DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000500230001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 13, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
13 November 1951
CIA No. 49421
Copy No. 143
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
2. Postponement of Moscow Economic Conference designed to attract
more Western supports The American Embassy in Moscow believes that
the sponsors of the International Economic Conference, now postponed
to April 1952, hope it will contribute to relaxing Western trade re-
strictions. According to the Embassy, the recurring postponements of
the meeting probably indicate Soviet appreciation that the conference
could not score more than propaganda gains unless it included more
representative elements than so far obtained. Evidently the USSR still
ecialists who are
d s
p
25X1 hopes to attract more non-Communist businessmen an
-_ ~L_ 0-4_4-
3.
Comments Concern has been expressed that non-Communist attendance
at the conference would in fact result in increased public pressures
on Western governments to allow shipment of critical items.
YUGOSLAVIA. Increased Hungarian pressures protestedi The Yugoslav
Legation in Budapest has delivered to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry
a strong protest condemning Hungarian border units for "numerous and
serious armed attacks and provocations." The Yugoslavs state that
these actions constitute "irrefutable proof that the Hungarian Govern-
ment has no desire to change its aggressive policy towards Yugoslavia."
To support this protest, the Yugoslavs contend that during the
period from August 20 to October 10 Hungarian border units carried out
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133 incidents, opening fire 81 times on Yugoslav border guards and in-
stallations firing rockets 50 times, and violating Yugoslav air space
omm nt? On 15 September 1951, the Yugoslavs protested against
52 provocations committed by Hungarian frontier guards between 11 July
and 19 August, Thus, it would appear that the Hungarians have stepped
up their pressure on the Yugoslav border since late August.
During the first 25 days of September, however, the Yugoslavs
charged all the Cominformist countries with only 113 provocations.
Since Rumania, Albania, and Bulgaria were charged with numerous provo-
cations. during the past three months, the Hungarians were either par-
ticularly active in late August or early October or the Yugoslav claims
are inaccurate.
In addition, this latest complaint appears to contradict a state-
ment of Assistant Foreign Minister Makiedo, who on 23 October told US'
Ambassador Allen that "border incidents had practically ceased':" He
attributed this to the desire of the Soviet Union to appear in a "good
light" before each new UN General Assembly.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. NEAR EAST,. New statement issued on Principles of Middle East Command;
The three Western powers and Turkey are releasing on 10 November an 11-
point statement indicating their intention to proceed with the establish-
ment of a Middle East Command, The statement outlines the principles on
which the Command is predicated, inviting all interested states individually
to associate themselves with it. Members of the Command will be offered
equipment "to the extent possible," The sponsoring powers specifically
state that the Command will in no way affect existing agreements and that
organizational changes and adjustments in -the Command may be made as
Commg_ While the four sponsoring powers do not expect any sub-
stantial Arab support for the Middle East defense plan at this time, this
general statement of principles should encourage those officials in the
Arab world who have privately expressed concern over the inherent
military weakness of the area..
Serious difficulties, nevertheless, face the eventual implementation
of these principles. While many Arab leaders have sharply criticized
Egypt's precipitous rejection of the Middle East Command proposals, these
same officials do not have the couraga to oppose Egypt in public on this
issue, or to break the formal united Arab front.
INDOCHINA. Progress of the Vietnamese Army disappointing The US
L..:gation in Saigon is concerned over the lack of real progress in the
creation of a Vietnamese army, The administration of mobilization
has demonstrated grave defects in the Huu government and the population
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is unenthusiastic about fig'htin~ under the leadership of Bao Dai, Huu and
De Lattre.
Comments- As long as Premier Huu retains the Defense portfolio--he also
heads four other ministries--efficient and vigorous development of a Viet-
namese army will be precluded. His unfitness for the job is widely recog-
nized.
Although the Vietnamese population is considerably more aware now than
a year ago of the Communist threat to their country, the people are generally
reluctant to fight for a government which is believed controlled,by the
French and in an army suspected of being an appendage of the French.army.
INDOCHINA. De Lattre reported in ill health: An official of the US Legation
in Saigon interviewed General de Lattre for over three hours last week and
found him more tired, more discouraged and more obviously in ill health than
had been heretofore apparent. De Lattre's vigor seems to be rapidly weaken-
ing, and a member of his personal staff said the General must undergo an op-
eration in France so t his resence in Indochina for a
considerable period.
Comments De Lattre himself complained recently of his ill health and
of the severe mental strain borne by his wife. His Chief of Staff is re-
ported to have stated several days ago that the General could not spend
another summer in Indochina.
