TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 9, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved Fd%#, Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0114W009006416
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
9 April 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY CIA No. 49608
Copy No. ? IC)
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence, It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence,
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 Approved Zor Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0'r46A000900070001-6
TOP: SECRET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFOtRMAA ION A FECTING THEONATIONAL
DEFENSE. OF . TTdE UNITED STATES SECS o 793 AND 794 , THE
ESPIONAGN. LA`~1S , TITLE 18, USC,
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION WHICHBYIN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED
1, American Embassy reports on Dr.
Indian assadr: T e In lto theaAmerican nEmbassy 'on his
Ra a ris Man, in reporting pointed out that it was
conversation with Premier Stalin, p
95with a non-Orbit diplo-
the first interview Stalin-had held
mat since he saw Radhakris a
The retiring Ambassador stated that Stalin, following
a discussion of Indian politics, wished
its ambitionso After listening to his criticisms of Soviet
actions in the Baltic States and in the Balkans, Stalin
replied that Soviet intentions
beeneconeerneduonlydwnthag~s own
ies
sever and that the USSR
security and "the establiment of ~/~e~oscowb1617,~ 7?Aprr52)
friendly to the Soviet Comment: The interview may be intended to underline
Sovie rien ship for India, to increase cultural and economic
penetration of that country, to counter reports of growing
toward the United States, to strengthen India's
Ietra amity support its position on Kashmir.
neuutralism, and to At the same time, the interview has given rise to a new
crop of conjectures that the recent Soviet diplomatic ma is of
big poWer
level
fensive may be intended to lead up to top-
SOVIET UNION
Stalin interview with
EASTERN EUROPE
2, Rumanian ~?r Force inineauCSarestplaseobservedhaboute
American Military Attache t fighters at the
60 aircraft which appear to be YAK-15 je
Ianca airfield near Braila in easternaRucania. Mosteof the
aircraft observed had skin-tight
.TOP SECRET
1 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 Approved E r Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0 6A000900070001-6
TOP SECRET
without covers had Rumanian markings.
The Attache reports that the field, heretofore thought
to be Russian occupied, now appears to be a Rumanian jet
fighter base, though it is still under construction and not
yet operational. (S Bucharest 386, Weeka 14, 4 Apr 52)
Comment: The covers on the aircraft suggest a new
shipment- TTlanesto the Rumanian Air Force, which was pre-
viously believed to have only 15 YAK-15 jet fighters.
2 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 Approved FC2elease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T011000900070001-6
Egyptian Foreign -Minister Hassouna Pasha-has stated that
the real point now at issue between Egypt and Britain is
the attitude of the Governor General Sir Robert Howe of the
Sudan. Hassouna informed the British Ambassador in Cairo
that unless assurances were given that the Governor General
would not put the new constitution into effect, the Egyptian
Government would not dare to continue its talks with the
British in the face of an aroused public opinion, (S S/S
Cairo 1743, 6 Apr; S London 4480, 7 Apr 52)
Comment-. The British Foreign Office has meanwhile
TOP SECRET
3 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
issue imperils Anglo-Egyptian talks-.
 Approved- Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T06A000900070001-6
TOP SECRET
informed the American Ambassador in London that the present
constitutional development in the Sudan must proceed on
schedule, since "to turn back now" would provide consider-
able trouble in the Sudan.
WESTERN EUROPE
6, Danish Government hesitates to negotiate base rights
agreement wit Norway,. A Norwegian Foreign ice o icial
as i.n ormed an American diplomat that the Danes are still
indecisive concerning a bilateral agreement with Norway
regarding the use of NATO facilities in Denmark. He stated
that a lack of strength in the Rigsdag made it difficult
for the Danish Government to make a firm and clear decision
on such matters. (TS Oslo 878, 5 Apr 52)
Comment,. In mid-January (see OCI Daily Digest, 17 Jan
52) t e Danish Foreign Minister informally told the US
Ambassador that if he were given time to prepare public
opinion, there would be little opposition to the establish-
ment of NATO air bases in Denmark, and that the conclusion
of a projected bilateral agreement between Denmark and
Norway on bases would make NATO bases more acceptable. It
now appears that even the latter agreement is too delicate
for present consideration.
