DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000600220001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 21, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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21 December 1951
CIA No. 49477
Copy No.
145
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
NAVY HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NAVY and DOS review(s) completed.
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. USSR. Showdown on Soviet A ro orod Plan indicated: A book review
published in the October issue of Soviet Book reaffirmed the position
taken by Pravda in March 1951 against the resettlement of the popula-
tion of merged collectives into centralized agrogorods -- new "agri-
cultural cities.?' In this connection, the review recommended taking
"local conditions" into consideration when implementing mergers.
A more significant article in Socialist Agriculture, written by an
official of the Ministry of Agriculture, stressed the danger of carry-
ing the physical im eme a ?
25X1 feasible limits. omically
Comment: These articles bear out the suspicion that the contro-
versial topic of agrogorods has been permitted to lie dormant in re-
cent months. Economically speaking, it is conservatively estimated
that the building of a new "agrogorod" would amount to three million
rubles, and thus on an all-Union scale the costs of such a program would
reach staggering proportions.
2. German scientist re orted head in advanced Soviet h sits ro rain:
A recent Spanish broadcast to America quoted a Stockholm dispatch to the
effect that the German scientist Gustav Hertz supervises all work on
Soviet atomic energy and is presently in charge of the Soviet advanced
physics program. The article claims that German and Scandinavian
scientists who have established contact with Hertz believe that Hertz
is playing a "very important" role in Soviet atomic research, radar,
and supersonic aviation. Hertz is described as being 74 excellent health, and as having won the Nobel Prize fforPhyears in
sicsoin91925.
He is reported to be surrounded by a circle of some 200 scientists, in
addition to rou s of Russian and German students who aid him in his
25X1 work.
Comments, Hertz was formerly director of the Siemens and Halske
research laboratory and a member of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in
Charlottenburg. Various members of this group including Hertz were "re-
moved" to the Soviet Union, where they, are known to be located at Sukumi
on the Caspian Sea. While it is known that Hertz is playing an active
role in the Soviet atomic energy program, there is at present no justi-
fication for assuming that he is in charge of the entire advanced physics
program.
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3. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. `US Embassy asks Czech Foreign Ministry to investigate
disappearance of American soldiers The US Embassy in Prague has re
quested the Czech Foreign Ministry to investigate the possibility that
a missing American soldier is in Czechoslovakia. The soldier, who is a
private assigned to a constabulary border post, disappeared on 12 De-
cember. Tracks in the snow near his out ost indicated that he mi ht
have been ca tured by the Czechs.
4. POLAND. Soviet Army women arrive in Poland: The US Embassy in Warsaw
reports that girls of 18 to 20 years of age in Soviet infantry uni-
forms were seen i
L
n
egnica during the latter part of November.
I
Comment: Legnica is the headquarters in Poland of the Soviet
Northern Group of Forces. This is the first report of Soviet army
women arriving in Poland and there is no indication yet of the number
involved.
Soviet army women have also arrived in East Germany, the Soviet
Zone of Austria, and Hungary. No definite estimate can be made of the
number, although recent reports indicate that a total of from 7,500 to
10,000 Soviet women, civilian and military, have been brought into East
Germany since last July.
The chief reason for the replacement of native female civilians
working at Soviet military installations by Soviet military and civilian
women appears to be a desire to further increase Soviet security measures
in Eastern Europe. There is no indication yet that the total replace-
ment of indigenous employees in Eastern Europe is contemplated by the
USSR.
5. YUGOSLAVIA. Cominform delegates on Danube Commission adopt construc-
tive attitude towards Yu oslav re resentationsa
on the present session of the Danube Commission indgoates aprsurpriess
reversal in the Cominform attitude towards the Yugoslavs. By 15 De-
cember, all but two of the twenty-three Yugoslav draft articles had
been approved by the majority of the Commission.
A note of disappointment in the Yugoslav press over the fact that
the Cominform delegates have been so conciliatory is noted by US of-
ficials. A continuation of Cominform tactics employed in previous
sessions would have provided Yugoslavia with concrete proof that the
Soviet bloc intended to disregard the spirit of Yugoslavia's UN resolu-
tion calling for a resumption of normal diplomatic relations and
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25X1 observance of international treaty provisions.
