TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT TO THE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000700170001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 24, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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TOP SECRET
.24 January 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY CIA No. 49509
Copy No.
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGES"f
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
46
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligences Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
State Dept. deaWaseficatia18a& P JO Jla {oofie84OAbf1I'O0170001-7
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? TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
EGYPT. Egyptian officials desire US aid in solving Anglo-Egyptian dispute:
The Egyptian bassador in Washington has expressed his belief that a
solution of the Anglo-Egyptian crisis is possible if the "neutral and
respected" United States plays a leading role and if face-saving formulas
are found for Britain and Egypt. The Ambassador suggested that Britain
might guarantee that it would evacuate its troops within a certain time
and that Egypt might then declare its readiness to discuss the Western
defense proposals.
The Lebanese UN delegate, Charles Malik, has also expressed his belief
that the US should "step in and take an active part" in solving the Anglo-
Egyptian crisis. According to Malik, the Egyptian Foreign Minister has
indicated that he or the Prime Minister may come to Washington for the
purpose of finding away out of the current impasse. (S 8/3 to London 3460,
22 Jan; S S/S Paris 1135, 21 Jan 52)
Comment: These two expressions of interest in American mediation
efforts indicate that the Wafd government is anxious to find a compromise
solution to the present crisis despite the intransigent attitude expressed
by Egyptian officials in public.
24 Jan 52
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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
24 January 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY OCI No. 3858
Copy No.
183
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
arrest: Evzen Erban, former Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, was'
1. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Ex-Minister of Labor and Social Welfare reported under
Comment: Erban, who was not a Communist Party member, was sum-
marily removed from his government post on 6 September during the
government and party reorganization when Slansky was also demoted.
Prior to 1948 Erban was an active left-wing Social Democrat and a
power in the Trade Union movement.
own to be
2. FINLAND. Poles accede to Finnish views in trade negotiations: During
negotiations for a 1952 trade agreement with Finland, Poland, which had
at first adopted its typically intransigent position on coal deliveries,
altered its stand with the result that the Finns obtained a very favor-
able agreement. At one point during the negotiations, Poland demanded
3,000 tons of copper and copper products from Finland in exchange for
400,000 tons of coal. The Finns, though in desperate need of the
Polish coal, courageously turned down the Poles and broke off the talks.
However, final agreement was reached whereby Finland will supply Poland
1,350 tons of copper and copper products in exchange for one million
tons of coal.
The US Embassy in Warsaw commented that the Polish reversal was
probably brought about because of Soviet policy towards Finland, i.e.,
the USSR is primarily interested in keeping Finnish trade to a maximum
degree within the Soviet Orbit. (C Warsaw Desp #237, 28 Dec 51)
Comment: Poland, in its negotiations during the past year with
other non-Communist countries, has consistently and successfully used
its capability to supply coal as a means of obtaining strategic com-
modities from the West. In addition to the cogent reason advanced by
the Embassy, it seems possible that Poland really needed the copper.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
Although in control of a government which is fighting Communist insur-
gents, the Burma Socialists consider themselves to be a Marxist-Leninist
party. Their neutral foreign policy is largely based upon a desire to
avoid antagonizing Communist China.
2. Premier reported.prepared to oust Defense Minister:
25X1C Premier in Nu has given in to-7R-e-Te-man s o Commander
in Uhief e Win and has promised to oust Deftnse Minister U Win, who is also
the Home Minister. This action is the result of a leak to Ne Win of an 25X1
alleged agreement between U Win and Thakin Nu to demote Ne Win from Commander
in Chief to Chief of Staff of the Army.
Comments U Win is one of.the more conservative memebers of the Burmese
Cabinet and has been friendly toward.the West. A natural rivalry has de-
veloped between U Win and the dpportuiistie Ne Win because of their common
concern with military matters. This is the first'report, however, that the
removal of one or the other is imminent.
