DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 15, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

Approv or Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T*146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
15 November 1951
CIA No. 49429
Copy No.
143
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 Approve or Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T~1146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
USSR. M. A. Menshikov replaced as Minister of Foreign Trade; The 10
November issue of Pravda announced the appointment of P. N. Kumykin as
Minister of Foreign Trade. The position had been held since 1949 by
M. A. Menshikov who at that time replaced Politburo member A. I. Mikoyan.
According to the announcement Menshikov was simply transferred to other
work., However, the US Embassy in Moscow believes that he may have been
given new duties in connection with the organization of the International
Economic Conference now scheduled for Moscow in April.
Viewed in connection with the recent three way shuffle of function-
al organs within the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Menshikov's removal may
have added significance, and at least reinforces the indications of
changes in this Ministry. (R Moscow 817, 10 Nov 51)
Comment: Evidence that this Ministry has been undergoing readjust-
ments for some time was noted in that
shakeups and arrests had occurred in the Ministry of Foreign Trade in-
volving personnel most frequently in contact with foreigners. However,
until knowledge of Menshikov's new duties is obtained, it is im-
possible to determine whether his displacement represents a promotion
or demotion.
From 1943 to 1956, Menshikov held various important posts in
UNRRA, which gave him valuable experience and contacts for work con-
nected with international economic organizations. While a temporary
position in charge of the proposed April conference appears below
Menshikov's stature, it is, of course, possible that the USSR hopes to
use this conference to increase world resentment against US sponsored
trade restrictions, and as the first step towards creating a permanent
international trade organization to back up the Soviet claims of wish-
ing to promote increased East-West trade.
2. Pravda asserts West's "act of sabotage" at UN General Assembly has
failed: Paris TASS correspondent, Yuri Zhukov, asserted in a Pravda
article that after the "failure" of the West's "act of sabotage" to
prevent the Soviet Union's armament proposal from being placed on the
agenda, the USSR's concrete program for peace had compelled Western
delegates "to send an SOS to Washington for further instructions."
Zhukov in summarizing the developments in the sessions to date
attacked US "San Francisco tactics," and implied that "pressure tactics"
will continue to fail because "Paris is not San Francisco" and be-
cause of the "aggravated internal contradictions in the camp of capital-
ism." He added that the "crazy aspirations for the establishment of a
25X1 C
1 15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 Approveor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
world-wide American empire spell no good," and warned that the Soviet
Union's "broad program for the struggle against the threat of another
world war forms the basis on which all proceedings of the session will
have to develop." (R FBID, 13 Nov 51)
Comment: The Soviet Union has already suffered a number of de-
feats in attempting to prevent UN General Assembly consideration of
various Western proposals. The tone of propaganda comment on the Paris
sessions and of Vyshinsky's attack on the Western disarmament plan re-
veals the sensitivity of the Kremlin to current Western diplomatic
initiatives and the USSR's inability to prevent General Assembly con-
sideration of proposals which the USSR opposes.
3. Soviet occupation authorities in Austria tighten security: The
Austrian Chancellor has confirmed reports that Soviet military authori-
ties are in the process of discharging all Austrian civilian employees
and replacing them with Soviet personnel.
Further indication of tightened security measures is reflected
in the pending Soviet request that the three western powers vacate
offices they now occupy in Hofburg Palace. The request will not be
honored.
The US High Commissioner in Vienna interprets these Soviet activi-
ties as (1) tightening security control, (2) further preventing frater-
nization of Soviet military with civilians, (3) possibly designed to
conceal new moves, and (4) revealing the absence of any Soviet intention
to leave Austria, (S' to Vienna 1679' 9 Nov 51)
4. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Transfer of administrative employees is still incom-
plete: Prague radio has reported that as of October 20, 74,000 out of
a planned total of 77,500 clerical workers had been transferred from
administration into production. A minority of this group were said
to have not"acquired a positive attitude toward production". (R FBID,
8 Nov 51)
Comment: A government mission for the transfer of administrative
employees was set up in June for the specific purpose of effecting the
planned transfer. The transfer is an attempt to alleviate the shortage
of productive manpower caused by increased production targets.
