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May 27, 1952
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Approved For Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146AQW000110001 ~ G>/ - SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION US OFFICIALS ONLY 27 May 1952 OCI No. 5189 Copy No. 2 6 7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re- ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. *ARMY , STATE REVIEWS COMPLETED* SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000110001 -9 Approved For Reuse 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AQQA000110001-9 SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. le Soviet resumes Japanese boat seizures: The US Embassy in To yo believes that e resumption o oviet seizures of Japanese fishing boats after the effectuation of the peace treaty may be intended as a means of forcing a partial re- sumption of diplomatic relations. Varying reports say that between 5 and 16 boats have been seized, some of which were in Japanese territorial waters. (S Tokyo 231, 23 May 52) Comment: The Embassy's analysis is supported by the fact ahe USSR, apparently as part of its friendship campaign toward Japan, refrained from seizing boats during the first four months of 1952. In recent actions, such as refusing Soviet trade offers and withholding diplomatic privileges from the Soviet Mission, the Japanese likewise may be exerting mild pressures in an effort to encourage a Soviet proposal to settle pending issues. 2. Comment on Soviet note of 25 May protesting German agree- ments: The latest Soviet note on a rman peace treaty was a propagandistic protest against Allied-German agreements which reiterated the USSR's previous proposal for a four-power con- ference and warned that a future all-German government would not be bound by the contractual agreement. The note serves as another clear indication that the USSR is not yet prepared to make any significant concessions in Germany to prevent Western defense plans. Although it was the Soviet Union's last chance to prevent Allied signature of the contractual agreements and the EDC treaty, the Soviet SECRET 1 27 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000110001 -9 Approved For Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146A&Gr1'000110001-9 SECRET Union not only did not meet the Western condition that there, be prior Soviet agreement to hold free all-German elections before Western agreement to have a four-power conference, but also did not advance from its position as stated in the Soviet note of 10 April, The notable absence of any concrete proposals in the Soviet note suggests that the USSR intends to continue its present policy, through East German action, of threats, harassment and tightening of interzonal borders. Such tactics do not preclude, however, further Soviet diplomatic moves or ostensible concessions as ratification of the Western agree- ments becomes more imminent. (R Factual Data from Moscow 1880, 25 May 52) 3. Bulgaria protests treatment of diplomatic personnel in ugos av m asst' n ofia a note-of protest against "the un- warranted restrictions applied against officials and employees of the Bulgarian Embassy in Belgrade." Noting that Yugo- slavia has recently instituted regulations making almost three quarters of the territory of Yugoslavia a prohibited area, the Bulgarian note stated that, should the Yugoslav re- strictions not be discontinued within seven days, identical measures would be taken against Yugoslav Embassy personnel in Sofia o Also on 22 May, a similar note of protest and threat of retaliatory action was presented by Bulgaria to the Turkish Legatign in Sofia. (R FBIS Sofia, 22 May 52) Comment, It is possible that these two notes might presaginstitution of even more stringent regulations re- stricting the movements of non-Orbit diplomatic personnel in Bulgaria. 4. Purge in Rumanian Ministry of Interior rumored, Accord- ing to the American Legation in uchares , ere are strong rumors that a "clean up" in the Ministry of Interior, with removals reaching a sub-cabinet level, is now in progress in Rumania. These rumors follow earlier reports of Army arrests and dismissals, in which an assistant minister of the armed forces and two other generals were reported involved. (S Bucharest 460, 24 May 52) 2 27 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000110001 -9 Approved For R ease 2002/05/20 CIA-RDP79T01146AQ '1000110001-9 SECRET Comment: There is no information available to sub- stant-a a ese rumors, which have been current in Rumania since mid-April. 