CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000900240001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 2, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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2 May 1952
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OCI No. 5172
Copy No.266
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
25X1
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
DIA, USAF and PACOM review(s) completed.
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
Britain sees American disarmament proposal as unacceptable
to Soviet Union, The-British Foreign Office believes that,
since the R will probably not accept any plan for reducing
armed forces, it would be bad public relations for the United
States to propose reducing armed forces to levels based on
population percentages. Such a plan, according to British
calculations, would greatly favor the NATO and Commonwealth
countries over the Soviet bloc, including China.
A spokesman for the British delegation to the United
Nations maintains that calling for reductions in armed forces
after the first stages of disclosure and verification would
appear to be asking the USSR to reduce its forces before atomic
weapons have been prohibited. 25X1
2. UN radio information program arousing Soviet opposition:
According to the members of the Advisory Committee on public
information, the Soviet representative has given every indica-
tion of being under instructions to reduce United Nations in-
formation programs as much as possible. The Soviet delegate
has been particularly critical of UN expenditures on radio
and has attempted to transfer radio funds to press and motion
pictures.
Members of the Advisory Committee believe that the UN
program is apparently more effective in the USSR than had
been previously thought. The top-ranking director of the UN
Department of Public Information commented that Soviet objec-
tion largely stems from success of the program in neutral
areas like Indonesia, Indo-China and India.
I _7
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Comment: Even though the USSR consistently attempts to
limit udgets, a particular concern for radio activities has
not previously been reported.
EASTERN EUROPE
3, Bulgarian first quarter industrial failures announced: al-
The Bu garian a e lane ng ommiss on as announce a ,
though the state economic plan for the first quarter of 1952 was
"fulfilled and overfulfilled" in a number of fields of vital
importance such as electric power, nonmetallic minerals, non-
ferrous metals, and chemical fertilizers, the industrial plan
as a whole was fulfilled by only 98.4 percent. The Ministries
of Light and Heavy Industry met their first quarter quotas by
only 97 and 95 percent, respectively, and the plans for lignite
coal, transportation of timber, cotton eather, rubber and
nails failed to be fulfilled. 25X1
Comment; According to the State Planning Commission, the 25X1
over-all 1951 industrial production plan for Bulgaria was ful-
filled by a bare 99.8 percent. It is difficult to reconcile
these admitted industrial failures with recent announcements
made by the Ministerial Council to the effect that the level
of industrial production in Bulgaria during 1952 will not only
have reached, but will have exceeded by 16.5 percent the goals
originally scheduled to be attained by the Five Year Plan at
the close of 1953..
4. Bulgaria protests Yugoslav border provocations: The Bul-
as a vere to the Yugo-
Jr-
M
25X1
a
inis ry o ore gn Ail. _L
garian
slav Embassy in Sofia a note of protest against new provocations
committed along the Bulgarian-Yugoslav frontier. Five viola-
d seven
tions of Bulgarian airspace, three border ambushes, an
d
tion are cite
cases of propaganda leaflet dissemina.
Comment; This note is the first formal protest Bulgaria
has made against Yugoslav border violations since 3 January.
5. Increased Russification seen in inauguration of Hungarian
Lenin Institute-, The-Ug Legation at u apep in erPrets the
naugura Aon o the Lenin Institute in the Budapest University
n y-
as indicating increased impetus in the de-Magya
garian society. It notes that Minister of Education Darvas,
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at the ceremony in which the former Russian Institute was
renamed Lenin Institute, emphasized the Institute's role as a
center for radiation of Marxist-Leninist knowledge. Party
Central Committee member Zoltan Biro reportedly said that the
Institute would undertake the ideological training of party
cadres.
Numerous secondary schools have announced that they
would have enlarged Russian sections i the next term.
25X1
Comment: The Russian Institute in Budapest University
was founded in 1946 allegedly "to educate cadres with an
outstanding knowledge of the Russian language." In 1950,
its staff was augmented by eight Soviet professors.
A Szabad Nep editorial on the renaming ceremonies commented
that the ungarian'universities had not turned out a large
enough number of Marxist-Leninist cadres, nor was their teaching
always satisfactory. The new Institute with its Soviet pro-
fessors and methods would produce propagandists and influence
all Hungarian universities in "proletarian internationalism
and Socialist patriotism."
