DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000800030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 18, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
18 February 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY OCI No. 3875
Copy No. 2 51
DAILY DIGEST
ARMY,DIA,JCS,DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
Office of. Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared pr inxarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECURITY'INFORMATION
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. USSR. Roshchin says Sino-Soviet Treaty now has ft particular significance":
According to Radio Peiping, Soviet ;Ambassador Roshchin, speaking at -the .
Sino-Soviet Friendship Association on the second anniversary of the Sines
Soviet Treaty, referred to the "brotherly concord and close economic co-
operation" resulting from the alliance. Calling the pant an "unequalled
force for peace," he concluded that "in the present complex international
situation, the full significance of the treaty makes itself felt with
particular effect." (R FBIS Ticker Peking, 15 Feb 52)
Comment: Roshchin's speech is in line with Moscow's propaganda
treatment of the treaty which, while admitting that the-alliance is a
"bulwark for peace," also".emphasizes the benefits of economic cooperation
implicit in the treaty and makes no claim, as does Peiping, that the pact
deters the US from expanding the Korean conflict.
2. POLAND. Polish Government offers fishermen special incentives: The
Polish Government has passed a resolution providing special benefits for sea
fishermen to help raise production from the 72,000-ton catch of 1951 to
126,000 tons for 1952. The resolution stipulates that the government
will lease extra housing to independent fishermen from May through.
November, provide coal aid and meat and fat ration coupons, and provide
a monthly premium for fulfilling the plan. (R Warsaw 538, 15 Feb 52)
Comment: Last August, and again in a revision of the plan in
November, ie government organized extensive economic benefits for farmers
who would 'contract to breed and deliver hogs to the State.
These special incentive plans appealing to the independent producer
are strong proof that the State's economic planning has failed signally
in at least these sectors of the economy.
RUM/NIA. Radio jamming reportedly increased- Voice of ..America, BBC, and
other glish and French broadcasts are heard with increasing difficulty
in Bucharest, Galati, and Braila, according to Rumanian refugees who ar-
rived.in Greece on 1 February. Several of these sources asserted that
reception of the Voice of America had been clearest, but increased jam
ming in January had effectively blocked it in the Galati area.
A recent French broadcast to the Balkans stated that'western news
items will be increasingly scarce in Rumania, since construction work
has begun on another special jamming station. (S USARMA Athens, MID 51,
8 Feb 52 R FBIS Ticker Paris, 12 Feb 52)
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4. YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavs show added interest in private forei_. capitals
IVlilenko Filipovic, financial adviser of the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington,
indicated to Ambassador Allen that one of the main purposes of his return
ththe depossibil-
to Belgrade early this year was to advise his government
ities of interesting American private capital, particularly GA.
guarantee provisions, in Yugoslav projects. Filipovic also stated that he
now has to deal with Tempo Vukmanov1c, Chairman of the powerful Federal
Council for Industry, as well as with Finance Minister.Popovic and Foreign
Minister Yardelj.
A private American source told American Embassy officials that there
is a difference of opinion in high Yugoslav Government circles regarding
the question of the intrusion. of private capital into Yugoslavia, and
that Vukuanovic advocates inviting private participation. (S Belgrade
Despatch 641, 9 Jan 52)
Comments In early December, American Embassy officials were in-
formed that a representative of a foreign syndicate? which is willing to
finance the construction of an oil refinery, was negotiating with the
Yugoslavs. The Embassy reported that this was the first time that any
private investors have evinced interest in financing developments under
the Tito regime.
A United Press story from Belgrade, datelined 31 December 1951,
reported the existence of a Yugoslav plan to luxe" private capital.
This article was vehemently denied by the Yugoslavs on 3 January 1952x
Nonetheless, the Yugoslavs, unable to justify larger sums of foreign aid,
may feel that in the case of economic development the ends justify the
means. Vukmanovicgs impending trip to the United States, for thll e an-
nounced purpose of touring American industrial projects, may we
related to Yugoslav plans designed to attract private investmento
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. EGYPT. Student groups prepare to act against governments Egyptian
-Ir pan versi y s ?) en s w o rare mem ers o e terroris iberata.on
Battalions" are considering demonstrations against Prime Minister Ali'Maher's
policy of suppressing all anti-British activities.
