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October 24, 1951
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Approve or Release 2005/01726 : eiA-RDP79 146A000500100001-6 TOP SECRET 24 October 1951 CIA No. 49395 Copy No. DAILY DIGEST Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIA, DOS AND USAF REVIEW COMPLETED 143 This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA, or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. TOP SE CR E T Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 Approveor Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T146A000500100001-6 TOP SECRET SECTION 1 (SOME la USSR. Soviet note re ected by US HICOM$ Austria: In a new exchange of notes, the US High Commissioner in Austria has flatly rejected the Soviet element's sharp note of 20 October which was in reply to American protests over Soviet confiscation of 500,000 maps prepared by the American Federation of Labor showing sites of slave labor camps in Russia. The Soviet note had vigorously attacked the AFL pamphlet and charged that American authorities in Austria were engaged in the "psychological pre- aration of the Austrian population fora new wax." 25X1 Comment; The incident of the slave labor maps and the attendant Austrian popular interest has touched a sensitive Soviet nerve. The affair is a phase in the US offensive in the Allied Council regarding the whole record of Soviet kidnapings, censorship,, and detentions in Austria. 2. RUMANIA. Jewish immigration to Israel.may be cut down: Accompanying an increased anti-Zionist press campaign, Communist Party activists in Rumania are calling on some 3,000 Jewish families awaiting exit visas to explain that 'good" Jews do not wish to emigrate and to sell a propaganda program of expanded employment for "good" Jews. A campaign of factory lectures in this vein is also being carried outs 25X1 Comment: The Rumanian Government's treatment of its Jewish minority closely parallels recent moves of the Bulgarian Government with regard to the emigration of ethnic Turks[ I It is probable that Rumania also may be finding it advantageous to o on to all available manpower. In March the Israeli Minister in Bucharest stated that between 200,000 and 250,000 Jews still remained in Rumania, and that if the flow of refugees continued at the same rate, most of them would have been re- moved from Rumania within three years. However, because of difficulties in securing exit visas, the Rumanian ship Transilvania, which is the only means of exodus permitted by the Rumanian Government, has not been carrying capacity loads in its last few voyages. TOP SECRET 1 24Oct51 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approve or Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP7911bn'146A000500100001-6 25X1 40 YUGOSLAVIA, Yugoslavs move to gain Western support for "national" Communism-, According to Party theoreticianvDjilas,, the USSR has brought the word "Communism" into such ill repute that the Yugoslav Government's greatest propaganda task is to convince the rest of the world that communism can be divorced from aggression in order to elicit Western support for the Yugoslav experiments. Ambassador Allen believes that the British Titoist Zilliacus is urging the Yugoslavs in this direction. Allen is inclined to believe,, however, that Yugoslav leaders are gradually coming to realize that Communism will never achieve support in the Western 25X1 world o Comment-. Djilas' statement is apparently an amplification of his recent complaint to General Collins that US support for Yugoslavia was based primarily on Yugoslav political and military defiance of the USSR rather than on its social and industrial policies. His statements suggest that Yugoslavia may be planning an intensified campaign to obtain greater Western support for its internal policies. It is quite likely that the Yugoslavs will use the Zagreb Peace Congress this week to feature this line by distinguishing between Yugoslav Communism and Soviet imperialism and emphasizing the thesis that equality of nations permits peaceful co-existence. TOP SECRET 2 24 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 Approveor Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T46A000500100001-6 25X1 SECTION 2 (EASTERN) 2? PAKISTAN. Government maintains stabi?~ lit, The US Embassy in Karachi reports complete calm prevailing in Pakistan following the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. It notes the absence in the press of any incitement to violence and states that an alert of the Pakistani armed services was canceled within tto cb.ys after the assassination. Finally, the Embassy remarks that the choices of Ghl'iam Mohammad and Khwaaa Nazimuddin as the new Governor-General and P.rimc Minister are the best o-ssible under the circu.mstaixaes. 