9a
Suka~?nogs references to the Cabinet and prevailing lawlessness highlight
Indonesia8s two most urgent problems the lack of a forceful effective govern~-
went and the existence of widespread insecur?itya
64 INDt~CHINAa 'Corrmzuxr~.st threat to Indochina seen ux~.batedt 13espite the present
lu: in .h4sti].3.t~.es .iz~ IndQehinaq -the .U -~gatian .in :Saigon wax^n.s that a prudent
estimate of the situation would andicate that the ~7.et M~xxh~ vrith the close ca- .
operation of Comtma.nist +Gliina~ is preparing for a for effart,~ In support of
this v~,.ew$ -the legation cites se~reral gent reports indica.tin~ 3.ncreased Chi
Hasa Ce3mmunist interest in Fiat Dinh fortunes a,s ~vel]. as the Peipang propaganda
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charge that 35~,ot3C +Chinese ~,tion,alist intex^nees in Indochina have been equipped
and trained and are no~v p?is~ed on the bt~rder for an in'vs,sion ?~~' South China, (5
Carmnent~ The rainy season in the Tonkin delta a~rea~ which wi]1 continue
throug~ep~e~nber~ accounts for the present lull in hostilitl.esm Despite heavy
~.ersses s~:f'fered by the Va~et P~izih earlier th~.s year and a fe~v ambiguous Commu3~3.st
rei?erences to a nego?~iated peace in Indochina aveil,able e~,dence supports the US
I-e~atimnes estimateti
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25X1
~o guerrilla activit is declinin in Kwan t K 25X1
anti-
ammunis guerrilla activity in these provinces is diminishinga Ir1 Kwang-
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tung~ the guerrillas are said to be {11,yying low,rr as action brings prompt and
severe retaliations In I{wangsi~ the.f~et that main railways and highways
are almost free of guerrilla interference indicates that guerrilla strength
is declininga The most competent observers feel that the guerrillas are
fighting a losing battle9 and that9 unless they receive effective outside aid,
they will be reduced by the end of 1951. to small scattered packets which
be able to survive but will have n~a significant effect on the regime;
25X1
Cow; This picture is probab]~y acc?ux^ate o Kwangtung and .~~rangsi have
been the two most difficult provinces .for the Communists to pacify but the
regime is clearly wlxini,ng~ tJS Ar^u~r C~~~ which follows the guerrilla situation
closely 3n .March 1951 estimated that ?~~e000 guerrillas were still active in
Kwangtung and ~?~,~000 in Kwangsi; in'July~ G~2 reestimated guerrilla strength
in. those provinces at 1~0~000 and 1~59000~ 25X1
10, Dairen situation quiets A Russian refugee 25X1
states that he did not see any unusual military or nave ac? v y zn Dairen
although the military airfield was in "constant usenra. 25X1
OSea~iet civil adrninistx~ation of Dairen was . abo s e on anuary~
and the Chinese new rr~astensiblyrr gove~?n the c~ty~ In aditi?n9 all Soviet or
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Sino?Soviet enterpx?ises in Dai~^ert,~ exc e Tschua?in store were tux?ned
over to the Chinese at the same time.
The JSSR, 3,n returning formal control of I3aix?en an ~ s en erpr ses
Chinese is fulfilling the terms of the Sinr~mSoviet treaty of February 1950;
heawever, the .Chinese administration of Daa.~en is probably a re]a.able instru-
ment of the Soviets a.
