DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 31, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECURITY INFORMATION
31 October 1951
-CIA No. 49413
Copy No. 1,
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant 'reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence'. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
State Dept. review completed
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SECTION 1 (sov=)
1, JSSR Uzbek cotton harvest reported endaneeredt Embassy Moscow reports
on a recut P s vos ok article that-contained an appeal from the.
'gzbekCouncil of Ministers and Party Central Committee to all agricultural
organs and workers for cooperation in averting serious cotton crop losses.
Monetary and in-kind incentives are to be offered, work norms. established,
delivery-requirements enunciated and nor-rural labor forces are to be
25X1 utilized,.
s According to the Embassy, this appeal climaxes a month
long spate of critical articles which have pointed out the growing
seriousness of the cotton harvest situation in Uzbekistan, The Soviet
press had previously stated that Uzbekistan produced an excellent cotton
crop, but that the harvest was delayed by faulty work organization and
nonpayment of earnings due the harvest workers. Finally., wet weather
caught the agricultural organization unprepared for mass drying.
C2EGHOSiTAKIA0 Ejpd n~ of esape train leaflets renoz?ds The US
Embassy in-.-Prague has.received reports that . balloon. leaflets telling the
story of the Czechoslovak escape train were found near Beroun and Kar-
lovy vary, in western Czechoslovakia, The embassy has evidence that the
leaflets are being clandestinely circulated in Prague,, No press,, radio
or goverment comment on the balloon release has been noted, but the
general response of Czechoslovak people is to believe the story carried
25X1 by the leaflets,
Gomments Balloons carrying leaflets describing the runaway train
incident were released from the American Zone of Cidrmany in late Sep-
tember. This is the first report from Czechoslovakia on the effects of
25X1 this operation.
25X1 4.
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utforn Marc
and Hungarian Danube barges and tankers were being fitted out
out has led to a complete discounting of the informations
and July a dozen Danube river mariners - Czechs,, Rumanians and Hun-
garians - were interrogated on this subject by US N&ty officers in Austria,
None of them had seen any blackout work being done on any of the ships
nor had any heard of plans for such work. The sources stated cthat Fif such
activities were being carried out it would be widely known,
Report #325 Vienna,, 12 Jul 51)
54 wo~?kex?s to honor October Reyoulz3 p"
rations in Hungary for he?.34.1h anniversary of the October, revolution
include increased work offers by factory employees. Other features of
the celebration will be the inauguration of operations at the Dunapem
tele Steel Works and the Inota Power Plant, en.exhibition of Soviet "Works
of Peace5, and-the recruitment of 15,,000 new members for the Hungarian-
25X1 Soviet Society,
d wa to celebrate a holiday in present day
d
te
25X1
r
n
UoZmenm s Thos a d
HOWary is to have the workers increase their production during the few
weeks preceding the holiday, The increased rate of production is then
used as a basis for a revision of the work norms?
PO Fo? maior airfield im~ov_ emend site, Within -a recent
eight day-period US Embassy. officials. in. Poland. identified four airfields
in north-east Poland at which major improvements and construction were
being undertaken, These four fields bring to eleven the total of known
major improvement and construction projects. Three of the eleven air-ri;
fields are- presentloccupied and eight are former German airfields not
now in. use,
.Mnj
q This first report osat,~aate~ep~nare being taken to
improvement in north-east Poland, suggests improve the air defenses of this area as part of the overall air defense
plan for Poland, Major airfield improvements are known to be underway
in south-west Poland.
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SECTION
(EASTERN)
t lv
2; EGYPT. Soviet Mini ter in ro re or d offers aidto 1-1 y The
pE Egyptian Foreign Minister
Soviet Minister in Cairo stated to the gyp ian
25X1 that the USSR would be willing to consider the exchange of gyp
cotton for Soviet oil should ,Anglo-Egyptian relations be broken off,
25X1
The Soviet Minister also promised
25X1
would hell), E t foment trouble with
Sudan,
that the USSR
ue canal and the
past two
C mm n a There has been.considerabie evidence during the addition
weeks that the Soviet Legation in Cairo and the local Communists, in
to Moscow R ad.io, have attempted to exploit the current tension in Egypt.
It is not possible at the present time, however, to confirm or den0TTman7 of
the rumors concerning recent developments in Soviet-Egyptian relations.