Comment: The Soviet-dominated majority has exhibited an astonishing
though belated reversal of form during the present Danube session. As
late as 12 December the Yugoslavs, in reporting the present session,
stated that the Danube Commission "has demonstrated that undemocratic
methods continue to be applied and implemented by the Commission."
The failure of the Cominform majority to ignore or quash Yugoslav
representations may be an effort to appear "sweet and reasonable" be-
fore the eyes of the world, thus giving the lie to the widely pub-
licized Yugoslav charges of "unfriendly acts."
6. Air Force defectors report low Yugoslav army morale and general
Yugoslav pilots advanced e o owing ques io -
able u -provocative opinions: there is a general apathy and lack of
hope among the people; Titoism is worse than ordinary Communism; the
morale of the Yugoslav army is low, and the assumption that it would
fight and acquit itself well in the event of a showdown is questionable.
Nonetheless, the pilots stated that they thought it was "wise" for the
West to support Tito and to use him for what he was worth, but that it
was imperative to remember that Tito is a Communist and would not hesi-
.tate "to cut the throat of the West if it suited his needs."
u that the real reason for their flight was obscure. He mentioned
the high pay of Yugoslav pilots and the fact that they carried their
passports at all sily without "flourish
and fanfare,"
Comment: The accuracy of the pilots' observations is extremely
dubious. The statements are at variance with informed opinion regard-
ing the army's willingness to fight and popular reaction to Titoism.
Views of defectors, regardless of their political propensities, con-
cerning economic conditions and troop morale generally lack objectivi-
ty.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
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2. KOREA. Communists employ radar in coastal defense role: UN naval units
operating off the North Korean east coast between Wonsan and Hungnam on
15 December report receiving gunfire at ranges from 8,000 to 13,000 yards
which fell within 25 to 150 yards on either side of a UN ship. The US
Navy Far East adds that "these guns were reported as definitely fire-controlled." I radar
3.
Comment: Utilization of radar fire-control of shore batteries can
be expend materially to increase coastal defense capabilities during
hours of darkness and.inclement weather. While insufficient information
is provided in this report on the conditions under which this radar was
used, it would normally be employed for bearing or range information.
JAPAN. Four Japanese invited to the April 1952 International Economic
Conference in Moscow: The Japanesepress on in'U December revealed he
names of four prominent Japanese economists who were invited by the USSR
to attend the International Economic Conference in Moscow next April.
These four are: H. Ouchi, president of Hosei University; H. Inaba,
Director of the National Economics Research Institute; S. Tsuru, a
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professor at Hitotsubashi University; and K. Hoashi member of the
25X1 upper house of the Diet.
Comment: Tsuru is considered a confirmed fellow-traveler, while
both uchi -and Hoashi are identified as Japan Communist Party members.
Ouchi is a former member of the Diet. H?ashi, currently. representing
the Party in the House of Councilors, has been active in various front
groups and has long been an advocate of trade with Communist China.
In the past, SCAP has not permitted Japanese to attend overseas
Communist or Communist-front conferences. This particular invitation
may have been issued to exploit propaganda-wise any refusal to permit
these four Japanese to attend the conference.
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SECTION 3 (WESTEIN)
FRANCE. Russian trade demands greater than previously revealed by France:
The French Government wants to postpone the Coordinating Committee's
consideration of French exports of "sensitive" items until current
French-Soviet trade negotiations reach a more advanced stage.
The Russians have requested up to 15.cargo ships of 5000 tons dis-
placement and capable of 13 knots speed. The French Foreign Office,
which claims it will keep within "gentlemen's agreement" limits, plans
2 5X1 to offer no more than six.
Comment: The French Ambassador in Washington had indicated earlier
that only four or five such vessels would be involved, without specifying
the number requested.
The French plan to trade the wheat offered by the Russians for Germal
coal. Inasmuch as the French recently disposed of the 5000-ton Wisconsin
to Poland in exchange for coal, they are likely to stretch a point to meet
the Russian demands for ships.