Other university students, members of the Wafd Party, are ready to
declare war on the new government" if such action is approved by the
party's Secretary General. 25X1A
Conmrents These reports-seem to show that student opposition to the
new Egyptian Government, though still small-scale, is likely to increase
rapidly if,there is no visible progress toward solving the' Anglo-Egyptian
impasse.',Under the Wafdist regime, Egyptian students -layed an important
pa t in'the anti-British demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria, as
well as in terrorist activities against British, troops in the Canal zone.
2. IRAN. Prime Minister considers armed forces unfriendly to his partys
Prime Minister Mossadeq considers the Iranian Army unfriendly to the~ie
National Front and has accused it of interfering in the elections.
told the American Ambassador that he had yet to find one high-ranking "
Iranian officer who had not been or was not still in British service.
The Shah is responsible for the army's conduct, but P:Mossad.eq h?Ls
asserted that he could not tolerate army interference in civil .fairs and
that he might have to take steps to counteract it. (S Tehran AFC 35-52,
12 Feb 52)
Comments Mossadeq and the National Front are determined to reduce
the power off` the Shah and to put the armed forces under S irect ctherarmed
of the government rather than of the ruler. Since
forces are the focal point of conservative opposition to Mossadeq's government,
t -Communist opposition.
on
3?
their neutralization would remove the most importan n
An attempt b the National Front to penetrate the air force has recently
been reported by it Tehran. He adds, however, that
National Front officers who were in important positions have been removed.
The "'Chief of Staff, backed by the Shah, is upholding their dismissal in
the fade of strong pressure from National Front leaders.
BURMA. Soviet Union seekin trade with Burman The American Embassy in
Rangoon reports that the oviet delegation to the recently oncluded
l
EC,AFE conference is prolonging its stay in Parma and is contacting loca
firms to promote trade with the USSR. The supply of illustrated pamphlets
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used by the Russians and the arrival of a TASS correspondent just
before the conference ended causes the Embassy to suspect that these
soviet activities were prearranged. (S Rangoon 1799, 11 Feb 52)
Comments While the USSR has made broad offers of trade to Indiap
Thailandd9 Ceylon and Indonesia, Burma is the first country in which it
has attempted an overt, well-organized approach at economic penetration
of South Asia.
:Vince Burma's imports are strictly controlled by licensing and
almost all established business firms have trading channels with the
West, Soviet success will depend largely upon collaboration by the Burmese
Government
Cabinet shakeup ecpecteds The American Embassy in Rangoon reports
that a Burmese Premier-is expected!soon to approve a Cabinet shakeup
dictated by the Socialists. Changes are to include the installation of
Socialist Party leader U Ba Swe as fefense Minister and the appointment
of Thakin Tin, chief author of the land Nationalization Act, to the newly-
created post of Minister for Land Nationalization. The Embassy coiiiments
that this reshuffle appears to pro4nise a stronger Cabinet and that no
change in foreign policy is indicated. (S Rangoon 806, 15 Feb 52)
Comments Both U Ba Swe and.Thskin Tin are self-admitted extreme
leftists who have never, concealed their anti-Western attitudes and their
admiration of Communist China and the USSR. 'hey also-retain friendly
relations with leaders of the pro-Communist Burma Workers and Peasants
Party.
The American Army Attache in Rangoon was recently informed that
Commander in Chief Ne Win was opposed to an appointment of U Ba Swe
as Defense Minister and that-rumors of a comp were "cropping up" again
among government officials.
Successful anti-Communist operations reported- The American Military
Attache reports that mi z ary operations against the insurgents, particularly
the Communists in the Mandalay area9are proceeding successfully. Con-
siderable arms and equipment have been captured and some long-established
Communist strongholds completely destroyed. These gains, howdver, will
be lost unlesq they are rapidly followed up by civilian administration
a development 'which seems doubtful. (S Rangoon 806, 15 Feb 52)
Comments The pattern of events shown in this report has been repeated
often throughout Burma. Government forces have been capable of capturing
a specific objective, but when their efforts are shifted to other operations
the insurgents return.
