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October 31, 1951
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Approve, For Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP791*146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 31 October 1951 -CIA No. 49413 Copy No. 1, DAILY DIGEST Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This summary of significant 'reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence'. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. State Dept. review completed TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 Approveor Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP70'f146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET SECTION 1 (sov=) 1, JSSR Uzbek cotton harvest reported endaneeredt Embassy Moscow reports on a recut P s vos ok article that-contained an appeal from the. 'gzbekCouncil of Ministers and Party Central Committee to all agricultural organs and workers for cooperation in averting serious cotton crop losses. Monetary and in-kind incentives are to be offered, work norms. established, delivery-requirements enunciated and nor-rural labor forces are to be 25X1 utilized,. s According to the Embassy, this appeal climaxes a month long spate of critical articles which have pointed out the growing seriousness of the cotton harvest situation in Uzbekistan, The Soviet press had previously stated that Uzbekistan produced an excellent cotton crop, but that the harvest was delayed by faulty work organization and nonpayment of earnings due the harvest workers. Finally., wet weather caught the agricultural organization unprepared for mass drying. C2EGHOSiTAKIA0 Ejpd n~ of esape train leaflets renoz?ds The US Embassy in-.-Prague has.received reports that . balloon. leaflets telling the story of the Czechoslovak escape train were found near Beroun and Kar- lovy vary, in western Czechoslovakia, The embassy has evidence that the leaflets are being clandestinely circulated in Prague,, No press,, radio or goverment comment on the balloon release has been noted, but the general response of Czechoslovak people is to believe the story carried 25X1 by the leaflets, Gomments Balloons carrying leaflets describing the runaway train incident were released from the American Zone of Cidrmany in late Sep- tember. This is the first report from Czechoslovakia on the effects of 25X1 this operation. 25X1 4. l 31Oct51 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 Approv +For Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP791 I46A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET utforn Marc and Hungarian Danube barges and tankers were being fitted out out has led to a complete discounting of the informations and July a dozen Danube river mariners - Czechs,, Rumanians and Hun- garians - were interrogated on this subject by US N&ty officers in Austria, None of them had seen any blackout work being done on any of the ships nor had any heard of plans for such work. The sources stated cthat Fif such activities were being carried out it would be widely known, Report #325 Vienna,, 12 Jul 51) 54 wo~?kex?s to honor October Reyoulz3 p" rations in Hungary for he?.34.1h anniversary of the October, revolution include increased work offers by factory employees. Other features of the celebration will be the inauguration of operations at the Dunapem tele Steel Works and the Inota Power Plant, en.exhibition of Soviet "Works of Peace5, and-the recruitment of 15,,000 new members for the Hungarian- 25X1 Soviet Society, d wa to celebrate a holiday in present day d te 25X1 r n UoZmenm s Thos a d HOWary is to have the workers increase their production during the few weeks preceding the holiday, The increased rate of production is then used as a basis for a revision of the work norms? PO Fo? maior airfield im~ov_ emend site, Within -a recent eight day-period US Embassy. officials. in. Poland. identified four airfields in north-east Poland at which major improvements and construction were being undertaken, These four fields bring to eleven the total of known major improvement and construction projects. Three of the eleven air-ri; fields are- presentloccupied and eight are former German airfields not now in. use, .Mnj q This first report osat,~aate~ep~nare being taken to improvement in north-east Poland, suggests improve the air defenses of this area as part of the overall air defense plan for Poland, Major airfield improvements are known to be underway in south-west Poland. 2 31 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP79TO1146AO00500150001-1 ApprovfFor Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET 25X1 SECTION (EASTERN) t lv 2; EGYPT. Soviet Mini ter in ro re or d offers aidto 1-1 y The pE Egyptian Foreign Minister Soviet Minister in Cairo stated to the gyp ian 25X1 that the USSR would be willing to consider the exchange of gyp cotton for Soviet oil should ,Anglo-Egyptian relations be broken off, 25X1 The Soviet Minister also promised 25X1 would hell), E t foment trouble with Sudan, that the USSR ue canal and the past two C mm n a There has been.considerabie evidence during the addition weeks that the Soviet Legation in Cairo and the local Communists, in to Moscow R ad.io, have attempted to exploit the current tension in Egypt. It is not possible at the present time, however, to confirm or den0TTman7 of the rumors concerning recent developments in Soviet-Egyptian relations. 