25X1
25X1
T, a; r; n~ forme. ion of a ~%ew Eat ian
x"11 Faro e or dlva?co d
25X1 G ? ~?,~y~er ents King Farouk arouk will replace the pres. t Prime Minister and his
25X1A Vvafd Party colleagues with a Palace government, Ind. en en would ' 25X1C
Former Premier Hussein
as 25X1
i
p
ersh
be the most l e .y candidate for the prem
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4. INDIA, ittea f orm~d, _dgrooo#~e the nt rna io .a1_Econom' donfere
in Moscow: The Indian press on 11 September ?eported. 'a statement issued
in Bombay the day previously by Professor D. D. Kosambi, "Member of the
Bureau of the World Peace Council," and by Professor P. A. Wadia, retired
member of the faculty of Wilson College, Bombay, and "Convenor of the All-
India Preparatory Committee for the forthcoming International Economic
-Conference" to be held in Moscow. The statement, which described the pur
pose of the Moscow conference, listed the following members of the Indian
Preparatory Committee: Ratilal Nanavati, Vice-President of the Indian
Merchants' Chamber; D. L. Shah, an obscure exporter, President of the
.All-India Export Association; N. M. Joshi, antiquated labor leader of
Bombay; Shibbanlal Saxena, outspokenly anti-government member of Parlia-
ment; S. A. Dange, leading member of the Communist Party of India. and
S. S. Mirajkar, Bombay Communist.
Comments As has been anticipated, the committee is comprised mainly
of educators and Communists or Communist sympathizers rather than of bona
fide economists or industrialists.' It is doubtful that any Indian industri-
alists of note can be persuaded to attend.
"5. Shipments ofmanganese ore to Japan get favored treatment: According
to the'US Minerals Attache in India, official records at the port of
Visakhapatnam (from which most of India's manganese ore is shipped) show
that, during the first eight months of 1951,, new clients in Japan received
105,000 tons of Indian manganese ore while old customers in the United
States got only 60,000 tons. This suggests that Indian ore shippers
supplying Japan have been unduly favored over those exporting to the.
25X1 United States.
Comment: India may be expected occasionally to favor Asian purchasers
over American ones. Indian favoritism in the above instance is not entirely
unfavorable to the United States, however, since a significant portion of
Japan's steel output is used in the Korean war. The quantity of manganese
ore imported by Japan in 1951 is far in excess of normal requirements and
was probably purchased during a raw materials buying spree in which Japan
indulged early in 1951.
25X1
6; BURMA. Swe ambitious to become Prime Minister: According to an
the Secretary General of
the Burma Socialist Party, U Ba we; is planning to run for Parliament
25X1A with a view to replacing Thakin Nu as the Prime Minister. The source
comments that Ba Swe believes that he can ,retain the support of the BWPP
and prevent it from going underground and joining the Burmese Communists,
C en Ba Sreg$ extreme leftist viewQ Are well known. He has
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recently been inacessible except to a few trusted Socialist intimates, and
it is impossible accurately to access his intentions. If he stands for
election there is no doubt that he will be returned, and he would then be
in a position seriously to challenge Thakin Nu,for the Premiership.
A Burmese Government headed by Ba $we would reverse the current trend
towards increasing cooperation with the Western powers and greatly increase
Burma?s vulnerability to Communist subversion.
7. Ms,ALAYA. e f i l~ur s closer AmQ"anaBri ,sh Ge a wor s Police
Commissioner Gray of the Federation of Malaya believes that closer US~UK
cooperation in Malaya is essential to successful operations against
Malayan Communists, and he cites several measures by which the US might
demonstrate its solidarity. These measures included the despatch of a
25X1
battalion of US Marines as 'aobserver&' and the assignment of a high-
ranking FBI officer to the Malayan police force. The US Consulate in
Kuala Lumpur was informed that these or similar proposals might b
Malayan government in the near future.
8. :INDONESIIA. S n ?s s eech may cause delay in Netherlands-Indonesian
discussions.
25X1 one resu
o res en u arno s United Nations Day speech be a further delay
25X1
in annulment discussions of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.
I I
C mm n ' Sukarno's hour-long UN Day speech consisted principally
of an elaboration of the theme that colonial imperialism is one of the
prime causes of international unrest. Reviling the Dutch record in
Indonesia, he characterized the Indonesians, during their struggle for
independence, as having been consistently conciliatory and the Dutch as
having been coercive, uncooperative, obdurate and intransigent. The
speech was delivered in English before a large audience,including the
diplomatic corps.