TOP SECRET
4 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED when bank-TOP CREI Jhen at / ~p:ftF ~'I~~ft3~9~0~9?PO~JA~~~ or declassi-
fied when filled in forAPP16 MI-19 `9 bSI Q'~2S~dr1'~n
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOURCE
0 C-.~
CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC
NO
.
.
DATE DOCUMENT R
DOC. DATE
D
C Z
ECEIVED
COPY NO
l
_
.
r
LOGG
NUMBER OF PAGES
ED BY
NUMBER OF ATT
ACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED
TO
DESTROYED
BY (Signature)
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
OFFICE
FORM
DATE
Approved F ?r
OFFICE
Release 2001/09/04
DATE
? CIA-RDP79T
OF
1(49iA000900070001-
DATE
-73 26 U4t PREVIOUS SDITJONS.
8
TOP SECRET
 Approved Fo- Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0'4A000900070001-6
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
9 April 1952
OCI No. 5155
Copy No.? G O
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
rts has been prepared
This summary of significant repo primarily doe for the internal use of the Office of oCurre
f all currentgreports in CIA
not represent a complete coverage represent the
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments rimmediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000900070001-6
 Approve
Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T046A000900070001-6
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE3MEANING
G4OFTTHE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
SOVIET UNION
American Embassy in Moscow reports on Nesterov speech:
The Ua m asst' in Moscow views V. . esterov s speec at
the World Economic Conference The USSR's assumption
Soviet foreign trade policy.
role of major world trader and exponent of "noriiial" world
trade gives surface indications of a shift in Soviet stra-
tegy. However, the Embassy notes that the stated Soviet
import requirements include many strategic items and con-
cludes that the major goal is therefore to punch holes in
the NATO strategic controls.
If the USSR is unable to reach agreement on tie-in
deals for strategic materials, the Embassy sees other pos-
sible Soviet moves which would have high propaganda value,
such as Nesterov's offer of machinery and technical assis-
tance to Southeast Asia and the Middle East may thei-
Soviet Union has no surplus of machinery, West mad selling in
sioning a middleman role, buying doubts the ability of
the East. In any case, the Embassy
the USSR to double exports in the next couple of years.
(C Moscow 1622, 6 Apr 52)
Comment: Nesterov's proposals in general follow the
Soviet commercial policy of the past few years and do not
In
mark a basic shift in Soviet foreign trade strategy.
Europe the Soviet Union offers agricultural goods and raw
materials in exchange for industrial goods, including items
on the export-control lists; in Asia the Soviet Union offers
light industrial goods in exchange for strategic raw materials.
Although the Soviet Union has relatively small expor-
table surpluses, it is nevertheless capable of financing
"forced exports" of agricultural goods and raw materials.
The Western export control program still stands as the main
deterrent to the achievement of the Nesterov proposals.