2 15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 0 Approve or Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T 146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. PAKISTAN. Atomic research laboratory to be established: According
to an Associated Press item datelined Karachi, the Pakistani tovernment
announced on 14 November that an atomic research laboratory is being
set up in Lahore, Punjab Province. The announcement states further that
orders have been placed with a Dutch firm for part of the equipment for
the laboratory which is expected to be completed late next year. (R
News Ticker, Karachi, 14 Nov 51)
2. BURMA. BWPP hopes for "'freedom" within year: During its 7 November
rally, the pro-Communist BWPP expressed the hope that "next year"
Burma would be "free from exploitation by Fascist capitalists."
(C Rangoon 457, 9 Nov 51)
Common : By issuing such a statement, the BWPP clearly demonstrates
its adherence to the Communist timetable for control of Burma as expressed
by Thakin Than Tun, leader of the BCP.
Delegates to Peiping return: The US Embassy in Rangoon reports that
four of the seven Burmese delegates to the l October celebrations in
Peiping have returned. They have been unreserved in their praise of the
Chinese Communist regime. The Embassy comments that the press has
reacted favorably to thes;= Burmese, particularly to'their claims of
religious freedom in China, (C Rangoon 457, 9 Nov 51)
Comment: Since all the delegates to Peiping were pro-Communists]
such statements were to be expected. It is interesting to note that
no concern has yet been expressed regarding the whereabouts of the
other three delegates. Two have been reported en route to Vienna via the
Soviet Union.
4. THAILAND. Clash between Thai army and _police predicted: An armed clash
2 5X1 C between the Thai army and police force in the near future is ed
by
25X1A V ody coup attempt of last June.
25X1 C
inter-service clash is a continuing possibility.
Comment: This report is the latest of a series detailing tension
between the army and police resulting from the rivalry for power between
the Director General of Police and the Assistant Commander in Chief of
the Army. Premier Phibun, whose position has been insecure since June,
has been playing the two against each.other in
order to-strengthen his authority. In this strained situation an
3 15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 ApprovW''4or Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP791146A000500250001-0
25X1 C
5. INDOCHINA.
Prenara.tions for Viet Minh attack reported: The Viet Minh is
to have begun recruitment of able-bodied men in several
provinces of the Tonkin delta, an activity which is usually a prelude to
25X1 C an attack. the chiefs of Viet Minh "sections" in
Hanoi have been instructed to move into Hanoi from their present suburban
locations, and that this order may indicate plans to coordinate a wave of
violence within the city with attacks by regular Viet Minh forces through-
25X1 A out the delta.
C-mmen s Recruiting of able-bodied men is a continuing Viet Minh ac-
tivity. Any accelerated recruiting'at this time is probably more a measure
of the heavy losses sustained by the Viet Minh during their unsuccessful
October operations than of their intention to launch an offensive through-
out the delta.
The Viet Minh will probably attack some point or points on the French
perimeter during the latter part of. November, but not in sufficient strength
to threaten Hanoi seriously, The Viet Minh would hardly stage an uprising
in Hanoi unless it were strong enough to attempt an all-out attack on the
French in Tonkin with a fair prospect of success.
6. De ttre sees end of Vist Minh by : De Lattre told minis-
ter Heath that current French military operations in North Vietnam had proved
very successful and would be followed promptly by other local offensives. He
could not launch a large offensive until mid-February 1952, when he will have
completed his defense works in the Tonkin delta. De Lattre claimed to have
received reliable reports that Viet Minh morale was declining, and he felt
"utterly confident" that by the spring of 1953 the Viet Minh revolt will have
been stamped out. (S Saigon 1016, 13 Nov 51)
-men s Viet Minh morale. is declining but it will not be stamped out
until a popular and viable non-Communist government is established. It is
very unlikely that this will have been accomplished by 1953. DeLattreos op-
timistic presentation may be an attempt to justify his return to France on
the ground that his mission to destroy the Viet Minh is well on the way to
being achieved.
7 < INDONESIA. Government sum ests a?1v IPu l Ir ddnesi an discussion of N.U
Guineas The Indonesian Government has handed the Netherlands High Com-
missioner a memorandum proposing that the West New Guinea issue be included
in discussions already scheduled by the two governments for the end of No-
vember. "In the interests of good relations" Indonesia suggested that the
New Guinea dispute be solved within the next several months--'before the
Dutch Parliament considers any changes in the Netherlands constitution.
