DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000400030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1961
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Lase 2002/0 TOP SECKETP79T01146J0400030001-5
28 August 1951
CIA No 49327
Copy No.
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intel'igence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
*Army, DIA and State Dept reviews
completed*
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
l USSR. Kremlin sensitive to recent USM,,r icon char ess A Moscow coi men-
tary contributed by the Soviet Peace Ctimiittee was devoted to the pos-
sibility of the coexistence of capitalism and socialism. After drawing
the usual distinction between the "average American and the US Govern-
ment, and reiterating that 10capitalism has always turned to war as a way
out of internal difficulties," the commentary defended the USSR "policy
of collaboration" thus:
"The Soviet citizen knows from experience that war
means unhappiness, The Soviet Union has proposed a big
five pact; the American State Department called this a
peace trap, The Soviet Union has persistently presented
concrete proposals in the UK for reducing armaments; the
US turned down all these proposals, Economic relations
provide a basis for peaceful cooperation; since the end of
the war the US has passed laws and regulations barring
trade with the USSI0"
Comments Many similar articles have appeared in Soviet output
during the past two weeks, The USSR's sensitivity to the recent US-
Morrison charges that the Kremlin is suppressing civil liberties and is
withholding the truth about the West0s attitude toward the Russian people
is revealed ins
(a) the defensive tone of these articles,
(b) the current practice of leveling these very charges
(c)
against the US., and
the simultaneous publication of articles on
"democratic privileges" in the USSR..
2? Soviet representatives sound out Norwegian fo ?ei c- s
has reported that the Soviet Embassy re-
cen y gave a party for two members of for the purpose
of soliciting information on the following pointss
lp Will Norway as a member of NATO follow the
US lead and sharply restrict trade with the USSR?
2m What is Norway0s attitude concerning admis-
sion of Turkey to the Atlantic Pact?
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3a Will Norway declare Xoshelev (Soviet Assistant Naval
Attache implicated in the Per Danielsen espionage case) persona
non grata and request his recall following a trial?
30
4,
I also described I. S. Merkulov,
Seco cretary of t theSoviet Embassy, as head of the Soviet Intel-
ligence Service 'in Oslo, 25X1 A
Qo _6,ta The first two questions may have been asked as an in-
direct means of indica.tln' g to the Norwegian Government that the Soviet
Union w i,d react unfavorably to any fwarther restriction of trade with
the USSR or to o ayas agreement to admit Turkey to the Atlantic Pact,
It Is-doubtful. that Norway would be intimidated by such a maneuver.
EA.SI?N MOPE,, C CHOSLOVAKIA. PM a _ ,nti?a ~^o_reft defenses imuroveds
Eight a.ddi.t;ional S~ n antioairoraft guns have appeared in a Prague suburb.,
Four of these are excellently camouflaged and have centrally located
directing equipment, according to the US Military Attache, (S Prague.,
DA IN 95929 25 Aug 51).
Oo ants There has been a gradual but systematic build-up in the
number of AA gun emplacements and radar sites in the Prague area,
Arm
a lebrati.ona to stress alliance with the t7SSRs According
to the Czechoslovak ,rmaees , Anny Day celebrations scheduled to reach their
climax on 6 October, will begin on 20 September in commemoration of the
1914 crossing of the Czechoslovak frontier by the Red Army, Exhibitions
have been planned in regional towns to stress the importance of the
SoviettCzech military alliance, Public athletie contests will be staged
by the Czechoslovak Army to prove its physical preparedness, (S Prague,
DA IN-9628, 25 Aug 51),
Comment s The Czechoslovak Airy is a second-rate fighting force as
a result of obsolescent equipment, lack of leadership from purges, poor
morale, and the general unreliability of its troops. Moreover, the
lack of Soviet-type equipment, inadequate training in soviet tactics,
as well as the incomplete reorganization of units and staffs to conform
to the Soviet pattern, would-detract fre the effectiveness of any joint
operations by Soviet and Czechoslovak forces,
BU ARIA government takes official cognizance of prom faints s The