56
INDONESIA. Philippine suggestion of SEA defense pact greeted with reserve:
According to a Semi-Official news agency, Indonesian parliamentary circles
have greeted with great reserve a recent speech of the Philippine President
advocating a Southeast Asian defense pact. Both parliamentary and press
opinion have indicated that adherence to 7ah ; a would be contrar to
Indonesia's "independent" foreign policy.
Comment: In connection with the Philippine suggestion, Information
Minister Mononutu stated on 5 November that Indonesia is not planning to
conclude any pact or alliances within the near future, but that cooperation
with neighboring countries will be continued.
6. Government requests clarification of reports that Netherlands
expects to annex Western ew Guinea; Aseini-official news agency reports
that the Netherlands High Commissioner to Indonesia on 7 November dis-
cussed with Prime Minister Sukiman press reports that draft changes in the
Dutch constitution propose incorporation of Western New Guinea into the
Netherlands kingdom. Prime Minister Sukiman stated that if the press
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reports are true, the Dutch intention can only be termed "an unfriendly act."
The High Commissioner stated that no official word had been received from
The Hague but agreed to inform the Netherlands Govenment immediatel of the necessity of official clarification of the issue.
Comment-. The disposition of Western New Guinea was not settled in
Decem er 1 9 when Indonesia achieved its independence, and since that time
dateonoefur-
the area has been to settletthemissue was unsuccessful, andspecial
in December 1950 t
ther negotiations have been held.
7. CHINA,. pei ing desires assurances "from US" on Chinese in Southeast Asia:
A t t s that the Peip ng .reign ff ice, ai-
a
proaohed by Indian Ambassador Pan ML 1 g
foreign nationals, did not "turn down" the approach but stated that, before
making a formal x?eply,`he would-]ikiA assurances
Philinninestand Malaysia. The US
e
is wiss Foreign Office spokesman
ikk ?n re and to Feipingps treatment of
Minister in Bern comments that tnls Unine5e ~~ ~~ ... ??w~ - __
endent overnments and an
e inde
h
p
av
fugefl" as Thailand and the Philippines
d Malaysia should be made to the UK.
25X1 _,_
an
Comments The Peiping spokesman is reliably reported to have told
Panik r at representations on behalf of foreign nationals in China were
to be viewed against-a background of widespread persecution oofkove rseaslater
Chinese (not specifically Communists) in Southeast Asia.
reported to have told the UK of a Peiping proposal to exchange "Europeans""
detained in China for Chinese imprisoned in Malaya; a British spokesman
subsequently denied this report. The Swiss account of Panikkar's interview
would largely reconcile the two reports, as the Peiping spokesman's remarks
could be interpreted as implying that some such solution was possible.
6. K uo Momjo repo1t s on "cultural and educational affairs Kuo Mo-jo,
Chairman of the Peiping regime?s Committee on Col. oral and Educational
Affairs, has claimed in a recent report that
(1) illiteracy among industrial workers can be wiped out in three years;
(2) 25 million peasants are enrolled in winter schools, with a goal. of
100 million;
(3) about half of China's 75 million children of school age are now in
school, with a goal of 80 percent in five years; and
(Z,.) newspaper circulation has reached seven. million daily, a total of
800 million copies of books and periodicals have been published, and cinema
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attendance has reached 110 million (the last two figures are for six months).
Kuo noted that China needs "large numbers of cadres" and to that end
must open many new "short-term!' schools and special courses. Kuo also con-
ceded "a la between the actual state of culture and education and their
tasks."
Comments Education has been limited in China to about 10 to 20 percent
of the population, has traditionally been compressed and sterilized by or-'
thodoxy, and has been largely in preparation for government employment, The
demands of orthodoxy, and government pre-emption of students, are features
which will be retained, although the orthodoxy is new and the kinds of em-
ployment more varied. Inasmuch as the state controls what its citizens may
read, the Chinese who acquires literacy under the Peiping regime is assisting
in his own enslavement. As Kuo's report indicates, the regime at this time
is chiefly interested in extending this form of control over industrial
workers and children.
90 Chinese Communists reportedly acquire British-flag coaster: Accord-
ing to the Hong Kong press, the ? u er ie d and r T- "eese1 Teinan
25X1 (2,991. GT) has been sold to another Hong Kong firm. The press account fol-
25X1 lows a Nationalist report on 22 September that Butterfield and Swire intended
+n AA11 the TAinam other vessels to the Chinese Communists.