The Indonesian Government is currently seeking the bilateral abro-
gation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union within which the two nations
exist as equal partners under the Dutch Crown. The Indonesians regard
the Union as a vestige of colonialism.
9.. Comm_nnist Q itese newsp_a r urayes vau ion against deceptive tactics
of 18r c ion B? Ching e Sires Po, Chinese Communist daily in Djakarta,
duly noted a 1 October broadcast from Peiping which included the state-
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deceived by them."
ment9 "the present urgent work for the Overseas Chinese is to unmask the
Chiang group's crimes of selling out our country and undermining the Over-
seas Chinese .... 11 ?JjLZ2 stated, POseeing our new mother country become
more progressive and stronger day by day, and themselves appraching eclipse,
the reactionaries can only attempt to undermine and intimidate our com-
patriots. They fear closer diplomatic ties between New China and Indonesia.
.Therefore, we Overseas Chinese must unmask their nefarious face and not be
o n o It is estimated that one-third of the Overseas Chinese in
Indonesia are strong adherents of the Chinese Communist regime, one-third
are uncommitted but easily swayed by the course of events, and one-third
are pro-Nationalist or anti-Communist. The increasingly vigilant attitude
of the Indonesian Government in recent months toward Communism and the
Chinese Communists has undoubtedly inspired optimism among anti-Communist'
Chinese and given them some edge over the Communists in approaching the
politically uncommitted group in the Chinese community.
10. TH~ACLtND. R en _Rred ions_of coups dQ p: at discounted., The possibility
that Thai political elements will stage c&ap . d?etat in the near future
25X1 is considered remote
points out that there are insufficient armed forces available to wou
2 5X1A be plotters to ensure success of such a venture. I believes
25X1
that it is unlakely tha\, local Chinese Communists will attempt overt
action unless assured that Communist China is prepared to invade Thailand.
o3aam to The conclusions contained in this report are well-founded
and are generally supported by an evaluation of the situation in Thailand
recently submitted
The possibility remains, however, that violence will occur as a
result of the constant rivalry for power among the various factions within
the Thai Government which control the police and military forces.
11. INDOCHINl~o A a Denis.- seen between ChineseyCC mmunia s and Viet;Minhg: The
US Legation in Saigon estimates that the Chinese Communist relationship
with the Viet Minh is not the perfect association which has often been
pictured. Evidence is available that the overwhelming majority of Viet
,Minh adherents dislike and fear the Chinese Communists and that the Viet
Minh leaders have resented the interference of political advisers and
'a'administrators" through whom the Chinese have attempted to guide Viet
Minh policy. The Legation warns against the conclusion, that a serious
rupture has already taken place, but comments that current friction may
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assume serious proportions more rapidly than has heretofore been thought
25X1 possible.
Comments Reports have been received periodically of antagonism
between inese Communist advisers and Viet Minh officials, and of rank
and file resentment of Chinese instructors. Such hostility, which has
deep historical roots., probably limits. the numbers and influence of the
Chinese Communists in the Viet Minh movement.
12,, CHINA. Indications of Peipin 's preparations for world war cited.- The
Consul-General n Hong Kong .believes a recent Chinese Communist
statements, as well as reports from the mainland, indicate that the
Peiping regime is increasingly taking a long view'and preparing for a
possible world war. He feels-that Peiping's efforts.to build defense
installations, to train and equip the CCF, to organize militia, to wipe
out opposition, to push land-reform, and to extract money for armaments
are ??not primarily" for operations in Korea or against Formosa. The
Consul-General speculates that Peiping's willingness to negotiate in
Korea may.indicat? desire for te. order to build up the regime's
25X1 overall strength.
Comment.- An authoritative Soviet journal recently stressed that
war is not necessarily inevitable. There is no doubt, however, that
Peiping's political-economic-military program is designed to prepare for
the possibility of global war. It may be speculated that Moscow and
Peiping have decided that it'is 'profitable to dissipate Peiping's
human and material resources, and to risk the crippling of the Chinese.
military establishment, in peripheral ventures in Korea or in Southeast
Asia. However, Peiping's true intentions are not known, and large-scale
Chinese operations in. both Korea and Southeast Asia remain possible at
any time.