Council of Ministers has decread a procedure for handling 'complaints,
applications and proposals made by the citizens,10 This action climaxes
a propaganda campaign to reassure the Bulgarian population that failure
to remedy conditions evidenced by popular complaints has been strictly
a matter of local rather than high-level government inefficiency and
inertia, According to the new law, municipal and village councils must
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make decisions on complaints within twenty'-days and within ten "Military or mobilized days for
decisions within thirty$ins? (U 2county5 organizations must make
y
U FD1D9 Aug 24 51)0
Co- e - Above the village and county councils
weals the usual Communist vagueness In the Q the decree re-
placing of responsi
actiona The decree is nothing more than a convenient means bybwhich for
the government can grac?f~
worker unrest me and ly sidestep responsibility for peasant and
to placate the "legally" charge the local organizations with failure
populat.iorn o
6? RTI&NIA. D S
ies rsoutines fit
appear?ance9 for the first tim.e9 of jet h the exception of the
celebration of Ru~a~.niafls L~.be~rationf~ plane, with. Rumanian markings the
yearn Foreign dale etas ' varied little from that of last
g both from the USM and the Satellites, were
of appr Oximately the name level of importance o
ceived about the normal p US B?warmorngeringt? re_
re-
ceiveamount of attention in the speeches, but fewer
anti-US and British placards were in evidenceq
carious church dignitar-
ellites
ies from Outside of the Orbit, who have been in the U" and other elutes recently (including the Patriarch of Antioch and the Red Dean Can?~erh Sat-
were in the reviewing stand. The US Legation interprets the
rets of
fact that Marshal Vorosh.ilov in his lead speech twice mentioned Petru
Oroza,, the non-Co uraist Premier, as the Soviet answer to numerous he
that Or?za, is slated for removal from his high 24, Aug 51) position. rumors
(C Bucharest gS,
7? bets a
with Rumanian e agar a _ Liberation pa
-- r ade R Fifteen Yak-15 jets
together with g participated in the 23 August Liberation Day 24 planes of the Yak-7 type. Sixteen thousand. troops parade
marched in the five-hour parade
guns and 42 T-34 tanks0 (C Buchar-0esti 88, 24. Aug ,l1) ) 48 self-propelled
g 0
oentoo This is the first time that jet planes with Satellite
markings have been definitely identified in either Rumania
Bulgar?ia o Hungary or
S? Y T eJgr l.~L~a a s earl devaluationo c irnar?s US In Bel radr considet?s it ir? p a:nt ttha.t the devaluation o the Yugo Alen s
dinar proceed without unnecessary delay since the current official rate has little more than nominal symb ,, f the Yugoslav
that a realistic revaluation of the dinariorastheiworld market dinar
streamline central control of currency balance remove t Allen states
negative
its in the Yugoslav balance of Payments caused by black t market would dealings
,, equalize the internal and foreign dinar values which the dealings,,
Yugoslav producers to sell on the foreign market. Ynterprises encourage
fhave been deterred from exporting owing to the
greater profit derived
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from domestic sales. Allen feels that a two week study of the Yugoslav
financial organization by an International Monetary Fund mission would
yield a satisfactory estimate of the desirable dinar rate level.
(S Belgrade 248, 25 Aug 51).
Comments Yugoslav officials recently advised the International
Monetary Fund staff that they will probably wish to discuss a change in
the par value of the dinar itmttediately after the IMF annual meeting on
15 September. The IMF staff replied that before announcing a new par
v'alue9 an IMF mission must arrive at an adequate judgment based on a
study.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. !N-RI-A- ion fro~a k ' ~ A 15-man good will mission con-
sisting of historians, philosophers, writers and artists will visit India
in Octoberg according to the United Press of India. The mission,., sponsored-
by the Communist Chinese Government, will study various aspects of Indian
life and establish closer relations between the peoples of India and China
before returning to their own country via Burma. (U New Delhi 728,
25 Aug 51).
20 uxientg The arrival of this delegation from China will undoubtedly
have some propaganda value. It may add impetus to the activity of the
Sino-Indian Friendship .Association inaugurated in Calcutta in February
1951. (See ~ wl Rijestsg U Apr 14 May, 4 June 51).