Comments Butterfield and Swire would not be able to secure official
approves or the sale of the Tsinan to Communist China. It is possible,
however, that the sale of the vessel will, for practical purposes, effect
its transfer to Communist interests. Such interests are suspected to be the
real owners of several vessels registered under the names of Hong Kong firms.
10, Pakistani vessel allegedly chartered to carry Ceylonese rubber to
Chinas The Ceylon press on b November reported that a vessel had been Mart-
eyed to call at Colombo shortly to load 3,800 tons of rubber for Communist
China.. This vessel is. possibly the Pakistani-flag Kaderbaksh, which recently
carried a cargo of raw cotton from Karachi to South China. According to
current Hong Kona rumors the Kaderbaksh is en route to Colombo to pick up
25X1 a rubber cargo.
Comment: The difficulty in finding shipping space has hampered Chinese
Commun s V efforts to buy Ceylon rubber. Since the UN embargo of May 1951,
which Ceylon has ignored, Communist purchasing agents have found only one
Polish vessel to deliver rubber to China.
Pakistan has previously refused to permit its vessels to carry rubber
to China, and there is no indication that it is about to reverse its stand.
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`.r w
11. CHINA KOREA. Peiping said to be "very anxious" to end Korean conflict: A
member of the than cultural delegation recently in Peiping has expressed
the view that the Chinese Communists are "very anxious" to end the fighting
25X1 in Korea.
Comment: Communist China's various economic difficulties are not be-
lieved tw sufficiently serious to force the regime to abandon its Korean
commitments Although most observers in or passing through the Communist
capital have agreed that the regime appears to desire an armistice in Korea,
evidence acquired in Peiping to support that belief has not been convincing.
Peiping?s propaganda on Korea, after a month of emphasis on the possibility
of successful negotiations for a cease-fire, has returned to a balance be-
tween conciliatory and belligerent statements.
12. KOREA. Communist ground forces expected to remain on defensive in Korea:
The Far East Command, in a detailed analysis of the enemy?s military in en-
tions, foresees that the Communists will continue to defend their present
ground positions. It is probable, however, that local counter-attacks to
restore positions lost to the UN and limited "spoiling" attacks to disrupt
UN offensive preparations will continue.
There continue to be, according to FECOM9 no indications that the Com-
munists will utilize in the immediate future the still considerable offensive
potential they retain in western Korea.
Comment. There are indications that the over:-all enemy ground offensive
potential in Korea has somewhat deteriorated in the past several weeks due
to logistic difficulties and to a shortage of immediately available reserves
in forward areas.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
1. FRANCE. French Communists attack proposed newspaper controls: French Com-
munists are stepping up their attacks on proposed legislation which would
bar persons with parliamentary immunity from the management of newspapers.
Essentially an anti-Communist measure, the pending law, passage of which is
considered certain, would force, Communist deputies to relinquish their
25X1 positions on newspaper staffs.
Comment: The government supports this Socialist-sponsored legislation
in its campaign to reduce Communist freedom of action.
2. Police removal of Communist art makes French Government appear
ridiculous: Police removal of seven Communist paintings from an art ex-
hibit, at the order of the government, is an example of unprofitable anti-
Communist witch hunting. The government is made ridiculous by seeming to
stand in fear of "relatively innocent forms of Communist propaganda." At
the same time, the incident provides the Communists with material to.sup-
port their campaign that the government represents nothing more than a
pseudo-fasr.;st eliaue whose real aim is the abolition of democratic free-
25X1 darns.
Comment: This is the first reported instance of a petty measure in
the government's anti-Communist campaign which began in January 1951 when
the international headquarters of Communist organizations in Paris were
outlawed.
3. FRENCH MOROCCO. Consequences of deferment of Moroccan debate in UN
General Assemb t North African nationalists probably will make strong
verbal protests against the UN General Committee's postponement of de-
bate on Arab charges that France is violating human rights in Morocco.
The Communist press also will exploit US support for French 'repressive"
measures as another example of US "imperialism" in Africa. Demonstrations
and disorders are probable, but sufficient French troops are.in the area
to control the situation.
This postponement is a major political and diplomatic victory for
France as well as for Western solidarity. French-US relations throughout
North Africa, but most particularly in Morocco,, can now be expected to
improve. The US, however, will lose favor with the Moroccan Sultan and
the nationalists, although neither will turn to the USSR for assistance.