25X1 Commento It appears that the Pakistani Uovernment has retained control of the situation for the time being and that there is little immediate danger of war either with India cr Afghanistan. 3. dRM.A INDIAN Ird1?an_ A,nbas dor h ittles KJL-Hshnu me According tc. the Ircian Ambassador in Rangoon, no important decisions are likely to be reached at the forthcoming meeting of the Indian and Burmese Prime Ministers. In support of this view, the Ambassador stated that Thakdn. Nu would confer with Nehru for only two days, while spending five in visiting various religious centers. The US Embassy commen+e that the general composition of Nu?s entourage substantiates these statements, but it points out that Myint Theirs, former Ambassador to China and senior member of Burma's diplomatic: corpswas included -w presumably to advise the/ Prime Minister on foreign affairsq 25X1 25X1 3 24 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 Approvel"F`or Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T`46A000500100001-6 Common s All reports concerning this meeting indicate that import- ant matters will be considered, but that little in the way of concrete action is likely to result. 25X1 4, ~UIMAv Army A aehe comments on Burmats security problem: The US Army Attache in Rangoon believes that Burmese Communists are capable of cap- turing Mandalay within forty-eight hours. He believes, however, that a more serious threat to the government is the possibility of a Communist attack in the north coordinated with a Karen campaign in the south. Ccarr~~nzs The Attache's estimate of the vulnerability of Mandalay to Communist capture accentuates the weakness of government forces in north-'central Burma. It also emphasizes the necessity of a government rapprochement with the Karens before control of upper Burma is entirely `most. 5+- Pry AInister shows timism in Indian Burmese Prime Minister Thakin Nu., currently in India to confer with Nehru, told a press confer- ence that five more years would be required to quell completely the rebellions against his government. He added, however, that the situation was improving and that "the three or four thousand" insurgents were no longer considered a serious threats Comment- These statements offer at least two glaring contradictions. Only a few months ago Nu stated that his "peace-within-one-year-plan" had been 95 percent successful and that henceforth Eurmans should shift their efforts "from peace to rehabilitation," As to the seriousness of the insurgency, the Burmese War Office now estimates that there are 1$,,500 active insurgents, and the Burmese Commander-in-Chief recently admitted that the initiative had passed from his hands to the rebels. 6, THAI AJND. D czrt es__-sail for China.- On 17 October, 231 Chinese deportees sailed from Bangkok for Swatow. Although 181 of these were criminal offenders, they were given a "royal sendoff" by the Chinese community. The Communists are expected to make additional propaganda use of these deportees when they arrive in China. The US Embassy in Bangkok attri- butes this approbation to (a) the Chinese belief that the deportees are victims of Thai discrimination and (b) a desire to ai n favor with the 25X1 Chinese Communist. regime. Co?mrt,. This is the first group of deportees that the Chinese Communists. have accepted in some time. It ends the problem for the Thais--until the jails are filled again. While the propaganda the TOP SECRET 4 24 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 25X1 NU.W Approved Flo Release 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP79T01MA000500100001-6 Communists may derive from this development will be of little practical values, the prospects of discovering able agents for future use in Thailand certainly must be attractive to the Communist authorities. 7. Effor to reduce animosity towardsolice reuortedm Police Director General Phao has announced that all invesitgative personnel will soon chenge to mufti, leaving only the enforcement elements in uniform. Phao himself will henceforth assume a civilian title. One purpose of these changes is to dispel public notion that the police are becoming an armed service." The US Embassy comments that these actions constitute an official admission of widespread criticism that the police force is a P9fr?eewheeling" armed force capable of challenging the army. In ad- dition, the Embassy believes that putting large numbers of policemen in mufti will make them less conspicuous, but probably will improve Phao's 25X1 secret service. 