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6. Continued friction among insurgents indicated: The Burmese press re-
ports that hakin Soo, head of the'Red Flag Communists, is attempting to
establish an underground alliance with elements of the insurgent Karens
and Peoples Volunteer Organisation.. Thakin Soo is quoted as accusing Than
T,zL, leader of the Burma Communist Party, of being a deviationisto The
American Embassy in Rangoon says that although such an alliance would be
a threat to the governmentsit also "contains the germ" of a violent split
among the insurgent groups. (S Rangoon 806, 15 Feb 52)
Comments Previously Thakin Soo has called Than Tun a deviationist,
and vice versao Although.the BCP, which is generally regarded as the
orthodox Communist Party, reportedly is vigorously pressing for an in-
surgent united front, there is reason to believe that the Red Flags were
the first to seek Karen support:
The various insurgents in Burma have always been seriously divided;
this report, if true, indicates that little progress has been achieved
in reaching an understanding.
INDOCHINA. French plan attack on "third force" group: French troops may
d
~sh.ortly launch offensive opera ions in Cochinchina against the jungle-basedh
7000-man "army" of the nationalist leader, Colonel Trinh Minh The. Al
The's force is small, he has achieved a network of tentative alliances with
other political groups which are both anti-Viet Minh and anti-French.
The American Legation believes that a French attack would be risky and
"cannot vouch" that it would not provoke a general uprising of Vietnamese
armed groups which have ostensibly been loyal to Bao Dail, possibly driving
some of them into the Viet Minh camp. (S Saigon 1613,
Comments Colonel The, formerly chief of staff to the armed forces of
the inf uential Cao Dai politico religious sect, renounced any cooperation
with the French in mid-1951 and established "third force" headquarters on
the Cochinohina-Cambodia border. His clandestine radio transmitter has
broadcast violent attacks against both the French "imperialists" and the
Viet Minh:
Colonel The?s principal propaganda theme, a demand for complete free-
dom from all.foreign intervention, has an enormous emotional appeal for the
Vietnamese, and he could probably count on some support from the Cao Dai
group, whose adherents number in the tens of thou&andso
25X1X
8o CHINA. Reports des railroad operation in West China: il~
!III
raveled on to s
25X1X
ng iver a coal mines- 25 miles north25XlX
road e e a
of Chungking, and reported it to be standard gauge and in good condition:
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Train schedules published in November for the Sian Bureau of the
Chengchow Railroad Administration list service as far west as Paochi and
over a 50-mile branch line north of Siano
The present travel times on the Kunming Railway Administrations
routes south of Kunming to Pisechai and east to Chanyi appear to an Ameri-
can official stationed at Kunming in 1949 to be no less than in that year.
17 Dec 51j U Hong Kong D-12309 17 Dec 519 R
Manila D-970, 18 Jan 52) -
Comments These train schedules and refugee reports provide useful
data on the extent of railroad reconstruction. Despite the reported resto-
ration of the Pisechai-Indoohina and Paochi-Tienshui lines, there was evi-
dently no regular commercial service over these routes in Novembero On the
other hand, the branch line north of Sian and the coal mine railroad near
Chungking were not known to be in operations
9e British official recommends American help to sto irac The
British Consul at Taipei is recommending that representat?ves ofothe US
7th Fleet and the British Navy at Hong Kong confer on obordination of,
patrols to handle the problem of increasing piracy in the Formosan Strait.
The American Consul General at Taipei says it is assumed that the pirate
vessel which attacked the British ship Wing Sang on 11 February belonged
to a pro-Nationalist, but not Nationalistmcontrclled9 guerrilla group*
This is the third instance of piracy in six weeks? and the ninth since July.
(S Taipei 1018, 13 Feb 52)
Comment- The Commander in Chief of the Chinese Navy, who admitted that
he doecontrol all pro-Nationalist naval forces, denied that the at-
tacker was under his command. Most of the ships attacked by pirates have
been British.
10. JAPAN. Government fears criticism over continued use of Japanese properties
by American forcers Ambassador Rusk repor s ham a apanese appear deter-
mined not to give the United States a flat commitment in the administrative
agreement of the US-Japan Security Treaty whioli would allow the United States
to continue using disputed facilities in Japano However, the Japanese will
grant this privilege in an exchange of notes to accompany the agreement, and
in view of Japanese misgivings Ambassador Rusk recommends this approaoho
(S Tokyo 1669, 15 Feb 52) -
Comments The Japanese Government fears that excessive retention of
Japanese facilities by the US military authorities after the treaty will lead
to anti-American sentiment and may provoke the Communists and other elements
unfriendly to the US to attack the government. They think that removal from
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the body of the agreement of the US "privilege" of retaining properties
not agreed upon by both governments will de-emphasize this concession to
the American position.