Kea ~1ew Chinese Communist ~ ax?rn~ group may be enrc~ute to Korea : According
to -the US Fax?: Eastern Command,. recent x^eparts suggest -~~strongly" -the m?ve~-
merit ?f the Chinese Co~nux~a.st 15th Army Group, 1~th Field Ax?my, from south
China tc~ Korea a While ~,t is not clear whether this composite farce, made up
from other ~.th Field Army ur~ts9 will. be used as an inte~r?al unit or for re-
placement purposes, it is nateworthy that the 1/a~lth Division, Chinese Commu-
nist th Ar 15th Army Group, is now accepted in K?~rea as a combat unite
25X1A
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Comment:: chile as yet an unconfirmed movement, the introduction into
urea of an .additional 14,000 fresYi Cha.nese Communist troops ~rould add con-
siderably tv the ~bmmunist offensive potexatial~ However,. the problem of
supp~ring these new divisions would further compl Tecate the Gornnur~sts P la- 25X1
gistieal positions
'25X1
15a J.~o Japanese opinion poll indicates satisfactio~th treatY~ A publ3.c
opinion poll candu~;ted by the newspaper Yv showed: the fvll.owing per-
centages on the peace''treaty questiono greatly satisfied, 8; generally satis-
fied, 35; slightly dissatisfied, lOa greatly dissatisfied, 2; undecided, t~5d
On the question of Japanese rearmament, the same po]al listed ercenta
as (allows; a.n favor, 51~ opposed, 32a undecided, 17a
Gvmment: This is the first reported poll on the draft treaty of peace,.
a treaty ~hi.ch must Japanese appear to have accepted as i~fa3.r~i but containing
some unfortunate territorial clausesa Japanese rearmament is gaining in-
creasing favor as the rea]a,ties of the international situation become more
apparent,
~. Study concludes that J'apa,n can rna.intain eight divisions of ground traces:
A joint study by the Economic Stabilizativn~Baard, the France ~.nistry and-
the Foreign Office concerning Japangs rearmament capacity concluded that the
economic strength of Japan today is.vnly rest enou h tv eight di-
25X1 visions of ground troops,
Gv ents Government officials consistently deny that an expansion of
the ~'atianal Ponce .Reserve is contemplated, but its conversion into an army
is believed to be under study The Japanese are gradually becoming more
.favorable toward rearmamentQ
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1'~a Yoshida. says Japan has no. choice in Chinese treaty' p~?oblem: Prime
~.nister Yoshidastated ~.n, a Diet intex^pellation on i$ August .that the Allied
Powers will decide which of the two Chinese Crovernments is to.sign a peace
treaty with Japane Yoshida added tY~a,t Ja an has no voice whatsoever in this
25X1 mattero
Cam: Yoshidags motive for making this statement, which is not ixz
accord-with the facts,..is not clear? He. may be preparing the way for an in-
definite postponement of the questionQ He also ~aay be concerned about ~he
probable resentment of both Chinese regimes over Japan.,~s prerogative to choose
between themA
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SECTIQN 3 (1NEiTER.I~)
25X1
la GEFi~~ANY~ C?mmunst ro agenda countered b farmers'rQOa anda atia.ongethe
o fici sin Germany warn that hough Communi~h pe psgna room for com-
U9'est German farmers has not made great headway,
placency with respect to its potential appealo Most ?l~taerecentGpolan
farmers have lour incomes and their education is poor;
they expressed a slight preference for dictatorship and manarchyo
Tha Communists attempt to exploit this fertile field by intense and
continuous propaganda over the 5oviet~c~ontrolled radio These efforts are
-Early this year a
combatted by various German and occupation agencieso
Berlin branch of one of the leading farmers' groups was opened`in Berlin.
principally to fortify the east German fanners in their resistance to the
Communist programso
Of particular propaganda value have been a number of special houses
for German farm women, located mostly in Bavaria near the Soviet Zone and
Czech borders These houses, intended to acquaint the farmers wives with
modern devices to relieve drudgery, are equipped with community launderies,
baths and showers, and sewing rooms, and in soma cashave beensenthusiastically
cider presses, canning machines, and bakeriese They
,received, and word. of them has filtered across through the Iron Curtain to
adjacent area5o HIGCG has approved a German request for counterpart funds
to build 140 morn of these houses.. which will also be located along the
borders
FR,ANCEm French refuse to sv. ort US on withdrawal of tariff c'oncessiozs
2'0
o zechoslov c a: ha renc Foreign ?ffice has ormed the.. assy
a.n Far2s a i ance is unable to support the US in a move to withdraw
tariff concessions from Czechoslovaki~lPadv sed,landathe maximum they ?u7-a
tactical grounds, the iJ5 position is
da would be to abstain. from voting if-the matter is acted upon t the sixth
session an the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)b
25X1
Comment: The same fear of losing Czech credits motivates French,
reluc ante o follow the US in this matter as in the case of ~e French are
to cancel permission for Czech aixlines to overfly Germany.
