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December 26, 2001
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April 11, 1952
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Approved Felease 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01100090 90001-4 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION US OFFICIALS ONLY CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OCI No. 5157 Copy No. n u This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146A00' C-11 I 11 April 1952 RETURN TO RRCHt ?ES It RECORDS CENTER IMMEDIATELY 01M HSE UR .'27- .. =- .V -- HHx Approved Fcelease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T0111000900090001-4 SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. GENERAL 1. The Soviet renewal of the German peace treaty proposal: In its April note, the Sovi-e-f--Unioi for the first time directly proposed four-power discussions of free all-German elections and investigation of electoral conditions. The East German Government made such a proposal last September with Soviet support, and it was rejected by Chancellor Adenauer. The note does not point to any forthcoming concessions, but instead reveals all the weaknesses of Russia's German policy. As a result, it is not likely to deflect the West German Government from its present course of Western in- tegration. The USSR has attempted to devise a new approach to ap- peal to West Germany and to convince the Western powers. that further negotiation would produce real concessions. It has been unable to make effective proposals, however, for fear of further weakening its hold on Germany. The new proposal indicates that the USSR cannot agree to free elections, which would result in the loss of East Germany, fearing an ultimate westward orientation of a unified Germany. Accordingly, the note only proposes that the four powers discuss the question. In answering the Western demand for UN investigation of electoral conditions, the note suggests that such a check could be carried out by a commission of the four occupying powers, presumably operating under a Soviet veto threat, but does not propose the setting up of such a commission. The Soviet note essentially represents a legalistic attempt to delay developments in the West without committing the USSR. Accordingly, it specifies neither a date nor an 1 11 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4 Approved F,o Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01`1iA000900090001-4 SECRET agenda for such a meeting. The failure of the USSR to clarify its earlier pro- imressioninfluencethat posal for a German army confirms the offer was made primarily reaffirming the Oder-Neisse among German nationalists. By line, however, the USSR dGn~man opinion byeofferingttod to make a drastic play for from Poland. take the former German territories away In a final attempt to appeal to West European and th the warning German opinion, the Soviet noteeobetween alunited Germany, that the choice is now being mad connoting peace, and a divided Germany carrying with it a continuing threat of war in Europe. (S Factual data based on S Moscow 1645; C Moscow 1644, 10 Apr 52) EASTERN EUROPE Possibility of high level Orbit mmeetiingmatlBudapest 2 . discoun e e T e relatively low ra personalities at the Liberation Day ceremonies in Budapest on 4 April does not support rumors that a "Cominformed meeting may have been held, although a gap activities on 5 1pl~tlzer would hand~,ethelpncaustime ion ofrhighhrank- conference. On the all the ing military personalittostheorumor thatSatehighlllevelites Albania lends credence taken placed and economic talks may have According to one unsubstantiated rumor, the Russian high command is pushing the Satellites Binapheir7p9epara- tions for a "big push in August." L-2860, 8 Apr 52) Comment: American Legation sources consistentlyihaver discounted the probability of a Cominform meeting. S rumors, which were never confirmed, circulated ins 1950 and when the Liberation Day.fete wasfttO~ba~ddeby Voro legations, in- a much more impressive assembly o cluding the so-called Cominform chief Suslov. Although there may have been a high level military meeting, the presence of ranking Satellite military per- sonnel at Liberation ceremonies in the various Orbit coun- tries is not unusual. SECRET 2 11 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4 Approved FvA Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01IWA000900090001-4 SECRET 25X6 FAR EAST South Korea reserves right to veto "dishonorable armistice": Ambassa or uCClo repor s t at t e area Imes on April quo- that his government ted a high-ranking ROK official as saying would veto any armistice signed under "dishonorable" circumstances. According to the official, the ROK attaches the greatest signifi- cance to an armistice provision for the withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops. This statement is in line with previous South Korean criti- cisms of