15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 ApprovPG''For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79 0 146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
Pending a reply from the Netherlands, the departure of an Indonesian mission
for the previously scheduled discussions has been indefinitely postponed.
(C Djakarta 707, 12 Nov; U Djakarta 70$9 12 Nov 51)
g2MA" The Indonesian Government has reacted with some hostility to
a proposed change in the Dutch constitution whereby West New Guinea would be
listed as part of the territory of the Netherlands Kingdom. Indonesians
claim that West New Guinea is rightfully theirs and is only under interim
Dutch administration pending disposition of the issue.
Pending a reply from the Netherlands Government, Indonesia has vir-
tually cancelled discussions on the abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesian
Union and revision of the 1949 Round Table Conference agreements. Should the
Netherlands prove reluctant to resume negotiations over New Guinea, Indonesia
may seriously consider a unilateral abrogation of the Union.
25X1 C
25X.
exclusively for the Chinese Communist army. Ac-
25X1 C cording to experienced no difficulties in
obtaining ru er; a oval Communist authorities arrange
an adequate quantity, He states that the rubber is shipped to China from
25X1 A Hong Kong.
omm nts The ban on shipments of rubber from Malaya and Hong Kong to
China has cut sharply into Chinese Communist purchases of this commodity.
However, the Communists probably have a large stockpile as a result of heavy
purchases in late 1950 and early 1951. This stockpile, together with small
amounts constantly obtained by smuggling, puts the Chinese in a fairly com-
fortable position with regard to rubber supply.
9. ion rDOqPAn~~d buds ~9 s The 1952 budget,
covering operations of both central and provincial governments on Formosa,
estimates revenues at 1 991 million Taiwan dollars (one US dollar equals
about 16 Taiwan dollars . Estimated expenditures will be 2,100 million
Taiwan dollars, of which 1,229 million is to be spent for military purposes.
New taxes are being proposed to bring estimated revenues up to expenditures.
(C Taipei TOECA 11$9, 11 Nov 51)
CgMMentss Nationalist success in achieving at least an approximate
balance in the budget is essential to remove the threat of inflation. The
Nationalists are genuinely concerned with the problem and have accepted US
guidance in the preparation of the budget. The Economic Stabilization Board,
which approved the 1952 budget, has several American officials represented
on it as observers.
TOP SECRET
5 15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
25X1 C
25X1
25X1
 Approv' "For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TUl146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1 C
China transfers rail emblovees to North Koreas
he Chinese mainland report no obvious economic s rains
resu ring rom the Korean war,
sonnet because of the assignment thus far of 38,000 railway personnel to
f
M
i
t
ry o
in
s
North Koreas adds that the Chinese Communist
Railways anticipates a more personnel will have to be sent and con
eludes that there will therefore be many difficulties in maintaining
China's railways during the next three months. (S Hong Kong 1395,
12 Oct 51)
-C mine : The number of railway workers reportedly assigned to
North Korea is probably correct and comes to about a tenth of the total
number of railway workers in China. Despite the reportedly tight labor
supply, the Chinese so far have proved fairly proficient in maintaining
rail operations. Civilian traffic has suffered because of the priority
given to military shipments, but the railroads are continuing to support
effectively the Chinese war effort.
lt. KOREAO Continued evidence of North Kor an agricultural troubles seen:
A 10 November North Korean domestic broadcast complained that "since'the
making of straw bags is not being carried through by systematic methods,
we must extend our working hours into the night." (R FBID Pyongyang,
10 Nov 51)
Comments Straw bags are the primary agricultural containers
utilized in Korea. Normally manufactured from rice straw during the
non-growing seasons, a shortage of straw bags could prove an additional
severe handicap for the already beleagured North Korean internal supply
system. Such shortages are prolably directly attributable to the acute
lack of agricultural manpower.