uiiwa.lling to sacrifice economic advantages for poossib e axn~ortaseru.rce in
especiall~r in view of the need to utilize every p
order to support the Governxnent~s anti-inflation import program,
French doubtful of abilit to contain inflation and mainta~-n ra'
ram:. Because of eir rapid y eteriorati.ng ollar reserve
armament grog
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position, the French have become very worried about going ahead with the
expanded import policy on which former Finance Minister Fetsche based his
anti-inflation programe Nevertheless, the government will probably use,
available reserves to continue an expanded level. of imports and to maintain
the present level of military effort until new tTS French talks can be held
25X1A to reassess US aid for French rearmament,.
25X1A
Comment: The French dollar trade balance,-although better-than a year
ago, is s i 1 quite favorable to the USo Moreover, the French position: will
probably be aggravated in 1952 due to an expected drop i,n current abnormally
high steel and sugar exports, The French expectation of financing an expanded
import program was based on a misunderstanding of the.bxtent of US commit-
ments in the October 1950 talks on US aids Both ECA and Paris Embassy of-
ficials have frequently stressed the urgency of additional support if France
is to carry out its military commitmentso
25X1A
56
FR~EIUCH P~OROCCOo Guillaume to succeed Juin as Resident. Generals According
o ac??iden Gener e Blesson, Gen, Augustin Guillaume will''succeed
Dena Juin as Resident General about 1 October; The Sultan has informed the
U5 Consulate in Rabat that he has learned Guillaume will remain only a few
months a redict? sidered wishful thinking by US Consul McBride,
Comment: The replacement of Jain should lessen somewhat the existing,
tension be ween.the Residency and the nationalists, even though Guillaume
probably will continue to fallow the policy outlined by Juina One of-the
outstanding French general officers, Guillaume is a gpacialist in Berber
affairs, and has-served in various capacities in Morocco almost continuously
from 1918 to-193 6 and again in 19~
O
M
~
.
ore recently he was French military
attache to Moscow t19~.6-1~8), Commanding General of French occupation troops
in Germany (19~.g-~0), and presently is substituting .far Gen, Join in SHAPE,
AUSTI~IA~ Cormnents an the failure of the Communist oath to transit Austri'~:
espz e ten ays o arassing y es ern oceupa ~.on au on ies of ommunzst
youth en route through Austria to the World Youth Congress, no serious re-
actions have so far been forthcoming from the Soviet Element, although the
British fxovernment has expressed concern over reports of the maltreatment
of British youth by US military policed
Beginning Z~ August, 2000 French and British youths were intercepted
by American MPs at the French-American demarcation line and returned to
Innsbrucko Subsequent attempts by tho Berlin pilgrims to avoid apprehension
were foiled by US and British autharitieso, The operation was carried out
with a minimum of manhandling of recalcitrant Co~ununists; however,- several
youths were in3ured resisting the US authoritieso
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Mast of the stranded delegates reconciled themselves to a Tyrolean
vacativndespite local Communist efforts to encourage a more belligerent
attitudes Some 840 French represeni;atives were, returned to France via the
French zone of Germany; the remaining delegates-have not been impeded in
their attempts to return homes- Communist claims that many of the delegates