the negotiations, according to Ambassador Mucci.. He notes that the ROK has been relatively restrained in recent weeks. (R Pusan 984, 10 Apr 52) Comment: The tempo of South Korean criticism of the armis- tice negotiations negotiations willlbeasuccessfullylconcluded. rumors that the g NEAR EAST - AFRICA Syrian Army Chief of Staff Shishakli visits Saudi Arabia: 11 I'll Syrian Army ae o a , to o is a Is vis ng SECRET 11 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4 ? Approved F%ORelease 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T0114,&A000900090001-4 i SECRET -King Ibn Saud in Riyadh with the reported intention of streng- thening Syrian-Saudi Arabian relations, Shishakli has expressed his confidence of having successful talks with the Saudi Arabian monarch during his first trip to Saudi Arabia since his coup d'etat in Damascus last November. (S Damascus 574, 8 Apr; R FBIS Ticker, Beirut, 9 Apr 52) Comment: Shishakii's stop-over in Riyadh follows his recent visit to Jordan and Lebanon. The Army Chief of Staff probably has two specific objectives: to gain further Arab support for the Syrian military regime, which is strongly op- posed by the Iraqi Government; and to obtain a new loan from King Ibn Saud to finance the purchase of arms and ammunition which Syria is currently trying to acquire abroad. Ibn Saud has long been a strong supporter of Syrian independence and has opposed any plan which might unite Syria with the Hashe- mite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. SECRET 4 11 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4 Approved FgRelease 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01WA000900090001-4 SECRET 25X6 7. Political support for French Premier Pinay is consolidated: The Amer can E asst' in Paris reports that Premier Pinay's favorable showing in the critical confidence vote on tax amnesty consolidated his political support and gave him a "clear mandate" to try out his economic program. Pinay's support now runs roughly from a half-way point in the centrist Popular Republican (MRP) ranks to a half-way point within the RPF on the right. Although this is not a majority in the Lssembly, it does afford fair stability, because the deputies of the divided parties who disagree with the Premier will abstain from voting rather than risk splitting their parties. Furthermore, though many of the other supporting deputies are highly skeptical of Pinay's program, they are fearful of public reaction if they should topple his government immediately. This new coalition coheres, however, only on internal issues,and until a comparable accord has been reached on foreign policy, the formation of a stable right-center majority cannot be claimed. (C Paris 6196, 9 Apr 52) SECRET 5 11 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4 Approved For lease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T0114W00900090001-4 SECRET Comment: Pinay's success in obtaining parliamentary support for his "stability without sacrifice" program assures him office tenure until late May when the Assembly reconvenes. Although the prevailing climate of confidence in the government has caused the franc to appreciate from 490 to 407 to the dollar, close observers doubt that Pinay's program can avert a collapse later in the year. 8. Communist influence reaffirmed in Air France,where new strike threatens: .ir France fl g personnel regret t e 'premature' termination of their fruitless December strike and contemplate another walkout after Easter, according to the American Embassy in Paris. The Embassy also reports that, in grievance-committee elections held in late March, the Communist-dominated General- Labor Confederation maintained its position as the most influential union among ground crew personnel. (C Paris 6217, 9 Apr 52) Comment: The December strike received little support from French labor, which considers Air France personnel well paid in comparison with other French workers. In view of Premier Pinay's success in holding the price line, the proposed strike may also be "premature." Although the number of Air France personnel on whom the Communist leadership can depend has been large, it is decreasing. The number which supported the CGT in the elections is far larger, however, and can be interpreted, as is the case in most French industries, as a protest against the ineffectiveness of non-Communist labor unions. 9. Austrian Minister of Interior warned about Communist influence in police: The editor of a large independent news- paper in a z urg has published an open letter to the Austrian Minister of Interior warning of the necessity for minimizing Communist infiltration into Austrian security forces. The letter charges that recent investigations of officers denounced by a Communist police official were used by a Communist police inspector to gain access to top secret files of the Austrian political police. Data so obtained, including loyalty files of Salzburg police and reports of alleged CIC and police co- operation in raiding local offices of the Communist Party, were later published in Communist newspapers, including the official organ of the Soviet occupation force. (II FBIS, Salzburger Nachtrichten, 8 Apr 52) 6 1.1 Apr. 