DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000400220001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 25, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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TOP SECRET
25 September 1951
CIA. No. 49358
Copy No.
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current :.Intelligence.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Army, Navy, USAF, DIA and State
Dept. review(s) completed.
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily?
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It. does.
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 1 ~SO~IET)
1, USSRa HICfJG Frankfurt examines Eas$, German unity aApealss In comment-
" ing on the East German appeal for German unity9 the US High Commission
in Frankfurt notes that it marks the intensification of the year-old
Soviet strategy to prevent a German contribution to West European de-
fense, The appeal was aimed 'at West German public opinion in an effort
to weaken popular support for rearmament and to take advantage of
Allied px?eoccupation with bringing Western Germany inter Western European
defense,
The unity appeal itself contains illusory concessions to previous
Bonn demands for a fx^eelymelected National Assemblya but does not
Via) endorse western conditions for free electionse ~b) concede that such
elections must precede all=German talks9 or (c) distinguish the proposal
for an a1lmGerman conference from the earlier suggestion of an all?
German Constituent Assembly on a parity basise
US officials suggest that the West call the East German bluff by
proposing its own unity formula, They point out that the West will be
handicapped in the contest for Germany if the USSR maintains the
initiative on the unity issue or wins substantial segments of West Ger-
man opinion to the view that integration with the West reclud d nifi-
cation except through civil war, 2 5X1
Commento There is no likelihood at present that the Soviet Union
would actually permit elections that the West could possibly accepts
The anti-Communist sentiment in the Soviet Zone is sufficiently strong
ao that even partially free elections there, coupled with the free elec-
tions in the Weste would destroy the entire Communist political hold on
Germany,
2, CZECHOSIA~TAk~IAo Balloon war continues$ A Czechoslovak balloon contain-
ing Communist propaganda material was found on 4 September in the US
.Zone of Austria9 according to a ~,inz press reporto
Commenter This is the first report that the Czechs have initiated
their own propaganda balloon attack in retaliation for the release by
Radio-Free Europe of propaganda balloons aimed at Czechoslovakia, Prime
~2inister Zapotocky~ in a belated reference to the ballQOns on 2 September,
said that capitalist reaction was preparing a crusade against Czecho-
slovakia9 but9 unable to attack openly as it did in Korea9 was polluting
the country with vermin and ditto The US Embassy in Prague reports that
there is some question among the Czechs as to whether the RFE balloon
project was designed primarily Poto encourage-Czech resistance or to
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advertise the RFE, Pp'
30 Mascow beams vigilance bu?rvadcasts to Czechoslovakian Recently
Moscow began to beam a serifs of weekly broadcasts on vigilance to
Czechoslovakian Allegedly designed to benefit the Czech workers the pro
grams are written by the author of a number of books on the subject of
the unmasking of imperialist spies, Ira introducing the broadcasts, it
was pointed out that the EJS is doing everything in its power to under-
mine the strength of those nations which have shaken off the yoke of
capitalism9 that it is using all means of espionages provocations
sabotages and terror9 and that only recently. the US Congress voted
1Q080008000 dollars for espionage and sabotage in the People?s Demooracies?
The broadcasts quote Stalin as saying that it is necessar to im-
perialists, methods in order to foil them, ,
omments Vigilance is a constant them in Satellite internal propa?
gandaQ In Czechoslovakia it has recently received emphasise and the
fact that the USSR is taking a hand in the matter gives it added signifi~
canes, In co~.nection with the recent Communist party reorganizations it
was pointed out that some of the chief tasks of the new Qrgburo would be
to attend to the problems of political educations mass agitation and
party propagandas which had kitherto been neglected,
~? ir~lomatic notes reveal Czech consternation over runaway traina Cn
20 September the Czech poreign Ministry handed the US Eatbassy in Prague
two strongly worded notes concerning the 11 September runaway train,
One note accused the US of perpetrating the escape and of aiding the
19crim~.nalsP? who stole the train and kidnapped the passengers, It further
alleged that US authorities in Germany had treated the victims of the
kidnappers inhumanlys grad were forcibly detaining some of them and hold?