ultima-~ely reached Berlin by devious routes are discounted by the LTa
Legation,
. Offically9 the US authorities considered the youth? delegates im-'
properly documented for transit of the demarcation lines; according to
regulations the Soviets themselves have insisted upana An offer by the
Soviet High Commissioner to waive grey-pass requirements was rejected by
Commissioner Donnelly on-the grounds that, while the LTS favors abolition of
such travel controls in generals it ti~ti.ll not accommodate special gr?upsa
-Pleas from the Austrian Communist Party for Austrian intervention were
also rejected,- The Austrians observed Chats while a regrettable consequence
of continued Allied controls, the dispute is purely an occupation matter,
Loud complaints from the Communist press of US brutalitys seizure of
railroads, etca, resulted only in abortive attempts to interfere with US
traffic on roads leading out of Vienna, Although the Communists continue
to predict strong Soviet reaetians9 Wane appears likely@
ITALYa Soviet purchase of south Italian crops-could enhance Ttalian'Con-
munist e ec or prospec ss recen? port ase y e IT o s 00 ons
o swee s el e a an s from Sicily-and south Italy as well as unspeci-
fied amounts of carob seed and manna has been reported by the US Consulate
Palermo, which infers the products may be intended for the cultivation of
bacilli: TTS Embassy Rome is disturbed not only by the possibility of these
items being used in bacteriological warfare but also by possible political
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implications of recent Soviet interest in tYie purchase of typical south
Rumors have been,
Italian craps not traditionally exported to the 'USSR, p so ht
reported from Palermo that the entire Sicilian lemone~t e~iortemarket for
by the USSR which had already become the second larg p
the fruito The Embassy stresses that proposed US re ~racanco~as raspects ip.
p
of Italian almonds tivauld greatly' enhance Communist p p
south Italy and Sicily, where local elections may be held this faller
25X1 25X1
CoYCnnenta Shipment of 300 tons of almonds from Catania, Si~i 'shipment
Odessa was previously reported from the US Consul-ate Pa~-e~a?
was reportedly arranged by an ~~~?toebefused tovcul Evatesbacilliafor estined
far the production of liquid p s
bacteriological, warfarea Communist e~cploitation~ of such a t15 embarg? on
local products would be particularly effective because the standard of living
is extremely law in south Italy and Sicilyo
,
Fi? SPA,INo Swings new securit cn~.e~, uv_w~.~;k.,~+>nn~.?r rpnPral .of Sectarsty taoints
over-a11. stepp1ng up c~ l ~L-,~ ~w . ~_ --_ _ _ ~ 25X1
s?nce been rumore against the lives off'
h
19 JulYa
appear: to have taken a further step towax g
reg~ne~s administrative efficiency which began with the cabinet reshuffle of
mmiediately sent I3ierro ~gartinez to Barre o
In giving the key
and Traffic Police ~^rith orders to investigate the ,crisis4~essive record as
security past to an offices of proven loyalty w1.th an imp
ts?oublemshootex? situations affecting inaeanaense~~r~1Yghtening of ~, eco
ave ~.
Opposition p a s
General. Franco, Labor Minieter Giron ~cnd cyan US Ambassador Griffisa
I3ierro ~artinez~ rapid promotion to genet a menacebeWln March, when the
the province of La.COruna of a serious guerrilla osect the gravest
Barcelona.demonstrations touched off a wave of ,,trikes that p
threat to the regime since ath~zed nth the aixnsiofnthehstrikers, Francof~e
of the security forces symp 1 na as Inspector General of Armed.