The Arab states have indicated their intention to bring up the mat-
ter again when the Committee Presents its proposed agenda for the ap-
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proval of the General Assembly as a whole. Most Moroccan nationalistic
leaders, however, may be privately glad that the question is postponed
because they have been apprehensive that the case was jeopardized by
25X1 hasty preparation of the brief.
4.
Sultan refuses to make statement desired by the French:
5X1 The Sultan of Morocco is reported to have refused a request by the French
2
Comment: The Sultan traditionally sends a message to his subjects
on the national holiday, which currently is on 18 November, the anniver-
sary of the Sultan's accession to the throne. It is extremely doubtful
that the Sultan in-his annual message will make.any references to "Franco-
Moroccan solidarity.'t
5. AUSTRIA. British abandoning Vienna airstrip rojectw Complications
arising over the proposed construction of an emergency airstrip in the
British sector of Vienna point to abandonment of the project. Partly
because of their long-standing "hands-off" policy in Austria, and partly
because of a reluctance to incite further.Communist publicity on the sub-
ject, the British are unwilling to requisition the site from the Austrians.
US officials in Vienna, feeling it unwise to give the impression that
the West has succumbed to Communist propaganda, are surveying the possibility
25X1 of an alternative airstrip in the US sector.
6. BELGIUM NETHERLANDS. Belgian and Dutch presses are highly critical of
sensationalism in US journalism: The Belgian press, highly-critical of
a part of the US press for its terrifying description of lithe next war.,"
charges that such graphic accounts furnish the Communists with "excellent
propaganda fodder." The strongest attacks were directed against Collier's,
which, by sensationalizing a theoretical third world war., is pictured as.
either bent on creating the mental climate for actual war or reflecting
US public opinion that war is inevitable.
The unfavorable comment by the Dutch press on the Collierts issue is
similar to that of the Belgian press. The Dutch also term the-publicity
for the next world war "shocking and shamelessly sensational." A Dutch
25X1 Foreign Office official-has stated
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V V
Comment-. This harsh criticism from Belgium and the Netherlands cor-
roborates that from France and may be indicative of a recurrent general
Western European fear concerning the direction and stability of US policy
in the East-West struggle. It is particularly harmful at a time when West-
ern defense plans, designed to keep the peace, are placing a heavy finan-
cial burden on the peoples of Western Europe.
7. NETHERLANDS. Dutch Legation in Bucharest to be closed. For reasons of
25X1
25X1
25X1 8.
economy, the Netherlands will soon close its legation in Bucharest, Rumania.
Dutch interests in Rumania, especially those of a consular nature, will be
looked after by the Belgian Legation in Bucharest.
Comment.- At the conference of Dutch ministers in Eastern Europe held
at The Hague last April, it was decided to reduce gradually Dutch represen-
tation in the Orbit countries in order to curtail government expenses.
9. UNITED KINDGOM. Measures proposed so far not adequate for British economic
crisis: The US Embassy in London considers that R. A. Butler's first
speech as Chancellor of the Exchequer on 7 November made a good impression
and will probably have a psychologically beneficial effect, but that the
economic measures the new government has proposed will not be sufficient
to restore confidence in sterling. The extent of this loss of confidence
in sterling was emphasized by the Chancellor's announcement that in October
alone the dollar deficit amounted to 320 million dollars and by his estimate,
based on present trends, of a possible over-all 1952 deficit of 500 to 6600
million.
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The Embassy doubts that the program proposed, which includes a heavy
cut in imports, reduced internal consumption, and a general tightening up
of government expenditure, will be adequate even if the other members of
the Commornrealth cooperate in cutting their dollar expenditures. The Em-
bassy believes, moreover, that this cooperation will be more difficult to
obtain than it was in the 1949 financial crisis, since the UK is now less
able to provide the other Commonwealth members with an alternative source
of capital goods.
Comment.- In the last connection it is probably significant that the
Commonwealth Finance Ministers conference, originally scheduled for late
November, has now been postponed until January. Other government measures
for dealing with the economic crisis will depend to a great extent on ex-
ternal factors, particularly the prospects of financial aid from the US
and the cooperation to be anticipated from other non-sterling countries.
10. UNITED KINGDOM. Government requests coal from US. Following a Cabinet
de` son on the subject, the UK on 8 November requested through OEEC the
importation of 750,000 tons of US coal this winter. The British would
a substantial part of the necessary shipping.