11. Reports of arms acquisition b Communists unconfirmedo Consistent
low-level intelligence reports of the acquisi ion, possession and even manu-
facture of weapons by the Japanese Communist Party remain unconfirmed, ac-
cording to CINCFE0 To date, only one JCP member has been apprehended with
a pistol, although probably a few pistols are owned by JCP memberso CINCFE
believes, however, that the increased emphasis on "revolutionary struggle
movements" as set forth in, the 1951 thesis of the JCP may embody greater
efforts toward procuring weapons. (C Dept of Army, Memo to CIA, undated)
Comment% Several alleged JCP directives contain instructions to ac-
celer the acquisition of arms;; they refer to the establishment of a unit
within the underground structure to maintain, store and distribute them.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
1. GERMANY. West German Communism meets with some success: Many West German
Social Democratic leaders are convinced that Communism and its anti-
rearmament theme are attracting more and more German workers, according
25X1C to recent reports Local party chiefs say that the 25X1C
rank and file of both t e par y an the German Federation of Trade Unions
feel that their leaders are letting them down by tacitly approving
rearmament under certain conditions. One top functionary asserts that
the West German Communist Party has recovered from its long decline at
the expense of the Social Democrats.
In contrast to these statements, Works Councils elections held in
the last six months have shown a steady Communist decline. These
elections, however, all antedate labor's violently adverse reaction to a
pro-rearmament speech two weeks ago by the head of the Trade Unions and
the latest observations of the Social Democratic leaders. Although
West German industrial workers -- with the possible exceptions of the
metalworkers and dockworkers -- oppose rearmament and may go along
with the Communist line temporarily, they will not be inclined either
to join the party in significant numbers or to participate in any
Communist-inspired anti-rearmament strikes. (Factual data from:
25X1 C
25X1 C
AUSTRIA. Vienna discussions bring closer. new try for Austrian treaty:
.The High Commissioners of the Western powers in Vienna have submitted
recommendations to their respective governments representing considerable
progress toward an agreed strategy for again seeking Soviet concurrence
in an Austrian settlement. The Foreign Ministers would promptly announce
Western intentions to obtain a treaty, and a new invitation would go
out to the USSR to cooperate. In the event of an unsatisfactory reply,
identical notes would be submitted to the Soviet Government, explaining
the Western desire to submit an abbreviated treaty as "a basis" for
renewed negotiations and as a means of obtaining withdrawal of the
occupation forces. The notes would be accompanied-by a "white paper"
outlining Western efforts to obtain a treaty.
Discussions in Vienna of the proposed text of the abbreviated
treaty have centered upon recommendations by one or more of the High
Commissioners or by the Austrian Government setting limits on an
Austrian army, prohibiting. an Austro-German ansch.luss, and guaranteeing
maintenance of democratic institutions in Austria. Some formula must
yet be worked out, however, to reconcile British desires that intro-
duction of the new text not imply the abandonment of the old, and US
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insistence that the USSR not be enabled to choose between the two texts.
(Factual data from: S Vienna 2591 and 2629, 7 and 12 Feb 52; S to Vienna
2016, 2026, and 2046, 8, 11, and 13 Feb 52; S London 3518, 13 Feb 52;
S Paris 4997,. 14 Feb 52)
ITALY. Strategic exports to Rumania suspended: The Italian Government
is suspending the issuance of export licenses to Rumania in an effort
to obtain the release of an Italian Legation employee arrested in
Bucharest on espionage charges. Italy is not blocking shipment of
embargoed equipment already licensed and paid for., however, on the
grounds that such action would jeopardize the success of diplomatic
negotiations for the employee's release. It believes that the temporary
non-issuance,of,export licenses may obtain the desired result, especially
since Italy has. allowed its debit trade balance with Rumania to mount to
350,000 dollars. (S Rome 3548, 13 Feb 52)
Comment: Italy has consistently opposed US proposals for joint
representations by the Western powers to Bucharest on the general
problem-of immunity of Western nationals in diplomatic missions in
Rumania. It argues that such a step would hurt its own diplomatic negoti-
ations for the release of the employee.