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4 Approved F Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1466A000900090001-4 SECRET Comment: Since 1945, the-Socialist Minister of Interior has mace -a considerable effort to purge from the police forces the numerous Communists installed there by his Communist predecessor in the provisional government. Despite the dismissals and transfers of unreliables,to non-Soviet sectors, his efforts have not been completely satisfactory. 10. Belgian trade union federations plan joint action to obtain wage iner Meeting jointly for the first Time in a number of years to "examine the situation," the Secretariats of the Socialist and Social Christian trade union federations (the FGTB and the CSC) insist that premiums to workers must come from excess business profits. An FGTB leader states that the adamant stand of employers against further wage increases will probably make strikes necessary. Any strike called by the FGTB unions would include miners, metal workers and possibly cement and tramway workers. Although the CSC has not yet committed itself to calling out the unions it controls, the US Embassy in Brussels believes that. a strike would bring CSC participation. (R Brussels 1487, 7 Apr 52) Comment: Because the CSC supports the one-party Social Christi~an government, it has not heretofore joined the FGTB demands. Ii the government fails to back strong labor demands, it is likely to lose the support of the CSC representatives in Parliament essential to its slim parliamentary majority. 11. Communist official foresees violence in Italy: 25X1C a member o the Communist Party Central Committee recently warned party officers in Milan not to be surprised if Italy "suddenly resembles Egypt and Tunisia" as a result of economic unrest, which, he predicted, would result from Italy's adherence to NATO policies. He urged the fomenting of general disturbances in every sector of the economy prior to the local spring elections, as well as an increase in clandestine activities in the labor field. This party official reportedly declared that the Christian Democrats are "heading toward ruin" and that the Communists A "must be shown to be the strongest party in Italy." 25X1 - 11 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4 25X1 C 25X1A Approved For keebase 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146WO900090001-4 SECRET Comment: While there have been no widespread riots or disturbances, the Communists for political reasons have stepped up labor agitation during the past few weeks and have obtained considerable support from workers with real economic grievances. If present governmental pressure on industries to discharge key Communist employees is effective, the Communists may be forced to rely more on clandestine means. According to American observers in Italy, the Christian Democrats have lost considerable strength because of widespread dissatisfaction with De Gasperi's policies. The Communists, as well as the neo-Fascists, are expected to make substantial gains in the local spring elections, 12. Norway reaches "favorable" trade accord with Poland: The American mbassy at Oslo reports t at t e trade agreement between Norway and Poland concluded on 8 April is "somewhat better" from the strategic goods viewpoint than the proposal originally submitted to COCOM, The Polish delegation made "strenuous" efforts to purchase ships and to charter additional vessels, but Norway refused and limited its maritime services to railings from Poland to other Baltic ports and to Norway. The Norwegians emphasize that they obtained a 60-percent increase in the coal commitment 275,000 to 450,000 metric tons -- by increasing their offers of rayon pulp to 2,000 tons, and their promises of ferromanganese and ferrochrome to 250 and 200 tons. Norway will also export 150,000 tons of iron ore, 15,000 tons of pyrites, and 750 tons of aluminum, (S Oslo 887, 9 Apr 52) Comment: Until a few days ago Norway appeared to be having Ui ficuity in obtaining a promise of 275,000 tons of coal. The unexpected relaxation by Poland without any undue increase in offers of strategic goods is another strong indi- cation that Polish coal is becoming available in greater quantity. The agreement also contains provisions for the delivery of other goods such as herring from Norway and textiles and sugar from Poland 8 11 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4 Approved F,Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T014"A000900090001-4 SECRET LATIN AMERICA 13, Argentine n ewspaper re peats Communist s' biological warfare propaganda: a April ed ition of mocr ae a state that telegrams receiv have used bombs the epidemic see paper also alleg ed from Eur containing ms to have ed that the ope "confirm t h cholera germs i spread to Chine Stars and Stri a n K se pes merican orea, and provinces reported troops that ." The on 9 February that the US 65th eggment ha3 u sed 500 bacteriologi cal bombs to test th eir effecti veness in artil lery bombardment. (R Buenos Aires 689, 9 Apr 52) Comment: Democracia is reportedly owned by Senora de PeronThese accusations are representative of Argentina's vitriolic anti-US campaign. 