6. First quarter plan fulfillment announced in Rumania: The
Rumanian vernment as announce-ff that the economic plan for
industry in the first quarter of 1952 was fulfilled by 102.4
percent. Gross output of all Rumanian industry was alleged
to be up 20.2 percent over that for the same period in 1951,
while labor productivity has increased by 11.8 percent.
The Ministries of Metallurgical and Chemical Industries,
Electric Power and Electrotechnical Industries, Construction
and Building Materials Industry, Transports, and Light Indus-
try are said to have exceeded their plans, while the Ministries
of Petroleum and Coal Industries, Timber, Paper, and Cellulose
25X1
of Foreign Trade lagged behind.
Comment: The over-all 1952 plan calls for a 24.5 percent
increase in industrial output over 1951, somewhat more than
the percentage increase announced for the first quarter.
While living conditions for Rumanian workers are alleged
to have improved greatly during the past year, the Ministry of
Food Industry fulfilled its first quarter plan by only 92.8
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ministry mentioned.
percent, the poorest performance of any
Other laggard ministries -- Petroleum, Timber, and Foreign
for export to other Orbit countries-
Trade -- produce much fail-
Since their 1951 plans ahead of schedule,
they met ter targets this year may indicate
ure to fulfill first quar its for 1952.
percent considerably b for the
3toe7 demands
that the USSR has increas
However, since they are only disrupt over-all production
quarter, this will not necessarily
plans for 1952.
Yugoslav officials warn Italy on future relations: In a
7. u go eserve icers on 29
speec o t e Associat on o g the
April, Deputy Defense Minister I. Gosniak flatly accused
Italian Government of imperils Mussaliniiregime.Pogecsaid,
identical to those of the fascist at which official repre-
sentatives are taking place in Italy of conquering territory
a
sallude to the necessity
within the border of the Yugoslav Republic. Thismegalo ani limited
of these t bankrupt military Rkaeand Zadar. They demand, like
to demands on on Istria, , and even then their appetite
Mussolini, the whole of Dalmatia,
is not satisfied."
An article written General D. Kveder of the Yugoslav
best mili-
etten by
General Staff f warned the Italian Gaoseesr oe~ortherntltaly leads
tary invasion route from Soviet base
and pointed out that
through northern Croatia and Slndee~taYu oslavia guarantees
25X1 the very existence of an indepe 25X1
25X1 Italy's security.
Comment: Despite a recent statement by Tito that his
off," it is
anger against Italy's Trieste policy had "cooled increasing,
ff," clear that Yugoslav bitterness toward Italy is and that the regime has begun a propaganda campaign against
aism
what it views as resurgent and successful Italian imps
evidenced in the Trieste issue.
The implied threat in the Kveder article is thtfYugo-
slavia will refuse to cooperate in military planning
defense, of southern Europe, if the Italians persist in their
Trieste policy.
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FAR EAST
8e Far East Command comments on May Day riots in Tokyo: The
on t e unprece ante riot in
Far Eas omman in comment ng
in that Tokyo states that there is nomuPOS' nist1Partydordersn the
although the
rioters were acting under
line
and action is in accord were generally
policies. Other May Y e pt for
orderly and without idand9Sendaidin 25X1
minor disorders in Kyoto
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Comment: The personnel and organization ofathedTokyo
riot sug sue, that local Communist leadership p
echelonnCommunist scale,
affairs Failure of teinriot to dicate adevelop
however, would seem to res-
invcreatedite
sioign ne of that widespread
s of the party. Acti atmosphere for the passage
Suversiveto curbv,iifenoBti
which is now before the p
outlaw, the Communist Party in Japan.
9. Communist aircraft again concentrateat Yalu bases: An
estima e enemy a rcra were observed at a r four Un the
Yalu River complex on the afternoon
feeto 30Theraircraft, reported-
F-$6 jet pilots, flying
ly occupying all major revetment and taxiway space, were dis-
persed at the three fields; 100 at Takushan, 150 at Tatungkou,
and 250 at Antung. Visibility during the ten minute sighting
was reportedly good and the US lead pilot used binoculars.
The Far East Air Force, while noting that such a concen-
tration is possible, believes that the sightings might have
been too high by as many as 100 planes. FEAF estimates that
350 Communist MIG-15' are based at these airfields.in the
25X1
25X1 Yalu River complex.