ITALY-ETHIOPIA. Return of former Fascists in diplomatic capacity feared
by Ethiopia: Ethiopia hopes the Italian Government will not be so unwise
as to include on the staff of its new Embassy at Addis Ababa Italians
who were in Ethiopia during the Fascist occupation. The Ethiopian
Foreign Minister has found the names of Italians associated with the
occupation listed among names of personnel waiting in Asmara to proceed
to Addis Ababa.
Italy has informed the US that., with one exception, no Italian
personnel are being sent from Asmara to Addis Ababa. (C Rome 3512,
11 Feb 52; S Addis Ababa Joint Weeka 6., 7 Feb 52; C Addis Ababa 327,
2 Feb 52 )
Comment: The Italian Ministry of African Affairs, a hangover
from the Fascist regime, is now being liquidated and possibly some of
its career personnel are scheduled for assignment to diplomatic missions
in Ethiopia and Libya because of their experience in colonial matters.
Appointments of old-time Fascists are not unlikely in view of the
tendency of the Christian Democratic right wing., which dominates the
government, to seek closer working relations with the neo-fascist Italian
Social Movement.
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6s
s
tion within the projected government."
ex
e
; and (3) guarantees against reprisals for future political oppo-
i
SPAIN-MOROCCO, New Nationalist-Spanish talk reported: The Moroccan
nationalist leader, Abd-el-Khalik Torres, is said to be optimistic re-
garding his 11 February conference with the Spanish High Commissioner,
Lt, Gene Garcia Valinoo At this conference, the first of a series, there
was reportedly discussion and "full accord" regarding (1) repeal of
restrictive measures on freedom of press, public assembly, and interzonal
travel; (2) release of political prisoners and readmittance of political
il
s
Comment: At a meeting between Garcia Valino and Torres in January,
prior to the Khalifa's visit to Madrid, the Spanish High Commissioner
reportedly agreed to the return of political exiles and overt nationalist
political activity. What agreement, if any, was reached in Madrid between
Franco and the Khalifa is not known, although the Khalifa on his return to
Morocco expressed conviction of Franco's goodwill. A Spanish Foreign
Ministry official has informed the US Embassy that there has been no change
in Spanish policy toward Morocco and that although the Franco regime is
sympathetic to Moroccan aspirations for greater autonomy, it does not
believe that Morocco is ready for independence. Franco is reportedly
planning a trip to the Protectorate in March or April which might provide
the occasion for a public announcement regarding Spanish intentions,
UNITED KINGDOM. Britain recommends hands-off olic in Saar dis ute:
The British Foreign Office has drafted for Foreign Secretary Eden's
approval a proposal that Britain and the US urge Germany and France to solve
the Saar question between themselves. The Foreign Office believes that
discussions with the French and Germans might result in Anglo-American
commitments as well as arouse French and German resentment at being pressed
into an agreement.
A Foreign Office spokesman stated that political considerations would
probably not allow Chancellor Adenauer to postpone negotiations on the
Saar until after the problem of Germany's status in the EDC has been
settled and contractual relations have come into effect. (S London 3517,
13 Feb 52)
Comment: West German officials had suggested that the US and Britain
press both Bonn and Paris for a settlement of the Saar dispute, which is
a major obstacle to agreement on Germany's participation in Western defense,
Other sterling area countries offset improvement in British
balance of trade: Improvement in the sterling area's balance of payments,
expected to result from the import cuts announced by Britain on 7 November,
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will be seriously delayed, according to the US Embassy in London. Particu-
larly as regards the EPU deficit, the effect of these cuts thus far is
diminished by continued large deficits with EPU countries on the part of
the rest of the sterling area. (C London 3528, 13 Feb 52)
Comment: Last week a British Treasury official expressed confidence
that the goal of balance in the last half of 1952 set by the finance
ministers' conference would be attained. The UK's adverse trade balance
was reduced 15 percent as a result of record exports in January, but the
strengthening of sterling also depends upon concomitant action by all
of the sterling area partners.
25X1A
25X1A
ra
on,
.C Asuncion
8. ARGENTINA. River Plate labor conference arouses little enthusiasm: The
opening meeting of the River Plate labor conference see OCI Daily Digest,
8 and 14 Feb 52), organized by the Argentine General Confederation of Labor,
was a "complete failure." The speech by Argentina's chief delegate re-
ceived scarcely any applause, and other speakers were noncommittal. In
the second part of the conference Paraguay was planning to press for a
committee for the unity of free trade unions aimed at world-wide partici-
pation, because it desires to diminish Argentine control.