14. Three Chileans reportedly departed for the Conference: Clotario Blest, President of the Government employees Union, and Jorge Salazar, Director of the Semi- government Employees Union, departed on 30 March for the Moscow Economic Conference. The United States Embassy in Santiago believes that these two and George Inascimento, who reportedly departed earlier for Paris en route to Moscow, will be the only individuals from Chile attending the conference. Blest is popular in labor circles and heads numerous Communist-front organizations, although he is not a party member and is a Catholic. Salazar is a Radical Party member with Marxist views. Inascimento, a Chilean publisher, is considered pro-Communist. Guillermo del Pedregal, a successful businessman and Communist sympathizer, who apparently would have headed the Chilean delegation, cancelled the trip because of business reasons, and also because he is managing Ibanez del Campo's presidential campaign in Chile. (Factual data from: C Santiago unnumbered, 20 Mar and 2 Apr 52; 25X1A 15. Panama refuses diplomatic status to Soviet couriers: The Panamanian Foreign Minister has told the Ambassador that "the two Soviet couriers will not be accorded diplomatic status for transiting Panama but may apply for ordinary consular visas." The Ambassador comments that the Foreign Minister SECRET 9 11 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4 25X1A Approved FQWRelease 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79TO11MA000900090001-4 presumably intends to examine the Soviet pouches if the couriers come through. (C Panama 877, 9 Apr 52) Comment. Soviet couriers have customarily stopped in Havana ox their way from Mexico to Venezuela. The USSR is now attempting to establish a new courier route because of the recent break in Soviet-Cuban relations 16. Prospects for bilateral military agreement with Uruguay believe good; T e- TS km asst' in Montevideo be ieves t at prospects for a.bilateral US-Uruguayan military assistance agreement are good; it points out that Chiles signing of such an agreement has had a helpful effect. Ex-Foreign Minister Dominguez Campora,-presiding officer of the Uruguayan delegation in the conversations, says, however, that he must discuss the military plan with the six majority members of the National Government Council, He intimated that the plan might have to be discussed with the three minority Herrerista Party members later, The US Embassy states that, while this may be unavoidable, "it presents security problems for the US Government." (S Montevideo 393, 9 Apr 52 ) Comment- While Dominguez has stated his understanding that t ep an. may not be submitted to Congress under any conditions, he has stated that Senate members of the minority party propose to fight the "political agreement." The Herrerista members of the National Government Council approved the opening of conversations o Ecuador, Peru, Cuba, Brazil and Chile have now signed bilateral military assistance agreements with the United States. No agreement could be reached with Mexico. 10 11 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4 Approved For F ase 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AW9004800f-f- TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION US OFFICIALS ONLY TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT 11 April 1952 CIA No, 49610 Copy No. 4 U TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (including S/S Cables) Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE. Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4 Approved FQp Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01U6A000900090001-4 TOP SECRET THIS MAT ,IAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRA.N3MISSI.ON OR REVELATION OF WHICH,IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORI':T;D PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. SOUTH ASIA 1. Importance of Stalin-Radhakrishnan interview said to be exaggerated: Secretary Ueneral a pa of the Indian Ministry o External Affairs has told Ambassador Bowles that he believes the importance of the 6 April interview between Premier Stalin and Indian Ambassador Radhakrishnan in Moscow has been exag- gerated out of all proportion. The Secretary General stated that the conference had no implication beyond the obvious de- sire of Stalin to convince India that the Soviet Union was always ready to come to an understanding with the West. 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