25X1 25X1 T, a; r; n~ forme. ion of a ~%ew Eat ian x"11 Faro e or dlva?co d 25X1 G ? ~?,~y~er ents King Farouk arouk will replace the pres. t Prime Minister and his 25X1A Vvafd Party colleagues with a Palace government, Ind. en en would ' 25X1C Former Premier Hussein as 25X1 i p ersh be the most l e .y candidate for the prem TOP SECRET 3 31 Oct 5l Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 Approve or Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T 146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET 4. INDIA, ittea f orm~d, _dgrooo#~e the nt rna io .a1_Econom' donfere in Moscow: The Indian press on 11 September ?eported. 'a statement issued in Bombay the day previously by Professor D. D. Kosambi, "Member of the Bureau of the World Peace Council," and by Professor P. A. Wadia, retired member of the faculty of Wilson College, Bombay, and "Convenor of the All- India Preparatory Committee for the forthcoming International Economic -Conference" to be held in Moscow. The statement, which described the pur pose of the Moscow conference, listed the following members of the Indian Preparatory Committee: Ratilal Nanavati, Vice-President of the Indian Merchants' Chamber; D. L. Shah, an obscure exporter, President of the .All-India Export Association; N. M. Joshi, antiquated labor leader of Bombay; Shibbanlal Saxena, outspokenly anti-government member of Parlia- ment; S. A. Dange, leading member of the Communist Party of India. and S. S. Mirajkar, Bombay Communist. Comments As has been anticipated, the committee is comprised mainly of educators and Communists or Communist sympathizers rather than of bona fide economists or industrialists.' It is doubtful that any Indian industri- alists of note can be persuaded to attend. "5. Shipments ofmanganese ore to Japan get favored treatment: According to the'US Minerals Attache in India, official records at the port of Visakhapatnam (from which most of India's manganese ore is shipped) show that, during the first eight months of 1951,, new clients in Japan received 105,000 tons of Indian manganese ore while old customers in the United States got only 60,000 tons. This suggests that Indian ore shippers supplying Japan have been unduly favored over those exporting to the. 25X1 United States. Comment: India may be expected occasionally to favor Asian purchasers over American ones. Indian favoritism in the above instance is not entirely unfavorable to the United States, however, since a significant portion of Japan's steel output is used in the Korean war. The quantity of manganese ore imported by Japan in 1951 is far in excess of normal requirements and was probably purchased during a raw materials buying spree in which Japan indulged early in 1951. 25X1 6; BURMA. Swe ambitious to become Prime Minister: According to an the Secretary General of the Burma Socialist Party, U Ba we; is planning to run for Parliament 25X1A with a view to replacing Thakin Nu as the Prime Minister. The source comments that Ba Swe believes that he can ,retain the support of the BWPP and prevent it from going underground and joining the Burmese Communists, C en Ba Sreg$ extreme leftist viewQ Are well known. He has TOP SECRET ?~ 31 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP79T01146A00050015000 1 25X1 Approve or Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79 146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET recently been inacessible except to a few trusted Socialist intimates, and it is impossible accurately to access his intentions. If he stands for election there is no doubt that he will be returned, and he would then be in a position seriously to challenge Thakin Nu,for the Premiership. A Burmese Government headed by Ba $we would reverse the current trend towards increasing cooperation with the Western powers and greatly increase Burma?s vulnerability to Communist subversion. 7. Ms,ALAYA. e f i l~ur s closer AmQ"anaBri ,sh Ge a wor s Police Commissioner Gray of the Federation of Malaya believes that closer US~UK cooperation in Malaya is essential to successful operations against Malayan Communists, and he cites several measures by which the US might demonstrate its solidarity. These measures included the despatch of a 25X1 battalion of US Marines as 'aobserver&' and the assignment of a high- ranking FBI officer to the Malayan police force. The US Consulate in Kuala Lumpur was informed that these or similar proposals might b Malayan government in the near future. 8. :INDONESIIA. S n ?s s eech may cause delay in Netherlands-Indonesian discussions. 25X1 one resu o res en u arno s United Nations Day speech be a further delay 25X1 in annulment discussions of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. I I C mm n ' Sukarno's hour-long UN Day speech consisted principally of an elaboration of the theme that colonial imperialism is one of the prime causes of international unrest. Reviling the Dutch record in Indonesia, he characterized the Indonesians, during their struggle for independence, as having been consistently conciliatory and the Dutch as having been coercive, uncooperative, obdurate and intransigent. The speech was delivered in English before a large audience,including the diplomatic corps. The Indonesian Government is currently seeking the bilateral abro- gation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union within which the two nations exist as equal partners under the Dutch Crown. The Indonesians regard the Union as a vestige of colonialism. 