12. KOREA/JAPAN. Koren-Japanee conference nears recriminative end: At
the seventh meeting of the Korean-Japanese talks on 12 November, the
Japanese admitted that the forthcoming "February meeting" for full-fledged
treatment of outstanding problems between the two countries would not
include finalizing the questions of fisheries, marine cables, and claims,
and that the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation could not be
negotiated until "next summer."
In a tense atmosphere, ROK Ambassador Yang accused the Japanese
of stalling, but failed to sway the Japanese position that "they have
no obligations directly to Korea under the Peace Treaty."
The ROK Ambassador privately expressed later that he would."raise
TOP SECRET
15 Nov 51-
25X1
25X1 C
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 Approv For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79 1146A000500250001-0
he." l" in Washington if the Koreans were "brushed off." The US Political
Advisor to SCAP believes the Japanese will "partly recede" from their
position. (C Tokyo 1015, 13 Nov 51)
Comment: The history of relations between the two nations will make
almost every problem on the agenda the subject of protracted negotiations.
The question of timing is essential to both parties in the negotiation
of outstanding questions between the two countries. Korea desires to
reach an agreement prior to the return of full sovereignty to Japan so
that the leverage of "the occupation" may be used, while Japan, for
similar reasons, desires a postponement of any major agreement.
7 15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 Approvor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
1. GERMANY. West Germans wary of retaliation against Soviet interference
in Berlin, ask four-power talks on matter: West German officials,
meeting on 12 November with HICOM representatives, displayed extreme
reluctance to implement the specific trade countermeasures recommended
by the Allies against Soviet harassing in Berlin. They stressed that
too strong a move would provoke more serious Soviet interference, and
,could only be accompanied by Allied action expanding the current air-
lift. The West Germans agreed, however, to instruct : firms not to
deliver certain scheduled key shipments to East Germany, and to issue
no more trade permits on such shipments. French and British officials
were reluctant to force drastic action.
The West Germans also asked that four-power talks be initiated
on the Berlin problem, but were informed of the tentative HICOM
decision not to take the initiative on this matter, but to be
prepared to discuss the problem on the invitation of the USSR. (S
Frankfurt 3816, 13 Nov 51)
Comment: The HICOM had previously agreed that if the Soviet
obstruction of West Berlin export permits was still continuing on
12 November, the West Germans would be instructed to revoke a
temporary East-West German trade agreement covering key goods. The
action finally agreed to by the West Germans does not go that far.
Further indications have been received from
of Soviet feelers for four-power discussions of Berlin trade
difficulties. The French High Commissioner expressed the view on
8 November that the Allies should make some response to this desire,
but the HICOM deferred discussion of the issue.
2. FRANCE. Communists uneasy under government repression: French
Communists are seriously concerned lest the recently tightened anti-
Communist bloc in the National Assembly pass broader repressive
measures against them. Party leaders have obviously been struck
by the overwhelming vote for the recent bill designed to weaken the
Communist press and have publicly accused all the non-Communist
parties of "envisaging serious attacks on civil liberties." Other
anti-Communist measures under attack have been "de facto' elimination"
of Communist deputies from the Foreign Affairs Committee and a
proposed procedural reform providing for discussion and adoption of
laws in secret committee rather than in public assembly sessions.
(C Paris 2801, 10 Nov 51)
TOP SECRET
8 15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
25X1 C
 Approv or Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79 146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
Comment: Although the Communists have retained their influence
over labor, the party has been increasingly on the defensive since
its last participation in the government in 1947. Repressive measures
during the past year have caused it considerable uneasiness, and have
served effectively to isolate it politically,
3. France presents import needs to USSR: Trade neotiat~ons
between France and the USSR began 8 November. French' requirements
include grain, non-ferrous metals, coal, asbestos, fuel oil, woodpulp
and newsprint. Soviet representatives did not comment on the
availability of these items, and stated that they would submit their
own requirements in the near future. (C Paris 2812, 10 Nov 51)
Comment: Although the French profess strict adherence to COCOM
restrictions, the search for non-dollar imports may tempt them to
stretch their interpretation of "critical" exports. They have reserved
the right to export limited quantities of critical items to the Orbit
in exchange for "vital" imports, and French officials have recently
stressed France's need for more imports from the Soviet bloc,
4. Socialist leader gives verbal support to Pleven sovernment The
Secretary-General of the French Socialist Party, Guy'Mollet, has'
has stated he will "do his utmost" to keep the Pleven government alive.