13e Peiping proposes exchange of Europeans in Chins for Chinese in
Ma la s Indian Ambassador Pan.i ar has repo rte di-y- ormed ri s
au horities in Hong Kong of-a Chinese Communist proposal to exchange all
"Europe It now detained in Communist China for Chinese imprisoned in
25X1 Malaya.aTlLi I
Comments Apart from UN POW's taken in Korea, about 20 US nationals
are imprisoned in Communist China, another 30 are under house arrest, and
possibly 150 are unable to obtain exit permits; as many as 100 other" for-
eign nationals of all kinds may be in similar situations. Several hundred
Chinese, apprehended in terrorist activities in Malaya, have been jailed
by the British authorities. I t is conceivable that Peiping has proposed
or will propose an exchange of all or some Europeans held in China for
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Chinese held in Malaya and other Southeast Asian areas but this alleged
proposal has not been confirmed F_ I
714 Peiping launches movement to "reform ideology" of universi
25X1
orming?the idgclogy" of Chinese university teachers. The four month
course is to involve a study of basic Communist works and a thorough
criticism and self-criticism" of each participant's theory and practice.
Peiping radio has commented that, while most teachers have accepted the
"general political principles of new democracy," they retain "some
European and American capitalist ideology" which must be eradicated.
teachers: The Peiping regime as? launched a s dy program aimed at 'x'?-
Comments Some 3,000 of China's estimated 10,000 teachers at the
univers y evel have begun to reform their ideology in the new program,
which will doubtless extend to the remainder. University teachers have
been reported as generally antagonistic to the regime. The systematic
imposition of the Communist world-view, regarded by most, of these
teachers as barbarous and farcical, will complete their process of disaf-
fection, but-it is not likely that the teachers, unqualified for other
work, will actively resist the Communist program.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
EAST GE=NY.. Results of economic plan show decline in rate of fulfillment:
un er last ermany s Five
tonom~c results or e it guar er ? Although the government claims
Year Plan were announced on 26 Octobers rke that several targets were fulfilled and over-fulfilled, there is aua sar ed.
deficiency in the machine construction and electro-engineering The The planned production quo~asof ' thelr pwere ortnshowsha lower ratehof plan
by. and large, was good. I ge
in thetmachine
fulfillment than in the previous two quarters. The failure
industry is particularly important, but Lcz emphasis on the metallurgical industry.
2. FRANCE. Schuman plans only to sketch federation scheme at Strasbour :
Despite Foreign Minis er 5chumanIs recen announcement ttza PFFE-nee-70-uld
propose a European federation at the November Council of Europe session,
the US Ambassador in Paris believes that the French Government is still
The Foreign
undecided as to the time and method of launching such a pVan..d be a reigns]
Minister has indicated that his initiative at Strasbourg fashaope and
one, by which he would introduce the problem only in "summary
in order to use the Council of Europe as a "laboratory" for a discussion.
beprincipal
Nevertheless, while'the.federation scheme fits
ele a y ei tolong-
term French policy trends, its advancement may now leaders in order to persuade Parliament that ac nited.Euro e which the
prospective European Army can
25X1
federation c
Comment: British coolness toward European
plans for achievement of this objective. more benevolent
and military integration, however, together with the UK.
attitude in recent months and Churchillts return to power, is encouraging
the proponents-of closer political ties.
3. ITALY. Issue of em 16 ee dismissals threatens aanttis o e eistglabor unity:
e ommunis an an i ommunls a or
bitter dispute over the mass dismissals scheduled for employees :of Breda's
electrical plant near Milan. The company has worked out with the Labor
Ministry a reorganization plan whereby it would dismiswoulthbonus pad ments
3,000 of its 12,000 workers, Half
training schools,
The Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation (CGIL) and the
democratic Socialist Union of Labor (UIL) have rejected the_plan, and have
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ThefCG
denounced the Christian Democrat
ollusion with the government.
accepting it and for alleged c
called a 2 hour rotest strike in all Milan metallurgical plants.
2.5X1
consistently fought, frequently with strike
comment: The COIL has industries of North
action-,Marge.scale layoffs of employees in the heavy BY its
Italy where Communist strength. among the workers is greatest.
stand on the purely economic issue involved in the Breda case, thetCCOILIL's
prestige among labor. Moreover, by.securing
will enhance its own t '11 make the formation of a strong
25X1
support in denouncing the Glob,
nti-Communist labor front more difficult.