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3. BELGIUM. Belgium reluctant to increase financial commitments for
defense: The US Embassy at Brussels comments that the seemingly
intransigeant Belgian attitude toward TCC, the EDF, the EPU, and other
current European projects is the result of the country's concern over
current and prospective calls on its resources. The Embassy adds
that "Belgium has been forced into" extreme reluctance toward
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acceptance of new commitments until the total picture of demands is
evident.
In general Belgian acceptance of the TCC recommendations would
require a radical shift from a tradition and policy of economic
liberalism. As an example of Belgian fears of increased drains on its
finances, Belgium suspects that the European Defense Forces, if the
common budget proposal is adopted, will be an organization for which
disproportionate Belgian financial contributions would be asked.
Co-Mment: The TCC paper on Belgium's defense effort, which recom-
mended a 40-percent increase, has been termed by the Belgian Foreign
Minister as "lacking in appreciation of the Belgian effort." From
a military point of view, the Belgians have, in proportion to the
populations of Western Europe countries, made the largest contribution
in terms of trained troops in the field. Belgium has consistently
resented American criticism that its aid to Western Europe is
inadequate, and has maintained that manufacturing specifications as
well asa financing plan must be assured before Belgium's production
capabilities can be fully utilized for rearmament.
4. ITALY. Neo-fascists seek to hold national congress in Trieste: The
Anglo-American military authorities in Zone A of the Free Territory
of Trieste and the Zone President agree it would be inadvisable to
permit the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) to hold a
national congress in the area, as it reportedly is seeking to do.
They do not consider it desirable at this time to refuse permission
to the Trieste MSI for a local congress since the party has not been
outlawed, but are prepared to prevent such a meeting from being
25X1 transformed into a national congress.
Comment: The MSI, which has been prevented from holding a
national congress in Italy by a ban imposed by the Italian authorities
in October 1950, has declared it would nevertheless seek to hold one
somewhere, if necessary on shipboard. It is still a relatively
minor party, but there are indications that it may be able to
influence currents in other parties, such as the majority Christie
Democrats, and to coalesce with these groups to attain power. In
an effort to curb the Mr:SI's increasing appeal, the Italian Government
is now pushing new legislation to enforce a provision of the consti-
tution prohibiting the reorganization of the former Fascist Party in
any form.
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5. DENMARK. Denmark insists on selling tanker to Poland: Denmark has
formally requested the United States to approve its sale of a tanker to
Poland in return for vitally needed coal. Emphasizing the adverse
effects the lack of coal would have on the Danish economy and defense
effort, the Foreign Minister stated that his government would "take a
25X1 very serious view of US disapproval.".
Comment: Although tankers are on the Coordinating Committee's list
of prohi bited exports, the American Embassy in Copenhagen has stated
that the only alternative to this trade is greatly increased US aid
in dollars and shipping.
If Denmark should despite US opposition bring this case before the
Committee, the other European members would probably side with the Danes.
6. TUNISIA. Nationalists call three-da rotest strike: In protest against
the French Government's rejection of Tunisian demands for a greater
share in government, the Tunisian nationalists have called a general
strike for 21 through 23 December. The Tunisian Communist Party and
Communist-controlled labor union have announced their support.
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Meanwhile, the nationalist leaders have convoked a national confer-
ence to redefine their policy.. Their publicly expressed reaction is
noteworthy for its moderation and lack of vitriolic denunciation of the
French Government
Comment: The success of the nati 1
o
'
t
na s
i
-sponsored strike on
29 November encouraged the party leaders to try this medium again.
Although such a demonstration could possibly be accompanied by violence,
the French maintain ample police and military forces to put down any
disorders. The nationalists will probably follow their usual procedure
of taking every precaution against inviting police suppression.
The Communists' support is the Communist Party's attempt to regain
some of its influence previously lost to the nationalists, who have
recently ignored all Communist overtures.
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21 December 1951
CIA. No. 49477-A
Copy NQ.