Prior to the meeting, two Uruguayan labor leaders toured Latin America
to arouse interest in the conference. Observers invited from countries
outside the River Plate area were assured the same rights at the conference
as official delegates, and all expenses were guaranteed by the Argentine
labor confede
ti
Comment: Observers from 13 countries outside the River Plate area
attended the conference. Plans for the conference were kept secret, but
it appears that Argentina's main purpose was to convoke an inter-American
labor conference under the River Plate label. While the meetinges success
is doubtful, Argentina at least succeeded in bringing together representa-
tives of labor unions, some of them important, from most of the Latin
American countries.
9. BOLIVIA. Government anxious to reach agreement on tin. A Foreign Office
official stated that because of Bolivia's deteriorating political situ-
ation, the government is anxious to reach agreement with the US on a new
tin price. In view of the delay in the Bolivian Ambassador's talks with
US officials, the Foreign Office has sent out a circular note to all
Bolivian missions in Latin America to seek publicity decrying the delay.
The note emphasized that the price of Bolivian tin must be somewhat higher
than that for Malayan tin, since Britain accepted a lower price than
warranted because of its need for steel, and asked that the missions
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approach other governments to obtain assurance of a
should the matter eventually be taken to the Ora proBolivian vote
(C La Paz 295, 14 Feb 52) g nization of American States.
Cow- In December Bolivian diplomats were instructed to seek port for their country's position in other Latin
of whom share Bolivia's views concerning the defenserofaP countries sup-
(see OCI Dail Digest, 28 -ec 51).
primary producers
10. VENEZUELA. Newl or
y ani
zed American com
ppartl ?
pa.nv sP~,c
th --- `" "ails: uj Embassy officials InvCaracaseareoas on
about er
e activities of a small group of US businessmen who have
the Venezuelan Government for oil concessions and have offered that ro
wenent partial control of any resulting operations. T petitoned
mc prtiaon he group, dohnsto capital ahea
it has dsodflttpheS S and Chamber of Commerce,, appears which includes
e an
arrangement such as it proposes "would be a aken the rathsher than that stimulus" to sentiment for nationalizing thep industry. rahan a
t an
a
Although there has always been a certain latent resentment of foreign
control of the oil industry, Venezuelan sentiment for nationalization has
never found an influential spokesman either from the right or the non-
Communist
left, Venezuelans have been generally satisfied with the benefits
accruing to the country from the exploitation of their petrol proposal for a Partly--nationalized company therefore a eo The
prema-
ture. There is no indication that Venezuela is ules an be ccept it, but any particularly a .new focus for nationalistic ysentimentps hitherto directeedte at a other r p robl
(Factual data from: C Caracas Des
p. 1072 and 1078, 15 and 16 J problems,
ai 52)
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. TOP SECRET
SECtJR 'y INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
18 February 1952
CIA No. 49542
COPY No, 46
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and ?/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant re
for the internal use of the Office p of Current eIn elli e prepared primarily
not represent a complete coverage of all re r
It does
or in the g It does
Office of current
Current Intelligence. Comments a in CIA
immediate views of the Office of represent the
Current' Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
SECIRITy INI~ITION
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
25X1 C
25X1 C
USSR. NATO Council Deputies view Soviet policy in Germany: Neutralization
of-the whole of Germany and the establishment there of a government devoted to
Moscow is considered by the Council Deputies of the North Atlantic Council to
be the primary aim of Soviet policy towards Germany. As yet, however, the
USSR has given no indication that it is willing to sacrifice effective
Communist control of East Germany to secure either German unity or German
neutrality.
But if they realize Germany's potential value to Soviet policy, the
Soviet leaders are equally conscious of her as a potential threat. The draft
report on Soviet foreign policy points out that the Soviet leaders might well
regard any prospect of a rearmed united Germany, free to associate with the
West, as intolerable, and they are unlikely to withdraw from the Soviet Zone
on any terms involving such a threat. Therefore, the immediate aim of the USSR
must be to prevent West Germany from being effectively integrated into the West
European defense effort, and to this end Soviet policy will continue to exploit
German fear of war and desire for unity.