SECRET
1 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 Approved Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01'A000900070001-6
SECRET
2e Conference of all USSR churches scheduled for Mayo At
the suggestion o Alexise the Patriarch of Moscow and all
Russia, a conference of all:churches and religions of the
USSR will be held in Moscow early in May on the question of
the defense of peace. The conference will discuss a report
on "The church together with the people in the fight for
peace." The Soviet press stated that prominent church
leaders from abroad have been invited, but no names were
given. I
The US Embassy in Moscow comments that the convocation
of a religious conference is a Soviet move to intensify ac-
tive participation of official Soviet religious leaders in
the "fight for peace" campaign. (R Moscow 1606, 6 Apr 52)
Comment. Since the launching of the peace campaign,.the
Kremlin, attempted to mobilize religious leaders' support,
aware of the mcral prestige afforded. The plan for a con-
ference indicates that Soviet authorities are now trying to
draw together all religious faiths into an organized bloc in
support of the peace campaign, Moreover, the decision to
invite foreign church leaders is an attempt to extend the
scope of this organization. Although every important faith
in the USSR was represented at the All-Union Conference for
the defense of peace in October of 1950, backing of the peace
campaign has generally been confined to individual statements
by prominent religious leaders,
3; Budapest fires may be caused by worker sabotage: A
minor outbreak o airly serious fires in Budapest during
the last two weeks may result from individual acts of sabotage
by factory wori;.ers as a protest against the speed-up in pro-
duction firms. Three fires, reported from personal observa-
tion of reliable westerners, occurred in a leather, a machine,
and a textile factory. In addition, unverified rumors reported
fires in factories in the larger provincial towns. No mention
of the fires has appeared in the local press Current rumor
states that the fires are blamed on an American-Yugoslav con-
spiracy. (S Budapest L-2859, 7 Apr 52)
Comment- Earlier reports indicated that by 28 March
Hungarian security police investigating the fires had arrested
from 200 to 400 workers and firemen for lack of enthusiasm in
fighting fires.
2 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 Approved Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01'146A000900070001-6
;JECRE T
4. Food shortages worsening in Poland: The US Embassy in
Warsaw reports that the shortages of mea, fats, sugar, and
and
soap have worsened in Poland and long queues
soap have been seen in the area between Warsaw and Czestochowa,
in southwestern Poland.
As of 1 April the Government decreed that patrons ordering
meat in restaurants must surrender ration coupons or pay a
double price for the meat. According that hog Embasscesy, thVeGov-
ernmentgs excuse for this new step
risen 30 percent under the terms of the recently implemented
compulsory meat delivery contract plane (-1 Warsaw 609, 4 Apr
52)
Comment: It would appear from the Government's most rit of
recent step that while meat costs have linen, as a reincreased have the compulsory meat delivery plan, supp
significantly. Supplies of meat and fats have gradually worsened t since last May and the Governmethouwas gh atrthe ti~tiedittwasthopedg
of these goods last September,
that this was a temporary measure,
50 polish-Norwegian trade talks reach critical point: Polish-
Norwegian trade negotiations have reac e a critxca stage be-
cause cause of increased Polish demands for certain strategic goods.
On 3 April the Poles demanded the following minimum quanti-
ties of Norwegian exports: 150,000 tons of iron ore, 1,000 tons
of aluminum, 3,000 tons of rayon pulp, and 20,000 tons of pyrites.
When the Norwegian negotiators refused to meet these minimums,
the Poles threatened to terminate the talks.
It developed during the talks that the availability of Polish
coal is limited only by the amountofsatisfactory counterdeliver ies
which can be obtained, (S Oslo 883, 7 Apr 52)
Coimiment: It is apparent from these talks that despite the
recently eased availability of Polish coal for delivery toutheo
West (see OCI Daily Digest 2 April 52),
demand that satisfactory counterdeliveries of strategic goods be
made.
upon the basis of Norwegian
din
g
Negotiations had been procee
offers of 150,000 tons of iron ore, 750 nego500
of rayon pulp, and 15,000 tons of pyrites, t tiations broke down last July, the Poles had been demandding the
same amount of iron ore, 2,000 tons of aluminum, 1,000
rayon pulp, and. 30,000 tons of pyrites.