5. Soviet submarine base reportedly established in Rumania: The American Legation in Bucharest reports a e ugos av, Swedish, and Danish Charges d'Affaires have received informa- tion, which they consider to be reliable, concerning a recent evacuation of the city of Mangalia and a closing off of traffic to the area, reportedly in connection with the establish- ment of a Soviet submarine base there. (S Bucharest 457, 21 May 52) Comment: Reports of low evaluation concerning the con- 25X1C strut of submarine pens at Mangalia, a town on the Black Sea some thirty miles south of Constanta, have been received since 1950. The Mangalia district has been for some time one o 25X1C the most highly restricted areas of Rumania. SECRET 3 27 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001000110001-9 25X1 C Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T011461 1000110001-9 SECRET 6, Japan unable to grant equal rights to UN forces: Foreign Minister Okazaki told Ambassador Murphy at pu is and Diet opposition will make it difficult, if not impossible, to grant UN forces in Japan the same rights as American forces operating under the security treaty. He said that parliamentary defeat for the proposed UN agreement was certain if the government publicly relinquished its jurisdiction in cases involving violation of Japanese law, although in practice Japan would. not exercise that right. Additionally, Diet sentiment was such that the government had no chance of obtaining money to support the UN forces. Murphy is convinced that the Japanese Government is eager to cooperate with the UN, but is restricted by the solid opposition. (C Tokyo 245, 24 May 52) Comment: The Commonwealth governments Are highly critical of Japan s unwillingness to accept any financial obligation for the support of non-US troops based in or sojourning in Japan, as well as its desire to retain criminal jurisdiction over UN forces. The government has been severely attacked by its political opposition on these points under the US-Japan security treaty; it fears that extending similar privileges to non-US forces will have serious domestic repercussions. 7. Chinese take initiative from North Koreans at Panmunjom: t e Chinese ommun s s ave 25X1C taken the initiative from the North Korean delegation in con- ducting the Panmunjom talks, and that Nam Il is now merely their spokesman, Chinese Communist delegates are in constant communication with Soviet political advisers, The Koreans are said to have abandoned their demand for the withdrawal of Chinese "volunteers" along with that of all 25X1A non-Korean UN troops, The Chinese reportedly believe that a Soviet "political feint" directed at Britain, France, India, and Japan will im- pel some favorable "change in American Plans." Comment: Peiping's views are presumed to determine the North Korean line in the talks, because the over-all military position in Korea depends upon Peiping's willingness to continue its commitment. 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/05/20 CIA-RDP79TO1146AO0100011OAT-9M~y 52 Approved For F ease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AeO1000110001-9 SECRET 25X1 D Communist China has indicated an intention to hold its "volunteers" in Korea at least until all UN forces are withdrawn. Rhee uses dictatorial measures against opposition: US Embassy Pusan reports that, since early on 25 may, -resident Rhee has taken a series of high-handed actions against the political opposition. Four opposition members of the Assembly have been arrested while 15 or 16 others are in hiding. The imposition of martial law by the ROK Military Police has been employed as an excuse for this action. Some 44 Assemblymen were held incommunicado by the Military Police on 26 May. Recently appointed Prime Minister Chang, finding his telephone wires cut and himself under virtual arrest, has resigned. The UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation in Korea called on Rhee on 26 May and expressed shock at this series of events. The President was unimpressed. The US Embassy comments that the President appears to be operating on the basis that the UN and the United States will not intervene and will sit by and watch the demise of democratic government in Korea. (S Pusan 1160, 26 May; S Pusan 1164, 26 May; S Pusan 1163, 27 May 52) 10. First Communist admission of Chinese air operations over Korea: The Communist newspaper a Kung Pao in Hong Kong claimed on 21 May that CCAF's hero ChangZ`ibi-hui1iad shot down two US aircraft over North Korea on 10 February. The reporting agency comments that this news story is the first Chinese Commu- nist claim that their "volunteers" are flying MIG-15's in combat in North Korea, a fact accepted by most observers for months. (S Hong Kong 3117, Joint Weeka 21, 23 May 52) 5 27 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000110001 -9 Approved For Lease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T011461000110001-9 SECRET Comment: It is not known how many of the estimated 350 to 50 e s in the Manchurian-Korean border area are piloted by either Chinese, Russians, or North Koreans. This is the first Communist publicity indicating the nationality of the pilots of any enemy jets. 11. American official doubts Peiping will compromise on POW issue: The American Consul General inHong Kong no es incas- inpropaganda coverage of the POW issue in the Chinese Commu- nist press and an adamant stand on what Peiping describes as the UN's "forcible retention" of POW's. The American official, recalling Indian Ambassador Panik- kar's prediction in early 1952 that the POW issue would be the most difficult of all to solve, remarks that it is "difficult to conceivd'of Peiping backing down on this point. (S Hong Kong 3117, 23 May 52) Comment: The Communist negotiators do not appear convinced that the Command will not compromise on the POW issue. There is thus insufficient evidence to indicate whether the Communists will allow the talks to founder on this issue. 