ing the train, The Czech. Government demanded that the U5 (~) permit a
Czech representative to contact the refugees still in Germanys (`b) im~
mediately release these persons and allow them to return to Czechoslo~
vakias cc) hand over the kidnappers to the proper Czech authoritiess and
(d) return the train,
The second note complained bitterly of the treatment given the
Czech diplomatic representatives who had attempted to contact the train
passengerso The note asserted that the procedures resorted to by the
US authorities in Germany contradicted all th? principles of internaional
law and customss and d?manded that strict mea be taken against the
persons responsible,
Commento The 77 passengers who wanted to return to Gzechoslovakis
have been sent backs The ~5 who initiated the escapes plus six others
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who decided to remain in the West9 have been given political asylum in
Western Germanyo The return of two Czech soldiers is contingent on the
Czechs permitting the US to photograph their released 'The return Qf the
f m the British and French9 which is
5?
train is dependent on concurrence ra .
expected early this wceko
klU~i?o Labor shorta a causin trans ortitsi~~rdently experien ing
Legation in Budapest reports that Hun F? d is rotting while rail ears.
serious transportation difficultiesa
A decree-has been
are idle due to a shortage of labor to unload themo
Sundays and
and night
d da
y
y
issued requiring that unloading procee
d Workers Union leaders are
il
roa
holidayed Railroad officials and Ra
being blamed for the difficul.tics,
Commenter In recent months the Hungarian Government has been
greatly concerned with the labor shortage in Hungary9 but its continuing
efforts to alleviate the problem have met with little successe
arian
6e Arrr- Da receivin wide ublici p The newly ubl~cized?th oughout
Army Day9 29 September9 .is currently being widely p
the countryo F'reliminaay demonstrations are emphasizing military type
~isportst9 (tra,rget shooting9 Pistol competition9 etco) as well as bonafide
sported A military review is includ?d in the schedule of celeb~ iogns~o
but there has been no evidence that the review ~~,d~,inSportsharaid cultural
went or reach the proportions of the May Day p
groups from the armed forces of CzechoDlaovtoiaarticipate ingtheacelebra~
Korea arrived two weeks prior to Arr~y_b..y~.w.,+Pa?,~;,,c the mast v~ar the
tionso The U~ M~~~.~ary t1~~a~:~.c ..v~upu~.. ----- -
l condition n~ and snorts o
i
~?
ca
or ,ohvs
~? ssrrnv ham ~?ne c,,~ 1 ?u
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8o YUGt?SLAVI.Ao Yugoslavia asks ri.eht to command anv UN ot~erations on its
territ?r4~. The Yugoslav Government has recommended a revision in the
.proposal for a UN agency Executive Military Authority) to direct UN
Military operations in the event of future aggressionso Yugoslavia sug-
~es'~s that the victim of the aggression should. appoint the Supreme Mili~
tart' Commander of all troops on its territory o~unless otherwise agr?ed,t~
Using Yugoslavia as an example9 the Yugoslav UN delegate explained that
in the event of aggression all foreign troops on Yugoslav soil would have
to b.e under the command of a Yugoslav coanmander even thou h the latter
would be subordinate to a UN roat~a2ando 25X1
Commenta As the US has conceived its function9 the ~cecutive Mali=
tart' Authority would act as a centralized general staff charged with
full responsibility for the strategic direction and control of military
operations and with coordinating the contributions of T:TN memberso Alm
though the Yugoslav resew that the victim of aggression would participate
in EMA consultations has been accepted, the Yugoslav delegate has here
tofore registered no other serious objections to the plan9 which is now
nearing completiono The last minute Yugoslav objection suggests that
Yugoslav leaders have only recently realized that their governor?nt might
not be in complete control of UI~ military operations to resist aggresm
sion against-its territory,
Government declines. invitation to visit Military Aid Advisory Grout
ia~ Parise. The Yugoslav Government had declined an.iravitation for a Yugo-
slav military group to visit the Military Aid Advisox?y'Group in Paris
an the grounds that its military officials are now urgently needed at
home. to prepare for? the US military aid program4 The US Embassy in
Belgrade has been informed that the text of the USmYugoslav military aid
treaty is acceptable and that only a few technical matters must be cleared
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up before it cam, be implemented.