2. ~ o u Go~ ,ruse t releases ? a ?eU. The US Embassy in
Rangoon reports that i.n accordance with a new screening program., a number
of Karen leaders and soldiers have been released. There are also indica-
tions that some of the Karens will be readmitted into the army. The
Burmese Government hopes that these Karens will return to their homes and
influence their followers to accept the government? s terms for setting up
a Karen State under the constitution. The embassy comments that while
these developments indicate a more realistic approach to the Karen problem
by the government, final solution remains distant. (S Rangoon 218, 25 Aug 51).
?n -. Settlement of the Karen insurrection would constitute a
long step towards restoring stability in Burma and would permit Burma to
gird itself better for the struggle to remain free of Communist domination.
There is reason to believe that genuine reasonableness on the part of the
government would be reciprocated by Karen leadership. However any
negotiations for a settlement will be tedious and delicate.
_-or. US Embassy in Rangoon reports
that unless Supreme Commander Ne Win gives up his unpopular mistress another
crisis will develop in the near future between the general on the one hand
and the Socialists and ranking army officers on the other. The embassy
states that the only logical successor to Me Win, should he be replaced.,
is Brigadier Kyaw Zaw, who is described as an. "independent Communist
nationalist." (S Rangoon 218, 25 Aug 51).
C, Friction between No Win and the Socialists will inevitably
lead to a showdown regardleaas of the former?s private life. Almost nothing
is known about Kyaw Zaw except that he is currently the Commanding Officer
of the Soath Burma Sub-District,
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Coa ta~~ The pro-Communist Burma Workers and
is dis la
Peasaxits party n degree of organization and ambition
heretofore u~akxlownu~?me.~eppa y g a ideg
Rancpoon9 and there is little doubt that itois according to US Embassy
he-
quarters recently announced that its members in parliament will p essafor
abrogation of Burmass ECA agreement and for the sending of a cultural
mission to the USSR and the Satellites (S Rangoon 218, 25 Aug 51),
Cmmrxrts The BWPP has maintained constant contact
with
the
Communist Embassy, from which it almost certainly receivesfinancialese
asaistaf`ceo It is also believed to be in touch with the insurgent
Burmese Con a fists, This is the first report, however., that the BWPP
is developing a following of any significance,
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50 ?moo i~eaey (rrovswR?
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_"??'YLnU -norZA of the Thai border" to seize
a portion of northern Thar d ossibl within the next two months?""
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9
2'',ant n:
has been notsriausl.y unreliable in the paste Bangkok
that only a handful of naval. personnel who ar have reported
Jame 'coup found t heir way c patad in the abortive
successfully cop ay northward. This force would be incapable of
undertaking such at adventure 'With any assistance short of
outright intervention. by Chinese Communist Pores; teach intervention does
not appear probable at this time?
Chino-.q^ TI.qx?Q
Lo F, ara
a' ~ ~ who' is also a member of the Commuxnist
Chines
t
C
con
e
rolled sedan Overseas
enera]. Association. ha.
oxr ,cO in Medano He says hesisinterested in learning whether Or not they are patriotic Chinese,
Chin cnent These inquiries have been made since the arrival of the
Chinese Communist Consul in Medan.
70
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8
HINA- Q a ;.t _ s A recent Peiping directive
officially confirms Communist preaa reports of waste of public funds in
construction work due to poor planning. The directive seeks to remedy this
situation by reducing subsidia ^y agenciesu independence of action and re-
quiring them to submit additional reports,, The US Conan]. General in Hong
Kong comments that the directive can only result in a greater burden on the
inadequate number of capable administrators,, (S Hong Kong 787 24 Aug 51).