12. Communists dredging new harbor in North China: Six dredges were o serve wor ing in - t e new harbor a Tangku, near Tientsin, (S Hong Kong 25X1X 25X1X 3117, 23 May 52) Comment: As many as five dredges were observed at work on this new ar or in late 1951. These reports support Communist claims that the new port will be sufficiently near completion this year to handle 10,000-ton ships. At present the Communists report. that the Taku Bar prevents ships over 3,000 tons from gaining access to the Hai Ho River channel and Tientsin. The Japanese started the construction of this new harbor and port. In 1948 it was estimated that their completion would cost 25 million dollars and require three years. 13. Hong Kong government deports 21 pro-Communist labor leaders: The Hong Kong au or es have, eporte pro- ommun s a or leaders from the Colony in the past three weeks. The US Consul General in Hong Kong remarks that the government's firm policy has quelled labor unrest for the time 27 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000110001 -9 Approved For F ease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AV61000110001-9 SECRET being, but that workers are being told that the "day of libera- tion is not fear off." (S Hong Kong 3117, 23 May 52) Comment: Peiping has protested these deportations as an exampel British "persecution" of Chinese in the Colony. Rumors of the imminent "liberation" of Hong Kong are circulated periodically by Communist agents in an effort to restore their sympathizers' morale and to frighten their opponents. While the threat to the Colony increases as its economic value to China declines, there is still no indication of an early assault. 14. India buying 100,000 tons of Chinese rice; The American Embassy n New Delhi e eves a n a has signed an agree- ment with Peiping to buy 100,000 tons of rice, to be shipped in the next four months. Indian officials state that the price is reasonable. (C New Delhi 4402, 24 May 52) Comment: Earlier this year the Chinese informed India that ey could spare other grains, but not rice. Their pre- sent willingness to sell rice may result from their need,,.to ship food through India to Tibet. Last year India contracted to buy 66,500 tons of rice and 450,000 tons of kaoliang, a coarse foodgrain, at reasonable prices. India has not revealed whether it is also negotiating to buy kaoliang or other grains besides rice. 15. Ho's birthday widely observed in Rangoon: The Viet Minh Agency in. Rangoon a is mss success u reception to date in honor of Ho Chi Minh's birthday. The party was attended by the Chinese, Russian, Indian and Indonesian Ambassadors, Cabinet members, members of Parliament and many news editors and their leading reporters. The press comment regarding the Viet Minh and its local representative was universally favor- able. The American Embassy in Rangoon states that the United States' attitude toward Indochina is clearly not shared by any sector of opinion in Rangoon. (C Rangoon 1124, 23 May 52) Comment: Such occasions as Ho's birthday, and international Communes anniversaries like 7 November and May Day, are semi- holidays in contemporary Burma; whereas holidays observed in Western countries are virtually unknown even to Burmese leaders. 7 27 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000110001 -9 Approved For Lease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146ft, 01000110001-9 SECRET 16. Thai police chief reported in contact with Peiping: The 25X1X rV11k:G - Peiping in arc ntact Chinese authorities on arrangements "for future protection." Phao admitted to the local press in a mid-May interview that he had recently sent "secret agents" to Canton and. be Shanghai. This was interpreted an effort to conceal the real mission of these "agents" when their trip became known. (S Bangkok 2501, 24 May 52) Commenta General Phao is one of the most powerful. and influe=figures in Thailand. While this report cannot be confirmed, the Thai have aJ historical record of "bending with the wind" in time of crisis. Furthermore, there have been several recent indications that Thai enthusiasm for cooperation with th'e West has cooled. 