Local elections for south Ital to be held next s ring: Interior
a e municipa an provirici elections for
Minister Sce a as s a e of 1952. This will complete the
ring
south Italy will be held in the sp
in May-June of this
series of elections be in north and central Italy
comment: humors that the south I a i had recently been
fort s fa 1 would probably be postponed until spring confirmed by a high official in Premier de Gasp i'ofChristian Democratic,
Party. The spring elections will serve as a guag
which showed an increase in the May-June elections in north andIcentrawould
the government in the spring
Italy, A favorable showing by
who -wish
strengthen the position of^toose Christian
fall of l952arather than inethexspring
t 1 an elections originally scheduled
25X1 . nation
of 1953
5 SWITZERLAND, Swiss elections for National Council show little change
T e elec ions o tie 1mver house o t e tines Par lament show it e shift
With 49 of the 196 seats still
in the political sentiments of the voters.
to be decided, the Conservatives have gained three seats, the Peasant Party
lIndependents, the
and Social Democrats have each gained r two, while the
Democrats
Radicals, the Liberals, and the
The Swiss Communist Party lost two of its seven seas. It a oo won only
Two
one unit in se~ctedsinaGeneva,eandroneieach inoBasel and Zurich.
Communists were
All parties, including the Communist, were agreed on a traditional
25X1 policy of neutralit . The Communists, however campaigned against Swiss
rearmament.
Comment: As anticipated little political shift has actually occurred
as a result of the elections. The Communists' retention of five out of
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25X1 the seven seats they held is surprising in view of the drastic decline in
party strength which has been reported for some time.
25
8_ COT.nM TA_. TTrdaneta may succeed Gomez as President: President Gomez
Congress was convoked at 2200 hours on 30 October to elect a Vice-Presidents
who will probably be Minister of Government Urdaneta, already Vice-President
under a 1950 decree. Departmental governors have been alerted, and the army
in Bogota has been confined to garrisons,
Comment: Gomezvs health has been known to be precarious since
September 19'0, and Minister of Government Roberto Urdaneta has consequently
had an important voice in governmental decisions for some time, Urdanet a
is a strong Hispanophile, but he would be unlikely to change the present
pro-US orientation of the Colombian Government,
Although the replacement of Gomez would increase prevailing unrest to
some extent, and although sporadic outbreaks of violence, frequent in recent
years, may be expected to recur, the opposition Liberal Party has lost
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power and influence to such a degree that it is probably not now capable
of even a determined attempt to overthrow the government.
9. ECUADORa Twenty-four-hour strike adds to political unrest: According to
press repor s, 70,000 Ecuadoran wor ers went on a -our strike throughout
the country in a protest against Congress on 29 October. The Confederation
of Ecuadoran Workers called the strike because Congress failed to adopt
a program demanded by the union. The union program called for changes in
road conscription laws, additional social security legislation, strengthening
25X1 of civil service, a general increase in wages, price controls, and revisions
t 1 aws
25X1
in the income ax
Comment: The total membership of the Communist-controlled Confeder-
ation o Ecuadoran Workers is approximately 70,000, and it is likely that
only about 20,000 were out on strike. Nevertheless, the strike reportedly
affected many stores and all transportation facilities. The presently
tense atmosphere will continue so for several days. Repercussions of an
added to the
r h
ave
attempt to assassinate Guevara Moreno on 2_5 Octobe
aquil
f Gua
it
t
y
y o
c
general unrest, particularly in the key por
10. NICARAGUA. New communist weekly being published: A Communist- 'ne weekly
newspaper c e Orzen aczon as begun publication in Managua. 1 -1
reports that the paper is 'Tie new mouthpiece of the Communist Par y.an i
intended as a successor to Voz Sindieal, the defunct organ of Nicaragua's
General Confederation of Labor. The US Embassy comments that the contents
and number of copies printed appear to confirm the view that the Communist
Party has embarked on a new campaign to propagate the Kremlin's line-in
Nicaragua, The close similarity between Communist propaganda-in other
countries and that now appearing in Orientacion further suggests that the
coordination and contacts of the Commun s arry with similar Communist
or anizations outside Nicaragua have recently been improved.
F F
25X1
Comment z The publication of this new weekly following, as it does,
closely e ind the circulation of the Communist-line handbill at the Fourth
Latin American Regional Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations of the
United Nations confirms the Embassy's conclusion and presages a period of
renewed activity on the part of Nicaraguan Communists.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
31 October 1951
CIA No. 49413-A.
Copy No. 49
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA,
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. .