Cabinet continues undecided on US aid: The Burmese Attorney General
informed the US Embassy in Rangoon that the provisions of the Battle Act were
the obstacle to Burmese acceptance of US aid. The Burmese official stated
that he thought the provisions were inconsistent with Burma's neutral for-
eign policy and referred to a growing feeling that further American re-
quirements would follow if the terms of the Act were accepted. He also
reiterated Burma's fear of antagonizing Communist China. (C Rangoon 175,
22 Jan 52)
Comment: The deadline for renegotiation of US aid agreements to meet
the requirements of MSA expired two weeks ago. Meanwhile, leftist propa-
ganda against American aid has become increasingly shrill and has been
successful in confusing the issue in the Burmese press.
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14. News story increases threat to MSA programs The US Embassy in Ran-
goon has eel n reliably informed that the BBC repeated a story apparently
reported by a correspondent of the London Observer that a fresh Chinese
Nationalist battalion had been flown into Burma with American support.
The Embassy believes that the story will be given a "big play" by the Bur-
mese press and will strengthen the opponents of US assistance-by giving
credibility to their misrepresentation of the statutory requirements of
the Mutual Security Act. (C Rangoon 716, 22 Jan 52)
Comments This development follows close upon the heels of intensi-
fied leftist demonstrations against the US, at a time when the Burmese
Cabinet is studying the problem of whether to accept US aid under the terms
of the MSA.
5. INDOCHINA. Chinese Communists concentrate forces near Indochina assn
French intelligence in Hanoi accepts as confirmed t e presence o ,000
Chinese Communist regulars in the region between Nanning and Pingsiang,
the best pass " nto Indochina. The US Consul comments that, if this report
is true, the "picture is not good," since a force of this size in such a
small area appears unnecessary for local security control. (S Hanoi 492,
21 Jan 52 )
Comment: Numerous reports indicating a build-up of Chinese Communist
he border area as a whole have not been, confirmed. However,
It is possible that deployment of Chinese Communist troops is designed
to divert the attention of the French or to cause enough displacement of
French forces to benefit the Viet Minh without actually involving China in
hostilities.
Viet Minh capabilities greatly increaseds A French official
told the American Consul in not that despite De La.ttre's strategy and
increased American aid, the situation in Tonkin is "more,-grim" than a year
ago. The Viet Minh army is now afar more efficient force, is receiving
far more Chinese logistic support, and. despite heavy casualties, appears to
have "inexhaustible" manpower reserves. The Consul comments that a feeling
of futility seems to be spreading among the French. (S Hanoi 492, 21 Jan 52)
Comments 'When De LAttre arrived in Indochina a year ago the French
were in grave danger of being driven out of Tonkin.
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In the past, reserve manpower has been'the greatest problem of the
Viet Minh military effort. Viet Minh infiltration of the Tonkin delta
during recent months has provided it with access to a manpower reservoir
which it has evidently been exploiting with great success*
said the
French command was "preoccupied" with the ability o the Viet Minh to main-
tain pressure against the French defenses in the delta over such a pro-
longed period.
CHINA/INDIA: Tibetans reported encroaching on Indian frontier area: Tibetan
officials from western Tibet are coming into G ar -wal and Almora, Indian
frontier areas northeast of Delhi, to "obtain "tribute" from Tibetans, ac-
cording to Indian news reports. In addition,-Chinese-Communists in western
Tibet are said to have started a campaign for the return to Tibet of
Badrinath shrine in northern Garhwal. Indian papers say that such claims
to Badrinath are made on the basis that the shrine was once administered
by Toling monastery in western Tibet. India, though disturbed over Tibetan
encroachments, has not protested lest Tibet be offended. New Delhi sources
say that the Indian Government has received no communication from'Peiping or
elsewhere laying claim to Badrinath. (S New Delhi 2L59, 11 Jan; FBIS
Ticker, 17 Jan 52)
Comments Accumulating evidence indicates a Communist tendency to ex-
pand from Ti et at the expense of border areas within the Indian sphere.
These areas are vulnerable on many counts: the Tibetan international border
is undefined; along this border lies a strip of. territory, about 20 to 60
miles wide, largely inhabited by Tibetans or closely related peoples but
administered severally by India, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan; the Tibetans
affected opposed the Indian takeover from the British. Garhwal and Almora
include part of this ethnically Tibetan belt.