17. Burmese mission to eastern Europe to be composed of high-level o cia s. T e urmese -mission o ugos av a and Orbit coon r es o eastern Europe will be led by U Kyaw Nyein, Secretary General of the government party, according to a reliable press report. Other members include the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense, director of the govern- ment-controlled trade union and the military commander of south Burma. The objective of this mission is to study the armies, economies, labor conditions and rehabilitation work in the countries visited. The Burmese War Office confirmed plans for the trip to Yugoslavia, but not its extension behind the Iron Curtain. (C Rangoon.128, 24 May 52) NEAR EAST - AFRICA 18. Government leaders dissatisfied with Iranian Prime Minis- ter's po a esa ran an -MInister o oa s s er o the n his cabinet position i g a on 15 may that he wished to res d e s ter Mossh e ~a 25X1C because of his differences with Prime Mini 25X1C persuaded Busheri to remain in the cabinet at east until Mossadeq returned from pleading Iran's case at The Hague. tween Mossadeq and National Front leader lit b e The sp Mullah Kashani is also reported to be so great that Kashani ,SECRET 8 27 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000110001 -9 25X1X 25X1X 25X1 C 25X1 C Approved For Rel ase 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T011461000110001-9 SECRET 25X1A I US Officials Only, F 25X1A 19. has withdrawn his support of the Prime Minister. (S/:Control _ Comment: There is no evidence that the Prime Minister's contro over his party is yet seriously threatened. These reports, however, reflect the growing dissatisfaction'among National Front leaders over the Prime Minister's handling of the elections and his attempt to purge the-opposition from Parliament. Angolan governor protests ""arbitrary'" overseas policy of Lisbon governmen : The Amer can o su in Luanda reports on reliable authority that the Governor General of Angola may resign in protest against "arbitrary" measures tending to stifle Angolan commerce which are imposed by the Lisbon government without consulting him or heeding his protests. (C Luanda 35, 23 May 52) Comment: This unconfirmed report points up the Governor Genera s growing complaint that, while technically charged with the execution of Angola's Five-Year Development Plan, he is not consulted by the Lisbon authorities on the desira- bility of specific projects or the best means of financing them. The Governor General perhaps considered it a severe blow to his prestige when three representatives of embittered Angolan commercial interests were credited with persuading the Lisbon National Assembly to modify the original drastic form of the government's 28 March decree which established what Angolans termed excessive surtaxes on the territory's exports of sisal and coffee. 9 27 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001000110001-9 Approved For lease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T0114601000110001-9 SECRET 20. Party official reports dissension among Trieste pro- 25X1C 25X1C it may be neces- 25X1C sary for elements of the party to break away from the leader- ship of Vittorio Vidali. Vidali has ?25X1C been controlling the party through a special junta established about 1 April 1952. This group is ';sacrificing old comrades for new members who automatically obey directives without question o'? F_ I 25X1 A Comment. Vidali's party has been losing members steadily t for more tnu a year. In addition, considerable dissension recently was generated among party officials when reports reached them that Vidali had advocated the return of the Free Territory to Italy in pre-election speeches in southern Italy. Large elements of the party desire for various reasons to maintain the present line calling for an independent Trieste. Germans prefer contractual agreement to present Soviet unity proposal- Reportinbg t e views of oth East and West ra~sa~s on t e Soviet unity proposals, American observers in Bonn state that the proposals have apparently elicited no more support in East Germany than they have in the West. East Zone residents interviewed in West Berlin believe that the proposals are nothing more than propaganda and should be rejected. Even if the USSR were to drop its insistence on the Oder-Neisse border, opposition would still outweigh ap- proval among East Zone respondents. Among West Germans, however, Soviet concession of the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line would make the proposal acceptable to better than half of those interviewed, including not only those of neutralist inclinations, but also those who have previously supported the West. (C Bonn 3043, 24 May 52) Comment. There has never been any evidence of substantial East rman support of the Soviet proposals; there have, on the other hand, been reports of uneasiness among Socialist Unity Party functionaries for fear that their party might be sacri- ficed for unity. The one reported declaration by the East German radio in March that the USSR was willing to reopen the Oder-Neisse SECRET 10 27 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000110001 -9 Approved For F~ease 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146A,G 1000110001-9 SECRET question was refuted by subsequent Soviet statements that the border was finale The latest Soviet note on a German peace treaty serves as another clear indication that the USSR is not yet prepared to make any significant concessions in Germany. Although it was the last chance to prevent Allied signature of the contractual agreement and the EDC treaty, the Soviet Union not only did not meet the Western condition that there be agreement on free all-German elections prior to a four-power conference; it also did not advance from its position as stated in the Soviet note of 10 April. 