Rearmament limited to West Germany is not considered likely to provoke
the Soviet Government into action risking war; but it will do its utmost to
prevent it by means short of war, and the undertaking must contain an element
of calculated risk for the West. (TS London DEPTO 1015, 1 Feb 52)
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
MALA,Yk. Chief Secretary of Federation reportedly resigns;
reported that Moroboe del Tufo, Chief Secretary o': the
e era on o aya, has tendered his resignation. If the report is true,
the government will have lost all its top level men with Malayan experience.
stated that Del Tufo bitterly resents having been passed over in the
appoin men of a Deputy High Commissioner and that in view of the clear indi-
cations that the Colonial office does not want him, he feels that he has no
choice but to resign.
The American Consul in Kuala Lumpur comments that Del Tufo's resignation
may have unfortunate repercussions on the Asian community which-favored his
appointment as Deputy High Commissioner. (S S/S Kuala Lumpur 116, 15 Feb 52)
Comment: Neither the new High Commissioner, General Templer, nor Deputy
High Commissioner MacGillavray, appointed on 4 February, have had previous
experience anywhere in the Far East. Del Tufo has been in the Malayan Civil
Service since 1923 and is widely regarded as having one of the best minds in
the Federation. Following the assassination of High Commissioner Gurney in
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Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : Cl1 RDP79T01146A000800030001-1
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October 1951, Del Tufo served as officer Administering the Government.
3. KOREA. Aging President Rhee's re-election seen certain: Emphasizing Presi-
dent Rhee's diminishing "lucidity," Ambassador Muccio reports that the
President's one-man conduct of government is becoming more emotional and
irrational. No member of the South Korean Cabinet is willing to stand up to
the President's wrath when given a ",stupid order.""
Muccio's anxiety over Rhee's advancing senility is accentuated by the
lack of stature of potential successors, by his determination to seek re-
election in June, and by the strong probability that he will win. (s S/S Pusan
801, 14 Feb 52 )
JAPAN. Labor and Welfare Ministries to consolidate: The Japanese Cabinet has
approved a plan to consolidate the Labor and We fare Ministries. The Japanese
Government intends to present the plan to the current Diet in March following
SOAP approval. SOAP probably will not oppose the plan because of the
imminence of Japanese sovereignty. (C S/S Tokyo 1687, 15 Feb 52)
Comment: Reduction of the Labor Ministry to a Bureau will inevitably re-
duce the influence of labor within the government. This plan previously has
been blocked by SOAP.
5, Japanese cautious in dealing with Chinese Nationalist Government on
"peace treaty:" The Chinese Nationalist Government has requested that the
Japanese Government expand the authority of its plenipotentiary to permit him
to sign a "peace treaty" instead of a "bilateral treaty."
A Japanese Foreign Office official told the US Political Adviser that it
would be difficult to expand or change the credentials as they are already
approved by the Cabinet and attested by the Emperor, and pointed out that the
Japanese Government cannot go beyond the formula contained in the Yoshida
letter to.Dulles. (S 3/3 Tokyo 1699, 15 Feb 52)
Comment: The Japanese have gone to great pains to avoid the mention of
'"peace t'.reaty" in reference to the coming negotiations for recognition of the
Nationalist regime. This may be a hedge against possible demands of the
Nationalists for benefits arising out of the San Francisco treaty, or may be
designed to permit the Japanese greater freedom of action in dealing with the
Communist regime in the future.
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Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000800030001-1
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
6? UNITED KINGDOM. Britain favors concurrent elections in Trieste
The British Foreign Office asserts that the Zone A Trieste electfo-Hs and Italy: be
held concurrently with the Italian elections and under the Italian system of
linking parties. Prime Minister de Gasperi will be asked to inform Britain
and the US of the Italian voting date so that the Zone A Commander can then
issue a date-setting proclamation,
Britain does not expect an Italo-Yugoslav settlement of the Trieste
dispute and hopes that the Zone A election results will be swallowed up in the
publicity about the Italian municipal elections. (S S/S London 3533, 14 Feb
52)
Comment: The British position is identical with the Allied Military
Government's recommendations on the Zone A communal elections.
The Italian Government, although it prefers an indefinite postponement of
the Trieste elections, is prepared to accept simultaneous voting if the Trieste
elections must be held,.
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