Co, ent~ The technical. matters which remain to be cleared ~.p are
the initial size of the US military group that will supervise the aid-
program and the manner in which the supervision will'be carried ou.t Tt~e
US has asstr~^ed the Yugoslavs that the staffs operations will tae co-
ordinated with the Yugoslav military establishment, but has insisted
that a staff of thirty is the ix'redueible minimum for supervising the
prcagram.
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SECTION 2 (EASTER.N)
1o IRAhTo I~^an to eel British techn cianss The remaining British oil tech-
nicians at Abadan will be expelled in a. week or ten days unless they sign
individual contracts with NIOC, according to a press report from Tehran.
Parliamentary Gil Board mamb~;r who made the announcement added that no
further overtures would be made to the British Gover concerning the
position of the tee.hniciansa
en British personnel have been leaving Abadan since the ~osaadeq
annouxacement that their residence permits would be canceled unless negoti-
ations were resumed by the British. This voluntary withdrawal may eontinu?
peacefully unless Iran att?mpts forcibly to speed up the proceaao It is un-
likely that the British Government would resort to armed intervention prior
to the 25 Goober general elections in Britain unless there was a serious
threat to the lives and safety of British aub~ects.
2. a Deb e~ation invited ton 1~~ ~*ipate in Peinir~g's ~:, Ocfi~ob~,; ce. e-
~'? o The Chinese Communist government has requested the Pakiataxii
Government to facilitate th9 travel of six Pakistanis to Peiping for the
celebration of the second s+aas3:iv?rsary of Communist Chinas The delegation
would be led b two roman tikhar-ud-Din and Begum Shah
Na~aaz o
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-n s This invitation and the formation of the Sino-Pakistani
Friendship Association follow closely the arrival in Karachi on 2 September
o~? the first Chinese :~baaaador to Pakistan, Clther members of the delegation
have a~ot been named9 and there is no indication at present that the Pakistani.
Gavernment wi11 allow thc~ acceptance of the Chinese invitation,
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4e BtJR,NlA, ~~aa Chine~~ mad d~,~~~e~atio~a o Ch~~+mo
of Commerce is sponsoring a mission of 22 The Burma Chinese Chamber
Septembex? to visit Commu~.ist Chi~aa? The ChinesesCommunistfAmb esadoron lg
the delegation~~the first of its ki~.d.~0a farewell gave
Chinese Communist press billed the gx?oups depax?ture asya "spontaneouscmove"
b local Chinese to learn mo$?e about thei~?? ?B anoestra]. countrye"
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Comments The mission inc~.uded persons representing a~variety of Chinese
organizations in Burffiao IA?spite signs of res~arging antimCommunism among the
Chinese in .Bur~aa9 this mission is indicative ?~ the widespread influence the
C?mmunists have b?en sole to develop oger the local Chinese community mostl
in the past two yearso 9 y
5e m~ommun~.s s receive n~~s~~
reports that it has been reliaoly inforoth a BurmeseEGover mentRissued
passports to ad.1 seven. B~.rmans wh? were invited to t n the l O~t~,hor ,,,., ,. 25X1
orations in P~i~?~~,~
~e Ca?y~v_^~aYri~n?~ ~~~,~~Tl~r^t~~t~e~~ _
Judicial Affairs has aounc?d t~hat~the Bu~eeeSCs?vernment isnpltanninf
introduce in pag?liament a bill for the establishment of a separate Karen
Statee tinder this bill Kax?en representation in the lower house of..parlia-
ment would be substa~atial.ly reduced9 while delineation of the state ? s
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boundaries would a?e~cai
n the responsibility of the three-year-old Re io
Autonom In uir Commiasioaa which has never
g nal
ubli
h
p
s
ed its f'indin s.
i
C ~ Such a bill is obviousl
euverp It will. not satisfy ISaren aspiratiosaspand will~natrcontribute to a
settlement of the Karen insurrection
~~ BWrP '4r'9e rrnvn..,.