For 40 years there have been recurrent disputes over the Indo-Tibetan
western frontier. Probably in the past the inhabitants paid taxes to
-whichever side could collect, sometimes even to both sides at once. This
background suggests that the Chinese Communists in western Tibet, by
fanning latent Tibetan irredentism,.may be able to subvert Indian rule in
the frontier areas of Almora and Garhwal, and perhaps also in Tehri Garhwal,
Bashahr, and Kashmir to the north.
8. KOREA. North Koreans called upon to revive and expand animal husbandry:
Plans to revive and expand North Korea's animal husbandry in 1952 were.pre-
sented by Vice Prime Minister Pak in a-Pyongyang conference called by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestryb After asking for a large increase
in the number of livestock for the coming year, the Communist official
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stated that North Korea has during the war lost 300,000 head of cattle,
700,000 pigs, 3,000,000 domestic fowls, and several thousand horses. (U
FBIS Ticker, 20 Jan 52)
Comment: In 1950, North Korea planned to attain a livestock popula-
tion o,000 head'of cattle, 788,000 pigs, several million domestic fowl,
and 13,000 horses.
The above figures and the losses announced by Pak point up the con-
siderable depletion of the numbers of domestic livestock in North Korea.
The swine and fowl losses appear somewhat exaggerated.
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A& k
SECTION 3 (IE5TERN)
1. GENERAL. Large antibiotic transshipments made through Switzerland: Approxi-
ma e y ,5 metric tons of streptomycin were transshipped to Prague through
a Swiss firm during 1951, according to the British Consul in Basel. About
20 percent of this quantity reportedly came to Switzerland through Israel.
The Consul states that the shipments were sent to Prague via Swissair and
KLM. (S Basel Desp. 38, 10 Dec 51)
Comment: It is improbable that such a large amount of streptomycin was
shipped by air through Switzerland during the.past year. During the past
three years, the Soviet bloc has been getting large quantities of antibiotics
from such widely separated points as the US, the UK, Denmark, Australia,
Italy, and Macao. Switzerland, Hongkong, and Israel have been frequently
used as transshipment points. The Soviet bloc1s success in procuring anti-
biotics is underscored in part by the capture by UN forces in Korea of anti-
biotics manufactured in America.
The US is severely restricting the shipment of antibiotics to the Soviet
bloc and has tried to prevent transshipment through third countries by spot
end-use checks of exports. The unwillingness of other Western nations to
follow suit, together with appeals on humanitarian grounds by the International
Red Cross for the shipment of antibiotics to Communist countries, has enabled
the Soviet Orbit to evade US controls.
2. GERMANY. West German public opinion is increasingly favorable toward the US:
Recent-opinion surveys show that West German attitudes toward e improved
markedly during 1951. Three polls during the past year based on the question:
"What is more important: a good understanding with the Americans, with the
Russians, or a neutral position between the two?" showed that the percentage
of those interviewed who favored a pro-American position increased from 39
to 49 percent, while those favoring the neutralist position dropped from
48 to 42 percent and the pro-Soviet group remained around one percent. (U
Duesseldorf Desp. 329, 12 Dec 51)
Comment: This change goes far to dispel a prevailing belief in many
quarters that some extreme rightist parties which espouse neutrality have
broadened their support during the past year. These polls would indicate
that the increased strength of these parties arises from factors other than
their neutrality planks. The poll also suggests that Adenauer's policy of
supporting Western integration will probably meet with increased public
approval.
3. EAST GERMANY. Measures against Socialist Party in East Berlin may not be
carried out: The East Berlin governmen has cancelled the leases on oice
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space occupied by the West German Socialist Party (SPD) in East Berlin and
turned down requests for allocations of other office space. A Socialist
Unity (Communist) Party functionary, however, who had been reprimanded by
a district mayor for the eviction action, has given the East Berlin SPD
Chairman the impression that the eviction notices will be revoked. An
article in Neues Deutschland, the official SED paper, emphasized the
possibility of appeal. (R Berlin unnumbered, 12 Jan 52; C Berlin 490,
19 Jan 52)
Comment: Both the SPD and the SED have been permitted to function in
all sectors of Berlin under a four-power agreement of 1946.