Comments This is the third recent sighting of large
numbers aircraft at Yalu River bases. On 13, April 500
fighters were observed at the Antung and Tatungkou airfields,
and sightings a
and. a a possible
continued Sino-Soviet operation of
f
or
10. Peiping preparing
Manchur an railway: e plhg finis er o Ra ways, 11 s a e
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April public statement praising Sino-Soviet operation of the
Chinese Changchun Railway, made no reference to the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of 1950? The treaty provides for the return to
Chinese control of this railway, the most important in Manchuria,
by the end of 1952.
Instead, the Minister eulogized the "remarkable progress"
of this railway under its Sino-Soviet board of directors, and
repeatedly expressed appreciation for the services of "Soviet
comrades."
Last February, both Chinese and Soviet commentaries on
the second anniversary of the treaty omitted any reference to
the provision for the return of this railway to Chinese control.
The systematic omission suggests that Peiping is preparing
to "request" the continued servi es of the USSR in the opera-
tion of the Changchun Railway.
25X1
Peiping permits replacement of British Embassy personnel:
Peiping Ministry o oreIgn-111 airs on 27 arc granted
entry permits?,.for an archivist and a messenger, both British
nationals, to' replace personnel at the British Embassy in
Peiping.
The British Charge in Peiping is considering filing an
application for the entry of a Foreign officer 25X1
place one now in Peiping.
Comment-, The British have not been successful, in almost
two years of attempted negotiations, in establishing diplomatic
relations with the Peiping regime. In early 1952 the British
Charge informed the Peiping authorities that the Embassy would
be forced eventually to close unless entry permits were
granted for replacements.
The issuance of entry permits for the clerk and messenger---
the first pernfIts issued to official personnel since autumn
1950--suggests that Peiping does not wish the Embassy to close.
There is still some question, however, whether Peiping will
allow the British to replace foreign service officers.
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15. Communi'sts report two new rail line Cein SoouthwestuCChh na-
A 13 pr- roa cast rom unm ng announ
25X1 Ruitse and Kunm - uchi railway lines were to be opened 15
25X1 April.
i and Yuchi
es that
Comment: Huitse is 110
is 60 m es to the to build railroads over these
the Communists were planning
routes.
The only railroads in the Kuutheastrta piwhich sechai have scheduled
and north-
service are lines from Kunming so been construct-
ing to Chanyi. The Communists have reportedly
ing extensions to both these lines, although it is not known
what progress they are making.
a
17. Important Ruk leader seen Le~ourna s as received an
Philippine vernmente
apparen y au ent c letter addressed to President Quirino
from Huk leader Luis in HerproposedathatdQuirino
sionment with the Communist or land owners to
call and preside over a meeting of major agrarian
attempt a genuine and peaceful solution of
directed that an
answer Defense raymeegsa meeting of Taruc, the journalist
answerer be sent suggesting
and himself.
d to cooperate with
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Philippine authorities consider Taruc the "softest" of
the top Communist leaders and believe that the letter signi-
fies a break in the Huk front which can be exploited. _25X1
Comment: Taruc in the past has been recognized as the
top Hu ea er. Recent evidence indicates, however, that the
first echelon of Philippine Communist leadership is now
composed of "harder" Communists.
SOUTH ASIA
18. Restoration of Japanese sovereignty draws-anti-American
comment from n an press: The Indian non-Communist press,
especially in the eas ern part of the country, has expressed
suspicion toward the formal announcement of the re-establish-
ment of Japanese sovereignty. Typical editorial comments are
that Japan is sovereign in name only, that the continued pre-
sence of American troops in Japan remains a threat to peace
in the Far East, and that India, China, and Japan should be
allowed independeptly to develop their own co-prosperity
25X1 sphere in Asia. 25X1
25X1
Comment: This press reaction indicates, contrary to
recent reports of growing Indo-American amity, that consi-
derable "doubt still existsin India about long-range American
intentions in the Far East and that many Indians still hope
eventually to see all vestiges of white influence removed
from Asian
19. American Ambassador to Iran refutes British charge of
United States support: m assa or Henderson n e ran consi-
ers British resentment over the conclusion of the American -
Iranian military assistance agreement "entirely unwarranted."
He believes that military aid to Iran is so important that
every opportunity to conclude an agreement had to be seized.