8. ZNDOCI3IIA TTietamesvilakaax him b military 4 ?a ions An official of the US Special Technical and Economic Mission reports that an attempt to provide relief supplies to Vietnamese civilians caught up in recent French clearing operations has miscarried, owing to the failure of the Vietnamese authorities to clear the project with the French and owing to the decision of the local French commander to "punish" some 10,000 military-age Vietnamese guilty of passive complicity with the Viet Minh. It was not clear what this punishment was to consist of, but the STEM official saw several thousand of these prisoners in a stockade with no shelter in evidence and, according to local reports, without food for two days. Another STEM official reported that 80 percent of the cases in a hoapital at Nam Dinh were civilian casualties of military operations. Both sources report that the depredations of French Union troops have created extreme sullenness among villagers throughout the area, and the sources question the wisdom of associatin American relief efforts with these operations. 9. D re makga trig rnph I etux?no Returning to Indochina after more than two months of consultation in Paris, Washington and London, General De Lattre received the most grandiose reception ever witnessed at the Saigon airport and eloquently reaffirmed his champion- ship of Vietnamese -.ndependence, Minister Heath found it significant that banners eulogizing De Lattre remained standing over night, which would not have been the case ae"a year or so ago." In contrast to Presi- dent Huuas reception a week earlier, there was little participation by Vietnamese school children and few Vietnamese were seen, although a holiday was declared for banks and business houses--an honor which had 25X1 not been accorded Huu. TOP SECRET 5 24 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 25X1 Approveor Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79TQ1146A000500100001-6 Comms o Vietnamese are likely to pay less attention to De Lattre1s promises than to the fact that the French authorities in Indo- china pay resounding tribute to De Lattre but do not even go to the airport to meet the President of Vietnam. 10. Local Chin?se s Cnt invasion with reserves e-scale Ibelieve that the rumored imminent Chinese Communist invasion 25X1 under General Cheer Kong will, if it comes at all, not occur for "some months." Current invasion rumors are attributed at least in part to 25X1 Viet Mir.h recruitment of "Tu-Kung" border tribesmen from both sides of the frontier. estimate the number of authentic Chinese advisers and specialists with the Viet Minh at 2,000, and the number of 25X1 Tu-Kung at 10,000. C mmesn s A large area embracing much of North Vietnam and South China is inhabited by various tribes which are neither Vietnamese nor Chinese, Viet Minh recruitment from among these tribes has greatly aggrava-ed the problem of determining when and to what extent a Chinese Communist invasion of Indochina can be said to have begun. 25X1 IT. N__o? Chi.. Minh urges solidarity of yellow races A Viet Minh broadcast of 18 October in the name of Ho Chi Minh urged Vietnamese not to join Bac Dais army remindin them "You are of the yellow 25X1 r1ace0 9? This is the first instance of race-consciousness in Viet Mink propaganda. 12. CHINA_,_, Chiare Kai-hell:forids "irreeularities?? in Formosan provincial es ;; ions President Chiang Kai-shek, reiterating his determination to oonursee Formosa to full democratization," instructed Premier Chen Chong on 21 October to take any steps necessary to prevent possible irregular- ities and frauds in the forthcoming elections for a Formosan Provisional Provincial Congress, according to a Taipei press dispatch. Premier Chen, who reportedly has initiated the self-government program for Formosa, expressed hope that the voters would not be "cowed by power and influence." F7 I 25X1 25X1 25X1 6 86M-1 Approved For Release 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP79TO1146A0005d&l Approvor Release 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP791146A000500100001-6 Commen - g On several occasions Chiang has expressed his intention to assist and cooperate with American efforts to eliminate corruption in the Nationalist regime. It appears that he has been influenced in this direction by Premier Chen, who reportedly believes that cooperation with the US at this time is the last hope of the Nationalists. Since the advent of Nationalist control over Formosa, the Formosan people have been agitating for a permanent, popularly elected, representa- tive governing body, heretofore denied them by the Nationalists. This is the first indication that the Nationalists plan to comply with this request, H wever, neither the principles of election to the body nor the extent of control which the body will exercise is made clear, 13. F r gn 4nUg i CYix e Nationalist Armes The American 25X1 military attaches in Taipei report that Formosan recruits are no longer being placed in Nationalist infantry units but are receiving specialist training for service in artillery, ordnance transportation and other special units. Gen jLts This information is consistent with reports of sizeable numbers of Formosan recruits receiving specialized training. Such a move, while satisfying long-standing Formosan objections to serv- ing in predominantly Chinese units, will also prevent the formation of any large bloc of Formosan soldiers. 