25X1C 22. East Germans draft law for establishment of national army: ment has drafted a law for the establishment of a national army. United States Army observers in Heidelberg believe this action was taken in anticipation of the signing of the contractual agree- ment. (S CINCEUR Heidelberg SX 5506, 23 May 52) Comment: The recently reported allocation of heavy weapons to the paramilitary police, an acceleration in recruiting, and vigorous propaganda on the need for an armed force to counteract West German contingents all suggest that the 24 Alert Police units may soon be formally unveiled as a national army., The probability is supported by a governmental reorganization which may culminate in the establishment of a defense 'or armaments ministry. The paramilitary police, a force of 52,000 which includes 14,000 to 16,000 officers, can easily be expanded at least to keep pace with the growth of a West German defense force. The formal establishment of an East German national army would not preclude continuation of the unity campaign. 23. New interzonal travel control procedures seen augmenting East erman responnsi ilityo mer can o icia s in West Germany nterpret angel in Soviet Zone procedures for the issuance of interzonal passes and residence permits as presaging mor&rigid police controls, "exploitation" of interzonal travellers, and facilitated movement of "agents" into West Germany. They also believe that the new procedures could be an initial step in giving East Zone People?s Police control over interzonal travel, contrary to Allied agreements. (C Bonn 3028, 23 May 52) 11 2?7 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000110001 -9 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0Q4'000110001-9 SECRET Comment- Procedural changes announced by the East German Government on 1 May provided that applications for passes or residence permits should be submitted to district People's Police offices, with the possibility, in the event of denial, of a final appeal to provincial police authorities. Heretofore procedures in both East and West Germany, although utilizing local German officials for screening of 'applications, have required final approval of permits by occupation authorities. Some East German spokesmen have asserted that the Soviet answer to conclusion of the Allied-West German contractual agree- ment would be the announcement ofa "nominally sovereign". East German Republic o France taking initiative on concessions to Saar: The French Ambassa or an a aar vernaanent ave ecide on the immediate formation of a mixed commission to revise the 1950 conventions governing French-Saar relations. The commission will file a report early in July for the French Assembly's consideration. The French Ambassador at Sa:arbruecken is said to favor "substantial concessions," provided strengthening the Saar as an autonomous state does not prejudice French economic interests. Saar demands will be in the direction of greater autonomy, particularly in the fields of taxation, banking, social welfare, and labor relations, QS Strasbourg 158, 24 May 52) Comment- France and Germany have been keeping the Saar issue n. a eyance until the signing of the contractual agreement and the EDC treaty. The latest move seems to be a now French approach designed to win local goodwill and promote autonomy for the Saar as the alternative to reintegration with Germany. Cabinet member opposes Belgium?s plan to control transit the American delegation that the Beigian minister ?a rc?nomic Affairs is now opposed to the transit trade control plan. The Belgian delegate, who does not know the reasons for or extent of this opposition, believes that an American approach emphasizing the importance of achieving practical results would be successful. (S Paris 7277, 23 May 52) Comment- The Belgian Economic Affairs Minister probably fears ta.t ntroduction of the control plan will reduce the trade e e Z ann delegate to D M as con entia ly informed SECRET 12 27 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000110001 -9 ? Approved For Rel ase 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146A09g000110001-9 SECRET volume and value of trade through Belgian ports, with both direct and indirect economic loss to Belgium. Ousted Communist leaders expected to establish rival Canal a,n un ono T e ousted ommunist leadership of the Canadian s r c o t e United Textile Workers of America is expected to organize a competing union, the American