9.. Comm_nnist Q itese newsp_a r urayes vau ion against deceptive tactics of 18r c ion B? Ching e Sires Po, Chinese Communist daily in Djakarta, duly noted a 1 October broadcast from Peiping which included the state- TOP SECRET 5 31 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approvefi or Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T&tI46A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET deceived by them." ment9 "the present urgent work for the Overseas Chinese is to unmask the Chiang group's crimes of selling out our country and undermining the Over- seas Chinese .... 11 ?JjLZ2 stated, POseeing our new mother country become more progressive and stronger day by day, and themselves appraching eclipse, the reactionaries can only attempt to undermine and intimidate our com- patriots. They fear closer diplomatic ties between New China and Indonesia. .Therefore, we Overseas Chinese must unmask their nefarious face and not be o n o It is estimated that one-third of the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia are strong adherents of the Chinese Communist regime, one-third are uncommitted but easily swayed by the course of events, and one-third are pro-Nationalist or anti-Communist. The increasingly vigilant attitude of the Indonesian Government in recent months toward Communism and the Chinese Communists has undoubtedly inspired optimism among anti-Communist' Chinese and given them some edge over the Communists in approaching the politically uncommitted group in the Chinese community. 10. TH~ACLtND. R en _Rred ions_of coups dQ p: at discounted., The possibility that Thai political elements will stage c&ap . d?etat in the near future 25X1 is considered remote points out that there are insufficient armed forces available to wou 2 5X1A be plotters to ensure success of such a venture. I believes 25X1 that it is unlakely tha\, local Chinese Communists will attempt overt action unless assured that Communist China is prepared to invade Thailand. o3aam to The conclusions contained in this report are well-founded and are generally supported by an evaluation of the situation in Thailand recently submitted The possibility remains, however, that violence will occur as a result of the constant rivalry for power among the various factions within the Thai Government which control the police and military forces. 11. INDOCHINl~o A a Denis.- seen between ChineseyCC mmunia s and Viet;Minhg: The US Legation in Saigon estimates that the Chinese Communist relationship with the Viet Minh is not the perfect association which has often been pictured. Evidence is available that the overwhelming majority of Viet ,Minh adherents dislike and fear the Chinese Communists and that the Viet Minh leaders have resented the interference of political advisers and 'a'administrators" through whom the Chinese have attempted to guide Viet Minh policy. The Legation warns against the conclusion, that a serious rupture has already taken place, but comments that current friction may TOP SECRET 6 31 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 25X1 25X1 Approveor Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T'146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET assume serious proportions more rapidly than has heretofore been thought 25X1 possible. Comments Reports have been received periodically of antagonism between inese Communist advisers and Viet Minh officials, and of rank and file resentment of Chinese instructors. Such hostility, which has deep historical roots., probably limits. the numbers and influence of the Chinese Communists in the Viet Minh movement. 12,, CHINA. Indications of Peipin 's preparations for world war cited.- The Consul-General n Hong Kong .believes a recent Chinese Communist statements, as well as reports from the mainland, indicate that the Peiping regime is increasingly taking a long view'and preparing for a possible world war. He feels-that Peiping's efforts.to build defense installations, to train and equip the CCF, to organize militia, to wipe out opposition, to push land-reform, and to extract money for armaments are ??not primarily" for operations in Korea or against Formosa. The Consul-General speculates that Peiping's willingness to negotiate in Korea may.indicat? desire for te. order to build up the regime's 25X1 overall strength. Comment.- An authoritative Soviet journal recently stressed that war is not necessarily inevitable. There is no doubt, however, that Peiping's political-economic-military program is designed to prepare for the possibility of global war. It may be speculated that Moscow and Peiping have decided that it'is 'profitable to dissipate Peiping's human and material resources, and to risk the crippling of the Chinese. military establishment, in peripheral ventures in Korea or in Southeast Asia. However, Peiping's true intentions are not known, and large-scale Chinese operations in. both Korea and Southeast Asia remain possible at any time. 13e Peiping proposes exchange of Europeans in Chins for Chinese in Ma la s Indian Ambassador Pan.i ar has repo rte di-y- ormed ri s au horities in Hong Kong of-a Chinese Communist proposal to exchange all "Europe It now detained in Communist China for Chinese imprisoned in 25X1 Malaya.aTlLi I Comments Apart from UN POW's taken in Korea, about 20 US nationals are imprisoned in Communist China, another 30 are under house arrest, and possibly 150 are unable to obtain exit permits; as many as 100 other" for- eign nationals of all kinds may be in similar situations. Several hundred Chinese, apprehended in terrorist activities