14. P iof- Formosa 0 3 The cash deficit resulting from the heavy military expenditures of the Nationalists come to 60 percent of all govern- ment expenditures -n Formosa. The consequent strain on the economy is evi- denced by the inflation of prices,- retail prices in August were 24 percent higher than at the beginning of the year. As a consequence of the increase in prices, there is less inducement to save, the government finds it diffi- 25X1 cult to borrow, commodities are being horded, and interest rates have gone zap with an attendant discouragement to productive investment. The ECA office Taipei bssrvea thAt tha a1tn1tion dampens the effectiveness of ECA aid, omments The Chinese Nationalists, remembering the inflationary spiral which cost them public support on the mainland, are genuinely concerned over the.. upward trend of prices on Formosa. On the whole, the Nationalists are proving themselves fairly proficient in avoiding another inflationary spiral in the face of the currently large government deficits. Prices are rising but are not running away. A continuation of the government deficits, however, would inevitably force a resort to paper money issues. The situation will re- main precarious as long as the budget is so greatly out of balance, 7 21+ Oct 51 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 ApproAWFor Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79TU1146A000500100001-6 15. KOREA. Q i i.ets designate ngw g aers for truce talk : On' 22 October the Peiping radio announced that the "Chinese People?s Volunteers" in Korea had designated General "Pien Chang-wuB' to replace General Tung Hua on the truce team. It was further announced that General "Chen Du kon" of the North Korean=Arm would replace General Chang Pyong-san. 25X1 e s No information is available on either of these replacements. It may be speculated that the North Korean general is a staff officer, in- asmuch as most North Korean military unit commanders have been identified by prisoners of war. 16. ~n~?lation y graces ROK leveling offs Although wages and prices in the ROK continued to rise during September, the rate of in- crease was considerably less than during the spring and summer of 19510 This was apparently due to a "serious effort on the part of the Korean Govern- ment to stop inflation through (a realistic) fiscal policy." according to US economic advisers. The retail price index for 12 October averaged 3.4 percent higher than that of the previous month, but two items--fuel and gold--decreased in price. A:l ther heartening sign is that there would have been a decrease in currency issue had there not been a won advance to the UN forces. With the 12,500,000 dollars given to Korea as partial settlement for previous won advances to UN forces, US, UN and ROK officials are currently "working on plans...to decrease 25X1 won in circulation..." omm is This is the first encouraging note on South Korean inflation that has been detected since the beginning of the war. A continuously strenu- ous effort, however, will have to be made to preserve any advances made in bringing runaway inflation under control. TOP SECRET 8 24 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 25X1 Approve For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79Tv1146A000500100001-6 SECTION 3 (WESTERN) 1. GERMANYO Soviet harassment in Berlin viewed as move to seed shi ments ro as Gex~na er can officials e .eve that continued Soviet amass g o West Berlin is probably aimed specifically at the East-West German talks scheduled to begin on 23 October on iron and steel deliveries. East German press and government circles have violently accused the West Germans of delaying tactics in the current series of East-West German discussions on implementing the trade pact. US authorities suggested that the 23 October talks be postponed, and no agreement be reached with the East Germans until they actually abandon various harassing measures as agreed at the time of the signing of the trade 2 5X1 pact. So far the British and French continue to.show reluctance to take such strop counteractions 125X1 Comments Twice in the past week, the USSR rejected large numbers of West Beexport Permits.' French and British reluctance to take counter- action may arise partly from the belief that the effect on the Berlin economy of the various harassing measures has not been extremely serious, as well as from a general unwillingness at this time to challenge