The Embassy, however, has already emphasized privately
and publicly that the agreement only concerns military aid.
The Iranian Government presumably would have continued its
practice of promoting public belief in impending American as-
no agreement had been reached.
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Comment: Iranian officials have let rumors be spread that
the agreement foreshadows American economic-and financial aid,
and the British apparently think that the American action has
strengthened Mossadeq's-government.
It would have been difficult for Mossadeq, who has long
publicly opposed foreign military aid, to sign any agreement
which specifically described the aid as "military." His
sudden willingness to give the MSA assurances suggests that he
will make every effort to convert military aid into financial
support for his government.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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25X1
Austrian budgetary compromise held an inadequate economic
e
solutions Mutual ecurity Agency off c a Is in Vienna ca t1
udgetary compromise approved by the Austrian cabinet on 29 April
"further temporizing with the basic stabilization problem."
,Coalition papers, however, hail it as a victory for their
respective party positions ?- the People?s Party claiming success
in limiting expenditures to the level of revenues without
increasing taxes, and the Socialists claiming that important
public investments have not been sacrificed.
The government has "balanced" the budget by postponing the
agricultural subsidy question, economizing in the investment
account, increasing excise taxes, improving tax collections,
and assuming there will be an increa counterpart
.leases.
Comment. The coalition agreement leaves the financing of
future su sidies uncovered and probably-overestimates government
income. It is not in itself disinflationary and leaves the
dilemma of major economic reforms unresolved.
Belgium and Netherlands threaten not to sign Defense Com-
munity treat . T e Belgian m assn or in Was ington noti
-P 1k4 .,.,.~carorsn,ant ? s "mism
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
upon unless his governmen
bution for the first year was to be divided. 25X1
the Deparzmen L. va ? a ,,.. --r- -- -
givings" about initialing the European Defense Community treaty
unless all member countries adopt a uniform twenty-four month
military service period. He added that the Belgian delegate
to the Community conference has already been instructed to
state that Belgium cannot sign the treaty unless this condition
is met. He proposed that the Community adopt the twenty=four
month figure now but leave the Community Council free to modify
it later.
On the same day the Dutch EDC delegate stated that he
could not even initial the articles of the treaty already agreed
t k ew how Germany's financial contri?
Comment: A reduction of the Belgian term of military
service to eighteen months o- equal to that of France and
Italy ?m would force Belgium to cut its commitment of forces
25X1
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Ital to NATO. There is little chance amilitary serviceato meetytheu$e1g$an
increase the levels of their demand.
Schuman Plan ratification dela ed by Italian elections:
23. a ta. ian am er o .put es are expec a to
prove to Schuman Plan by the second week in May. Because
approve the Comm
of the forthcoming municipal elections, however, parlicausery
nnroval will be delayed at least until the beginning of June.
25X1 25X1
Comment: The upper houses of both the.Belgian and Italian
Parliaments have already ~?~i~~edlethe Schuman te Plan.before'The
States has been pressing treaty is signed.
European Defense Community
24. Possibility of Communist election victory victory in Roemeeinc ceased
by de ect ons rom government cos part es i
a arties in Rome
from t e veiviiiia t coaelection campaign are "unfavorable
in the current rent municipal " ac-
f the democratic parties,
chances o
factors affecting the cording to the US Embassy in Rome. A minority faction of
Democratic Socialists has aligned itself with lthe eaderscof Mthgenani of the
group of dissident Communists, and Republican party has defected to the Communist bloc.
Officially, however, the Democratic Socialists and Republicans
in Rome have reconciled themselves to In--elpetoral alliance
the Christian Democrats and Liberals.
Comment: Even a few defections from theccenter coalition
might We enough to prevent it from retaining
Rome municipal because
and fascist?blocs~ nWhich?
of the fight among Co
ever of these obtains plurality May will counciliandly
receive two-thirds of the seats in the municipal
will elect the mayor.
25. Italian Communists incensed over
caovernment'snconfiscation
of Di ttox?io 1 S passport e
bat to an ommun sts are incensed over the confiscation by
Italian border police of the passport of Giuseppe
head of the Communist-dominated Gene General CConfederationwof Labor
and member of Parliament,
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Di Vittorio has complained to the President of the Chamber of
Deputies about the alleged violation of his parliamentary im-
munity.