in Malaya, have been jailed by the British authorities. I t is conceivable that Peiping has proposed or will propose an exchange of all or some Europeans held in China for TOP SECRET 7 31 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 Approv or Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79i '146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET Chinese held in Malaya and other Southeast Asian areas but this alleged proposal has not been confirmed F_ I 714 Peiping launches movement to "reform ideology" of universi 25X1 orming?the idgclogy" of Chinese university teachers. The four month course is to involve a study of basic Communist works and a thorough criticism and self-criticism" of each participant's theory and practice. Peiping radio has commented that, while most teachers have accepted the "general political principles of new democracy," they retain "some European and American capitalist ideology" which must be eradicated. teachers: The Peiping regime as? launched a s dy program aimed at 'x'?- Comments Some 3,000 of China's estimated 10,000 teachers at the univers y evel have begun to reform their ideology in the new program, which will doubtless extend to the remainder. University teachers have been reported as generally antagonistic to the regime. The systematic imposition of the Communist world-view, regarded by most, of these teachers as barbarous and farcical, will complete their process of disaf- fection, but-it is not likely that the teachers, unqualified for other work, will actively resist the Communist program. TOP SECRET 8 31Oct51 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 25X1 Approve l For Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP79 01146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET SECTION 3 (WESTERN) EAST GE=NY.. Results of economic plan show decline in rate of fulfillment: un er last ermany s Five tonom~c results or e it guar er ? Although the government claims Year Plan were announced on 26 Octobers rke that several targets were fulfilled and over-fulfilled, there is aua sar ed. deficiency in the machine construction and electro-engineering The The planned production quo~asof ' thelr pwere ortnshowsha lower ratehof plan by. and large, was good. I ge in thetmachine fulfillment than in the previous two quarters. The failure industry is particularly important, but Lcz emphasis on the metallurgical industry. 2. FRANCE. Schuman plans only to sketch federation scheme at Strasbour : Despite Foreign Minis er 5chumanIs recen announcement ttza PFFE-nee-70-uld propose a European federation at the November Council of Europe session, the US Ambassador in Paris believes that the French Government is still The Foreign undecided as to the time and method of launching such a pVan..d be a reigns] Minister has indicated that his initiative at Strasbourg fashaope and one, by which he would introduce the problem only in "summary in order to use the Council of Europe as a "laboratory" for a discussion. beprincipal Nevertheless, while'the.federation scheme fits ele a y ei tolong- term French policy trends, its advancement may now leaders in order to persuade Parliament that ac nited.Euro e which the prospective European Army can 25X1 federation c Comment: British coolness toward European plans for achievement of this objective. more benevolent and military integration, however, together with the UK. attitude in recent months and Churchillts return to power, is encouraging the proponents-of closer political ties. 3. ITALY. Issue of em 16 ee dismissals threatens aanttis o e eistglabor unity: e ommunis an an i ommunls a or bitter dispute over the mass dismissals scheduled for employees :of Breda's electrical plant near Milan. The company has worked out with the Labor Ministry a reorganization plan whereby it would dismiswoulthbonus pad ments 3,000 of its 12,000 workers, Half training schools, The Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation (CGIL) and the democratic Socialist Union of Labor (UIL) have rejected the_plan, and have TOP SECRET 9 31 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 25X1 25X1 Approv'For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79''1146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET ThefCG denounced the Christian Democrat ollusion with the government. accepting it and for alleged c called a 2 hour rotest strike in all Milan metallurgical plants. 2.5X1 consistently fought, frequently with strike comment: The COIL has industries of North action-,Marge.scale layoffs of employees in the heavy BY its Italy where Communist strength. among the workers is greatest. stand on the purely economic issue involved in the Breda case, thetCCOILIL's prestige among labor. Moreover, by.securing will enhance its own t '11 make the formation of a strong 25X1 support in denouncing the Glob, nti-Communist labor front more difficult. Local elections for south Ital to be held next s ring: Interior a e municipa an provirici elections for Minister Sce a as s a e of 1952. This will complete the ring south Italy will be held in the sp in May-June of this series of elections be in north and central Italy comment: humors that the south I a i had recently been fort s fa 1 would probably be postponed until spring confirmed by a high official in Premier de Gasp i'ofChristian Democratic, Party. The spring elections will serve as a guag which showed an increase in the May-June elections in north andIcentrawould the government in the spring Italy, A