? The US Embassy in
n aagoon reports that the pro-~Commu t Burma Workers and Peasants Pert
(BWPP) continues to ?~ y
of parliament.re ~ perform political chores for the Communists in and out
government b party spokesman in parliament apparently embarrassed the
sting with Soviet and~Chinese Embass police interrogations of persons associ-
y personnel, Another BWPP leader addressed
a letter to the Foreign Minister u$?g$ng that the Burmese repreaetatativ
GATT Conference in Geneva be instructed to 0
for the withdrawal of trade concessions to Czechoslo~raki oesolution callingth~
.The embassy comments that these actions of the BWFP
camp~gn to hold the Burmese Gov?r~ament to a strict itaterpretation ofoa its
rextetxtx?al~ f oreigaa policy which @0tends both to ~ripgrle CUB
itself against Commi
ffo
fi
e
e
rts
f th colu~ activity aaad inf3uence the GQB to def?nd
foreign, nolicy stands which the Commi?a ~~~, ~a?~.,.____~ take
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9. TAI ?-? ~ind~c~.~t,~ ~;~a.
US Embassy in Bangkok has beea?tially infarmed that the TUSs
been .impressed by the d?f?nss a The
th? Phili gp?e?~aents which the tTS has concluded withe
Bef enae Copuaa.cil ~ isuconsidering a?reZues tf
s and that Thailandos National
q or a similar agreement,
The embassy oomments that should the `.i
on this matt?r~ the US would .face. the difficult p~^ob em ~avoidin
sound milita~? pproach
went which dra s mostffiof?tit~t~~~~xastY~if?~?~ its a g an un-
y undermining the Phibun govern-
ship with .the US, pparently close relation-
1C3. ~~h z~aawy ~f?f??8 ~
retire ira dig~TQ+o The
Chief? of? the Tna~. ~'oiaat Staff-- as a Commander of the Third Ar
liably reported to have de~;ided to retire because of their dis st
Phin?Phao cliqu?a The US Embassy in Bangkok observes that while t ~e rg-
ment of these ?~ with the
generals would mean a considerable victory for Phin and Phaoe
it would ive additional strength to stay potential opposition ou
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Co---~to: It is not clear whether the possible retirements are moti-
vated by envy or moral indignationo The advantages accruin
in power through greater control over the army would outweightthose ~lique
gained by the oppositionsBS acquisition of two dis o b?
less of their personal followinga gruntled generals, regard-
~.2e PHILIPPINESo Huks ushi
oranization of liquidation uni+s: In order to
discourage defections induced by the government'
- pushes the
lqu a on un s
other evidence andjthatus
h u
o
ue
nits ma
partici anon in the N vember electionsbeasswellsas forntheo
discourage
purpose cited.
C mmen s Communist ro a
the Philippines9 and the Huks hopeatosbenefitibg the "futility" of voting in
popular revulsion that foll~swed the frauds of the lasteelectionf the
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reor~ani~ation and ex anston of 1_jn? s~oeward policy, the Huks are
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14o Chinese and~Soviet responsibilities in Dairen ,~
of the reports of merchant vessel masters returning frame-airen indicates
that the Soviets control the operations of the port while the Chinese control
.the administration, For example9 berthing and communications are Soviet
responsibilities9 while cost?ms9 immigration9 police and labor are Chinese.
.The reporting officer comments that the Soviets9 controlling the operational
phase of the port9 probably are not interested in burdening themselves with
administration sa 1on as the Chinese administration functions efficiently.