Q ? The Peiping regime suffore seriously from lack of competent
administrative and technical person.nne l0 This lack is aggravated by the
regimens over-centralization,, Peiping is seeking to solve this problem--
and therby creates others--by large-scale recruitment and assignment to
the hinterland of high school and university students,,
90 Pei ~~e e~offiP of _ fa t~:a d Qw ng of? standardeo
The Chinese Communist press notes that in Southwest Chin''a the number of
students attending high schools and colleges has decreased 23 percent in
the past six moxiths, and in East China students are being compelled to
attend so many political meetings that Their academic work is suffering,,
The US Consfie::1 General in Hong Kong comments that there is little prospect
of early solution to the overemphasis in political activities and the
demands of the armed forces and ?0 empire-building ? agencies for increased
personnel. (S gong Kong 787, 24 Aug 51).
e o The difficulties noted in Southwest and East China are
probably general throughout China,, . The Communists have themselves to
blame, as they have put pressure on the students to work for the govern-
ment before they are well qua .,ified and have subordinated practical to
doctrinal considerations as a matter of national policy,, -
lea c ted n ~a? a Natica aab s cabins o Several recent
reports Indicate that there may be a shake-up in the Chinese Nationalist
cabinet because of the recent resignations of the Minister of Economics
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and the Minister of Finance, The latter is said to have resigned because
of his inability to meet increased government expenses required by the
military. It is expected that Chan Chang will remain as Premiere
George Yeh, present Foreign Minister, may be forced to resign if the
Nationalists are unable to negotiate a bilateral treaty with the Japanese
shortly after the signing of the multilateral treaty by the other nations,
as Chiang Kai-shek is displeased with Yeh?s failure to secure Nationa st
participation in the conference- S
NA Taipei, Weeks 349 24 Aug 51)
Comments In an attempt to arrive at an understanding between Japan and
Nationalist China on the signing of a peace treaty before the opening of the
Legislative Yuan, on 15 September, Foreign Minister Yeh has ne-
gotiating with Japan concerning the dispatching to Formosa or a representa-
tive of the Japanese Government. Yeh is considered to be too pro-Western
in hie ideas on Nationalist government problems and for this reason there
has been a movement to replace him,
lie 4o i tai
ind
- Chen Kuo,~ , a veteran leader of
the Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang party, died on Formosa of tuberculosis
on 26 August. (U UP Taipei, 26 Aug 51).
QMRIAWI. Chen, with his brother Chem Li-fez, were the founders of the
most conservative bloc of the Kuomintang, known as the "CC Clique." In re-
cent years this group has not overtly played an active part in Kuomintang.
The death of Chen Li-fu is not expected to bring about any significant
changes in the Kuomintang program.
12,
further states that the Communists recently
s repot tends -7o confirm earlier reports of plane for-.the'
retadrrn of Fourth Field An units to Korea and of
in China. However, it seems more probable that some
units o : e Fourth Field Army not previously in Korea have gone or are
now an route to Northeast China. Also, on the basis of current reports
of the replacement program in units recently returned from Korea, it is
doubted that they can possibly be ready for combat by early fall. It can-
not be accepted that the entire Fourth Field Army will leave Central and
South China, since the public security and militia units are still incap-
able of controlling and defending these areas from anti-Communist elements
and the other field armies have too many commitments of their own to fill
the void. (US Armlo9 Hong Kong 5669 C?3, 24 Aug 51).
all of the Chinese Connau~jist Fourth Field Army will
44 _
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13. KOREA, CQmm its can su=rt 6_?div sW on attack for 26 a The Far
East Command estimates that enemy forces have accumulated sufficient sup-
plies to support the 28 Chinese Communist and 18 North Korean divisions
currently accepted south of the 39th parallel in a 26-day attack. This
estimate is based on observation of over 359000 vehicles moving southward
in forward areas during the period from 23 June to 22 August and indicates
the largest supply build-up during the Korean war,
Although in all previous offensives the enemy has successfully accumu-
lated stockpiles in forward areas prior to opening the attack., the enemy's
inability to move supplies forward to exploit any successes has been his
outstanding deficiency. The Far at Command suggests that the enemy may
have attempted to remedy this shortcoming and that he may be able to launch
another offensive with a much improved supply capability immediately behind
the front. (S CINCFE TELECON 50819 26 Aug 51)0
140
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