45
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
l? CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Western European nations differ on Czech request for
Ong rigts; ance, Belgium and the N
nd
eth
n
er nds ho diver
th gent views ? e Czech request for landing ri
hts f
g
or a weekl fliht
Paris via Copenhagen andyg from Prague to
Am
t
d
s
er
am. The French Foreign Office has
confidentiall advised
y the United States that it will deny landing rights
if and when approached by the Czechs.
however, argue that denial of landing rigThe hts~uishdifand Belgian ficult because rofeats,
existing treaty obligations with C
zechoslovakilt
a, ahough they. seem
im ressed by the US suestion that th
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e Three -Power ban on overflights of Western Germany imposed ed as part of Western pressure following the Oatis trial. The
Czech airlines have previously been used as part of Czech intelligence
operations.
S
e fates desires to block the Czech request sin
grant~nT"would weaken +'"
Comment: The Unit d
ev employ delaying tactic G
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
2. FRANCE. French opposed to limited British participation in Euro
Legration schemes:e Commenting on Churchi r pears
rz in wis e o s recent statement tat
associated with both the-Schuman and the Pleven Plans,
a French Foreign
attempt to work .Ministry spokesman said that it was preferable not to
out in detail the form of British association because the
Benelux countries might seek a similar relationship in preference to full
participation. The French spokesman suggested, however, that it would be
helpful if, during Churchill's Washington visit, the United States Govern-
ment urged that British relations with the two European inte ration chemes
25X1 be formal and as close as possible.
Comment: French government leaders believe that eventual full
British participation is essential to European integration. The smaller
Continental nations have used British abstention as an excuse for their re-
luctance to bind themselves too closely to the proposed supranational
organizations, and the French are anxious to avoid presenting them with a
pretext to back out of commitments already taken.
France would probably welcome limited British participation as an
intermediate stage, if not made public before the Continental nations had
ratified the present plans.
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AUSTRIA. Western High Commissioners submit agreed recommendations on
treaty stiateg The Western Hlg Commissioners in Vienna avecomp eted
their discussions with the Austrian Government and with the US Austrian
Treaty Deputy, and have submitted the following recommendations to their
respective overnments: (1) the treaty discussions should resume on 21
January; (2) if there seems to be hope for such a course, the West should
be prepared to accept the Russian text of the unagreed articles in order to
achieve an agreement; (3) if, however, the Russians once again raise
extraneous objections, the conference should be adjourned pending Western
consultations among themselves and with the Austrian Government; (.) rather
than acquiesce in a stalemate, and, rather than submit the Austrian question
to the UN, the Austrian Government and the Western Elements in Vienna should
introduce an abbreviated treaty as a basis for further negotiations; and
(5) the West should be prepared to mak
e some concessions on the abbreviated
draft, but should consider a return to the old draft only if a Soviet re-
quest to do so seems to merit such consideration in the light of the new
situation which would then prevail,
Comment: In previous high-level discussions,, the three Western
governments had been unable to resolve differences of opinion over the
desirability of making further concessions to the Russians or of introducing
a new draft treaty as a basis for negotiation. It is apparent that, if the
Soviet negotiator makes any show of amenability upon the resumption of
treaty discussions, the US will be under strongest pressure from the British,
the French, and the Austrians to accept in whole or in part the Russian
version of articles not yet agreed upon in the old draft.
UNITED KINGDOM. British to suggest appointment of new Egyptian government;
rids m assador ,S evenson in Cairo as been instructed to suggestKing Farouk that he appoint a new government that will at least discuss
the Middle East Command proposals. Stevenson is to agree that some with-
drawal of British troops would start thirty days after the advent of a new
government and the stabilization of the situation. Foreign Office officials,
stating that they had little hope for the success of this move, have
emphasized again Foreign Secretar Eden0s firm o o ition to making any new
proposals on the Sudana
Comments The British and American Ambassadors in Cairo have stated
that although King Farouk would like to dismiss the present government, he
is apparently unwilling to take the risk at present except as a last resort.
There is no evidence that any Egyptian government would be amenable to
reaching an agreement with the British without some compromise on the Sudan.
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