With the backing of a majority in the party's executive'
xecutive committee,
however, he is determinedly opposed to participation by the Socialists
in the government, where they would be "prisoners of a rightist
majority," thus leaving the Left entirely open to Communist exploitation,
Regarding the possibility of a coalition including the Gaullists,
Mollet comments that he has no desire to bring about a crisis which
might "install a Salazar" in France. (C Paris 2796, 10 Nov 51)
Comment: Despite an increasing number of friendly overtures from
the Communists, the Socialists seem determined to play'thn role of
rrbuffer" between the extreme left and Pleven's middle-of-the-road
re;grime, which they consider too rightist to warrant Socialist
participation. Mollet's stand buttresses other recent indications
that the current coalition will not crumble this year.
TOP SECRET
9 15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 Approvb!'For Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
5, AUSTRIA. Government moves to terminate fourpower censorship:
Chancellor Figl has advised Ambassador Donnelly that the coalition
parties will introduce a joint resolution in Parliament instructing
the government to cease salary payments to Austrian employees of the
Quadripartite Censorship Bureau. Overwhelming approval of the
resolution is anticipated, whereupon the Austrian Government will
inform the four occupying powers that Allied censorship activities
will no longer be maintained at Austrian expense. Ambassador Donnelly
assured Figl of US support in this move. (S Vienna 1665, 9 Nov 51)
Comment: Western efforts to terminate quadripartite gensorship
of Austrian international communications have been blocked by Soviet
opposition and by Western reluctance to give the Soviet authorities
a free hand.in censorship through Western nonparticipation. The
Austrian move is by no means assured of success. If the Soviet
Headquarters continues to insist upon censorship, the West may be
compelled to continue its association with the objectionable
activity and to pay the Austrian salaries out of occupation-costs funds.
6, Communist Party conference demands Austrian association with
Eastern Orbit: At the conclusion of its 15th Congress last week,
the Austrian Communist Party (KPOe) adopted a resolution demanding
that Austria dissociate itself from the Atlantic Pact, that the
Union of Independents (VdU) be prohibited, that Austria withdraw from
ERP and intensify trade relations with her Eastern neighbors, and that
wages and salaries be raised to offset price increases since last
summer. (R FBIS, Vienna Volkstimme, 6 Nov 51)
Comment: The KPOe line does not vary materially from previous
statements of party attitude, and was considerably influenced by
the simultaneous convention of the World Peace Council, by Soviet
propaganda with respect to Austrian remilitarization, and by current
government efforts to negotiate a new economic program. The party
conference, however, was notable for an unusual candor with respect
to KPOe capabilities and for the fixity of its attention on Western
defense preparations. Chairman Koplenig, acknowledging the
impossibility of organizing strikes and public demonstrations on
every issue, asserted that the KOPe does not immediately aspire to
the formation of an Austrian People's Democracy, but will freely
support any Austrian government opposed to cooperation with the West.
10 15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 Approv I+Eor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79te 14.6A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
70 BELGIUM Be1;o-Polish trade agreement reportedly to be signed:
The` Belgian press has reported that a new trade agreement between
Belgium and Poland will be signed in November, (U Brussels Joint
Weeka 44, 31 Oct 51)
Comment: No official confirmation of this report has been
received. There has been no information on the commodities to be
exchanged under the agreement, although the Belgian'Government has
not "admitted contemplating" a commitment of strategic items to
Poland in return for coal.
NETHERL DS. Socialist trade union protests government's socio-
economic policies: At a recent well-attended Socialist trade
union meeting at Utrecht, a strong protest against the government's
socio-economic policy was voiced. The trade union was especially
alarmed at the lack of policy to balance foreign trade, to protect
the standard of living, to construct homes at the present rate, and
"to maintain opportunities for employment.". The government was
asked to construct at least 50,000 houses in 1952 and to control
investments directly. (U The Hague, Joint Weeka.44, 2 Nov 51)
Comment: To insure fulfillment of the government's defense
program, the Socialist trade union agreed, albeit reluctantly, to
support the Cathloic-Labor government's economic policy providing
for a five percent cut in the standard of living among all segments
of the Dutch population. Labor, however, has taken about a seven
percent cut, and no remedial action is in sight at present.