FRANCEO US intervention in Saar issue is discouraged:
statements of Schlamar, ~r~
an early solution of the &nese
the issue,, lea ers are o
p is is or
25X1
Embassy Paris fears that even an inquiry by the ITS on the Saar question
might be regarded by the French as another ,:ruing Germany on which the US is already in a series of questions con-
Such an inquiry might thus prejudice the settlement of o heremoretTimportant.rr . seeking to French
current issues. Moreover., it would probably lead the French to endeavor
"to nail down US support" for a French-slanted settlement which would be
more "generously1P formulated if additional t
definitive positions are taken, S i12 were allowed before
24 Aug 51) ( London. 10129 23 Aug 51; S Paris 1208,
Comment: The US High Commissioner in Bonn previously commented that
the 3 ugus note of the Western answering Chancellor 's
29 May protest against, the Saar Government B s polies settled littler and
the issue remains one of current interest and considerable controvers.ft
y
2, AUSTRIA, Anti-Communist bombs and Soviet meddling increase Austrian
den sG lennese newspapers reported on r
?n%he premises of Communist Party August a om s exp oded
of the Austrian, capital. The Communist Volkstirnmenassertsdthatt ten Districts
incidents have so far been. reported and tt a filar
saults on Communist club rooms and movie theaters have not b entapre end:
Demanding explanation for the failure to punish such outrages, the kstim
asks if the culprits are in fact connected with the Ministry the V rater or
and police headquarters, ry of the Interior
At the same time, non-Communist papers have reported new interferences
in internal Austrian affairs by the Soviet occupation authorities,
coverage has been given to Soviet Kommandatura Special
unishm meted out
St; Poelten hotel (in the Soviet zone) for having
fatedna visiting tai;
soccer team without prior Soviet approval, Another instanc in Italian
is cited in Soviet attempts to force a local mayor to dismissoa gendarmerce
official 'who had incurred Soviet displeasure, (R .FBIS Vienna
21 Au e
g 51; U Vienna 7179 23 Aug 51) press,
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Comment: While perhaps insignificant in themselves, the number of
recen ins,ances of Soviet interference suggests a pattern of increasing
tensions. Minister of Interior Helmer has alternately viewed with alarm
and discounted the seriousness of the Soviet-Communist potential for inciting
trouble in the coming months. In a recent conversation with Commissioner
Donnelly, Helmer flatly asserted that many reports of attacks on Communist
installations were .faked,, and suggested that they were designed to provide
a security excuse for direct Soviet intervention. Believing that such
incidents may perhaps become serious in the fall, the Minister nevertheless
continues optimistic in his conviction that Austrian police are competent
to maintain order.
3. ITALY. Enlisted army ersonnel respond to Communist, propaganda: The
C's ormriunist ave m vuz some ini is success in seeking to obtain peace
pledges from soldiers-in North Italian military camps and maneuver areas
in an effort to strengthen their peace car,Fipaign. Small meetings are ar-
ranged and propaganda leaflets distributed in nearby communities which the
men are allowed to visit during off-duty hours. The major unit commanders
have issued orders that the troops abstain from any participation in such
meetings. It is believed this order will. largely prevent, further Communist
activities of this nature. (C Rome, Joint Weeka 34, 24 Aug 51)
Comment.- The orders issued may prevent the attendance of the men at
the meetings, but will not remove all contact between the Communists and the
soldiers. Probably 10% of the enlisted men are active Communists or at least
receptive to Communist influence.
Italians increase agitation over Trieste issue.- Intensification of
Italy's c ampai rung fo th r tui of e to reached a new climax with
the statement by a semi-offi.ciai. Italian news agency that if Yugoslavia
"persisted in refusing a c(mIpromise solution" it would risk an "increase
in (Itaio Yugoslav) tension which Italy considered especially inopportune
at this momentt , 4c During the past week there has been a resurgence of
interest in the _Trieste issue in. the Italian press at, home and in Trieste.
In Italy the conservative independent press declares it is impossible
to make further concessions after the sacrifice of so much territory, and
alludes to De Gasperils remarks that Italy will not agree to use of the
Trieste issue as a bargaining point for revision of the Italian peace treaty
of 1947. Assuming that the British favor the Yugoslavs and the US champions
the Italians, it charges that the US should exert greater pressure on Tito.
Harrimanos visit to Belgrade is interpreted as an attempt by Yugoslavia
to counterbalance De Gasperi a s projected visit to the US in September.
The Communist papers speculate as to whether Harriman has been charged with
mediation of the. Ital.-Yugoslav dispute.