SEC IET
3 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 Approved F Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T016A000900070001-6
SECRET
6. High Yugoslav official inspects American information
center in Belgra eo lagoje eskovice a member a t e Yugoslav
olitburo, visited the United States Information Center in Bel-
grade after the usual hour of departure of the American staff
and, according to a Yugoslav employee, gave a most complete
scrutiny to every bulletin, map, picture, and display. Embassy
officials consider this visit symbolic of the unusual Yugoslav
interest in American information activities. They find it
"scarcely conceivable" that Neskovic, who is regarded as a
most intolerant Communist, was seeking information for his own
edification. (C Belgrade 1232, 5 Apr 52)
Comment. The British Ambassador has received information
that t e .cal populace, as well as members of the party, has
been warned against using American information facilities in
Belgrade. Since the relaxation of rigid police controls last
year, the American information center has been extremely well
patronized by Yugoslavs. In light of the current party drive
to extirpate Western bourgeois influences on Yugoslav life,
the American program is particularly vulnerable to various un-
official pressures and attacks.
7. Yugoslav Foreign Minister stresses anti-bureaucratic role
_f f for Communist Party According to American o icials in Bel-
Foreign MMinister Kardelj?s speech before the Yugoslav
National Assembly on 1 April gives further weight to recent
statements by Marshal Tito emphasizing the role of the Communist
Party as a revolutionary cadre. Kardelj advocated the separation
of the party from administrative and executive functions as a
means of combatting bureaucracy and replacing incompetent party
members with professional technicians in executive positions.
The role of party members would thus be confined to political
direction and education in the various local legislative groups
and among the masses.
American observers believe that the Kaidelj. thesis of
"greater democratization" at the higher levels axzd a decentra-
lization of authority faces stiff opposition from a group of
"practical Communists," led by Boris Kidric, which favors a
centralization of authority. It is believed that the party is
not sufficiently strong or confident to override the objections
posed by this latter group favoring tight party control from the
top, Attention is currently being directed to the application
of more practical measures designed to strengthen the party, such
as efforts to increase fund raising and the strength of the state
security forces, (S Belgrade Joint Weeka 14, 4 Apr 52)
4 J Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 Approved F' 'Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01 A000900070001-6
SECRET
9. Spread of epidemics in China reported: Plague was spread-
ing from t e 'Interioro Manc aria soot eastward toward China
proper,
as reported that all rreignt train
service north of Ch'angch'un, in central Manchuria, was sus-
pended in late March because of epidemics.
Comment, Peiping's propaganda campaign on epidemic con-
trol as given rise to numerous unconfirmed accounts of the
spread of plague in China. Reports, likewise unverified, have
been received alleging that epidemics have forced the restric-
tion of railroad traffic in Manchuria.
10. British business interests want to postpone showdown with
Chinese Communists o British firms With usiness interests in
China are ova?veering in their decision to force a showdown with
the Chinese Communists. Having previously agreed that the
British Foreign Office should make immediate representations
to Peiping pointing out the impossibility of doing business
in China and asking for permission to close down, the business-
men have on second thought requested postponement of this
action, The decision is prompted by fear of a strong Chinese
5 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T016A000900070001-6
SECRET
reaction, which might result in such serious consequences as
the detention of British vessels in China ports. (S London
4452, 5 Apr 52)
Comment: Like other foreign nationals, British business
execu ves are being held hostage in China pending .the settle-
ment of exorbitant financial demands for severance pay to
Chinese workers. In the meantime, home offices must remit
funds steadily to meet current payroll and other expenses.
Although the British Foreign Office will present the
subject to Peiping, it will make no strong representations as
long as British business interests are undecided on a firm
course of action.
11. Early French action on repatriation of Chinese Nationals
in In oc ina n ica e : e renc Government expects to
ec e within a wee on a formula which will permit early action
on the repatriation of the Chinese Nationalist troops interned
in Indochina, according to a Foreign Office' spokesman. (C
Paris 6165, 7 Apr 52)
12, Recent Viet Minh casualty rate not critical: During the
three recent renc campaigns aga ns The vI-eT-Rinh within the
Tonkin delta, the insurgents' casualties, including 833 killed,
were five times those of the attacking forces, The American
Army Attache in Saigon points out, however, that this compari-
son, supplied by the French commander in Tonkin, does not take
into account losses among French-commanded village militia
and auxiliaries. He estimated that Viet Minh losses must be
ten times those of the French in order to "insure eventual
victory." (S 0 ARMA MC 136-52, 7 Apr 52)
Comment: In the past, the results of clearing operations
withinelta have proved inconclusive.