the Soviet right to control Berlin exports. ; 2. FRANCE. Deteriorating French financial situation threatens NATO interests file ff Am assa or in Paris is. increasing y concerned" over the deteriorating French financial situation and_over the "prevailing resentment" of French officials because of the delay in holding US-French talks on assistance. The A bbssador proposes immediate consideration of interim assistance pending the completion of a NATO committee analysis, and urges that the proposed talks begin at once., since uncertainty on the type and extent of aid will force the French Government into actions "that may well be injurious to NATO 25X1 interests." Comment: France wants definite US commitments as ,a basis for defense expen tares under the 1952 budget.. Because of unfavorable economic trends in France and the probability of early devaluation of the franc., it now seems increasingly unlikely that France will be able to meet its defense conpnit- ments. AUSTRIA. SHAPE opposes approach to Austria on milita plans: The Commanding genera of Forces in Austria has been a vise by SHAPE of its concern that any approach to the Austrian Government with respect to an Austrian military contribution in the event of hostilities might compromise the TOP SECRET 9 21.E Oct 51 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 ApproveFor Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79146A000500100001-6 security of Western defense plans. Any disclosure of an intention to include Austria in Western planning would provide the USSR with a propaganda weapon on the occasion of the reconvening of the Austrian treaty deputies. Further- more, an approach to the Austrian Government would appear to require prior Anglo-French approval on a diplomatic level. 25X1 Comment:: Vienna, under four-power occupation., does not provide suf- ficient safeguards for the protection of high military plans. Soviet sponsored and Communist newspapers have already charged that Western oc- cupation forces in Austria receive their commands from General Eisenhower. An approach to the Austrians now on military plans could jeopardize the chances for conclusion of a state treaty, which is the prerequisite for any substantial Austrian contribution to Western defense, Austrian manufacturers deliver embargoed ball bearings to Poland: The US Lega ion in zenna reports t a the eyr works delivered to Po and 100,000 dollars worth of embargo-type ball bearings during the months of August and September and will deliver,a large quantity of such types during October. Deliveries of embargoed items constitute 50 percent of total deliveries for the first two months and far exceed the quota governing such shipments, The: Austrian Foreign Office asserts that the excessive deliveries were necessary because Western orders had absorbed Steyr capacity in non-embargo types, and the filling of Polish orders was necessary if Polish coal is to be received. The US Legation shares the concern of the Austrian Government that Polish coal will be cut off unless Austria meets its total commitments and approves .a. still?endin g contract involving further large shipments of embargo- 25X1 type bearings, Comment.- Pending a survey of alternative sources of coal, the Austrian Govermeen and the US Legation agreed last August that the Austrians might accept sufficient. ball bearing orders to persuade the Poles to begin coal deliveries - with the stipulation that only distant delivery dates would be authorized and that actual embargo-type deliveries would not exceed 10 percent of the total. Grave political repercussions will probably result if there is a failure of coal deliveries during the winter months. ITALY. Italians seek to continue duty-free status of Libyan imports: The Ita fans are seeking a waiver from the General Agreement on Tarim and Trade signatories, authorizing Italy to continue temporarily the present preferential customs on Libyan imports after Libya attains independence. Under the present system, Italy allows practically all imports from Libya 10 21 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 Approve or Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T 1146A000500100001-6 TOP SECRET to come in duty-free,. Libya, however, does not grant such a preference to Italian goods. The Italians have made this offer as their contribution to assist Libyans economy during its initial period of independence? The French, Belgian' and Dutch GATT delegates have supported the Italian position, while the British are awaiting instructions from London. In the meantime, the Italians have indicated that they will not.present their request unless they are given prior assurance that they have US support. 