C en Chin?se assumption of the Dairen administration follows
from the Sino~Soviet treaty of February 1950, :~s the reporting officer
suggestse Soviet control af' operations adequately protects uoviet interests
in the part, In any cases there has been no evidence of significant Sino~
Soviet friction regarding Dairerx,
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~+-, iii ., vtta CU1 i1i'CLt i-e oortiea?
STS naval un~'.ts in~ `"`he W?~xsan area re~art ??extensive Communist activity
south ?f Wonsan. airfield9?P with beach defenses being stx?en~thened~~-
Comgaents The W~arassn area has always been considered by the Commun-
ists as particuia,rly vulnerable to a ~JN amphibious- attack, Fear of such
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action ham induced them to deploy a sizeable.foree in a static coastal
Quality of_eriem_y agents improveda
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enemy agents were taken during the period 3 9u~a.st to 10 September, the
alit and methods of o eration of those captured are 'k~ecidedly improved."
25 sep 51
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Camrnen ~ Previously the enemy has employed the "saturation" technique
by using a great many low level, ~llmtrained agents with a limited mission
in the immediate vicinity of the battle linen The appearance of improved
front-line espionage techniques may be expected to enhance the enemy's
capability in this sector,
21. ,JAPAN/CHII~AD Radio Peinin~ claims US assembling 1~OQOa000-man Ja~aanese
r it .Alaskan Radio Peiping on 22 Spptember broadcast the claZm that
under the cloak of "emigration" the US is sending 1,000,000 Japanese to
il.aska "for war preparationsa" This broadcast .also included a report on
the formation and training of another bady of $5,000 Japanese PO~P's in
"lmerica9s Arctic bases of aggression," The FOW's allegedly were taken in
Burma, Malaya, Java9 Sumatra and "other islands north of Australia" in
1944 and 1945. The latter re ort is credited to a 10 September Telepress
dispatch from Ottawa,
mm n s This fantasy may have been con3ured up to "document" Comm-
unist charges of US aggressive intent towards Asia and~or to offset the
unfavorable publicity created by the Soviet failure to accaunt for 340000
Japanese POTNQS taken in Manchurian Sakhalin and the Kuriles in 1945.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN}
GERI~A;NYe East Germany rejects Western proposals for all-Berlin.: elections
precede alb-German elections: In a public statement on 19 eptember,
as German envier Grotewohl rejected the West Berlin counterproposal
that, in order to prove that its 15 September offer to hold free all-
German elections is sincere, East Germany first permit free all-Berlin
elections, Grotewohl laughed off this offer as a "diversonist tactic which
East Germany does not intend to follow," He denounced Western rearmament
plans and the "Bonn traitors," and again. dared West Germans to sit dovaz at
one table with East Germans in order to convince themselves that the`Volkskammer
offer to ne otiate unification is not simply a propaganda maneuver.
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Comment:- East Germany's rejection of all-Berlin elections probably will
be of some assistance in Western efforts to expose the falsity of the current
unity offer,
2, FRAi,'VCEa. French ress questions results of Ottawa Conference: The admission
o~(reece and Turkey to NATO is-the only thing which saved t e bttawa
Conference from being a failure, in the view of the Paris press. Most
papers consider the new coordination committee as a compromise to assuage
the fears of the smaller nationso Fro-government Fi aro questions the need
for the new groin since the de uties could resumably perform the functions
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Comment; The Faris press has tended to play up what it calls "the
revol~o~e small nations" at Ottawa, While this criticism bears out the
.apprehensions of those who warned against the psychological effect of another
inconclusive international meeting, French reaction on the whole to the
decisions of the past few weeks has been favorable,
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3a Prospective aid to France inadequate for meeting US objectives: .The
ECA Mission to France is "firmly convinced" that the 170,000,000 dollars
which now seems to be the ..limit of US economic aid to France far fiscal
1952 will not be adequate to maintain the level of economic activity con-
sidered by the UC to be essential for building Western defensee In view
of grave inflationary pressures and the stringent financial conditions,
France may be obliged to cut back its milita ro-ram if sufficien external
resources are not forthcomingo 2 5X1
Comments On the basis of military plans formulated in May 1951, the.