TOP SECRET
iee controlsa The appoint
ol
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loo ARGENTINAa Government to move into navy fields The .Argentine Government in-
ens ?enter o es a oo is ri u ion, according to reports from whole-
salerso Since Senora de Peronos "oharity .foundation" plans to enlarge its
Buenas Aires retail. food chain from 60 to 200 units9_the government may pur-
chase private wholesale companiesa TJS Embassy Buenos Aires comments that
-this rnave would have immediate propaganda value during the election campaign
X as a ri t
2 5 1
D
Commerite In addition to imposing rigid controls ovex? the economy, the
Peronn stratian has nationalized various services such a.s transporta-
tion and banking and is an important producer ~.n some industriesA Labor
unions, schools, newspapers, and radio are controlled by the governmezito
The Church~tate relationship is one of mutual. tcyleration~
p ce con. rol measures
12, ,ECUADOR-PERUa Meetin of gua~?anto~? nations may be heTdm An official : off'
ire Braze ,.ian Foreign O `~zce as` ~o ixnned~o the Uassador in 13.io the
fact that the current Ecuador-Peru border dispute has been referred to the
Brazilian Foreign Office by both countries He added that despite incomplete
information regarding the facts of the situation, the Far sign Minister con-
siders the situation sufficiently serious to ca11 a meeting of the represen-
tatives of the gua~r^antor pov~rers~ and will do so after individual consu7.tation
25X1
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25X1
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TdP 5ECRET
Cammen'ts Under the terms of the 19~~ Rio Protocol. of Peaee, Friendship
and Boun arias, which.ended a. short war between Ecuador- and Peruy the Proto-
col.. and execution thereof were put under the guaranty of the USA Argentina,
Brazil and Chilee It was stipulated that any disagreements arising in the
execution of the Protocol were to be settled by the parties concerned, with
the assistance of the g,aaxantor nations .The last period of tension in
Ecuador Peruvian relations (Oetober November 195c~) was relieved when repre-
sentatives of the guarantors, meeting in Rio, agreed to set up an impartial.
military eomrnission to inspect the frontier and investigate al.legations of
troop concentrations which had been made by both countries<
15 20 -Aug ~-
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 TOP SECRET
'UNCLASSIFIED when E~~t-d~PdSIE~~F{~~~g~gtg(~~Org/(~qp; ~#p~t~~2t~gl I(}~q~t11t00?I~pg4~~ge~ or declassi-
fied when filled in form. Is detached from controlled document.
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duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers wlxo rece{ve and/or release tlxe attac7~ed Top Secret material will sign this form
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~e~ease 2007/03/07
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~~IF~~f4000300430001-
DATE
FORM 2 6 UO[ PRE YIOUS f01T10N5.
6.73
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TOP SECRET
2.A August,.1951
CAA No. 49309-A
Copy No.
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination. outside. 4/CI and O/NE..
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of .significant reports has been prepared .primarily
far the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
-not represent a complete coverage of all current- reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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S~RET
SECTION ~ (EASTERN)
1, ~Ad Syrian coo~peratiQn with West a~Aeara to deoend ors Israeli c?mnliance
~r1.th i8 UN'resolution: .Current Syrian cooperation with,the.We~t wi]1
depend largely ors gaining Israeli compliance with the T3~T Security Council
resolution of lg T~'ay concerning the Styrian Israeli boundar3t dispute? Pointing
tc~ recent Syrian Parliamentaxy sympat~ for Egypt in its difficulties with
Britain, the t1S Minister in Darnascua asserts that the Syrians would batik Egypt~e
citation of Israeli non-compliance as a precedent for Sts 3.ntransigence on the.
Suez Ganal restrictions. He is also concerned lest the new Syrian Cabinet,? 25X1
which he believes can be counted on to cooperate with the [TS., should shift its
present Western orientation because of a feeling that the L~bT had loaned over
ae1Qa failure to eom with its instructions.
omments Israeli non-compliance 'with certain provisions of the 1~ I~,y
resolution has wmrxiad the U S, the TJK and France, who are currently attempting
to persuade Egypt to lift its reatrictior~s on Suez Canal traffic< Although
there is some sentiment for an mediate Security Council debate on the Iaraeli-
3yrian dispute, na action is exilected soon, General Riley Chief of Staff of
the t~N'Truce Supervision Organization, playa to file an interim report on the
situation and then return to the area to carry out further negotiat~.ons with
the ter :parties.
a I a iatereate is mu ual efen a act a aj Iraqi-Prime
Said wants to propose to Ei.ng Ibn gaud of Saudi Ara
agreement for the Peraiart 4ulf< He has "also hinted that,~igivenucertainf aix-..