25X1 Comment- The Italians are interested in preserving a substantial economic in Brest in Libya and this is one way of achieving it. The fact that over one-third of Libya's 1950 exports went to Italy indicates the extent of Libyan economic dependence upon Italy. However, the uncertain status of Italians in an independent Libya.may cause an exodus of Italians and thus alter the present trade pattern between Italy and Libya. 6, Italy seeks council seat in UN Food and Aariculture.Organination& insistienu Dnat the ui5 support their candidacy for membership in the executive council of the Food and Agriculture Organization, The Embassy points out that failure of Italy to acquire a council seat., after its huge outlays for an FAO headquarters in Rome, would place another weapon in the hands of extremist critics of the Italian Government, The Embassy urged further that 25X1 "fullest possible Italian participation in FA0 and other specialized agencies will encourage Italian support of the UN at a time when Italyes continued exclusion om membership is an important political issue." Comment: In addition to the fact that ItalyBs agriculture problem is one o. "its greatest concerns,, the fact that 'the Italian Government has not yet been admitted to the UN makes it particularly anxious to show the public that Italy nevertheless has strong participation in UN--sponsored organizations such as the FAO. 7. Communists threaten large-scale general strikes. In connection with the Common s sfl plan or e-so e economic" strikes on.the wages issue, the leadership-of the Communist-dominated-Labor Confederation (CGIL) has decided to demand general wage increases of about 15 percent, according to a speech by CGIL chief Di Vittorio at a meeting of the organizations directing body. He told the meeting that the CGIL hoped to Will increases "without conflict" through negotiations with Confindustria, the industrial- ists' organization, but that if the negotiations failed the workers would "concentrate forces thus unleashing those battles which would become 25X1 necessary,ft 25X1 11 21i. Oct 51 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 Approveor Release 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 Comment-. It is improbable that the CGIL will be able to carry out large-sca e9 general strikes without the support of the anti-Communist unions. The latter have announced their opposition to Communist demands for general wage increases to offset the rise in the cost of living, and are advocating instead a reduction in the cost of living. If no reduction is effected, the anti-Communist unions might support the CGIL in short, general strikes, Meanwhile, the CGIL, in view of its success during the last year in negotiating wage increases, may be able to secure further concessions from Confindustria through bargaining. CGIL success in either negotiations or in strike action would enhance CGIL prestige among labor at the expense of the anti-Communist unions, 8. SWITZERLAND. Stockpiling program near com leton: Swiss foreign trade figures in September shoes an ex )o t surplus fourthe. first time in two years. Contrary to the normal seasonal trend at this time, imports con- 25X1 tinued to decline. Comment.- A temporary surplus in monthly foreign trade figures is an occasion a, phenomenon in Swiss foreign trade. However, a number of reports have indicated that the stockpiling program has proceeded satisfactorily, in many cases to the levels established for-the, present. The Swiss may also anticipate a decline in world market prices, and this may have led to the reduction in purchases,, 9. UNITED KINGDOM, London Times and Manchester Guardian give their su ort to Conservative Par: Two days before the 25 October general election, The London Time s ande Manchester Guardian, two of the most respected inde- pendent daily newspapers in Britain, have swung their support to the Conservative Party. In leading editorials both newspapers stated their belief that Labor Party policies no longer serve the countryas best interests. In the 1950 general election the Guardian supported the Labor Party, while the Times remained neutral. Comment: The decision of these influential papers will likely persuade many l =era who had intended to abstain from voting as well as many of the still undecided independents to support the Conservatives. The critical Liberal vote should be especially sensitive to the views of the Guardian, which, though nominally independent, has a long Liberal tradition. 10. ARGENTINA. Foreign Minister has offered his resignation: Foreign Minister ammo emo zr no Ea o ere s resign.