90 ITALY. Italian officials seek to remedy surplus in European Payments
Union. Italy is surplus in the European Payments Union (EPU) rose by
another 64 million dollars in October to make a total of 206 million.
This surplus is thus one million dollars more than is permitted.
Budget Minister Pella and other Italian officials are now in Paris to
discuss new Italian trade and payments measures designed to remedy
the situation and to reach an agreement on the disposition of the
surpluses accruing beyond the Italian quota. (S Rome Joint Weeka 45,
9 Nov 51)
Comment: The accumulation of such large Italian surpluses in
the EPU is in part attributable to the fact that steps taken last
year to liberalize most of Italy's imports have not had the expected
effect. This appears to be due to the Italian general customs tariff,
which came into force about the same time as the liberalization
measures and which is considered by financial experts to be too high.
TOP SECRET
11 15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 Appro For Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79~01146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
Consequently, the government has authorized the temporary abolition
of all quotas and other quantitative restrictions affecting most goods
imported from the European Payments Union.
Another method of reducing the Italian surplus in the EPU has
been offered by ECA officials in Rome. They suggest that if Italy
embarks on an adequate program of defense spending, increased
domestic demand will be sufficient to stimulate Italian imports so
that the EPU surplus will be reduced. However, Pella is unlikely to
approve such a course of action because of his fear of inflation.
10. Italian Government anti-strike bill meets widespread o 2fLtion*
The Italian Government is about to present its final draft of the
long expected anti-strike bill, which is less stringent than anticipated
but apparently still unacceptable to both Communist and
non conciliation.
labor unions. All strikes are to be preceded by comp Y
Those in public services are permissible only after a seven-day notice,
and those in the government service are outlawed. Lockouts are
prohibited under penalty of fine or imprisonment.
Aside from the opposition from labor, the Italian Confederation
of Industrialists (Confidustria) objects to the lookout provisions.
A long discussion of the bill in Parliament seems probable, with
final passage in doubt unless modifications are made to satisfy
dissident groups. (S Rome Joint Weeka 45, 9 Nov 51)
Comment: Another reason for labor's opposition'to the bill is
that it would in effect prevent strikes in protest against the mass
dismissals of surplus workers which plague Italian industry.
The Communists would undoubtedly welcome passage of the bill as
a useful issue for exploitation. The government's support of the bill
is likely to alienate labor further and to push the non-Communist
unions into greater cooperation with the Communist-controlled Italian
General Confederation of Labor.
11. UNITED KINGDOM,' British re uest broadening of militar aid criteria:
The British Defense Ministry has asked the US Military Assistance
Advisory Group in London whether the military aid given Great Britain
by the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program c
can
be applied to (1) research and development. equipment, (2)
assistance for the overhauling of US type equipment, (3) component
parts, (4) engineering construction equipment, and (5) British forces
not committed to NATO. (S London 2297, 12 Nov 51)
TOP SECRET
15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 Approvor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79P146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
Comment: For many months British officials have attempted to
bring about a broadening of the criteria by which US military aid
to Britain is determined. They probably see an immediate opportunity
for increased aid, pending the results of NATO studies, and quite
independent of any forthcoming requests for US economic assistance.
12. NORWAY. Trade agreement with Czechoslovakia concludede Trade
agreement negotiations between Norway and Czechoslovakia have been
concluded, according to a Norwegian Foreign Office official. In
addition to non-strategic commodities normally exchanged by the two
countries, the agreement provides that Norway will send 500 tons of
aluminum in exchange for 500 tons of ship plates from Czechoslovakia.