Comment-. Last August the Labor government, because of the dollar
shortage, refused the National Coal Board's request for authorization to
buy 1.5 million tons of coal from the US._ Just before the 25 October
general election the UK Government considered asking the US for 1.3 mil-
lion tons to enable it to increase British coal exports, mainly to Sweden,
in return for much needed iron ore. Now, however, it appears that despite
the dollar shortage the government has decided it must import coal simply
for domestic consumption in an effort to avoid a coal crisis this winter.
This pessimistic view of the coal situation is further illustrated by"
the 8 November cut in coal allocations to householders to less than 50
percent of last winter's allocations.
11. NORWAY. Government replies to Soviet protest on war graves. In a note
to the U on 5 November the Norwegian Government "notes and deplores"
the-'unusually strong wording with which the Soviet Government on 31'
October protested the movement of Russian war graves. The Norwegian
reply refers the Soviet Government to Norway's earlier detailed statements
on the subject and repeats the suggestion for a joint commission to plan
new cemeteries. Pointing out that the movement of graves from North
25X1 Norway is virtually complete, the Norwegian Government states finally
that, further n1 ans for concentration will be held in abeyance.
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Comment: This note follows the usual pattern of a firm rejection
of Soviet accusations, but appears slightly more terse than the Norwegian
replies to other Soviet notes this fall. The suspension of further con-
centration is a conciliatory gesture, but does not indicate that Norway
has been intimidated since, in order to frustrate Soviet espionage efforts,
those graves in the north had priority. Norway would like to preclude
any additional propaganda advantage to the Soviet Union and the local Com-
munists on this issue, which it regards as little more than a tempest-in-
a-teapot fomented for just that purpose.
12. SWEDEN. Poland to receive strategic ball bearings: The chief Swedish
trade negotiator with Poland has informed the Swedish. Cabinet and US Em-
bass- officials that the Poles are unwilling to conclude a trade agree-
25X1 ment unless Sweden provides some List I
bearings. he expects to be advised y the Cabinet to prevail upon SKF
(the Swedish manufacturer of ball bearings) to revise its firm stand..to-
wards the Poles and offer one million crowns (0193,000) worth of List I
bearings. Although he does not expect Polish agreement on that basis,.he
hopes to keep the ultimate concession not substantially greater. The
25X1 Swedes have already indicated that 200,000 tons of iron ore in addition
Comment: The Department of State has concluded that Sweden must
obtain . to 3 million tons of coal from Poland and recognizes that
some embargo-type bearings must be exported in compensation. It has
expressed its hope that such bearings can be limited in value to 165
million crowns (!~209.,000).
13. COLOTMIA. Battalion in Korea praised by General van Fleet: General van
F el et reports that during the past three mont s, while the Colombians
were attached to the 21st Infantry Regiment of the US 24th Division, they
participated in all advances and shared largely in inflicting heavy losses
on Chinese Communist forces. As of 25 October, the Colombians had.12
killed, 59 wounded, and 9 missing in action out of a total of 1,050 men.
This is a remarkably low casualty rate for a unit in front line action and
close support, and attests to excellent combat efficiency, according to
General van Fleet. He attributes the meritorious conduct of the Colombian
Battalion largely to the leadership of its commander, Lieutenant Colonel
Jaime Polania Puvo which was reflected in the battalion's enthusiasm.
Comment: Lengthy personal accounts published in the Bogota news-
paper El Tiempo show that the Colombian soldiers themselves are somewhat
surprised that they were able to meet the standard expected of them in
Korea.
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13 November 195
CIA No. 49421-A.
Copy.No. 49
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete covey?age of all current reports in CIA
of in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. AUSTRALIA. Government will approve Middle East Command but is unwilling to
sponsor joint declaration: Australia will not sponsor the joint declaration
on the Middle East Command. It feels that the text, by indirection, would
probably have the effect of committing Australian troops to the Middle East
in wartime, which is a step further than Australia has yet agreed to go.
The government feels it should not have been asked to abandon its
reservations and publicly announced position against troop commitment on
5X1 such short notice. Australia is willing, however, to announce general
2
2. JAPAN/CHINA. Japan's attitude toward China disclosed: The Japanese Govern-
ment believes that negotiations for a peace treaty with the Chinese
Nationalist Government should be delayed until after the multilateral treaty
comes into force, according to the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. He
pointed out that Prime Minister Yoshida desired to "do everything possible not
to antagonize the UK and Commonwealth Governments prior to their ratification
of the peace treaty," but left the impression that the Japanese would be re-
ceptive to an early Chinese Nationalist approach for exploratory negotiations.