?umstances, Iraq might like to be invited tv fain Us~
di'
au
ArabiaA defense
~'rangeffients< According tv Nuri, his svx~ has ta~tked to ~n Saud about this
matter and has cabled that .hie g-iseio~t has been successft~7.,
The t~ Ambassador its Baghdad believes that;,~s approavh to Ibn Saud,
is an attempt to allay the latterts presumed resistance tv a union of Iraq and,
~'ardan~ The ambassador also thinks that Nuri~ who distrusts Egyptis anti-
~she~ite policies, may be trying tv disrupt the Egyptian--9audi Arabian
rapprochement Ike ste~tes that the Hritish would be amenable tv sffcrts tv
25X1 dilute Arab solidarity under Egyptian aegis 25X1
Leaders in all the Arab
t
t
a
s
es appear interested in f finding
ways tv vapitalime vn the pvlitival fluidity that has fvllowod the death of
Kiang Abdullahs Iraq has a definite desire tv invcrporate Jvrdan3 Syx3afs
p~asitivn is less vlear, but as a result of Saudi s timulatior~, it appears tv
b? i~atmrested in maintaining the status qu?~
SEQRET
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SECRET
IND?CHINAa Kin~? ~rf Cambodia sags French retain col?nial aims In an ut~
ecederatedly ~r~hement criticism of French policy in Cambodia, .King Norodom e~
pressed. the fear that French officials in Indochina, as well as the &en~h,
Government itself9 have not given up the idea of restorixag Cambodia to its
former colcanial statusm The King, claiming tta speak for Vietnam and, Cambodia'
said that the French Unian rasa acceptable "in principl.e~n but that xaeither he
nor his pee~ple were willing t? fight to bring back French colonialism, He was
particularly bitter regarding French insistence that Cambodiasign a judiciary
agreement under which Chinese residents of Cambodia would be tried by mixed
French~Cambodian courtsb
Th? King conceded that his difficulties with the French were not insu.x~
moixntable and th~.t the war against Communi:~m was the ma3or issue6 Q 25X1
25X1
Commen ~ The judicial question ~s an irritant of long standing in French
Cambodian relations,. However, this is the first time that the King has-gone be-
yond. mild. criticism of the Frenc~ha .
SECTI(7N 3 (WESTERN)
25jC1
GETtMAI4S'o High Comm~.ss~ion.ers favor rebuke to Cer~.ns for recalc~.trant attitudes
The-three Western~3gh. Commissioners in Germany are concerned over the manner in
which VicemChancellor Blue~chers opposition leader Schumacher, and others are
whipping up Lerman public opini..on against the fulfillment of German obligations
to the European cr~mmunitya Commissioners are agreed that immediate consideration
must be given to issuance of a high-level announcement to the .effect that the
establishment of a new relationship between the Allies and the Germans is not a
foregs~ne conclusions but rather is dependent upon the mangier in which Germany
assumes and discha.~?g?s its obligationne. Unless the present trend is checked, STS
High Comr~.issicaner ~lcCZoy sees nc~ p?ssibilit of c~oncludi contractual arrangem
manta tai replace the occupation regime
Com~nen?to The Germans have lately given vent to strong resentment of Allied
de~isions~ particularly those rejecting a redue?Ifion of Germar~y~s coal export
-quota and insisting on full payFn.?nt of mccupation costsa Bluecher threatened,
tea resign as representative to th? Rum Authority where he was defeated,on the
cr~al i;~su?a and even the conservative press has been talking in terms of the
~~disastrousdE A1:7~~,ed pol~:,o.1..e~~ the ~~high political tension's in Bonn, and the
probability caf an maternal German political and eceanomic crisis:
50 ~A~+J'CE,~ Fc~rei~n Off~c~ _tak~s pessimistic view of Far Eastern .situation: In
recent talks with French Foreign Office officials, US Embassy representatives
have discovered. e'littl~s optim~,~rt'~ w3.th regard to the Kaesong armisti..ce negotia~
ticns and much. ~"desperate casting arc~undt' for a solut3.an in Indochinaa Whip
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SECRET
the French attitude towgr~d recognition of the Chinese Communist regime and its
admission into t7N has not changed$ oon.siderable political pressure is building
up for negotiations looking to a settlement of all Far Eastern questions in
the event of a successful outcome of the Kaesong talks,;- Foreign Office of-
fioialsg however view these talks as part of the Soviet pesos offensive and
expect them to. b? broken off once the USSR has achieved mat~irnum propaganda
advantage4
The Foreign t3ffioe is particular] gleamy about the situation in Indo-
uhina~, t-where France oontimues to pour out men and moneyfT with nc~ end in sights.