Embassy in Ottawa reports. The Communists are denouncing as "American interference in Canadian affairs" the move taken against them on 26 May by the American Federation of Labor with which the union is af- filiateda (C Ottawa 221, 24 May 52; U NY Times, 27 May 52) Comment: This Canadian textile union represented the last major s ronghold in the Canadian affiliate of the AFL. Although most Communist unions have been ousted from both major Canadian labor federations, the Communists remain strong in such vulnerable areas as the base metal mining industry and the electronics and radar industry. to initiate reform in Guatemala's backward agricultural economy and is a "far cry" from the radical suggestions previously offered by the Communists. It has, nevertheless, caused alarm among the landholding aristocracy, which has labeled it an attempt to "incite class war." The reform bill is generally considered the cause of a serious run on the local banks which lasted five days. (C Guatemala City Weeka 20, 17 May 52; U La Prensa, 23 May 52; U NY Times, 23 May 52) Comment: Arbenz will probably be able to get the agrarian reform through Congress, but possibly with some Communist- inspired modifications. In any event, the strong Communist influence in the government will cause many to look at the bill with suspicion, even though many Guatemalans and even some conservative businessmen recognize the need for some sort of agrarian reform. 1 June to debate the agrarian reform bill sent to Congress by President Arbenzo The bill appears to be a moderate attempt A special seas on ? the uatema an Congress has been called or Agrarian reform bill alarms large landowners in Guatemala: SECRET 13 27 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000110001 -9 ? Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T011460Sl000110001-9 The reform bill will undoubtedly harden the attitude of the landowner class and intensify their efforts to undermine the Arberiz government. 28. Peru ready to recognize Bolivia: The Peruvian Foreign Minister o the United States, Brazilian and Chilean Ambassadors in Lima on 23 May that Peru is now ready to recognize the new Bolivian regime. He strongly urged simultaneous action by the four countries. (S Lima 560, 24 May 52) Comment: Shortly after the Bolivian revolution, Brazil, Chile,eru and the United States agreed to joint consultation before recognizing the Paz Estenssoro government. Peru has ap- peared the most reluctant due to fear of local repercussions from the Bolivian coup and reports that MNR leaders were inclined to assist Aprista plotters. Chile, also fearful of the revo- lutionary example as well as the presence of another unfriendly government across its border, recently showed an inclination to await Peruvian action. Last week Brazil and the United States, after more than a month, indicated their desire to recognize Bolivia and subsequently made overtures to Chile and Peru. Peru's decision would appear to clear the way for simultaneous recog- nition. To date Bolivia has been recognized by only Argentina, Paraguay, Guatemala, and Spain. SECRET 14 27 May 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000110001 -9 .0 1 '00/ Ir-oc -Approved For Wease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146"601000110001 -9 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION US OFFICIALS ONLY TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT 27 May 1952 CIA No. 49674 Copy No. 46 TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (including S/S Cables) Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE. Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1146AO01000110001-9 Approved For ease 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79TO11464E01000110001-9 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW, . 1, Pei ing believes Chinese Communist prisoners soon to be 25X1X sent to Formosa: 25X1X inese officials claim to have information that Chinese prisoners held in South Korea are "about to be sent to Formosa," (S S/S New Delhi 4371, 23 May 52) Comment: Peiping is probably aware that many Chinese prisoners, particularly those who once served in the Nation- alist armies, have asked to be sent to Formosa and that the Taipei government is urging such a transfer. The claim 0 25X1X may be introduced at any time into Peip- ing's propaganda about Korea and alleged American plans for "aggression" in Asia, possibly in an attempt to block any plans for a transfer. 25X1X Approved For Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146A00100011( 061*y 52 UNCLASSIFIED when TdOVE IYefea'SQ,a OCfL~$92~PT PC~2~FJ~'0'r'A ~i4~tl9Q~bO~DFO~IOG or declossi- Pied when filled in form is etac ed ro m control'ed gocument. CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY SOURCE C' CIA CONTROL NO. DOC. NO. ' _ DATE DOCUMENT REC IVED DOC. DATE ~. J~ C .-L2J1 /l ~ L t 4 . COPY NO. LOGGED BY NUMBER OF PAGES NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. 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