Possible retaliatory action by West.Berlin could close twelve SED
offices and interfere with many other Communist front activities in West
Berlin, whereas only eight SPD offices in East Berlin would suffer. The
SED may have threatened the evictions in hopes of pressuring the SPD into
cooperation on the unity issue. Such a clumsy effort, however, would gravely
impugn the sincerity of the, Communist propaganda on unity, a reaction that
may have been belatedly appreciated by higher Communist officials.
4. FRANCE-TUNISIA. French forces capable of keeping Tunisian disorders at
minimum: The superior force of rench arms is capable of keeping Tunisian
disorders at a minimum, even though the troops did have difficulty in
quelling the riot at Sousse on 22 January. Tunisian efforts have, however,
been at least somewhat successful, inasmuch as France now appears more
amenable toward requests for more native responsibility in the Tunisian
government.
The new French Government may have made some commitment to secure the
support of the Socialists who have long advocated a more lenient policy
toward the North African protectorates. Discussions regarding reform
measures are expected when the situation has calmed. Despite the fact that
Tunisian Communist as well as nationalist leaders have-been taken into
custody and despite Communist participation in the demonstrations, there
is no evidence to support French contentions of nationalist-Communist co-
operation., (Factual data from: NY Times, 23 Jan 52; S Paris 4338, 21 Jan 52)
5. AUSTRIA. Vienna about to conclude trade pact with Czechoslovakia: An
Austrian delegation left for Prague on 21-January to conclude a trade agree-
ment under which Austria will deliver ball bearings, steel, iron, aluminum,
electric furnaces, and cranes to Czechoslovakia, which has dropped its
demands for special alloy steels.
The cranes involved are manufactured by the Soviet enterprises in
Austria; were they not included in the trade agreement, the Czechs could
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get them anyway. The shipment of semi-fabricated aluminum is tied to the
import of 70,000 tons of coke dust from Czechoslovakia. The Austrian Foreign
Office says that the electric furnaces are to fill orders placed for normal
types in 1950; five of the furnaces were 25X1C
ordered from Siemens- a s e bus a ovem e.
The US Embassy in Vienna, while agreeing that Austria is paying too
much in strategic shipments, believes that the only solution is for the US
tb replace Poland and Czechoslovakia as a source of coal for Austria, and to
finance the trade deficit with which Austria would be faced if it sto ed
all trade with the two Satellites. (S Vienna 2377, 21 Jan 52; 25X1A
wrote r?oreign z5ecretiary i;aen criticizing
the Foreign Office view a the USSR had not been seriously affected by
East-West trade restrictions and that the Soviet campaign last summer to
expand East-West trade was primarily a propaganda move. The Ambassador
argues that, on the contrary, the USSR fears a complete blockade and is
anxious to increase trade with the West primarily because of economic need.
He contends that the Soviet capital development program, increasing Soviet
rearmament, and now the industrialization of Communist China call for a
scale of Soviet Orbit production which cannot be met without help through
external trade. (S Moscow 353, 27 Nov 51)
Comment: This is the first indication of a change in British thinking
on East-West trade controls. There has been no evidence that the present
British Government has modified the Foreign Office view that trade with the
Soviet Orbit is necessary to the British economy.
7. SCANDINAVIA. Government opinion divided on location of NATO headquarters:
In the projected reorganization of NATO agencies, Norway favors centralizing
in Paris as a practical measure which, among other things, would facilitate
coordination of NATO and OEEC policy. Danish military and economic officials
prefer locating the headquarters in Paris in order to be close to SHAPE and
OEEC, but political leaders fear that a Paris location might be detrimental
to British prestige. The Danish delegate is authorized, however, to accept
Paris as the NATO headquarters if strong support for that city is apparent
among the other council delegates. Iceland is indifferent and will accept
either London or Paris. (S Oslo 6h6, 22 Jan 52; S Copenhagen 529, 22 Jan 52.;
S London DEPT0-855, 22 Jan 52)
8. DENMARK. Government desires to build schooners for USSR: Denmark has
requested COCOM to approve a contract for the construction of eight seal-
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hunting schooners for the USSR. Denmark would not receive in return any
goods essential to its economy, but would reduce its debt for past deliveries
of such goods. The Danes assert that the vessels are not suitable for mine
laying, mine sweeping, or escort purposes. (S Paris 4292, 19 Jan 52)
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