favorable showing by who -wish strengthen the position of^toose Christian fall of l952arather than inethexspring t 1 an elections originally scheduled 25X1 . nation of 1953 5 SWITZERLAND, Swiss elections for National Council show little change T e elec ions o tie 1mver house o t e tines Par lament show it e shift With 49 of the 196 seats still in the political sentiments of the voters. to be decided, the Conservatives have gained three seats, the Peasant Party lIndependents, the and Social Democrats have each gained r two, while the Democrats Radicals, the Liberals, and the The Swiss Communist Party lost two of its seven seas. It a oo won only Two one unit in se~ctedsinaGeneva,eandroneieach inoBasel and Zurich. Communists were All parties, including the Communist, were agreed on a traditional 25X1 policy of neutralit . The Communists, however campaigned against Swiss rearmament. Comment: As anticipated little political shift has actually occurred as a result of the elections. The Communists' retention of five out of TOP SECRET 10 31 Oct 51 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 Approvor Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79t146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET 25X1 the seven seats they held is surprising in view of the drastic decline in party strength which has been reported for some time. 25 8_ COT.nM TA_. TTrdaneta may succeed Gomez as President: President Gomez Congress was convoked at 2200 hours on 30 October to elect a Vice-Presidents who will probably be Minister of Government Urdaneta, already Vice-President under a 1950 decree. Departmental governors have been alerted, and the army in Bogota has been confined to garrisons, Comment: Gomezvs health has been known to be precarious since September 19'0, and Minister of Government Roberto Urdaneta has consequently had an important voice in governmental decisions for some time, Urdanet a is a strong Hispanophile, but he would be unlikely to change the present pro-US orientation of the Colombian Government, Although the replacement of Gomez would increase prevailing unrest to some extent, and although sporadic outbreaks of violence, frequent in recent years, may be expected to recur, the opposition Liberal Party has lost TOP SECRET 11 31 Oct ;1 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 25X1 Approv'For Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP79 146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET power and influence to such a degree that it is probably not now capable of even a determined attempt to overthrow the government. 9. ECUADORa Twenty-four-hour strike adds to political unrest: According to press repor s, 70,000 Ecuadoran wor ers went on a -our strike throughout the country in a protest against Congress on 29 October. The Confederation of Ecuadoran Workers called the strike because Congress failed to adopt a program demanded by the union. The union program called for changes in road conscription laws, additional social security legislation, strengthening 25X1 of civil service, a general increase in wages, price controls, and revisions t 1 aws 25X1 in the income ax Comment: The total membership of the Communist-controlled Confeder- ation o Ecuadoran Workers is approximately 70,000, and it is likely that only about 20,000 were out on strike. Nevertheless, the strike reportedly affected many stores and all transportation facilities. The presently tense atmosphere will continue so for several days. Repercussions of an added to the r h ave attempt to assassinate Guevara Moreno on 2_5 Octobe aquil f Gua it t y y o c general unrest, particularly in the key por 10. NICARAGUA. New communist weekly being published: A Communist- 'ne weekly newspaper c e Orzen aczon as begun publication in Managua. 1 -1 reports that the paper is 'Tie new mouthpiece of the Communist Par y.an i intended as a successor to Voz Sindieal, the defunct organ of Nicaragua's General Confederation of Labor. The US Embassy comments that the contents and number of copies printed appear to confirm the view that the Communist Party has embarked on a new campaign to propagate the Kremlin's line-in Nicaragua, The close similarity between Communist propaganda-in other countries and that now appearing in Orientacion further suggests that the coordination and contacts of the Commun s arry with similar Communist or anizations outside Nicaragua have recently been improved. F F 25X1 Comment z The publication of this new weekly following, as it does, closely e ind the circulation of the Communist-line handbill at the Fourth Latin American Regional Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations of the United Nations confirms the Embassy's conclusion and presages a period of renewed activity on the part of Nicaraguan Communists. TOP SECRET 12 31 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 25X1 25X1 C 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 Approv or Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79YfI 46A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 31 October 1951 CIA No. 49413-A. Copy No. 49 S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT TO THE DAILY DIGEST Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE. Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA, or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. . TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 ApproWel For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP71146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET SECTION 2 (EASTERN) 1. IRAN Moderates in Iran campaign to remove Mossadeq: Minister of Court Ala reports that Iranian political moderates are planning a campaign to replace Prime Minister Mossadeq by Ahmad Qavam, to whom the Shah has privately given his support. The moderates hope to accomplish their aim by p rivaaadinmenta Mossadeq to retire upon his return to Iran, or by using normal pry methods to unseat him. The Shah would hesitate to remove Mossadeq if the latter were to rid 25X1 himself of unsavory advisers and transfer Iranian nationalist sentiment into constructive channels. However, he would feel compelled to should the latter continue to insist on his present policy. Comment: When Mossadeq returns, he will face opposition from elements within his own party as well as from the moderates and the left. Previous opposition to Mossadeq, however, has quickly evaporated, Unless the opposition can manage to enlist whole-hearted nationalist support, it seems highly unlikely that the Prime Minister can be easily removed. 25X1 Iranian Forei n Minister asser ts that Iran's stand on the oil dispute ed the US Ambassador in f remains unchan ed: The Iranian Foreig Iran on 29 October that there had bee on the oil dispute. The Minister rei Iran would negotiate with the British 25X1 cation of oil to Britain and compensa orm n Minister in n no change in his government's attitude terated that the only points on which were then the concerning the future allo- tion due the AIOC for the nationalized of Iranian oil we sin e properti_e The development, extract int ernal mat Lers and. not subject to n. g s ion and proc egotiatzuln with Britain. 25X1 Com~ent: Th ere is no reliable e vidence to indicate th;-,.t t,p ere has been ute il dis 3 any weakening of INDOCHINA. Do the Iranian attitude ttreblamed for lac . p in the o k of Vietnamese mission in US: The Vice- th that Premier Hun had H . Prem_ier of the Vietnamese Government thus far refused to appoint a ministe ea told Minister r to the US out of deference to the 25X1 wishes of General De Lattre. Comment: The strong suspicion which General De Lattre has displayed with respect to US policy in Indochina lends plausibility to this report. Rivalries among Vietnamese politicians may have been a contributing factor. 4. JAPAN. Soviet diplomatic personnel to e t sp(cial ..identific2_tion cards: The TOP SECRET 31 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 Approv " or Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP791Vf 146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET Department of State has informed the US Political Adviser in Tokyo that it 25X1 favors SCAP's plan to issue d st_'nctively colored identification cards to r ovi c diplomatic personnel as a measure to emphasize that their presence in Tr. an is only by virtue of the USSR T s members ?i i-) in the Allied Council. Coimnent: All diplomatic personnel in Japan except the Soviets are accredited to SOAP. With the coming into force of the peace treaty the raison dTetre of the Allied Council will be ended, and the continued presence of Soviet diplomatic personnel in Japan presumably will be subject to negotiation between Japan and the USSR. As a first step toward independent contact with the Japanese Government, the Soviet Member of the ACJ has extended an invitation to high Japanese officials to attend a social event at the Soviet Embassy on 7 November, thus assuming the privileges recently granted by SOAP to the accredited foreign missions. SECTION 3 (WESTERN) 5. FRANCE. Parliament reported hostile to German NATO membership: If the French National Assembly suspects that German accession to NATO is implied in French ratification of the European Defense Forces, the government will suffer a severe defeat when this question is debated in the near future, according to 25X1 the US Embassy in Paris. Comment: While the attitude of the French Foreign Office on this issue has changed completely in the past two years, popular opinion is still violently opposed to German participation in NATO. The government hopes to sidestep the question during the forthcoming foreign policy debates in Parliament and thereby to gain time for a gradual con- version of public opinion. 6. SWEDEN. Swedish official hopeful regarding Polish trade negotiations: The American Embassy in Stockholm reports that the Swedish Assistant Foreign Minister gives the impression that he hopes to reach an agreement with Poland on terms somewhat better than the present agreement, but including a substantial amount of List I bearings. Comment: During the trade year ending on 31 October Sweden obtained approximately 3,200,000 tons of coal and 200,000 tons of coke from Poland; Swedish exports included 700,000 tons of iron ore (worth six million dollars) and bearings valued at one million dollars, including 600,000 dollars worth of List I bearings. It is doubtful whether Sweden could, even if it so desired, completely replace Polish coal with supplies from other sources. However, Sweden "regards a trade agreement as necessary for political and strategic 25X1 25X1 2 31 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1 Appro'Lot For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP791146A000500150001-1 TOP SECRET reasons}'; and therefore it is evidently prepared to export a certain quantity of bearings and iron ore to Poland. in order to obtain an agreement. TOP SECRET 3 31 Oct 51 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500150001-1