The government had previously indicated that it would
prosecute Di Vittorio for publirhiln while abroad an article
Pravda I'defaming Italy 25X1
25X1 25X1
Comment: Because of the difficulty of circumventing
Di Vittorio s parliamentary immunity and the danger of serious
the
labor agitation and adverse tpelitice~l~enPeisu~Q~?likelyito move
present election campaign, hgov
quickly against this popular labor leader.
LATIN AMERICA
Reorganization of Cuban Army planned: The Cuban Army has
appoin e a oar to study and submit recommendaticins for the
badly-needed reorganization of the army. Where practicable,
US tactical, administrative, and organizational concepts will
be followed. If equipment can be obtained from the United States,
the army will standardize its equipment with that of the US Army.
The US Army Attache comments that the reorganization will
provide opportunities to promote more officers and thus help
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remove the reported dissatisfaction of
25X1 s
Comment? The Cuban Army Air Force-has just been reorganized
nTaber aval
under idance of the US Air Force Mission. lGeneral
nilla, Army Chief of Staff, has stated
forces will also be modernized by the US military missions now
in Cuba.
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TOP SECRET
2 May 1952
CIA No. 49630
Copy No. 46
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC,.SECO 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
WESTERN EUROPE
to Austrian conservatives may file strong protest against
American inter erencea ustrian Foreign Minister Gruber re-
por e y con emp ates strong protests to the US Government
regarding the public release of an American report on re-
strictive business practices in Austria. Gruber allegedly
connects the release of the report with the current inves-
tigation of illegal diversions of dollar funds from the
European Recovery Program for private purposes and feels that
the United testes is trying to weaken the People's Party
position,
Comment: Preliminary findings of the current inves-
tigation -suggest that full disclosure of the magnitude of
illegal dollar diversions may seriously embarrass and fur-
ther weaken the People's Party in the coalition government.
2. Indian official-foresees- no recognition for Vietnam:
Indian Consul General Kamath, during a farewell ca 1 on
American Minister Heath in Saigon, stated that he had noted
no basic change throughout the last two and a half years in
French-Vietnamese relations, in the unpopular and unrepre-
sentative nature of the Vietnamese Government or in the "bad
military situation" in Indochina. He discounted the pos-
sibility of Vietnam being recognized soon by India, saying
that he believed such an action would not only unnecessarily
,i
link India with one side in the "cold war" but align
"dubious" French and Vietnamese political elements. u
25X1
Comment: Kamath has long been a severe critic of French
policy in Indochina. His views are reflected in India's cool
attitude toward the Associated States, which it steadfastly
refuses to recognize diplomatically.
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
SOUTH ASIA
3. High Indian Official advocates partition of Kashmir: In
25X1
two recent conversat ons wit h American Am assn or Bow es,
Secretary General Bajpai of the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs has expressed his conviction that further discussions
between India and Pakistan on Kashmir would be useless unless
the subject of partition could be raised. Bajpai stated that
the Indian Government has not fully considered its position
on the partition question. He thought, however, that if an
agreement on Kashmir were ever to be reached, it would have
to be based on partition with a plebisgite only in the most
densely settled portion of the state.
I I
Comment: Indications are that the Indian Government,
anxious to avoid the onus of terminating.negotiations but un-
certain of its ability to hold out indefinitely on the de-
militarization problem, is attempting to postpone discussions
or to turn them into a new channel,
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Soviet experts investigate Point IV activities on Irano-
Soviet or er: Tree Russian *soi experts"' visits a zer-
Ba jan rr n_fier in early April, according to the American
Consulate in Tabriz. The experts reportedly inquired exten-
sively about Point IV operati in the area and criticized
American activities in Iran.
Comment: The Russians have shown an increasing interest
recen y in Point IV activities in Iran, and they may be
planning an intensified campaign against the program, The
Iranian Government has not previously been reported as em-
ploying any Soviet soil experts.
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t' I wn raded or dec
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NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO RECEIVED RELEASED SEEN BY
OFFICE SIGNATURE DATE TIME DATE TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE/DIV. DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED DESTROYED DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
BY (Signature) TO
TO
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
OFFICE Ap TVFed For R
IeaseE2007/03/07: CI
DATE
-RDP79T011
OFFICE
6A000900240001-7
DATE
FORM 26 UAE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
A.73
TOP SECRET