The Foreign Office official expressed his doubt that this'latter
exchange would ever materialize, since difficulties'in fulfilling
inspection requirements for the ship plates may prove insurmountable
and Norway will not export any aluminum until receipt of the plates
is assured. (S Oslo 460, 9 Nov 51)
Comment: Norwegian officials initially made some attempts to
exclude aluminum from the agreement, despite their conviction that the
Czechoslovaks would, as they ultimately did, make any agreement
contingent upon aluminum imports. Norway was willing to include
aluminum rather than precipitate a breakdown in trade relations,
TOP SECRET
13 15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 Approveor Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
15 November 1951
CIA No. 49429-A
Copy No. 49
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
Approved For RdW9V81jM4 kDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 Approv or Release 2002/05/20 : C1A-RDP79 146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. EGYPT. Egyptian Minister of Interior indicates interest in Middle East
Command: The Egyptian Minister of Interior, who is also the politically
powerful Secretary General of the Wafd Party, has informed the US
2 5X1 Ambassador in Cairo that Egypt could accept the Middle East Command under
certain conditions.
Comment: The fact that the second most influential official in the
Egyptian Cabinet has followed the Prime Minister in broaching Egypt's
possible acceptance of the Western defense scheme indicates that the
Government's abrupt rejection of the plan three weeks ago did not close the
door to further negotiations on the subject. It is noteworthy that the
Sudan issue was not mentioned.
The wide gap, however, between Egyptian and Western thinking on the
defense issue and the extreme demands made in public by Egyptian Government
officials still minimize the hope for any settlement.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
2. AUSTRIA. Western strategy on Austrian settlement blocked by French
position: With the British Foreign office having now accepted in principle
oa
a new approach on an Austrian settlement, it is apparent that the primary
obstacle to an attempt to negotiate an Austrian treaty remains French
opposition to the abbreviated treaty proposal suggested by the US. The
British and Austrian Foreign Ministers have agreed to the shorter treaty
draft, provided it is submitted as an alternative proposal subsequent to a
failure to achieve agreement on the old treaty. The French Foreign Office,
however, shows no signs of relenting in its disagreement with this pro-
cedure.
Recent approaches to the French Foreign Office have confirmed that
French opposition reflects (1) a conviction that the Soviet Union is less
likely to approve the shorter treaty than the old draft, (2) a belief that
introduction of the new proposal will swing world public opinion against the
West, and (3) a fear that Soviet rejection of the abbreviated treaty will
destroy the mechanism of the treaty discussions and lead to a fundamental
TOP SECRET
1 15Nov51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0
 Approv or Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79IW146A000500250001-0
TOP SECRET
alteration in the status quo in Austria which these discussions have until
now maintained. The French are in favor of -- but will not insist upon --
conceding to the Soviet Union on the outstanding issues in the old draft
in a supreme effort to obtain agreement, and they favor threats to with-
draw previous concessions if the Soviet authorities remain adamant.
Foreign Office officials assert, however, that they have no intention
of dropping their opposition to any effort which they feel may jeopardize
the Deputy Foreign Ministers' Conferences as such.
The US State Department is increasingly concerrm d over the deadlock,
pointing out that more than two months have elapsed since the Western
Foreign Ministers called for a resolute effort on the Austriar treaty. An
attempt will probably be made to resolve the impasse with a direct approach
to Foreign Minister Schuman in Paris. (Factual data based on: S S/S
London 2202, 6 Nov 51; S S/S Paris 2689, 6 Nov 51; S S/S Vienna 1640, 7 Nov
51; S S/S to Paris TOSEC 19, 10 Nov 51)
Soviet Government seen reluctant to discuss Austrian treaty in
Paris: The Soviet political adviser in Vienna has questioned Austrian
Foreign Minister Gruber as to the likelihood of US reference of the Austrian
treaty dispute to the UN General Assembly in Paris. According to Gruber,
the Soviet adviser indicated that his government is reluctant to discuss
this subject at the Paris meeting, and will take the position that the USSR
is in favor of an Austrian treaty provided World War III can be prevented.
The Austrian Foreign Minister interprets the adviserts observation as in-
dicating that the Kremlin will sign such a treaty only as part of a general
settlement of world issues. (S S/S Vienna 1691, 9 Nov 51)
Comment: The Soviet Government may be puzzled as to what to expect
from the West on the Austrian treaty in view of the Foreign Ministers'
declaration in Washington calling for a resolute effort. Gruber has
strongly supported an appeal to the UN on the Austrian issue, but has other-
wise indicated his belief that an Austrian settlement will be achieved only
with a general relaxation of world tensions,
TOP SECRET
2 15 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500250001-0