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. IRAN Moderates in Iran campaign to remove Mossadeq: Minister of Court Ala
reports that Iranian political moderates are planning a campaign to replace
Prime Minister Mossadeq by Ahmad Qavam, to whom the Shah has privately given
his support. The moderates hope to accomplish their aim by p rivaaadinmenta
Mossadeq to retire upon his return to Iran, or by using normal pry
methods to unseat him.
The Shah would hesitate to remove Mossadeq if the latter were to rid
25X1 himself of unsavory advisers and transfer Iranian nationalist sentiment into
constructive channels. However, he would feel compelled to
should the latter continue to insist on his present policy.
Comment: When Mossadeq returns, he will face opposition from elements
within his own party as well as from the moderates and the left. Previous
opposition to Mossadeq, however, has quickly evaporated, Unless the opposition
can manage to enlist whole-hearted nationalist support, it seems highly unlikely
that the Prime Minister can be easily removed.
25X1
Iranian Forei n Minister asser
ts that Iran's stand on the oil dispute
ed the US Ambassador in
f
remains unchan ed: The Iranian Foreig
Iran on 29 October that there had bee
on the oil dispute. The Minister rei
Iran would negotiate with the British
25X1 cation of oil to Britain and compensa
orm
n Minister in
n no change in his government's attitude
terated that the only points on which
were then the concerning the future allo-
tion due the AIOC for the nationalized
of Iranian oil we
sin
e
properti_e The development, extract
int ernal mat Lers and. not subject to n.
g
s
ion and proc
egotiatzuln with Britain.
25X1
Com~ent: Th
ere is no reliable e
vidence to indicate th;-,.t t,p ere has been
ute
il dis
3
any weakening of
INDOCHINA. Do
the Iranian attitude
ttreblamed for lac
.
p
in the o
k of Vietnamese mission in US: The Vice-
th that Premier Hun had
H
.
Prem_ier of the Vietnamese Government
thus far refused to appoint a ministe
ea
told Minister
r to the US out of deference to the
25X1
wishes of General De Lattre.
Comment: The strong suspicion which General De Lattre has displayed with
respect to US policy in Indochina lends plausibility to this report. Rivalries
among Vietnamese politicians may have been a contributing factor.
4. JAPAN. Soviet diplomatic personnel to e t sp(cial ..identific2_tion cards: The
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Department of State has informed the US Political Adviser in Tokyo that it
25X1 favors SCAP's plan to issue d st_'nctively colored identification cards to
r ovi c diplomatic personnel as a measure to emphasize that their presence in
Tr. an is only by virtue of the USSR T s members ?i i-) in the Allied Council.
Coimnent: All diplomatic personnel in Japan except the Soviets are
accredited to SOAP. With the coming into force of the peace treaty the raison
dTetre of the Allied Council will be ended, and the continued presence of
Soviet diplomatic personnel in Japan presumably will be subject to negotiation
between Japan and the USSR. As a first step toward independent contact with
the Japanese Government, the Soviet Member of the ACJ has extended an invitation
to high Japanese officials to attend a social event at the Soviet Embassy on
7 November, thus assuming the privileges recently granted by SOAP to the
accredited foreign missions.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
5. FRANCE. Parliament reported hostile to German NATO membership: If the French
National Assembly suspects that German accession to NATO is implied in French
ratification of the European Defense Forces, the government will suffer a
severe defeat when this question is debated in the near future, according to
25X1 the US Embassy in Paris.
Comment: While the attitude of the French Foreign Office on this issue
has changed completely in the past two years, popular opinion is still violently
opposed to German participation in NATO.
The government hopes to sidestep the question during the forthcoming
foreign policy debates in Parliament and thereby to gain time for a gradual con-
version of public opinion.
6. SWEDEN. Swedish official hopeful regarding Polish trade negotiations:
The American Embassy in Stockholm reports that the Swedish Assistant Foreign
Minister gives the impression that he hopes to reach an agreement with Poland
on terms somewhat better than the present agreement, but including a
substantial amount of List I bearings.
Comment: During the trade year ending on 31 October Sweden obtained
approximately 3,200,000 tons of coal and 200,000 tons of coke from Poland;
Swedish exports included 700,000 tons of iron ore (worth six million dollars)
and bearings valued at one million dollars, including 600,000 dollars worth of
List I bearings. It is doubtful whether Sweden could, even if it so desired,
completely replace Polish coal with supplies from other sources. However,
Sweden "regards a trade agreement as necessary for political and strategic
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reasons}'; and therefore it is evidently prepared to export a certain quantity
of bearings and iron ore to Poland. in order to obtain an agreement.
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