There is some feeling that the IJ~" pasiti?n on Formosa blacks the ~ssibility
of ~. general political settlement in thr~ Far East and that the French Govern-~
went has nothing tc~ offer the Chinese Communists in return grantee
against intervention in Indoohinaa
25X1
Crammento The weakness of the n.ew French Gavernment9 resentment of the
infle~ibi~lit~y of T.15 policies aimed at containing the USSR and fear of warsen-
ing economic conditions resulting from increasing inflati?nary pressures farm
a background fc~r the pessimism of the .Foreign pffice on Far Eastern matters,;.
~a DE:` RKd Political leaders fear x3aeular resentment at ECA estimate of economic
t~ote~ttial far defenseQ The I1S Embassy and EGA mission report that the leaders
of both the gavern~nent and the principal opposition art
fear the consequences of making publi~e in Denmark anpECA estimate of Denma~kgs
economic potential for defense e~penditureso ~ y fear that the Danish press.
wi11 treat the esta..mate sensationally and inevitab3y.distort it. This would
arouse publiw ~'eeling9embarra~~ the government and further strain ITS-Danish
relations, which have recent.~y been damaged by the Kem .amendment and the re~
striotion an the tTS impartation of cheeses The Embassy and the ECA mission
concur in this view and urge special precautions to reve
25X1 du~?ing presentation to the D'S Gongress~ es
Ca_,?,~to The ECA estimate ~16~ million for the fiscal year 1951 --
represents the ~ calculation of the value of eeen.omio resources which the
Des~.es could manage to divert to military efforts on the basis of the estirra ted
.Danish grass national pr~];uct and the amount of American aid contemplated,. The
present Danish military budget9 which moray Danes regard as already anerous~ .
authari~es an expenditure equal to only ~q~ mi].l.ionfl Responsible Danish leaders
fear that the disclosure of such an American estira, to far Danish military ex
penditures wi1.1 stimulate the belief that the i~ is unwarrantedly interfering
in Denmarkas domestic affairs and making a~outrag?ous demands~~ as to imply that
the country is becoming a mere t~ sat~~llite~
SECRET
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TED KINGDOM. $~itish opposed to extending t1N =enera Assemb~y~ s aecurity
r?I8? The T.~S representative on the UN Collect~.ve Measures Co~nittee saes a
basic British disagreement with i1S policy of extending the General A ssemblyrs
responsibilities far security, under the 'uniting for peace" resolution of .
last fall,
The UK representative has stated that his government never liked the
resolution' and was pushed into it only by t~ insistence, (The resolution
calla for the prior commitment of national military contingents to the [TN for
use in emergencies,) Great Britain objects, he said, to the fundamental
American concept that the UN should have at its disposal the means for main-
taining peace pending conclusion ~' agreements between member countries and
the Security Council under Article /~3 of the Charter, He expressed the view-
; that so long as the Security Council is unable to function, no further efforts
should be made to make the UN act as a collective security agency.
Tha US representative comments that the underlying UK objection is the
belief that the General Assembly, which has added res ty under the
resolution, is an irresponsible bodyQ
2 ~X1A ei s Basically, this divergence grows out of the British reluctance
to accept tTa policies which to them seem predicated upon the finality of the
split between the Soviet Union and the West, ~e UPS continues to look upon the
tJN as~a.lusble in the long run more as a forum for settling disputes than as a
device for- taking collective action, especially when the great powers are in
disagreement, Skepticism on the capability of the General Assembly to reach
sound ~cisions has been reinforced particularly by the bloc voting of Latin
American members on such questions as the disposition of the former Ital iaa
colonies, and by ?ecasionaY rough treatment of the British on colonial goes-.
tions~
s~cRET
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