French. Finance Iviinistry estimated required economic aid .for 1952 at
300,000,000 dollarsa However, it soon judged that, with. heavy NATO and
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Indo-d~inese commitments, governmental instability, and fiscal inefficiency,
France would actually need between ~.p0,000,Op0 and 5009000,.000 dollars:
Even before the House of Representatives acted on tY~e, foreign aid bill,
French officials expressed their belief that French. defense plans would
have to be cut back or spread over a longer period,
Comment on Pleven governmentas defeat on minimum wa e bill; The
two-to-one de ea of t e P even governme
t
n
on the first reading of an .
escalator-type minimum wage bill will probably Lead to the posing of a
question of confidence when the bill receives its second reading in November,
The government, which had just decreed a 15 percent increase in the
minimum wage, zs firmly opposed to this bill as voted because of a fear that
it .would be seriously inflationary, and thus would imperil economic stability
and aggravate the rearmament burden, Grawin
that the measure would soon lead to another gnc reaselin ~ p~l~~~sw ~~;cate
which in France directly results in a revision of the whole wage structure,.
The government has. shown a willingness to compromise, however, and there
is still na reason to believe that the middle-of-the-road parties intend to
allow a situation to arise which would enable De Gaulle to come to power
on his own termso
5. AUSTRIAo Second Communist demonstration effectively controlled by Austrian
police: A second ammunist=stage demonstration against the rent-increase
measure, now under debate in the Austrian Parliament, took place 21 September.
A crowd, estimated at two to three thousand, which assembled during the
manning on the streets and sidewalks before the parliament., was dispersed.
by the .police, Communist intentions to occupy the parliament galleries were
foiled by the expedient of alloting available seats to police cadets, In-
clement weather and strong police patrols discouraged anv yiolPn+, demonstra-
tiveness on the part of the crowd
~
,
Commento Communist propaganda preceding the demonstration: had caused
some apprehension that Communist agitation might cause a larger disturbance
during the parliamentary hearings on the rent measure than they. did on
18 Septembero While it is believed that the Communists neither intended
nor achieved a very impressive display of strength, it is apparent that
Austrian police preparations were far more effective on this occasion than
they were during the Communist demonstrations last falls
6o SAN h~lRINO, Pro-communists retain lurality in`-San ~4arino governing bod ;
in uno ficia resu is of the recent San Marino national e ections give
the Communists and the pro-~ ommunist Socialists 31 seats in the Grand
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Council to 29 for the non-Communistso Qf the pro-Communist seats, 1~3 went
to the Communists and 13 to the Socialists; of the non-Carununist, 2 went
to the rightists and 27 to the Christian Democrats, who thus have a technical
right to form a government by virtue of the largest single ballot4 The
Christian Democrats, however, tivoizld obviously have difficulty in governing
unless they make a temporary deal with the pro-Communistso
These elections resulted from a "cold warn initiated by the Italian
Government to fosoe out .the revious ro-Communist overnment of San Marino,
Comment; San Marino has traditionally provided asylum to political
refugees from Italya Under its recent Communist government it has reportedly
housed arms caches for Italian Communis-tso
7o SPAINo Disciplinary action threatened against anti-Franco Basque clergy:
i~ e bishops in the asque region have hreatened severe disciplinary
.action, including excommunication, for any of their clergy who have any
connection whatsoever with the clandestine'Basque nationalist paper Egiz,
This paper, which is repoxted to be published by Basque priests, has ap-
peared for about three ears d has been highly critical of the Franco
25X1 regimen
Comment: The bishops action was undoubtedly taken at government insti-
gation, and indicates the regimegs continuing determination to deal with
Basque discontent by severe repressive measures, such. as were taken against
Basque workers who participated in, the strikes of last spring, The Basque
clergy have traditionally aligned themselves with the Basque people as op-
posed to the central governmentQ Many of them were actively involved in~
instigating the recent strikes, This new action will arouse further Basqua
ill will against the regime; but the government is apparently satisfied that