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Trieste newspapers indicate fear of the growing strength of the
independentist movement supported by, pro. Cor inform Communists in the area.
(C Rome, Joint Weeka 3, 24 Aug 51)
Comment:. The urgency of Italian representation regarding Trieste
springs p ly from a feeling that Italy's bargaining position is deterio-
rating, but partly from De vasperits uneasiness regarding his decreasing
popularity, even in his own party..
5. ICELAND.. US reconnaissance of Soviet fishing fleet desired: In response
o a U inqu~ea?y, the Iceandic Farn I~tinister has indicated. that he would
greatly appreciate reconnaissance by US naval vessels during the month of
September to observe the activities of Soviet fishing vessels off the Ice-
landic coast, (TS Reykjavik 33, 24 Aug 51)
Comment: Although Soviet fishing in Icelandic waters has been an an-
nual occ.uxx?ence since 1948, the Icelanders are suspicious of either hostile
or subversive motives for the presence of Soviet vessels. (See OCI Daily
Digest, 6 Aug 51.)
6, NORWAY.- Foreign_ Office believes limited trade with USSR and Poland. may
e easibTe A Foreign Off ice official 'relieves tha Poland may sill
agree ?sante type of trade with Norway despite Nb wegian restrictions on
strategic exports;, and that the USSR-apparently desires a continuation of
trade'relations on a limited basis. Attempts by Poland to obtain goods
through various channels and Soviet interest in barter deals are cited as
evidence that there is an economic basis for a continuation of trade. The
Foreign Office believes, however, that negotiations with Czechoslovakia in
the fall will be difficult and any trade arranged will be less than in the
past. Norway would particularly like to see a renewal of the three-year
agreement with the USSR which expires in January, exchanging USSR grain for
herring and fats., but adding; the exchange of Soviet manganese for Norwegian
aluminum, (S Oslo., 21)4, 2I Aug 51)
Comment: Negotiations for renewal of Norway?s annual trade agreements
with 73i Poland and the USSR have been stalemated over prices and quantities
of strategic commodities:
.During the-discussions of EastWest trade relations now going-on under
UN auspices. in Geneva, the USSR delegate has stated that Western European
nations must be willing to export the same goods to the USSR as they did
in 1949-1950 in order to maintain the level of East-West trade for those
years. In addition to sundry- non-strategic goods, the USSR received from
Norway aluminum, molybdenum and pyrites in 1949 and aluminum in 1950.
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7. UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. Two government parties to merge: The Afrikaner
m no rity par y in#fe present coa tion government, unanimously
agreed to amalgamate with Premier Malan's Nationalist Party at a special
party congress in Bloemfontein on 23 August. (U NY Times, 2I Aug Si)
Comment: This move is important mainly as formalizing the Nationalists'
achie7em~' ent of full control over government policy, independent of restraint
by their less extremist junior partners.
For the first two years of the
Malan government the Afrikaner Party held the balance of power in the House
of Assembly, refused all Nationalist overtures to merge and also refused
to accept a Nationalist measure to restrict the voting rights of Colored
(mixed breed) citizens. Victory in South West Africans elections in August
1950, however, gave the Nationalists enough votes to make them independent
of Afrikaner Party support. A compromise reached in October 1950 on the
Colored vote removed the major difference between the two parties, and since
that time a formal merger has been generally anticipated.
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28 August 1951
CIA No, 49327-A
Copy Noe
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
2. FRANCE, French ready to approve Greek and Turkish admission to NATO* Unquali-
fied French. approval of NATO membership for Greece and Turkey will probably
be forthcoming this week, according to a Foreign Office spokesman, Although
the Cabinet has not officially acted on the question, Schuman has secured
enough support to ensure approval..
The French representative on the three-power NATO Standing Group reports
some progress toward the acceptance of French views on the distribution of
command posts in the Mediterranean area." (TS; S/S Paris 1215, 25 Aug 51).
Cooimnent4 The French have abandoned their conditional approval of two
weeks ago.- Prance has been jealous of US and UK influence in the Eastern
Mediterranean, but the Foreign Office probably now believes that the Standing
Group will emtend its control eastward and thus protect French interests in
the areao
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1 28 Aug 51
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