Three of the five Viet Minh infantry divisions in Tonkin
have engaged in a minimum of combat during the past two months.
The strengthening of these divisions serves to offset Viet
Minh losses within the delta, which appear to be much less
significant than the French have publicly claimed.
13. Malay high command disagrees on "get tough" policy:
r o pePa ons n a aya , pri-
Generate oc t .art. , Deputy i.rec tor--o-T-
vately opposes High Commissioner Templer's "get tough" policy,
6 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000900070001-6
 Approved fr.r Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T06A000900070001-6
SECRET
exemplified by the harsh measures taken against the town of
Tanjen Malim whose people
willwnot inducerfurther.
suchameasurescooperate
Lockhart believes that
cooperation, and cannot be imposed on other trouble
bleespots
without placing a serious strain upon security
There are indications that the Federation police agreeerence
Singapore Templer's 52)
forhhecarmy. and
for t
Comment: This information suggests that Templer has not
yet been to achieve agreement on a unified approach to
the security problem. In the past, different approaches by
and the police, and by newly-assigned officers and
the army
"old Malaya hands" weakened the total British effort.
SECRET
7 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 Approved , Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0{6A000900070001-6
SECRET
WESTERN EUROPE
14. Trieste port workers ready to revolt against their Com-
munist leaders over issue of future disposition of Trieste.
merican offic als in Trieste ave receive re is le reports
that local port workers belonging to the Communist-organized
Sindacati Unici are highly dissatisfied with irrendentist state-
ments made by the leader of Trieste's pro-Cominform Communist
Party, Vittorio Vidali, during his Italian tour, He follows an
"independent line" in Trieste. A majority of the port workers
favor the establishment of an independent Trieste and are
expected to revolt from the union. (C Trieste 934, 3 Apr 52)
Comment, There is increasing evidence of trouble within
the pro-Cominform party resulting from its apparent abandonment
of a militant independentist policy. Slovene party members and
workers who feel that a return to Italy would damage their
economic position constitute an important base of support of
the Vidali party. An abandonment of an independent stand could
be explained only in terms of an order from Moscow to adjust
policy to that of the Italian Communist Party in order to thwart
Yugoslav objectives and prepare for an eventual merger of the
two neighboring Communist parties,
15. Czechoslovakia shows renewed interest in Prague-Paris air
route, The French Foreign 0 ice as received a Czec note
requesting fifth freedom as well as terminal traffic rights
for the Czech Air Lines' proposed Prague-Paris air route by
way of Copenhagen, Amsterdam, and Brussels.
Meanwhile, in answer to the Czech overflight request of
last December and the reminder last month, the Dutch Foreign
Office has asked for further information as to who owns and
controls the Czech Air Lines. Casually mentioning the in-
directness of the proposed air route, it also requested
information on the commercial privileges that have been granted
at other points along the line.
A Netherlands Foreign Office official believes that Belgium
will soon receive a reminder from the Czechs. (S The Hague
1053, 3 Apr 52; S Paris 6119, 4 Apr 52)
Comment- In late December, France stated that it intended
to refuse any Czech request for overflight and landing rights,
but did not wish to be alone in its refusal.
SECRET
8 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 Approved Uoi Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T016A000900070001-6
SECRET
Although both Belgium and the Netherlands have indicated
thsstate
rbboth
willingness to stall the Czechs as long as stpopossible,
that they will eventually have to approve With Danish approval of their request already received
(see OCI Daily Digest, 5 Feb 52), the Czechs apparently want
Dutch approval next to use as a bargaining point in discussions
with Belgium and France.