its harsh policies will minimize any threat to internal security,
8, ~10RWAYo braves are being concentrated to reduce Soviet intelligence o
orbunities: Nox?~regian out on ies, espite ovze o sections, are going
ahea with plans to concentrate Russian war graves sa that they can be
,properly cared far, according to a foreign office press statement, Graves
of Soviet World War II dead are -widely scattered throughout Norway, but
.principally in the three northern provinces where there ~
different cemeteries,
Commence This move is partly motivated by the Norwegian Governmentfs
desire~o -shop the numerous visits by Soviet attaches to the scattered graves,
particularly those located near military installations,
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SWEAENo Foreign Minister seeks to avoid UN milita commitments: The
we is Foreign. office as advised the Secretary-General of the UN-that
its government is not in, a position to propose any Swedish officers for
appointment to the panel of military experts as provided under paragraph
1(3 of the "uniting for peace" resolution adopted by the General Assembly
in November 195?. This negative announcement, coupled with the government's
apparent policy of delaying action on the proposal of the Swedish military.-
authorities to make a unit available,-has caused both the conservative and
liberal press in Sweden to accuse Foreign Minister Unden of seeking through
deception ,and procrastination to avoid the obligations. which. he assumed in
su ortina the "Acheson Plan" for UN collective military actiono
Gommenta The Swedish Government fears that its adherence to the
"Achesonan," which calls for the prior commitment. of national military
contingents to the UN for use in emergencies, would jeopardize Sweden's
"neutrality" if the UN supported the US in an attempt to counter Soviet
aggressiono Unden is therefore seeking an indirect way of reversing
Sweden's UN action of ten months agog
The Swedes are not alone in their dislike of the resolutions .British.
representatives in the UN in mid-August flatly acknowledged to Ameriean of-
ficials their government's dislike and stated that under present. circumstances
the UK objects to the basic concept of prior military commitments in the UN~
1C~a CUBAb Comment on resident's reversal of attitude toward labor, In his
recent ra. io a ress to the Guban people in which he enie rumors of his
resignation,. President Frio sharply criticized the country's labor unions,
stating "important labor groups have been led astray and urged to rebel,
amazing the people and dangerously increasing the unrest that has seized
the nation The announcement of strikes and_the constant threat to the
public power seem to be the invariable policy of the trade union," Follow-
ing this censure, the president refused to grant an audience to Eusebo
Pdujal and other prominent leaders of the influential, Confederation of
Cuban V4forkers
A revolutionary who played a, very active role in the campaign against
the abuses of the Machado regime,. Frio has long been considered a great
friend of the workers, and has even been accused by the local press of
permitting the labor unions to exert too much influence over the national
economyo His sudden reversal of attitude, particularly in the face of the
presidential elections next June, has produced a mild sensation and .much
speculation in public circlesQ In all probability it reflects the growing
concern among responsible Cubans that the irresponsible conduct of the labor
leaders is not -only blocking the .economic progress of the country, but is
also provoking an almost continuous state of uncertainty,
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17 25 Sep ~1.
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CIA No. 49358-A
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TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
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or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
SECTION' 2 (El~STERN)
2, .?? Burmese Foreign Minister opposed to UN appeal: The Burmese Foreign
Minister has informed US Ambassador Key that he was personally responsible
for his governments decision, in early September, to postpone an appeal to
the tTN regarding Chinese Nationalist troops in north Burma. He expresed
apps?ciation of an American offer to consider sympathetically any Burmese
request for assistance in settlin the Nationalist problem and promised to
submit it to the cabinets
Qo?: The Foreign i~nister has previously indicated an awareness
of the widespread embarrassment that might result from a Burmese appeal to
the UN. Other members of th? :abinet have strongly favored such a move.
TOP SECRET
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