The Vice Minister also strongly reaffirmed that the Japanese Government
25X1 has no intention of concluding a bilateral peace treaty or establishin re-
lations of any kind with Communist China.
Comment: This is the first time that Japan's policy regarding a peace
treaty with Nationalist China has been clarified. Prime Minister Yoshida's
careful circumlocution of this question in the Diet led to some speculation
that Japan would seek to work out a modus vivendi with both Chinese regimes.
Under considerable pressure from industrial interests not to prejudice
future trading prospects with the Communists, but at the same time cognizant
of the need for Japan to parallel US policy on China, the Japanese Government
probably will be receptive to the conclusion of a treaty with the Nationalists
which would extend only to the territory and people now under Nationalist con-
trol.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
3. GERMANY. Western promise of ultimate NATO membershi-may satisfy Germany:
US High Commissioner McCloy in Germany declares it is clear that while Chan-
cellor Adenauer is not demanding German membership in NATO now, he nevertheless
will not accept any arrangement which ultimately will discriminate against
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Germany. McCloy believes that Adenauer would accept an arrangement whereby
the Western Allies would. give their assurances that at some "Pppropriate
time" not too far distant they would see that Germany had the same relation-
ship with NATO as other participants in the European Defense Community. As
ith German
Adenauer would have to use such a promise in his dealin7s w
parliamentary leaders, it could not be kept secret.
Comment: It has been apparent for some weeks that the problem of
Germany's relationship to NATO was worrying Adenauer. Although the matter
is not an urgent one at the moment, the Chancellor will certainly require
satisfactory answers when the European army plan comes before the Bundestag,
where the prevailing view is that Germany must receive equal treatment.
UNITED KINGDOM. British believe German NATO candi_da2y must_be_def erred:
A senior Foreign Office official, conB_rmi.ng the British Government's
opinion that Germany should eventually be admitted to NATO, has indicated
that his government now feels that German admission may have to be put off
for some time. He emphasized that a "dramatic" German entrance now might
cause "serious trouble" with the Russians, and quoted Foreign Secretary Eden
as saying that it was inadvisable to consider German membership until after
set u
i
p.
s
contractual relations are signed and a European Defense Force
The British Government apparent,] feels that pressure must now be
brought to bear on the Germans rather than on the French.
Comment: This attitude is in line with Prime Minister Churchill's
general faith in the feasibility of East-West negotiations and his desire to
avoid any actions now which might disturb the atmosphere for top-level talks.
British views on Far Eastern situation: The US Embassy in
London reports that the Foreign office has received no indications from the
new Cabinet that any modification of British Far Eastern policy is in the
offing. The Embassy points out, however, that Eden's relatively flexible
attitude on the question of Chinese representation in the UN may indicate
that there will be changes in emphasis in British policies.
Foreign Office officials have stated that the Peiping mission would be
reduced in size and present consular offices in Tientsin, Shanghai, Hankow,
and Canton would be closed if the recent rapid decline in the number of
British residents in China should continue over the near future. In Shanghai,
t
s a
for example, there are now only 1000 British res aAnts. which represen
Comment: If the British community in China declines to a hard core of a
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few hundred who would not leave under any circumstances, reduction of Brit-
ish representation in C}ina would be justified on practical grounds, and
would not necessarily reflect any change In the Foreign Office view of the
desirability of establishment of full diplomatic relations with the Peiping
regime.
UK.wants guarantee of European Defense Force's immediate aid
to NATO: British North Atlantic Council Deputy Hoyer-Millar further ex-
plained his couiitryts view that NATO relations i:th the European Defense
Community (EDC) must insure immediate and effective use of European Defense
Forces (EDF) under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) in the
event of aggression in Europe, since otherwise US. and UK forces would be the
only substantial ones immediately available. This could be achieved by a
clear and unbroken chain of authority beginning with the EDF under SACEUR,
SACEUR under strategic guidance from the Standing Group, and the latter
under the political guidance of the North Atlantic Council. He said it
would not be satisfactory if the chain of authority were complicated by the
necessity for "other action by EDC," since the principle of unanimity would
25X1 permit Germany or any other one nation to immobilize, at least temporarily,
all available NATO forces on the continent except those of the US and. UK.
Comment: This view generally coincides with the European Defense
Forces concept agreed on at the sixth North Atlantic Council meeting at
Brussels last December. The reference to possible complications arising from
the need for "other action by EDC" is not clear, as the interim report on
EDF discussions provides for the commitment of EDF to NATO under the same
conditions as the military contingents of other NATO members are committed.
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