- ioon o President Peron as a result of a disagreement with administration economic policies. Informants 25X1 12 24 Oct l Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 swl~ Appro'fbd' For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 TOP SECRET 25X1 sag a it is unlikely that any action w: -i- o ~ d~j ~1 ~? --- vember presidential election. ~L_ ? T o USAF mission contract will not be renewed: The new Air Minister 11. mission o gen ins that Argentina is has advised e ie o not-renewing the contract for the retention of that missiono Reasons given by the government for include"f1rethearequirementdjustment longer and organization of the Argentine exists." Arrangements are now under way to transfer personnel and equipment. 25X1 fates that this action of the Argentine The US Embassy in Buenos Aires s Government appears to be another anti-US political move. The Embassy believes ld have referred to retain the mission* ne it Force wou tha h r n ? take lesson from Suez and Influential news a er sug ests Panama 12. pp at an i uen i ai y a ores c alms o reprisals. It reports, moreover, -1-1, Suez Canal with Egypt having a ran situa onsa a senses z "ran has manstrated, as did Mexi hattthe confiscation sagitationn has not resulted only in the suggestion that the UN purohase for Panama voice in the management; it says now is situation the onlto the Panama to agitate for concessions e Canal is parallel. La Hora asserts that the L1S is tooo p reoccupieduwithlt the cold war to desire ernfUTT with effect Va small a~~-Ysucand h a conflict in its 25X1 fear that the Comments La Hora is a noonday Pa~n~ea oCity lder brother of texSPresidented by ex Pric~ent Harmodio Arias, w ~es Arnulfo Arias and one of the most influential men in gamma. A scnd 13. VENEZUELA. Government quells new series of d 9orders in srineVenezue a: revolt e Venezu seri`~???e oT disor ers9 escri e y by Democratic Action and Cep sannounced tthataarmput ed dCi~viliansustormed an federal troops. The government SECRET 25X1 13 24 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 Approve or Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 officers training school and bombed several radio stations, while a clandestine radio broadcast news of the uprising and urged the public to participate. The oil fields, where Democratic Action influence is strong, apparently continue quiet. In a Havana interview following the incidents, Romulo Betancourt, leader of the Democratic Action forces in exile, denied that his followers condone violence as a political instrument, but warned that "Venezuela is 2 5X1 a volcano in eruption and there will be no public peace while the dictator- ship lastso"~ 25X1 14 24 Oct 5l Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6 UNCLASSIFIED when bla,,~ ,T~o~ ,~,g gt c gecrE p I I o declassi- fied when filled in form is ~c efa' c ee rom co ?r~o Wj%do`cu . ' G t ~~ k~QO ~ -~ CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY SOURCE CIA CO TROL NO. DOC. NO. DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED DOC. DATE COPY NO. LOGGED BY NUMBER OF PAGES NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns. REFERRED TO RECEIVED RELEASED SEEN BY OFFICE SIGNATURE DATE TIME DATE TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE/DIV. DATE MEN 10 ARCHIVE IEPRAnl~ ENT' : IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE JOB NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record. DOWNGRADED DESTROYED DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO BY (Signature) TO BY (Signature) WITNESSED BY (Signature) BY (Signature) OFFICE D TE TE F OF I E r F~eeease 2005/01/26 DATE : CIA-RDP79 OFFICE 01146A0005001001 DATE 6 SECRET Sr F73M 26 uaE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. TOP SECRET aD79, Approveor Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T146A00050010000r1 6 TOP SE CR E T 24 October 1951 CIA No. 49395-A Copy No. 49 25X1 25X1 TO THE DAILY DIGEST Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE. Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0005 100001-6 Appro'For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79101146A000500100001-6 TOP SECRET SECTION 2 (EASTERN) CYPRUS. Middle East Command a target of Cypriot Cmmunists: Increased Communist activity on Cyprus is designed not only to create unrest and em- barrass the British but also to create the impression that Cyprus is The US politically unsuitable for the Middle East Command Headquarters. .Consul on Cyprus, who expressed the above opinion, reports that the Commu- nist Party and the Nationalist Party are both renewin a itation for the union of Greece and Cyprus. Comments The recent visits of British and American military missions and the Egyptian refusal to participate in the Middle East Command have re- sulted in widely spread rumors to the effect that Cyprus will become a major Western base. The Cypriot Communists have long campaigned for theof union of Greece and Cyprus,, an issue on which they can gain the support most Cypriots and most Greeks. TOP SECRET 24 Oct 51 25X1 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6