Britain opposes setting of deadline for Allied-German
treaties. A Briti i Foreign Cif- ice p o states t at it
would inadvisable to set a specific date for the signing of
the Allied-German contractual agreement and the European Defense
Treaty. To do so, he said, would give the West German Government
an opportunity to obtain concessions by delaying final agreement.
Furthermore, some difficulty might arise which would necessitate
a high-level tripartite conference in order to confront the
Federal Republic with a common position. (S London 4478,
7 Apr 52)
Comment: This report implies that the Federal Republic
is less desirous than the Allies of reaching immediate agreements
Chancellor Adenauer,who has consistently pressed for rapid
progress toward accord, suggested again last week, however, that
the negotiators "burn midnight oil" until all problems are
solved.
British defense guarantee meets Dutch objections: The
recent Br.tisK formal or linking the brussels Fact to the,
European Defense Community has, according to a high Dutch Foreign
Office official, gone a "long way" toward satisfying Dutch op-
position to the Community's proposed automatic defense guarantee.
The Dutch official agreed with the US Embassy that it would
not be wise to press now for an extension of the 20-year North
Atlantic Treaty to conform with the proposed 50-year duration
of the European Defense Community treaty. (S The Hague 1065,
7 Apr 52)
Comment: Britain has agreed to an exchange of automatic
mutual security guarantees with the European Defense Community,
but has limited this agreement to the duration of its membership
in NATO.
SECRET
9 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 Approved W- Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01`I'tA000900070001-6
SECRET
Because Dutch officials agree that the Defense Community
treaty should be initialed by all the member countries at the
earliest possible moment, they may defer their objections to
an extension of the term of the Defense Community beyond that
of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The Netherlands, however, has stated that it would not
even sign the treaty unless it received assurances that the
Germans would finance the costs of their forces through. 19540
18, Belgian Government proposes compromise to implement defense
program- The Belgian Pr ime Minister is optimistic gist Pan ia?
merit will pass the government's excess profits tax. bill; he
states that the government?s position is strengthened by the
fact that the harshly critical Socialist and Liberal Parties
are divided on their reasons for opposing the bill. The measure,
introduced because of the large increase in gross profits in
1951, may help silence, at least within the Catholic Party,
labor's complaint that it is carrying a disproportionately large
share of the rearmament burden. The bill is also an answer to
outside critics, who have insisted that Belgium can finance
its defense effort without instituting controls over its economy.
At the same time, however, the Belgian Government has
divided its proposed 202 million dollars of military expenditures
in the extraordinary budget into three separate categories. The
money for items in the second and third categories m? 75 million
dollars ?Q will be spent only when Belgium considers that the
other Atlantic Community countries have fulfilled their defense
commitments as it has
The government has also stated that, in response to Belgian
public clamor that Belgium is making a disproportionately large
defense effort, it will reduce the two year military conscription
period to eighteen months if by August each of the other countries
of the Defense Community has not increased its military service
period. (Factual data from- C Brussels Joint Weeka 13,
28 Mar 52; R Brussels 1434, 1466, and 1451, 27 Mar, 3 and
4 Apr 52)
19. Disorders follow Irish Labor Party meeting protesting new
budget The American-Mmbassy in Dublin reports that twenty
perso,s were injured in altercations between police and a large
crowd leaving an outdoor Labor Party meeting held to protest
the new budget and demand the resignation of Finance Minister
MacEnteea (R Dublin 155, 7 Apr 52)
. 10 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6
 Approved Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01'iA000900070001-6
SECRET
Comment: The US Embassy believes that hostile reaction
to pr ce increases provided for in the new budget may precipi-
tate a general election (see Current Intelligence Digest,
7 Apr 52).
The Labor Party, which supports the Opposition in Parlia-
ment, is not a powerful force in Irish politics.
ll 9 Apr 52
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000900070001-6